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CONFIRMATION, DECISION, AND EVIDENTIAL 
PROBABILITY 
 
William Peden 
 
Henry Kyburg’s theory of Evidential Probability offers a neglected tool for 
approaching problems in confirmation theory and decision theory. I use Evidential 
Probability to examine some persistent problems within these areas of the philosophy of 
science. Formal tools in general and probability theory in particular have great promise for 
conceptual analysis in confirmation theory and decision theory, but they face many 
challenges. 
 
 In each chapter, I apply Evidential Probability to a specific issue in confirmation 
theory or decision theory. In Chapter 1, I challenge the notion that Bayesian probability offers 
the best basis for a probabilistic theory of evidence. In Chapter 2, I criticise the conventional 
measures of quantities of evidence that use the degree of imprecision of imprecise 
probabilities. In Chapter 3, I develop an alternative to orthodox utility-maximizing decision 
theory using Kyburg’s system. In Chapter 4, I confront the orthodox notion that Nelson 
Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction makes purely formal theories of induction untenable. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, I defend probabilistic theories of inductive reasoning against John D. 
Norton’s recent collection of criticisms. 
 
 My aim is the development of fresh perspectives on classic problems and 
contemporary debates. I both defend and exemplify a formal approach to the philosophy of 
science. I argue that Evidential Probability has great potential for clarifying our concepts of 
evidence and rationality.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Science has a tremendous importance for epistemologists. In turn, confirmation theory 
and normative decision theory are important areas of the epistemology of science. 
Confirmation theorists are interested in modelling the standards for evidence to either support 
or undermine a hypothesis. Normative decision theorists aim to model ideally rational choice; 
in the context of the philosophy of science, their discipline is especially relevant for 
modelling rational decision-making regarding (1) the theories to select for acceptance or for 
testing, (2) the methods with which to develop them or test them, and (3) other choices made 
by scientists. These formal models are not historical or sociological descriptions of actual 
scientific practice, nor are they descriptions of “the” scientific view of confirmation and 
decision, since different scientists have different ideas about these concepts; instead, they are 
models of ideal reasoning. 
 
 There are many reasons why models can be useful for confirmation theory and 
decision theory. I shall list several: 
 
Confirmation Theory: Unclear Cases 
 
  Sometimes it is intuitive that a body of evidence confirms or disconfirms a 
hypothesis. It might also be clear that this relation is weak or strong. In other cases, these 
claims are far more controversial. It would be useful to have standards of reasoning that 
conform to our firm judgements of the evidential relations (at least insofar as these 
judgements withstand scrutiny) but also provide useful guidance when our intuitions are 
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weak or conflicting. This programme in confirmation theory is comparable to how some 
philosophers have viewed formal deductive logic1. For instance, philosophers disagree about 
whether empirical evidence can confirm hypotheses like Newton’s laws (interpreted as 
universal generalizations over an infinite number of objects) as Rudolf Carnap2 denies this 
claim, whereas Colin Howson and Peter Urbach affirm it3. This dispute could be resolved by 
establishing a common confirmation theory. 
 
Confirmation Theory: Conflicting General Claims 
 
 Plausible general claims about confirmation can be incompatible. For example, 
consider the claims: 
 
(a) If a hypothesis H is more probable after learning some evidence E, then E confirms H. 
 
(b) A set of inconsistent hypotheses cannot each be confirmed by internally consistent 
evidence. 
 
(c) The hypotheses ‘Average British male height is 182.5 cm’ and ‘Average British male 
height is 183.5 cm’ can both become more probable upon learning that the sample mean of 
height for a sample of British males is 183 cm. 
 
 At least one of these claims must be false. Some confirmation theories will endorse 
                                                          
1 Kyburg and Teng (2001) p. 35-39. 
 
2 Carnap (1962) p. 570-571. 
 
3 Howson and Urbach (1993) p. 392. 
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one or two of these theses, but no logically consistent confirmation theory can allow all three. 
Therefore, the choice of confirmation theory can help adjudicate between apparently correct 
but logically inconsistent general claims about confirmation. 
 
Normative Decision-Theory 
 
 Normative decision theorists aim to formalise standards of rational choice for an agent 
facing uncertainty. For this inquiry, confirmation theory has a fundamental importance, 
because such an investigation involves epistemic concepts such as evidence, uncertainty, 
rational belief revision, and personal probability. Confirmation theorists can use formal 
methods to clarify, systematise, and analyse these epistemic concepts in decision theory. 
 
 Today, the predominant confirmation theory is Bayesianism. In this theory, one 
models confirmation using the probabilistic relations between statements. In general, if the 
hypothesis is more probable given the evidence than if the evidence were false, then the 
hypothesis is confirmed by the evidence; if the hypothesis is less probable given the evidence 
than if the evidence is false, then the hypothesis is disconfirmed by the evidence. Subjective 
Bayesianism probabilities are typically (a) real numbers4 and (b) almost entirely determined 
via subjective judgements. Insights from Bayesianism are used in decision theory, in 
statistics, critical thinking courses, and in other disciplines5. 
 
 Confirmation theorists such as Bayesians often formulate definitions of two distinct 
                                                          
4 They are points along the number line. Bayesian probabilities are typically fractions with values from 0 to 1. In 
Chapter 4, I discuss Imprecise Bayesians, who do not require that probabilities are real numbers. 
 
5 Talbott (2016). 
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but related concepts. Firstly, there is the qualitative concept of some evidence confirming, 
disconfirming, or being neutral towards a hypothesis. Confirmation, in this qualitative sense, 
is binary: either the evidence confirms the hypothesis (perhaps relative to some background 
knowledge) or it does not. For example, as I shall discuss in Chapter 1 Subsection 2.2, many 
Bayesians define this concept as favourable probabilistic relevance6. Secondly, there is the 
concept of the degree to which some evidence confirms or disconfirms a hypothesis. There 
are many differing analyses of this concept. Some major rival definitions of the degree of 
confirmation of a hypothesis H by some evidence E relative to background knowledge K 
include: 
 
The Difference Measure: (H, E | K) = P(H | E ^ K) – P(H | K). 
The Log-Ratio Measure: log⁡(
𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸⁡^⁡𝐾)
𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐾)
). 
The Log-Likelihood Measure: log⁡(
𝑃(𝐸⁡|⁡𝐻⁡^⁡𝐾)
𝑃(𝐸⁡|⁡¬𝐻⁡^⁡𝐾)
). 
The Normalized Difference Measure: P(H | E ^ K) – P(H | ¬E ^ K). 
 
 Bayesian epistemologists who have endorsed a degree of confirmation in recent 
decades have tended to adopt one of these measures, a measure that is ordinally equivalent to 
one of these measures, or a measure that is similar except without an explicit reference to 
background knowledge7. On all of these definitions, E has a positive degree of confirmation 
with respect to H relative to K if and only if E is positively probabilistically relevant to H 
relative to K. In other words, for all of the above measures, the degree of confirmation is 
                                                          
6 Fitelson (2008) p. 620. 
 
7 Fitelson (2001) p. 124. 
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greater than zero if and only if P(H | E ^ K) > P(H | K)8. Consequently, a Bayesian who 
adopted a qualitative definition of confirmation in terms of positive quantitative degree of 
confirmation on one of the above measures would be effectively adopting the standard 
definition. In this thesis, my discussions of confirmation will be almost entirely focused on 
qualitative definitions of confirmation, rather than definitions of degrees of confirmation. 
 
 There have also been definitions of concepts close to degrees of confirmation that do 
not require favourable probabilistic relevance. For instance, Popper does not believe that 
scientific hypotheses can be more probable given some evidence than in the absence of that 
evidence, because he believes that P(H | E) = 0, for any scientific hypothesis H. Nonetheless, 
he offers a definition of degrees of confirmation for H given E relative to K: 
 
Popperian Definition: (
𝑃(𝐸⁡|⁡𝐻⁡^⁡𝐾)⁡−⁡𝑃(𝐸⁡|⁡𝐾)
𝑃(𝐸⁡|⁡𝐻⁡^⁡𝐾)⁡+⁡𝑃(𝐸⁡|⁡𝐾)
) (1 + 𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐾)⁡𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸⁡^⁡𝐾))9 
 
 This definition is in the context of Popper’s probability system, in which conditional 
probabilities like P(E | H ^ K) are defined even when P(H) = 0. He also offers an almost 
identical definition without the reference to background knowledge K10. 
 
 A Bayesian could also adopt such a definition. If, like Popper, they defined 
conditional probabilities such as P(E | H ^ K) was defined even when P(H) = 0, then it would 
                                                          
8 Eells and Fitelson (2000) p. 663-664. 
 
9 Popper (1980) p. 401. 
 
10 Popper (1980) p. 400. Popper also notes a simpler approach that also satisfies his criteria in a footnote on page 
400. 
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be possible for the degree of confirmation to be increased by additions to E without 
increasing the probability of H. On the other hand, if conditional probability is defined as in 
Chapter 1 Subsection 2.1.1, then this will not be possible. 
 
 Although probabilistic analyses of confirmation are predominant, they are nonetheless 
controversial. Peter Achinstein argues that the notion of evidential support cannot be defined 
using probabilities11. Susan Haack argues that Bayesian probabilities do not correspond to 
our concepts of evidential support12. John D. Norton has recently provided a useful 
compilation of the most powerful outstanding criticisms of Bayesian confirmation theory13. 
 
 Most probabilist confirmation theories are Bayesian, but it is possible to be a non-
Bayesian probabilist. John Maynard Keynes developed one of the most influential 
probabilistic confirmation theories, but he was not a Bayesian14. While Keynes and the 
Bayesians agree that confirmation is ultimately a probabilistic notion, they disagree on many 
other important issues. For instance, Bayesian probabilities are real-valued, whereas 
Keynesian probabilities are not always real-valued15. In general, all Bayesian confirmation 
theorists are probabilists, but not all probabilists are Bayesians. 
 
Henry E. Kyburg was another non-Bayesian probabilist. His theory of Evidential 
Probability differs from Bayesianism in a number of important respects. One important 
                                                          
11 Achinstein (1994). 
 
12 Haack (2003) p. 75-76. 
 
13 Norton (2011). 
 
14 Keynes (1921). 
 
15 Keynes (1921) p. 27-28. 
15 Confirmation, Decision, and Evidential Probability 
 
 
difference is that, in Evidential Probability, the probability values are expressed using two 
real numbers, rather than just one. Another difference is that a subjective choice of values 
determines the values of Subjective Bayesian probabilities, whereas evidential probabilities 
are always derived from information about relative frequencies. 
 
In this thesis, I apply Kyburg’s theory of Evidential Probability to examine several 
different topics in confirmation theory and decision theory. I argue that probabilist 
confirmation theorists can avoid some classic objections and paradoxes by using the 
resources from Evidential Probability. One common thread is that Kyburg’s system helps 
confirmation theorists to focus on some neglected aspects of evidential support and these 
overlooked dimensions of reasoning are useful for addressing these objections and paradoxes. 
 
In Chapter 1, I critically examine the project of analysing the concept of ‘relevant 
evidence’ using probabilistic theories of confirmation. I begin by providing some reasons 
why evidential relevance is important, before describing the prevalent Bayesian probabilistic 
analysis of this concept. Their analysis faces a severe challenge from Karl Popper’s ‘Paradox 
of Ideal Evidence’, which indicates that the Bayesian definition of evidence is too narrow. I 
discuss some probabilist responses to Popper’s paradox, which are variously too broad or too 
narrow. To set up my alternative, I explain Kyburg’s Evidential Probabilist theory. I use this 
probability theory as the basis of a revised definition of evidential relevance. I argue that this 
definition avoids the Paradox of Ideal Evidence and provides an analysis of evidential 
relevance that is neither too broad nor too narrow. 
 
16 Introduction  
 
 In Chapter 2, I look at proposals that have been made for using imprecise probabilities 
to measure the quantity of relevant evidence. Firstly, I introduce the concept of the quantity 
of relevant evidence, which Keynes called the “weight of argument”. Secondly, I discuss a 
measure developed by Peter Walley in Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities 
(1991). I argue that it performs very poorly as a measure of the quantity of relevant evidence. 
Thirdly, I discuss a measure proposed by Kyburg, which performs somewhat better. 
However, it is nonetheless very problematic, and I briefly suggest an alternative research 
programme for measuring the weight of argument using Evidential Probability. 
 
 In Chapter 3, I discuss the Ellsberg Paradox. This is a problem in normative decision 
theory, in which most people’s choices in a type of decision-problem are irrational, according 
to the standard normative decision theory, yet their reasoning does not seem mistaken. I 
describe the standard approach to normative decision theory and explain the challenge that 
the Ellsberg Paradox presents to it. I consider some prominent responses to this paradox and 
argue that neither response is entirely satisfactory. I discuss Kyburg’s response and conclude 
that it is interesting but unnecessarily radical, given the other tools that his theory offers. 
Finally, I use these tools from Evidential Probability develop an answer by developing a 
novel decision theory that avoids the Ellsberg Paradox and yet retains much of standard 
decision theory. 
 
 One of the most historically important paradoxes in confirmation theory has been 
Nelson Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction. Most philosophers of science regard this 
paradox as a fatal problem for confirmation theories that use only formal relations to analyse 
evidential support. In Chapter 4, I challenge this consensus by arguing that Goodman’s 
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Riddle does not pose a problem for formalism as such. I begin by discussing the historical 
impact of the Riddle on confirmation theory. Since Goodman’s principal target was Carl 
Hempel’s formalist theory of confirmation, I discuss whether Hempel’s theory is directly 
challenged by Goodman’s Riddle. I argue that the New Riddle of Induction as such is not a 
problem for Hempel’s theory, but only because of the severe limitations of that theory. A 
formalist should want to prove that a richer confirmation theory can also avoid Goodman’s 
paradox. To answer the Riddle, I consider the concept of the reliability of evidence. I argue 
that a sophisticated formalist can answer the New Riddle of Induction by formalising and 
utilising this aspect of scientific reasoning. I describe how this can be done in Kyburg’s 
model of scientific knowledge. Interestingly, by weakening a common idealization in 
confirmation theory (that the evidence is always known with complete certainty) a formalist 
can answer their greatest single challenge.  
 
 As I noted earlier, the probabilistic approach to studying confirmation is popular but 
controversial, and Norton is a prominent contemporary critic. In Chapter 5 I argue that, even 
if Norton’s arguments against Bayesianism are sound, a probabilist can avoid them by using 
Evidential Probability. I focus my discussion on inductive reasoning Firstly, I distinguish 
inductive reasoning from other parts of the scientific method. Secondly, I present an 
Evidential Probabilist theory of confirmation and illustrate it using a variety of forms of 
induction. Thirdly, I discuss Norton’s criticisms of Bayesianism and argue that none of them 
presents a problem for an Evidential Probabilist. I conclude that probabilists who are troubled 
by Norton’s criticisms of Bayesianism can view Kyburg’s system as offering an alternative 
theory of induction. 
 
 Bayesianism has reached tremendous prominence in philosophy. As a result, it has 
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suffered the criticisms that come with such prominence. By providing numerous new 
inquiries using Evidential Probability, my thesis provides a rare discussion of a neglected 
cousin of Bayesianism. Like a cousin, it shares some family resemblances and yet it has some 
very distinctive features. At the same time, I provide a discussion of important topics 
regarding confirmation and decision that have too often been neglected. Consequently, my 
thesis is a novel contribution to the disciplines of confirmation theory and normative decision 
theory. 
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CHAPTER 1: RELEVANCE AND THE PARADOX OF 
IDEAL EVIDENCE 
 
For many philosophers modelling scientific reasoning, reducing methodological 
concepts to probabilistic relations has a great appeal. Probability is a concept that has 
undergone voluminous mathematical and philosophical investigation. Evidence is one 
concept for which there is a standard probabilistic analysis16. This concept plays an important 
role in the philosophy of science: methodologists claim that one should (ideally) consider all 
the relevant evidence in scientific reasoning; theories of rational choice involve identifying 
and appropriately responding to relevant evidence; and as I discuss in Chapter 2, a significant 
number of philosophers have argued that there is an importance to the concept of the quantity 
of relevant evidence. 
 
 The standard probabilistic theory of evidential relevance comes from Bayesianism: a 
statement is evidentially relevant to another statement if and only if it is probabilistically 
relevant within Bayesian probability theory. However, Popper’s ‘Paradox of Ideal Evidence’ 
challenges this analysis. Popper presents a scenario in which the Bayesian definition misses 
apparently relevant evidence. 
 
 In this chapter, I argue that an alternative definition that uses Kyburg’s system of 
Evidential Probability can avoid Popper’s paradox. In Section 1, I explain evidential 
relevance and its importance. In Section 2, I examine the standard probabilistic approach to 
analysing evidential relevance. In Section 3, I present Popper’s paradox. In Section 4, I 
critically examine the existing responses to the paradox. I describe Kyburg’s theory of 
                                                          
16 Fitelson (2008) p. 620. 
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Evidential Probability in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6, I use this theory to answer the 
Paradox of Ideal Evidence. 
 
 
SECTION 1: EVIDENTIAL RELEVANCE 
 
No statement is ‘evidence’ by itself; a statement can only be evidence regarding some 
other statement. I shall use ‘evidential relevance’ to refer to this relation between the 
evidence and the other statement. All logically contingent statements are evidentially relevant 
to at least one other statement (for instance, their negation) and in this weak sense they are 
‘evidence’, but ‘evidential relevance’ refers to the relationship between a particular 
hypothesis and a particular evidence-statement. An evidence-statement (often simply called 
“evidence”) often provides a description of some non-linguistic evidence, which could 
consist of observations, measurements, testimony, and so on. 
 
 There is an important distinction between relevance and confirmation. If a statement 
confirms a hypothesis, then it is evidentially relevant to that hypothesis. However, statements 
can be evidentially relevant to a hypothesis without confirming it. Most obviously, they can 
disconfirm the hypothesis. For instance, a statement reporting the discovery of a quadruple 
star system is relevant to the hypothesis that ‘Most multiple star systems are triples’, but the 
evidential relation is disconfirmation. 
 
 Evidential relevance plays an important role in every aspect of science, politics, and 
our personal lives. For instance, imagine that a research institute has commissioned a team of 
economists to study whether the inclusion of Turkey into the European Union will increase 
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UK GDP. Additionally, this team of economists has a mandate to acquire some new data on 
the issue. In accordance with their mandate, the economists acquire statistical data on the 
issue and perform statistical tests. How can the researchers tell if they have achieved their 
mandate of acquiring relevant evidence? It would be helpful if the philosophy of science 
could provide a clear and principled answer to this question, as well as more complex applied 
questions about evidence. 
 
 At a more abstract level, there are methodological principles that refer to the notion of 
evidence. For example, Carnap’s “Requirement of Total Evidence” is a popular 
methodological thesis: one should try to take into account all of the available relevant 
evidence when using a confirmation theory to evaluate the plausibility of a hypothesis17. 
Some philosophers, like Alan Hájek, have criticised Carnap’s principle by claiming that what 
constitutes “relevant evidence” is obscure18. For example, suppose you are wondering if there 
is a black hole in a particular region of space. You learn that there was a minute shortening in 
a super-fine rod. You also have strong reasons to believe that the known background causes 
cannot explain this phenomenon. In this context, a report of the measurement of the rod 
seems to confirm that the black hole exists. Therefore, the report is relevant evidence. 
However, you also acquired a large quantity of other knowledge: that this measurement 
occurred at a particular time in your field of reference, the implicit knowledge that it 
coincided with the Red Spot storm on Jupiter, and an indefinitely expandable set of second-
order statements like ‘I learned that this event occurred’, ‘I learned that I learned that this 
event occurred’ and so on. How should you identify the relevant evidence from among this 
                                                          
17 Carnap (1947) p. 138-139. 
 
18 Hájek (2012). 
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vast motley of information?  If it is impossible to demarcate the “total relevant evidence” 
from the total available knowledge, then the satisfaction conditions of the Requirement of 
Total Evidence are opaque. Therefore, the clarification of evidential relevance has a 
methodological importance. 
 
 Evidential relevance is also a significant part of normative decision theory, which is 
the study of ideally rational choice. Ken Gemes notes that philosophers could clarify 
decision-theoretic imperatives like “Do not expend resources on irrelevant 
Evidence” by analysing the concept of evidential relevance19. Perhaps no general analysis of 
this concept is possible, but if such a characterisation can be achieved, then it would enrich 
normative decision theory. Gemes’s point is especially significant for the development of 
artificial intelligence: while human judgements of evidential relevance are often intuitive and 
subconscious, such a reliance on tacit reasoning is not possible in the design of artificial 
intelligence. If confirmation theorists can provide a general and formal method for 
identifying whether information bears on a hypothesis, then this would be a useful 
contribution to artificial intelligence research. 
 
 Additionally, a sound understanding of evidential relevance is a requirement for the 
application of a theory of rationality. As Hempel argues, the assessment of the rationality of a 
particular agent’s decision at a time t requires (1) the identification of the information that 
was available to that agent at t and (2) an assessment of its relevance to the agent’s beliefs 
concerning the context of the decision20. If an agent makes a choice that they would regret 
                                                          
19 Gemes (2007) p. 161. 
 
20 Hempel (1965) p. 464. 
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had they taken into account some information that was clearly relevant and easily available, 
then their reasoning is intuitively irrational. Similarly, it might be possible to rationalise 
someone’s apparently unreasonable choice by considering the entirety of their relevant 
evidence. Such considerations can be important for historical judgements: it was arguably 
rational for the Ancient Greeks to sacrifice sheep to the Olympian gods in order to acquire 
more sheep, because this was likely to be a successful strategy given their total relevant 
evidence. 
 
 Additionally, confirmation theorists and formal epistemologists in general have made 
a number of very broad generalisations about evidence relevance. For instance, Hempel 
claims that all relevant evidence either confirms or disconfirms a hypothesis21. In contrast, 
John Maynard Keynes22 and Janina Hosiasson23 contend that evidence can be relevant 
without confirming or disconfirming a hypothesis24. Different definitions of evidential 
relevance imply contrary positions within this debate. 
 
 Keynes also argues that the quantity of relevant evidence is a pertinent issue within 
epistemology and normative decision theory. I shall discuss Keynes’s concept in the next 
chapter. Here, the important points are that (1) an analysis of the concept of the quantity of 
relevant evidence can be no clearer than the analysis of relevance itself and (2) one could 
develop a method of identifying changes in the quantity of relevant evidence via a formal 
means of certifying a statement as ‘relevant’. 
                                                          
21 E.g. Hempel (1945) p. 3. 
 
22 Keynes (1921) Chapter VI. 
 
23 Hosiasson (1931). 
 
24 E.g. Hempel (1945) p. 3. 
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 This is just a sample of cases in which evidential relevance is a significant part of an 
interesting controversy or can have useful applications. Clearly, there is much to gain from 
the study of evidential relevance. I shall now turn to the Bayesian analysis of this important 
concept. 
 
SECTION 2: THE BAYESIAN ANALYSIS OF EVIDENTIAL 
RELEVANCE 
 
 In this section, I first describe Bayesian confirmation theory, before explaining the 
Bayesian definition of evidential relevance. 
 
2.1 Bayesianism 
 
2.1.1 Bayesian Probabilities 
 
 In contemporary philosophy, Bayesianism is perhaps the most popular theory of 
probability. I shall use ‘Bayesian’ to describe several different philosophies of probability. 
All share a common formalization and a common type of interpretation of probability. 
Bayesians use a probability function P that assigns unconditional probabilities to a domain of 
statements. The function P must be consistent with the axioms of the probability calculus, 
which I shall describe in Subsection 2.1.2. Consider a very simple domain that contains three 
statements H, E, and K. The statement H is a hypothesis; the statement E is some putative 
evidence for this hypothesis; and the statement K is a conjunction of background knowledge. 
Bayesians can assign values for the conjunctions of each statement in the domain and use the 
probability calculus to derive the marginal probabilities P(H), P(E), and P(K). In turn, 
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Bayesians can apply the probability calculus to deriving the joint probabilities P(H ^ E), P(H 
^ K), P(E ^ K), and P(H ^ E ^ K) from the marginal probabilities. Finally, once these values 
are all determined, it is possible to calculate the conditional probabilities like P(H | E ^ K), 
where these conditional probabilities are defined. The symbol ‘|’ indicates that the probability 
is the probability of the statement on the left given the truth of the statement on the right. A 
conditional probability such as P(Φ | Ψ), where Φ and Ψ are statements in the domain, exists 
when P(Ψ) > 0. 
 
 Conditional probabilities play a crucial role in standard Bayesian analyses of 
relevance. They can be defined by Bayes’s Theorem: 
 
Key 
P(H): The “prior probability” of H. 
P(E): The “expectedness” of E. 
P(E | H): The “likelihood” of E given H. 
 
𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸) =
𝑃(𝐻⁡^⁡𝐸)
𝑃(𝐸)
= ⁡
𝑃(𝐻)𝑃(𝐸⁡|⁡𝐻)
𝑃(𝐸)
 
 
 Bayesians can adopt a variety of axioms of probability that may or may not include 
the equation above: for example, Colin Howson and Peter Urbach take the definition above 
as an axiom25 whereas others take conditional probability to be defined by such an equation, 
                                                          
25 Howson and Urbach (1993) p. 22. 
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and it is also possible to regard conditional probability as primitive26. The terms in the key 
above are the prevailing labels within Bayesianism. None of them is entirely intuitive. The 
“prior probability” is not necessarily determined a priori, nor must it be determined prior to 
the values for P(H), P(H | E), or P(E | H) when calculating a conditional probability. 
Similarly, the “expectedness” of E could just as accurately be called the “prior probability” of 
E, since it is just the marginal probability of E. Finally, the “likelihood” has no 
straightforward relation to the term in ordinary language, because in their non-technical 
usage, “likelihood” and “probability” are synonymous. The likelihood is simply the 
conditional probability for E given H. Nonetheless, these are common usages in the literature 
and I shall stick to them. 
 
 Bayesians interpret these probabilities as epistemic probabilities. Such probabilities 
are given interpretations that refer to epistemic concepts like belief, knowledge, rationality, 
evidence, ignorance, and so on. Epistemic probabilities are also used in descriptive contexts 
such as psychology and economics. These probabilities are distinct from probabilities that 
represent non-normative phenomena, such as relative frequencies or propensities. 
 
2.1.2 The Bayesian Formal Framework 
 
 In addition to the formal features discussed above, all Bayesians (excluding the 
Imprecise Bayesians, whom I shall describe in Chapter 2) use a probabilistic framework with 
the following features in their confirmation theories: 
 
                                                          
26 For example, Hájek (2003) proposes using conditional probability as primitive. 
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(1) The Domain of Probability Functions: The domain of a Bayesian probability function is 
a set Ω of statements (or propositions or sentences etc.) that is closed under the connectives 
of negation and disjunction. This strong form of deductive closure means that if Ω contains 
the statement ‘Fa’ and the statement ‘Fb’, then Ω contains the negated statements ‘¬Fa’ and 
‘¬Fb’, as well the disjunction ‘Fa v Fb’, and all permutations of these operations. Due to the 
interdefinability of the connectives in propositional logic, this closure under negation and 
disjunction also entails closure under all other propositional logic truth functions of the 
standard propositional calculus. 
 
(2) The Co-Domain of Probability Functions: The co-domain of Bayesian probability 
functions is the set of real numbers. (The co-domain of a function is the set of its possible 
outputs.) For instance, if we compute the joint probability of the statements Φ and Ψ, where 
Φ and Ψ are in Ω, then we shall have the value P(Φ ^ Ψ) = r for some r, where r ∈⁡ℝ⁡and ℝ⁡is 
the set of real numbers27. 
 
(3) Additivity: Standard Bayesian probability functions satisfy the axioms of additive 
probability and all the theorems of these axioms. The axioms are: 
 
(i) 1 ≥ P(Φ) ≥ 0 for all Φ in the domain of P. 
 
(ii) P(T) = 1 for any tautology T. 
 
                                                          
27 A non-Bayesian probability function Pnb can have a different co-domain. The function might only provide 
numerical inequalities, like P(Φ ^ Ψ) > 0.5. Alternatively, it might only provide information about a 
comparative ordering, like P(Φ ^ Ψ) > P(χ ^ ξ). 
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(iii) If P(Φ ^ Ψ) are mutually exclusive, then P(Φ v Ψ) = P(Φ) + P(Ψ)28. 
 
 From these axioms, one can derive the many useful theorems of the probability 
calculus. 
 
2.1.3 The Interpretation of Probability 
 
 In the sense I am using the term ‘Bayesian’, all Bayesians endorse the following 
theses about the interpretation of this formal framework: 
 
(1) Epistemic Probability: The probabilities assigned using the function P have epistemic 
interpretations. There are many Bayesian interpretations, but all of them agree that there is 
some epistemic significance to probability. The principal Bayesian interpretations are: 
 
(i) Subjective Bayesians: This is currently the most popular Bayesian interpretation. They 
interpret the probabilities as a rational person’s degrees of belief in the statements of the 
domain, where being “rational” involves satisfying a number of constraints. Standard 
Subjectivist constraints include the axioms of additive probability and conditionalization. 
Some Subjective Bayesians propose additional constraints. Apart from satisfying these 
constraints, the degrees of belief are an arbitrary matter for the person who has them. (A 
subjectivist could also interpret them as the rationally constrained degrees of belief of a 
                                                          
28 Adapted from Howson and Urbach (1993) p. 21. The principal differences are that Howson and Urbach take 
the definition of conditional probability above as an axiom rather than a definition and only require that P(Φ) ≥ 
0; they infer the upper bound for P(Φ) from an axiom that P(Φ) ≥ 0 and Axioms (ii) and (iii) via four proofs in 
Howson and Urbach (1993) p. 24-25. For reasons of brevity, I simply place the upper bound requirement in 
Axiom (i), rather than reproduce all four proofs.  
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computer or a group of people.) Howson and Urbach29 develop a prominent Subjective 
Bayesian probability theory that has very few constraints. 
 
(ii) Objective Bayesianism: This view is less common than the Subjective interpretation. 
Objective Bayesians, like Subjective Bayesians, interpret probabilities as rational degrees of 
belief. However, Objective Bayesians put much stronger constraints on the values that the 
degrees of belief might take. Objective Bayesians regard degree of belief as either entirely 
constrained or almost entirely constrained. There is a spectrum of between these views: an 
extreme Objectivist would contend that the values of degrees of belief are entirely 
constrained, whereas an extreme Subjectivist would contend that the values are entirely 
arbitrary. Edwin T. Jaynes30 and Jon Williamson31 are prominent Objectivists. 
 
(iii) Logical Bayesianism: This logical interpretation is now rare, but it was an important part 
of the development of Bayesian epistemology. Logical Bayesians regard probability as a 
logical relation between two statements (or propositions or sentences or sets etc.) that is akin 
to deductive entailment. (Some logicists, like Keynes, were not Bayesians.) Logical 
Bayesians combine the logical interpretation of probability with the Bayesian formalism. The 
paradigmatic Logical Bayesian is Carnap32 and a more recent example is Patrick Maher33. 
This approach is not always distinguished from Objective Bayesianism34, but others 
                                                          
29 Howson and Urbach (1993). 
 
30 Jaynes (2003). 
 
31 Williamson (2010). 
 
32 Carnap (1962) is his most extensive development of this interpretation. 
 
33 Maher (2010) is the apex of Maher’s own Logical Bayesian project. 
 
34 Franklin (2001) uses ‘the logical interpretation of probability’ and ‘objective Bayesianism’ as synonyms. 
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rigorously distinguish logical interpretations of probability from Objective Bayesian 
interpretations35.  
 
 Bayesians do not need to interpret all probability statements as epistemic. They can be 
pluralists about probability. Pluralists believe that there are multiple legitimate 
interpretations. Carnap was an early and influential pluralist Bayesian36. 
 
 Most Bayesians also believe that an epistemic probability distribution should be 
updated by conditionalization: 
 
(2) Conditionalization: When a statement E is ‘learned’, in the sense that its probability 
switches to 1, then one updates every statement by conditionalization to form a new 
probability distribution P´. Conditionalization of a statement, like H, occurs when the new 
probability P´ for H is changed such that such that H acquires the probability given by P(H | 
E), so that P'(H) = P(H | E). 
 
 Not all Bayesians adopt conditionalization as a universal norm. For instance, some 
Bayesians like Richard C. Jeffrey37 regard it as a special case of Jeffrey Conditionalization. 
Additionally, some Objective Bayesians like Williamson reject conditionalization under some 
circumstances38. However, in conventional versions of Bayesianism, conditionalization is the 
                                                          
35 Rowbottom (2008). 
 
36 Carnap (1945). 
 
37 Jeffrey (1965). 
 
38 Williamson (2011). 
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only updating method. Conditionalization is an important part of Bayesian epistemology: if it 
is removed from the system, then some important standard arguments for Bayesianism (such 
as the argument that Bayesians will converge towards long-run agreement given some quite 
general assumptions) are no longer sound. 
 
2.2 Bayesianism and Evidential Relevance 
 
 
 The formalism above provides the basic terms for the standard probabilistic definition 
of evidential relevance. This analysis was originally developed by Keynes in a non-Bayesian 
context39. It has subsequently become the conventional approach within Bayesianism40. 
 
 Bayesians define evidential relevance as a three-place relation between the hypothesis 
H, the evidence E, and the available background knowledge K. The definition includes K 
because differences in the background knowledge can affect the evidential relations. For 
example, suppose that you are making a random selection from a deck of 52 cards. You are 
wondering if the selected card is a face card. If your background knowledge contains the 
information that the deck is a normal deck, then the information that it is a Club is irrelevant 
to the hypothesis that it is a face card, because the proportion of face Clubs in a normal deck 
is equal to the proportion of face cards in the deck as a whole. In contrast, imagine if your 
background knowledge contained the information that the deck is normal except that 12 out 
of the 13 Clubs in the deck are face cards. Relative to this background knowledge, learning 
                                                          
39 Keynes (1921) p. 55. 
 
40 Howson and Urbach (1993) p. 117. 
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that the card is a Club is intuitively relevant to the hypothesis. Consequently, evidence can be 
relevant or irrelevant depending on the background knowledge. 
 
 Most Bayesians adopt the following definition of relevance: 
 
Probabilistic Definition of Evidential Relevance: E is relevant to H relative to K if and 
only if (1) P(H | E ^ K) ≠ P(H | K) and (2) P(E ^ K) ≠ 0. 
 
(The second clause is needed because P(H | E ^ K) is undefined, under the standard 
definition, when P(E ^ K) = 0.) 
 
 Thus, on the standard Bayesian analysis, E is evidentially relevant to H given K when 
the probability of H given E and K differs from the probability given K alone. Broadly, they 
identify evidential relevance with probabilistic relevance, while evidential irrelevance occurs 
when there is probabilistic irrelevance. 
 
 For example, imagine that you have a coin whose bias or fairness is unknown. You 
assign a prior probability of 0.5 to the hypothesis that the head will land on heads if you toss 
the coin. Subsequently, a friend tells you that she tossed the coin 20 times, and that it landed 
heads on 18 out of the 20 tosses. Assume that the conditional probability of the coin landing 
heads given your friend’s report and your background knowledge is greater than 0.5. 
According to the standard approach, your friend’s report is evidentially relevant, because it is 
probabilistically relevant. 
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Bayesian confirmation theorists also define confirmation and disconfirmation in terms 
of probabilistic relevance. Confirmation is identified with positive probabilistic relevance. 
Disconfirmation is identified with negative probabilistic relevance. Thus, in Bayesian 
confirmation theory, relevant evidence can either confirm the hypothesis or it can disconfirm 
the hypothesis41. Implicitly, Bayesians side with Hempel on the impossibility of neutral 
evidence (evidence that neither confirms nor disconfirms a hypothesis) in contrast to 
philosophers like Keynes and Hosiasson. 
 
 Bayesianism seems to offer an analysis of evidential relevance that is tremendously 
general in scope, because it is not restricted to one part of science or one type of evidential 
reasoning. It also offers the basis for analysing some other interesting concepts. For example, 
Keynes argued that the quantity of relevant evidence was important for confirmation theory 
and decision theory42. Bayesians can define changes in this quantity in the following way: E 
adds to the quantity of evidence for H if and only if P(H | E ^ K) ≠ P(H | K), because this 
entails that E is relevant to H. 
 
 Despite these advantages, the Bayesian analysis of evidential relevance faces a 
number of problems. I shall now turn to one of the most persistent challenges to this analysis. 
 
 
 
                                                          
41 Howson and Urbach (1993) p. 117. 
 
42 Keynes (1921) Chapter VI. 
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SECTION 3: THE PARADOX OF IDEAL EVIDENCE 
 
 
Popper’s Paradox of Ideal Evidence (PIE) is a criticism of the standard analysis of 
evidential relevance. He develops the following scenario: suppose that you have a coin, Z, 
when you have no knowledge of the bias or fairness of Z. Assume that you assign a 
probability of 0.5 to the hypothesis H, which is the conjecture that “the nth unobserved toss 
of Z will be heads”. You subsequently learn E, which is a statistical report that is “ideally 
favourable” to this assignment of 0.5, such as a report stating that 1,500 out of the 3,000 
tosses landed heads43. Suppose that the conditional probability of H given your newly 
acquired evidence is equal to the prior probability, such that P(H | E ^ K) = 0.5. According to 
the standard probabilist definition of evidential relevance, the report is irrelevant to H, but 
this is counterintuitive. The standard probabilistic definition seems to be too narrow44. 
 
 Popper assumes that the Bayesian must assign P(H) = 0.5. However, there are some 
theories of epistemic probability, like Subjective Bayesianism, in which it is consistent with 
Popper’s scenario that P(H | K) has any value from 0 to 1. However, the important point for 
Popper’s argument is that P(H | K) = 0.5 is possible in any Bayesian probability theory, even 
though it is not always mandatory. Furthermore, Popper could adapt his scenario to any other 
prior probability via modifying the sample mean: if P(H | K) = r, then a sample mean of r will 
be “ideally favourable” to the assignment P(H | K) = r under the conditions that he postulates. 
 
 I shall also illustrate Popper’s basic point using a non-numismatic example: recall the 
                                                          
43 Popper’s argument can also be made in terms of margins of error: if the sample mean is within a margin of 
error of 0.5, such that P(H | E ^ K) = P(H | K), then there is also an apparent counterexample to the standard 
probabilist definition of relevance.  
 
44 Popper (1980) p. 407-408. 
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team of economists who have been commissioned to study the effects of Turkey joining the 
EU on the UK’s GDP. Imagine that, after a survey of the existing evidence, the team 
concludes that the available evidence is equivocal to the hypothesis that Turkish membership 
will increase the GDP of the UK: the probability of the hypothesis given the available 
background knowledge is 50%. The second part of the team’s mandate requires them to 
acquire some new evidence. Imagine that the team gathers a large database of new statistics 
on UK-Turkish trade, migration figures, capital flows, and other economic information about 
the direct and indirect economic relations between the two countries. The economists conduct 
statistical tests using this data and estimate the effects of Turkish membership on UK GDP. 
They conclude that the total evidence is still equivocal: there is a 50% probability that 
Turkish membership will increase UK GDP. The standard probabilistic definition of 
evidential relevance provides the absurd judgement that all of their new data is entirely 
irrelevant to the hypothesis. 
 
The PIE was subsequently adapted as an objection to probabilistic analyses of the 
strength of evidence by Achinstein45. Kyburg also describes the paradox as a challenge to 
probabilistic theories of evidence46. The PIE is also an example of the criticism that is 
sometimes made of Bayesianism: it does not supply the means of distinguishing the state of 
lacking any evidence from the epistemic state of having acquired evidence that is equivocal47. 
                                                          
45 Achinstein (1978) p. 29-30. 
 
46 Kyburg (1970) p. 168. 
 
47 Reiss (2014) p. 289 and Norton (2011) p. 408-415. 
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Other philosophers, such as James M. Joyce, use the PIE to motivate a distinction between 
(1) the quantity of evidence and (2) the balance of the evidence for or against a hypothesis48.  
 
 Popper was making two criticisms with his scenario. He directs both at philosophers 
such as Keynes and Carnap, who adopted epistemic interpretations of probability. The first 
criticism is the objection that I have described: the probabilist analyses of evidence says that 
intuitively relevant evidence is irrelevant. The second objection is a criticism of how Keynes 
and Carnap represent an agent’s beliefs: the degree of belief in the outcome of the nth coin 
toss will not change after learning about the coin tosses49. Initially, your degree of belief that 
the nth toss will be heads is 0.5. After acquiring the report, your degree of belief will still be 
0.5. Yet Popper suggests that something about your belief in the conjecture has altered, but 
the probabilistic framework does not formalise this change. He concludes that epistemic 
probabilities do not adequately represent how beliefs respond to evidence. 
 
 The bulk of the literature on the PIE concerns this second aspect of the paradox. The 
conventional response is (a) to accept that there is no change in a Bayesian reasoner’s degree 
of belief in the hypothesis, but also (b) to note that there are other statements for which the 
degree of belief has changed. For instance, even if the probability of the nth toss landing 
heads is unchanged by learning sample report of coin tosses, this information might reduce 
the expected standard deviation50 for tossing the coin. Consequently, there is an increase in 
                                                          
48 Joyce (2005) p. 176. 
 
49 Popper (1980) p. 408. 
 
50 The standard deviation of a set of trials (such as coin tosses) is a measure of the dispersion of those results. If 
all of the results are at the mean, then their standard deviation is a minimum. The standard deviation increases as 
more of the trials differ from the mean value. Formally, the standard deviation of a sample is 
√∑(𝑥 − 𝑥)2 ÷ (𝑛 − 1), where x is the value of a member of the sample,  𝑥 is the mean value and n is the 
sample size. 
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the probability that all of 10 tosses of the coin will land heads on 5 occasions. Therefore, the 
Bayesian probabilities can represent a change in one’s beliefs after learning the report, even 
though there is no change in one’s belief regarding the nth toss in particular. This response 
was first formulated by Jeffrey51 and it has been further developed by Bayesians like Howson 
and Urbach52. 
 
 However, even if this response to Popper is adequate, there is still the problem that he 
presents for the Bayesian definition of evidential relevance. In this chapter, I shall focus on 
this first aspect of the PIE. I shall ignore the second aspect. (I shall return to it in Chapter 3 
Subsection 6.3.) There have been some responses to this second problem that Popper raised, 
and I shall now consider them. 
 
SECTION 4: RESPONSES TO THE PARADOX 
 
 
 One obvious response to the PIE (which Popper would recommend) is to abandon 
probabilistic analyses of evidential relevance. C. A. Hooker and D. C. Stove are examples of 
philosophers who adopt this position, despite being broadly sympathetic to Bayesianism53. 
However, there are costs to this strategy. Probability is a well-explored concept that is 
amenable to formal modelling, and accordingly it is a promising basis for an analysans of 
relevance. For that reason, it is worth attempting to maintain a form of probabilistic 
                                                          
51 Jeffrey (1960). 
 
52 Howson and Urbach (1993) p. 401-403. 
 
53 Hooker and Stove (1968) p. 310. 
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definition, in spite of the PIE. I shall focus in this section on responses that retain a 
probabilistic definition. 
 
One might question the relevance of the coin-tossing report in the PIE, especially if 
one has a strong intuition that data cannot be both neutral and relevant regarding a 
hypothesis. However, it is plausible that one could “combine evidence” by concatenating the 
coin-tossing report with similarly neutral data from a physical model of the Z’s dynamics. 
Additionally, imagine that a casino manager asks you to obtain relevant evidence that the nth 
toss will land heads and you know that 0.5 is the accepted value for P(H). Suppose that you 
have the spare time to carry out 3,000 tosses of Z and you report that the coin had landed 
heads on 1,500 occasions. Intuitively, you have satisfied the request. Popper does not seem to 
be making any tendentious conceptual claims about relevance in the PIE.  
 
  Given that the PIE indicates that the standard probabilistic definition is too narrow, a 
probabilist response should expand the definition to include the type of scenario that Popper 
describes, while also avoiding excessive breadth. In this section, I shall critically discuss 
several probabilist attempts to improve the standard analysis, as well as listing some more 
radical alternatives. All of them are consistent with a Bayesian interpretation of the 
probabilities involved. However, I shall argue that none of them is satisfactory. 
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4.1 Keynes’s Strict Definition 
 
 Keynes anticipates Popper’s problem and proposes a “stricter and more complicated 
definition” of relevance to address such scenarios54. This strict definition contains the 
standard probabilist definition as a special case. Keynes regards the standard definition as 
adequate for most situations, whereas his Strict Definition is more robust. 
 
Keynes’s Strict Definition of Evidential Relevance: E is relevant to H relative to K if and 
only if (1) P(E ^ K) ≠ 0 and (2) either: 
 
(i) P(H | E ^ K) ≠ P(H | K) 
 
- or - 
 
(ii) (E ^ K) implies a statement J such that P(H | J ^ K) ≠ P(H | K). 
 
 The intuition behind Keynes’s strict definition is that if E has a part that is relevant to 
H given K, then E is relevant to H given K. For instance, consider a detective who acquires 
two testimonies regarding a fatal collision between a car and a pedestrian. One witness says 
that the car was driven erratically prior to the crash, whereas the other says that the car was 
being driven normally. The detective has no reason to think that the testimony of either 
witness is more reliable than the other. Assume that the probability (relative to the detective’s 
total knowledge) that the car was being driven erratically is unchanged by learning both of 
the testimonies. The conjunction of the testimonies seems relevant, but it is irrelevant 
                                                          
54 Keynes (1921) p. 55. 
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according to the standard probabilistic definition. In contrast, if we use Keynes’s strict 
definition, we can say that the conjunction of testimonies is relevant, because each individual 
testimony is entailed by their conjunction, and these individual testimonies are 
probabilistically relevant to the hypothesis given the detective’s background knowledge. 
 
 In the PIE, the statistical report E that ‘1,500 out of 3,000 tosses of this coin landed 
heads’ implies the statement J, that ‘1,500 out of 1,500 tosses of this coin landed heads’, 
since J describes a subset of the tosses recorded in E. Assume that J can combine with the 
background knowledge (while ignoring the 1,500 tosses of Z that landed tails) such that it is 
more likely that the nth toss will land heads given J and K than given K alone. It follows that 
J will be relevant to H, because learning J would increase the probability of H given K, and 
so E is relevant to H on Keynes’s strict definition of relevance, because (E ^ K) implies J. 
 
 However, Carnap proved a trivialization result for Keynes’s strict definition: it entails 
that every statement is relevant to every other statement, except in special circumstances55. If 
P(H | K) is neither 0 nor 1 and P(E | K) ≠ 1, then E is relevant to H on Keynes’s definition. 
For any statement E, it will be the case that (E ^ K) implies (E v H). Provided that H and E do 
not have extreme probabilities of 1 or 0 relative to K, the probability of H given (E v H) will 
be different from the probability of H given K alone. 
 
 To see Carnap’s point, consider three probabilistically and evidentially independent 
statements H, E, and K. Assume the following probability distribution: 
 
(1) 𝑃(𝐻⁡^⁡𝐸) = 𝑃(𝐻)𝑃(𝐸) = 0.5625 
                                                          
55 Carnap (1962) p. 420. 
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(2) 𝑃(𝐻⁡^⁡¬𝐸) = 𝑃(𝐻)𝑃(¬𝐸) = 0.1875 
(3) 𝑃(¬𝐻⁡^⁡¬𝐸) = 𝑃(¬𝐻)𝑃(¬𝐸) = 0.0625 
(4) 𝑃(¬𝐻⁡^⁡𝐸) = 𝑃(¬𝐻)𝑃(𝐸) = 0.1875 
(5) 𝑃(𝐾⁡^⁡𝐻⁡^⁡𝐸) = 𝑃(𝐾)𝑃(𝐻)𝑃(𝐸) = 0.5625 
 
 We can derive the marginal probabilities P(H) and P(E) from the joint probabilities 
above. Since P(H) = P(H ^ E) + P(H ^ ¬E), it follows from (1) and (2) that: 
 
(6) 𝑃(𝐻) = 0.5625 + 0.1875 = 0.75 
 
 Similarly, from (1) and (4): 
 
(7) 𝑃(𝐸) = 0.5625 + 0.1875 = 0.75 
 
 From (5), (6), and (7): 
 
(8) 𝑃(𝐾) =
0.5625
𝑃(𝐻)𝑃(𝐸)
= 1 
 
 Finally, I shall calculate the conditional probabilities. From (6), (7), and (8): 
 
(9) 𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐾) ⁡=
𝑃(𝐻⁡^⁡𝐾)
𝑃(𝐾)
= ⁡0.75 
 
(10)⁡𝑃(𝐸⁡|⁡𝐾) ⁡=
𝑃(𝐸⁡^⁡𝐾)
𝑃(𝐾)
= ⁡0.75 
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 From (1), (7), and (8): 
 
(11)⁡𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸⁡^⁡𝐾) ⁡=
𝑃(𝐻⁡^⁡𝐸⁡^⁡𝐾)
𝑃(𝐸⁡^⁡𝐾)
=⁡
𝑃(𝐻⁡^⁡𝐸)
𝑃(𝐸)
= 0.75⁡ 
 
 By symmetry of probabilistic irrelevance, from (10) and (11): 
 
(12)⁡𝑃(𝐸⁡|⁡𝐻⁡^⁡𝐾) ⁡= 0.75 
 
 E implies (E v H) by disjunction introduction. Using the above details, axiom (iii) in 
Subsection 2.1.2 implies that: 
 
(13)⁡𝑃(𝐸⁡𝑣⁡𝐻) = ⁡𝑃(𝐸) + ⁡𝑃(𝐻)⁡– ⁡𝑃(𝐻⁡^⁡𝐸) 
 
Using (6), (7), and (13): 
 
(14)  𝑃(𝐸⁡𝑣⁡𝐻) = 0.75 + 0.75 − ⁡0.5625 = 0.9375 
 
 From (8) and (14): 
 
(15) 𝑃((𝐸⁡𝑣⁡𝐻)⁡^⁡𝐾) ⁡= ⁡0.9375 
 
 H implies (E v H). Hence, from (8) and (15): 
 
(16)⁡𝑃((𝐸⁡𝑣⁡𝐻)⁡^⁡𝐾⁡|⁡𝐻) ⁡= ⁡1 
 
43 Confirmation, Decision, and Evidential Probability 
 
 
 Applying Bayes’ Theorem and the values from (6), (15), and (16): 
 
(17) 𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡(𝐸⁡𝑣⁡𝐻)⁡^⁡𝐾) = ⁡
𝑃((𝐸⁡𝑣⁡𝐻)⁡^⁡𝐾)⁡|⁡𝐻)𝑃(𝐻)
𝑃((𝐸⁡𝑣⁡𝐻)⁡^⁡𝐾)⁡
= 0.8 
 
 Substituting J for (E v H), it follows from (9) and (17) that: 
 
(1)⁡𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐽⁡^⁡𝐾) ⁡= ⁡0.8⁡ ≠ ⁡𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐾)  
 
 Therefore, J is probabilistically relevant to H given K. Since (E ^ K) implies J, it 
follows from Keynes’s strict definition that E is relevant to H. Yet E, H, and K can be almost 
any statements. Carnap’s trivialization proof demonstrates that Keynes’s strict definition is 
far too broad. 
 
 There are a number of ways of modifying Keynes’s strict definition to address the PIE 
and Carnap’s trivialization proof. One approach is to adopt a different interpretation of 
‘implies’. Keynes understands ‘implies’ to mean logical entailment in classical logic: 
 
Classical Logical Entailment: φ logically entails ψ in classical logic if and only if there is 
no logically possible world in which φ is true and ψ is false. 
 
 However, there are a tremendous number of alternative interpretations of entailment 
in the philosophy of logic. It would be interesting to explore the consequences of adopting 
different interpretations of ‘implies’ for Keynes’s analysis of relevance, but it would also be 
an extensive project, with no guarantee of success. 
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 One possible option would be to restrict disjunction introduction, at least within the 
context of Keynes’s strict definition. This rule allows the inference of (φ v ψ) from φ or from 
ψ, regardless of what propositions that φ or ψ might be. Some philosophers have argued that 
this principle is the source of many problems, including problems in confirmation theory56. 
However, merely removing this rule is insufficient to avoid Carnap-style trivialization proofs, 
because these can be formulated using inference rules other than disjunction introduction. For 
instance, one can use the rule that E implies (¬E → H). Consider the following probability 
distribution: 
 
(1) 𝑃(𝐻⁡^⁡𝐸) = 𝑃(𝐻)𝑃(𝐸) = 1/4 
(2) 𝑃(𝐻⁡^⁡¬𝐸) = 𝑃(𝐻)𝑃(¬𝐸) = 1/4 
(3)⁡𝑃(¬𝐻⁡^⁡𝐸) = 𝑃(¬𝐻)𝑃(𝐸) = 1/4 
(4) 𝑃(¬𝐻⁡^⁡¬𝐸) = 𝑃(¬𝐻)𝑃(¬𝐸) = 1/4 
(5) 𝑃(𝐾⁡^⁡𝐻⁡^⁡𝐸) = 𝑃(𝐾)𝑃(𝐻)𝑃(𝐸) = 1/4 
(6) 𝑃(𝐾⁡^⁡𝐻) = 𝑃(𝐻) = 1/2 
(7) 𝑃(𝐾⁡^⁡𝐸) = 𝑃(𝐸) = 1/2 
(8) 𝑃(𝐾) = 1 
 
 In accordance with Carnap’s claim, P(H | K) is neither 0 nor 1 and P(E | K) ≠ 1. 
Additionally, note that H, E, and K are probabilistically independent. 
 
 Suppose that a conditional is true if its antecedent is false. Thus, E implies the 
conditional (¬E → H). Let ‘J’ refer to this conditional. J is equivalent to ¬(¬H ^ ¬E) and 
therefore its probability can be quickly derived from (4): 
                                                          
56 Weingartner (1994) p. 93. 
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(9) 𝑃(𝐽⁡|⁡𝐾) = 1 − 𝑃(¬𝐻⁡^⁡¬𝐸⁡|⁡𝐾) = 3/4 
 
 J is also equivalent to ((H ^ E) v (¬H ^ E) v (H ^ ¬E))57. Therefore: 
 
(10) 𝑃(𝐽⁡|⁡𝐻⁡^⁡𝐸⁡^⁡𝐾)) = 1 
 
(11) 𝑃(𝐽⁡|⁡𝐻⁡^⁡¬𝐸⁡^⁡𝐾)) = 1 
 
 From (1), (9), (10), and (11), the following conditional probabilities can be derived: 
 
(12) 𝑃(𝐻⁡^⁡𝐸⁡|⁡𝐽⁡^⁡𝐾) ⁡=
𝑃(𝐽⁡|⁡𝐻⁡^⁡𝐸⁡^⁡𝐾)𝑃(𝐻⁡^⁡𝐸)
𝑃(𝐽⁡^⁡𝐾)
=
(1)(1/4)
(3/4)
= 1/3  
 
(13) 𝑃(𝐻⁡^⁡¬𝐸⁡|⁡𝐽⁡^⁡𝐾) ⁡=
𝑃(𝐽⁡|⁡𝐻⁡^⁡¬𝐸)𝑃(𝐻⁡^⁡¬𝐸)
𝑃(𝐽)
=
(1)(1/4)
(3/4)
= 1/3 
 
 H is equivalent to ((H ^ E) v (H ^ ¬E)). Therefore, from (10) and (11): 
 
(12) 𝑃(𝐽⁡|⁡𝐻⁡^⁡𝐾) = 1 
 
 From (6), (9), and (12): 
 
                                                          
57 Note that this is a logical equivalence, not an entailment, so disjunction introduction is not being ‘smuggled’ 
in here. The same applies to the equivalence of H and ((H ^ E) v (H ^ ¬E)) later in the proof. 
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(14) 𝑃(𝐻⁡|𝐽⁡^⁡𝐾) ⁡=
𝑃(𝐽⁡^⁡𝐾⁡|⁡𝐻)𝑃(𝐻)
𝑃(𝐽⁡^⁡𝐾)
=
(1)(1/2)
(3/4)
= 2/3 
 
 Finally, from (6) and (8): 
 
(14) 𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐾) ⁡=
𝑃(𝐻⁡^⁡𝐾)
𝑃(𝐾)
=
1/2
1
= 1/2 
 
 Since P(H | J ^ K) > P(H | K), it follows that J is probabilistically relevant to H 
relative to K. As E implies J, this proof provides an equivalent result to Carnap’s 
trivialization proof for Keynes’s strict definition of relevance, except using (¬E → H) rather 
than (H v E) as J. 
 
 However, one could go further than simply forbidding the use of disjunction 
introduction: that E implies (¬E → H) is also questionable. Nonetheless, my proof above 
demonstrates that it is not sufficient to eliminate just one rule from Classical Logic in order to 
avoid Carnap’s trivialization proof. More generally, one could investigate the consequences 
of using non-classical systems in Keynes’s definition58. The consequences of such a view for 
formulating a definition of evidential relevance would be an exciting topic for further 
investigation, but an extended inquiry into the broader consequences of such a maneuverer 
would be needed before one could be confident that it would not create new paradoxes. 
Therefore, I shall neither endorse nor reject the views of Weingartner and similar positions, 
but I shall note that they reveal the range of tactics that a defender of Keynes’s strict 
definition might use. Keynes’s strict definition does have some strong prima facie 
                                                          
58 For example, Relevance Logicians argue that both the disjunction introduction rule and the particular 
conditional introduction rule that I used in the proof are objectionable, so their systems would be a natural place 
for a defender of Keynes’s strict definition to start. 
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plausibility, so one cannot rule out that the basic notion is untenable; what one can rule in is 
that Keynes’s strict definition leads to triviality under Classical Logical Entailment or some 
interesting modifications of this form of entailment. 
 
 Another possible alternative, material entailment, will not help Keynes’s strict 
definition. 
 
Material Entailment: φ materially entails ψ if and only if ψ is true or φ is false. 
 
 Reinterpreting ‘implies’ as material entailment will not narrow the scope of Keynes’s 
definition, because all logical entailments are also material entailments. For instance, ‘Either 
William Shakespeare or Christopher Marlowe wrote Romeo and Juliet, and Christopher 
Marlowe did not write Romeo and Juliet’ logically implies ‘William Shakespeare wrote 
Romeo and Juliet’, but the first statement also materially entails the second. In contrast, not 
all material entailments are logical entailments. ‘Bertrand Russell met Ludwig Wittgenstein’ 
materially entails ‘Bertrand Russell met John Maynard Keynes’, because it is not the case 
that the first statement is true and the second false. However, the first statement does not 
logically entail the second, since it would be possible that Russell would have met 
Wittgenstein but not met Keynes. In general, logical entailments are a subset of material 
entailments. In particular, E always materially implies (E v H), since the latter is a logical 
implication of the former, and consequently it is also a material implication. It is not possible 
to obviate Carnap’s trivialization proof by reinterpreting ‘implies’ as material implication. 
 
 I shall now examine two modifications of Keynes’s strict definition that probabilists 
have made in response to the PIE and other paradoxes of evidential relevance such as 
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Carnap’s trivialization proof. I shall argue that the first is too broad and the second is too 
narrow. 
 
4.2 Rod O’Donnell’s Response 
 
 Rod O’Donnell aims avoid the PIE by adding the condition that data is relevant when 
it implies a statement J and the negation ¬J is relevant on Keynes’s strict definition: 
 
O’Donnell’s Strict Definition of Evidential Relevance: E is relevant to H relative to K if 
and only if P(E ^ K) ≠ 0 and at least one the following are true: 
 
(i) P(H | E ^ K) ≠ P(H | K). 
 
(ii) (E ^ K) implies a statement J such that P(H | J ^ K) ≠ P(H | K) and  
P(J | K) ≠ 0. 
 
(iii) (E ^ K) implies a statement J such that its negation ¬J is relevant according to the 
first two conditions59. 
 
 Returning to the PIE, O’Donnell claims that the report of coin tosses E and your 
background knowledge K jointly imply J1, where J1 is ‘The expected relative frequency of 
heads in tosses of this coin is within a margin of error of 0.5.’60 The negation ¬J1 denies this 
claim. In O’Donnell’s scenario, the following conditional probabilities hold: 
                                                          
59 O’Donnell (1992) p. 49-50. 
 
60 O’Donnell (1992) p. 49-50. 
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(a) P(H | E ^ K) = P(H | K) = 0.5. 
 
(The conditional probability of H given (E ^ K) is equal to the probability given K, since E 
states that the coin tosses have a relative frequency equal to the prior probability.) 
 
(b) P(H | J1 ^ K) = P(H | K) = 0.5. 
 
(The conditional probability of H given (J1 ^ K) is equal to the probability given K, since J1 
states that the expected relative frequency of head tosses is within the margin of error of the 
prior probability.) 
 
(c) P(H | ¬J1 ^ K) = P(H | K) ≠ 0.5. 
 
(The conditional probability of H given (E ^ K) is not equal to the probability given K, since 
¬J1 states that the relative frequency of the coin tosses is not within the margin of error of 
0.5.) 
 
 Since ¬J1 is relevant to H given K, it follows from O’Donnell’s definition that J1 is 
relevant to H given K. Since J1 is relevant to H given K and (E ^ K) implies J1, it follows that 
E is relevant to H given K. In this way, O’Donnell’s definition provides the intuitively correct 
judgement that the report of coin tosses is relevant in Popper’s scenario. 
 
 The basic notion that a statement is relevant if its negation is relevant is plausible. 
O’Donnell locates some historical precedent for this idea in discussions of evidential 
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relevance by Keynes61 and Stove62, whose uses of this condition is motivated independently 
of the PIE. Thus, if it were satisfactory, his definition would have the advantage of being a 
non-ad hoc response to the PIE. 
 
 However, O’Donnell’s discussion of the PIE has two important problems. Firstly, 
O’Donnell seems to misdiagnose Keynes’s strict definition. E implies that there were 1,500 
coin tosses that landed heads, and this implied statement is straightforwardly relevant to H 
given K according to Keynes’s strict definition. O’Donnell’s might be intrinsically intuitive, 
but it is superfluous for determining that E is evidentially relevant. 
 
 Secondly, O’Donnell’s definition is no narrower than Keynes’s strict definition: 
anything that is relevant on Keynes’s definition will be relevant on O’Donnell’s strict 
definition, because O’Donnell does not add any necessary conditions to Keynes’s definition. 
The only modification that O’Donnell makes is an additional sufficient condition for 
relevance. Consequently, his definition is still subject to Carnap’s trivialization proof, and 
hence unacceptably broad as an analysis of evidential relevance. O’Donnell does not discuss 
Carnap’s trivialization proof, so naturally he does not suggest a response. Like Keynes, he 
has not managed to navigate between the Scylla of Popper’s PIE and the Charybdis of 
Carnap’s trivialization proof. 
 
 
 
                                                          
61 Keynes (1921) p. 121. 
 
62 Stove (1986) p. 82. 
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4.3 Gemes’s Analysis of Relevance 
 
 Gemes aims to retain the basic intuition in Keynes’s strict definition: if a part of E is 
relevant to H, then E is relevant to H, but he modifies the analysis of propositional content 
(being a “part”) to avoid Carnap’s trivialization proof and other counterintuitive features of 
the analysis of content used by Keynes63. 
 
 In Keynes’s strict definition, J is a part of the content of E if and only if E implies J. I 
shall use the term ‘Implication Analysis’ to name this analysis of logical content. It can lead 
to very strange results. For instance: 
 
Key 
H: The orbits of the planets are elliptical. 
E: The Sun is at a focal point of the planets’ orbits. 
J: The orbits of the planets are not elliptical. 
 
 Consider the conjunction: 
 
 
(1) H ^ E. 
 
 
 
 By conjunction elimination, (1) implies: 
 
                                                          
63 Gemes (2007) p. 163-164. 
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(2) E. 
 
  (2) implies, by disjunction introduction: 
 
(3) E v J. 
 
 However, by the same rule, (3) can also be derived from: 
 
(4) J. 
 
 J intuitively confirms (E v J), but it would be very peculiar to say that ‘J confirms a 
part of (H ^ E)’, because J is inconsistent with H and J is irrelevant to E. Yet, according to the 
Implication Analysis, (3) is a part of (1). Assuming that (4) confirms (3), we must say that (4) 
confirms a part of (1) if we are using the Implication Analysis of propositional content. 
 
 Unlike philosophers such as Weingartner, Gemes does not object to disjunction 
introduction: he is arguing that while (ϕ v ψ) is a consequence of any proposition ϕ, it is not 
thereby a part of the propositional content of ψ64. Gemes develops an alternative analysis that 
has potential benefits for defenders of classical logic: by rejecting the Implication Analysis, 
they can retain the classic analysis of logical consequence, while nonetheless avoiding any 
paradoxical results of using that analysis for logical content. However, even if Gemes’s 
analysis of logical content is satisfactory, there might still be reasons (such as those raised by 
Weingartner) for rejecting features of the classic analysis of logical consequence, such as 
                                                          
64 Gemes (2007) p. 164. 
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paradoxes where disjunction introduction or ex falso quodlibet seem to be responsible. 
  
Using his alternative analysis of propositional content that avoids these problems, 
Gemes develops a revised version of Keynes’s strict definition of relevance: 
 
Gemes’s Definition of Relevance: E is relevant to H given K if and only if  
(1) P(E ^ K) ≠ 0 and (2) there is a part J of the propositional content of E such that  
P(H | J ^ K) ≠ P(H | K)65. 
 
(Gemes does not have an explicit reference to background knowledge K in his definition. I 
have added it to preserve consistency with other definitions.) 
 
 I shall not discuss Gemes’s account of propositional content or how it avoids both the 
PIE and Carnap’s trivialization proof, because his account is highly complex and the details 
are unnecessary for my criticism. Gemes’s definition faces a problem that I shall call the 
‘Problem of Corroborating Evidence’66. For example: 
 
 
 
                                                          
65 Gemes (2007) p. 165. 
 
66 I am using ‘corroborate’ in a non-technical sense, rather than in Popper’s sense of the term. 
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Key 
H: All swans are white. 
E: Bob is a swan and Bob is not white. 
K: Our background knowledge, which includes the information that Arnold is a swan and 
Arnold is not white. 
 
Intuitively, E is relevant to H given K, because a counterexample is relevant to a 
universal generalisation, even if you know that there is another counterexample. However, 
obviously P(H | K) = 0 and P(H | E ^ K) = 0. Thus, according to Gemes’s definition, E is not 
directly evidentially relevant to H given K. Furthermore, there can be no J such that (a) J is 
part of the logical content of E and (b) J is relevant to H given K, because J cannot raise H’s 
probability given K and zero is the lowest possible value of the function P. In general, the 
probability calculus implies that additions to the conditions in an extreme-valued probability 
do not alter the probability. 
 
 For example, suppose that H is inconsistent with the background knowledge and  
P(J ^ K) > 0. Consider the Bayesian probability distribution in which: 
 
(1) 𝑃(𝐻⁡^⁡𝐽⁡^⁡𝐾) = 0 
(2) 𝑃(𝐻⁡^⁡𝐾) = 0⁡ 
(3) 𝑃(𝐽⁡^⁡𝐾) = 0.5⁡ 
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 Applying Bayes’ Theorem to derive the conditional probability of H given J and K 
from (1) and (3): 
 
𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐽⁡^⁡𝐾) =
𝑃(𝐻⁡^⁡𝐽⁡^⁡𝐾)
𝑃(𝐽⁡^⁡𝐾)
=
0
0.5
= 0 
  
  Gemes’s definition has the consequence that there is no evidence that can corroborate 
the falsification of a hypothesis, yet this is counterintuitive. Even knowing that H is false, it is 
intuitively possible to obtain corroborating evidence that the hypothesis is false. 
 
 One might question whether corroborating counterexamples are actually relevant 
evidence, but there are several reasons to see them as evidence. Firstly, imagine that the 
original falsifying counterexamples are withdrawn from the body of scientific evidence, but 
the corroborating statements are retained. For example, we might discover that the birds that 
were the initial apparent counterexamples to ‘All swans are white’ were another species of 
bird. However, provided that the corroborating counterexamples are retained, then the 
hypothesis will still be inconsistent with our total evidence. In such scenarios, it is natural to 
say that ‘The hypothesis is inconsistent with what remains of our evidence’, rather than that 
‘The counterexamples were never part of the evidence, but entered into the total evidence 
once the original observations were retracted.’ 
 
 Secondly, though the corroborating counterexamples are probabilistically irrelevant to 
the hypothesis, it is natural to say that they indirectly provide support to the negation of the 
universal generalisation, because the initial counterexamples are more reliable given the 
corroborations. For instance, even if one accepts counterexamples to ‘Every chemical 
element has a uniform melting temperature under laboratory conditions’, it is still possible to 
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increase the reliability of the initial counterexamples by replicating the falsifying experiments 
involving allotropes. Such corroboration of falsifications is one of the contributions that 
experimental evidence often provides to scientific knowledge. 
 
 Thirdly, it would be unfair to say that a scientist who has gathered observations of 
black swans has not gathered any evidence regarding ‘All swans are white’, assuming that 
her project managers asked her to carry out such an investigation. What she has done might 
be uninteresting, but it nonetheless constitutes gathering relevant evidence. There is an 
important distinction between ‘interesting evidence’ and ‘relevant evidence’. Corroborating 
counterexamples can be instances of the latter without being instances of the former. 
 
4.4. Further Alternatives 
 
 There are other responses to the PIE that I have not discussed here. Peter Gärdenfors’s 
abandons the standard Bayesian framework and combines a modified definition of relevance 
with a nonstandard model of belief revision67. Ronald N. Giere briefly approaches the 
problem from a Neyman-Pearson version of classical statistics68. 
 
 Others, such as Maya Bar Hillel, analyse the problem in terms of second-order 
probabilities, which are degrees of confidence in first-order probability assignments such as 
the assignment of 0.5 to ‘The nth toss will land heads’ in Popper’s scenario69. I am quite 
                                                          
67 Gärdenfors (1990). 
68 Giere (1970) p. 357. 
 
69 Bar Hillel (1982). 
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sympathetic to the use of probabilities with multiple orderings (as in Chapter 3) but often 
they can solve a particular formulation of a problem only by creating a regress, and such an 
approach needs to answer versions of the PIE that use the second-order probability 
assignments. There is also the challenge of formulating an answer that would also address the 
Problem of Corroborating Intervals. While I do not have a strong argument against this 
approach to the PIE, I shall not pursue it further, for the reasons adumbrated. 
 
Section Summary 
 
 Even with clever modifications, the standard probabilistic analysis of evidential 
relevance is unsatisfactory. However, this does not prove that a probabilistic analysis is 
impossible. In the next two sections, I shall present an alternative to Bayesianism and use this 
rival to develop a new definition. 
 
SECTION 5: EVIDENTIAL PROBABILISM 
 
 
 In this section, I shall introduce Kyburg’s theory of Evidential Probability. This will 
be the basis of my answer to the PIE in Section 6. 
 
5.1 Basic Principles of Evidential Probability 
 
 Kyburg developed his theory over 40 years, from 1961 to 200170. Throughout this 
evolution, two fundamental ideas remained constant: (1) epistemic probability should be 
                                                          
70 From Kyburg (1961) to Kyburg and Teng (2001). 
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modelled as a formal evidential relation between sentences and (2) every probability relation 
must be based on information about relative frequencies71. 
 
Like Bayesianism, Kyburg’s theory of Evidential Probability is an epistemic theory of 
probability. (Specifically, it is a logicist interpretation.) The fundamental difference is that 
there is no prior distribution; instead, Evidential Probabilities are derived by direct inference 
from relative frequency data72. Direct inference is also sometimes called “the statistical 
syllogism” or “the proportional syllogism”. Such reasoning begins from (a) a premise about 
the relative frequency of some predicate in a population and (b) a premise that an individual 
or sample is a member of that population, and infers to (c) the assertion or denial that the 
individual or sample satisfies that predicate. For example: 
 
(1) The proportion of red balls in the box is 95/100. 
 
(2) Ball A is a ball in the box. 
 
Therefore, probably, (3) Ball A is red73. 
 
 There are a number of important points about direct inferences. Firstly, direct 
                                                          
71 Kyburg (1990) p. 43. 
 
72 Kyburg and Teng (2001) p. 201. 
 
73 The positioning of ‘probably’ is important: the argument is a non-deductive inference of (3), rather than the 
ascription of a probability to (3), so ‘probably’ characterises the argument. The conclusion of this argument is 
not a probabilistic statement. This is importantly distinct from a similar form of inference, in which (3) would be 
a probabilistic statement, i.e. ‘Ball A is probably red’ or ‘The probability that A is red > 0.5’ etc. Put another 
way, ‘probably’ qualifies ‘therefore’, which in turn is the relation of the premises to the conclusion; ‘probably’ 
is not a qualifier in the conclusion itself. For further discussion of these aspects of direct inference, see Hempel 
(1960) p. 444-447. 
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inferences are (typically) deductively invalid. For example, it is consistent with the truth of 
(1) and (2) that Ball A is one of the 5% of balls in the box that are not red. Direct inferences 
will only be deductively valid when either: 
 
(i) The premises assert that 100% of the population have the predicate in question and the 
conclusion asserts that the subject of the direct inference has that predicate. 
 
- or - 
 
(ii) The premises assert that 0% of the population have the predicate in question and the 
conclusion denies that the subject of the direct inference has that predicate. 
 
 When either (i) or (ii) holds, a direct inference is simply a type of deductive 
syllogism. Indeed, one can understand the logic of direct inferences as a generalisation of 
syllogistic logic to arguments that feature quantifiers like ‘Most’ or ‘15%’ rather than ‘All’ or 
‘Some’74. 
 
 Secondly, when (i) and (ii) do not hold, the argument is non-monotonic. In a non-
monotonic argument, additions to the premises can alter the strength of the argument. In the 
example of the box of balls, one could add the premise that ‘Ball A is near the top of the box 
and nearly all of the balls near the top of the box are green’. Intuitively, the premises would 
no longer provide support for the conclusion. 
 
 In practice, our use of direct inference is usually so automatic and confident that it is 
                                                          
74 Williams (1947) p. 36. 
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unreflective. Our everyday facility with direct inferences seems to have led many 
philosophers and logicians to overlook non-monotonic direct inferences, in comparison to 
more controversial forms of non-monotonic reasoning like enumerative induction and 
analogy. 
 
5.2 Imprecise Probabilities 
 
 Before I describe Kyburg’s theory of direct inference, there is a crucial part of 
Evidential Probability that I must explain. Kyburg incorporates imprecise probabilities into 
his system because our statistical information is typically imprecise: I might know that 
between 50% and 75% of the balls in a bag are green, but not know the exact proportion. 
Imprecise statistical information is even more familiar when we are not considering gambling 
apparatuses. For instance, I am confident that the average UK household owns at least one 
car, but I do not know the precise figure. Similarly, when discussing the probability of 
scientific hypotheses like ‘The Solar System has more planets than have been discovered’, it 
is more natural to use imprecise background data like ‘Star Systems with the astrophysical 
characteristics of the Solar System generally have more planets than have been discovered’ as 
opposed to point-valued figures. 
 
 Kyburg uses closed intervals within the co-domain of fractions from 0 to 1 inclusive 
to formalise imprecise statistical information and probabilities. A closed interval [x, y] is an 
interval that includes x and y and everything in between. An open interval (x, y) includes 
everything between x and y, but excludes these values. For example, the closed interval of 
integers [0, 5] contains 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, whereas the open interval of integers (0, 5) 
contains 1, 2, 3, and 4. 
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 In my notation for Evidential Probability, I shall deviate in some respects from 
Kyburg’s formalism, because I want to keep as close as possible to standard formalisation of 
Bayesian probabilities, in order to make my discussion easily accessible for readers who are 
used to Bayesian notation. I shall use ‘EP’ for the Evidential Probability function. I shall use 
‘K’ to represent background knowledge. (EP always takes K as one term in the conditional 
probability of a statement.) For the probability of H given K alone, I shall use EP(H | K) = [x, 
y], where x and y are fractions or inequalities. When precise limits are inappropriate, I shall 
use inequalities for x and/or y, like [> 0.5, < 1], instead of open intervals like (0.5, 1), because 
this approach allows the easy formalisation of expressions like ‘the probability of H is at least 
50%’ as closed intervals like [> 0.5, 1]. An agent’s background knowledge can be conjoined 
to their evidence E to determine the probability of a hypothesis H given that E has been 
learned. I shall represent such probabilities using the notation EP(H | E ^ K) = [x, y]. When 
the relative frequency information is rich enough to supply an exact evidential probability, 
such that x = y, then an Evidential Probabilist formalises such a probability as a degenerate 
interval75 like EP(H | K) = [0.5, 0.5], which corresponds to a precise probability of 0.5. 
 
 For example, if K represents the knowledge that 65-75% of the balls in the bag are 
green and H represents the hypothesis that a randomly selected ball from that bag will be 
green, then this evidential relation is represented as EP(H | K) = [0.65, 0.75]. This formalises 
the claim that the probability of H given E is 65% to 75%. 
 
 Generally, one could remove K from the notation. However, sometimes it is important 
to consider different real or hypothetical bodies of background knowledge, and this can be 
formalised by distinguishing between K1, K2, K3… Additionally, the explicit reference to 
                                                          
75 A degenerate interval is any interval in which the limits are equal. 
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background knowledge makes it clear that evidential probabilities are always relational: there 
are no unconditional Evidential Probability values. By contrast, in standard Bayesianism, 
there are marginal probabilities like P(H) and P(E) that can be derived from the full 
distribution over the domain. The reference to K highlights this important difference between 
the two systems. 
 
 Returning to my illustration of direct inference: 
 
(1) The proportion of red balls in the box is 95/100. 
 
(2) Ball A is a ball in the box. 
 
Therefore, probably, (3) Ball A is red. 
 
 Suppose one is constructing an Evidential Probability model of an agent’s reasoning. 
Assume that (1) and (2) are her relevant background knowledge K. Let H represent the 
conclusion (3). On the assumption that the information in the premises is the agent’s best data 
for the probability of H, then the function EP will assign the value [0.95, 0.95] as the value 
for EP(H | K)76. 
 
                                                          
76 To clarify, Kyburg is not saying that we can infer the evidential probability from the premises; instead, the 
information from the premises (along with any relevant background knowledge) is part of what determines the 
probabilistic relation between the premises and the conclusion. In other words, as in the original example, it is 
not the case that a probabilistic statement is being inferred; instead, Kyburg is proposing that the value of a 
conditional probability that relates two sets of statements should be calculated using the relative frequency data 
in the premises, provided that this is the best available evidence with respect to the conclusion. Thus, ‘EP(H | K) 
= [0.95, 0.95]’ is a statement that asserts a (non-deductive) logical relation between H and K, rather than a 
contingent relative frequency statement. Put another way, ‘EP(H | K) = [0.95, 0.95]’ describes ‘therefore’ in the 
argument; it is not a probabilistic statement that is inferred by the argument itself. 
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 Intervals are Kyburg’s own preferred means of representing imprecise probabilities, 
but there are many alternatives. Each approach has advantages in some contexts and 
disadvantages in others77. A pluralistic attitude is consistent with the basic principles of 
Evidential Probability, because the central objective for an Evidential Probabilist is the best 
possible representation of the available statistical information; plausibly, different 
formalisations are optimal for this objective in different contexts. Since Kyburg uses an 
interval-valued formalism and this formalism is generally satisfactory, I shall discuss 
Evidential Probability as an interval-valued system. I shall use ‘imprecise’ as a synonym of 
‘interval-valued’. 
 
 One interesting facet of Kyburg’s system is that the probability that is defined for any 
statement Φ given any set of statements Γ, even if  Γ contains no statistical information 
regarding Φ. For example, consider the hypothesis that the average annual rainfall will be 
greater in Borneo than in the Amazon in the year 250,000 AD. Such conjectures are cases of 
what Frank H. Knight called “uncertainty”, for which there can be no precise probabilities 
that are determined by the available evidence. Knight contrasts such conjectures with cases of 
“risks” that can be measured, because there are known reasons to assign precise 
probabilities78. Someone who made a decision regarding the rainfall hypothesis would be 
making an ‘uncertain’ decision, in Knight’s sense79. According to Evidential Probabilists, a 
precise probability distribution for such conjectures is inappropriate. However, even if no 
degree of precision (even a wide interval like [0.1, 0.9]) seems appropriate, an Evidential 
Probabilist still assign the maximally imprecise [0, 1] interval. (I shall explain this aspect of 
                                                          
77 Walley (2000) provides a detailed critical survey. 
 
78 Knight (2006) p. 233. 
 
79 Knight (2006) p. 226. 
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Evidential Probability in Subsection 5.3) Even though the values must always be based on 
relative frequency data, an Evidential Probabilist can always assign an evidential probability, 
even when the evidence and background knowledge provides no relevant statistical 
information. 
 
 Despite the references to “relative frequencies” in Evidential Probability, the 
probabilities are not statements about long-run or short-run frequencies. Instead, they are 
normative claims about the relationships between statements80. The basic form of evidential 
probability is the assignment of a value to a single-case. The evidential probabilities of more 
general hypotheses are constructed from this foundation. If a hypothesis is a conjunction of 
different claims (like ‘This unknown compound is highly radioactive, poisonous and 
conducts electricity’) then its probability is determined by calculating the probability of the 
conjunction of those claims. If a hypothesis makes reference to a generic member of a class 
(like ‘A man living in Bearsden has a life expectancy of 85 years’) then its probability is the 
probability for an individual in that class for which it is only known that the individual is a 
member of this class. Consequently, there is no problem with single-case probabilities in 
Kyburg’s system: these probability statements not only occur, but they are the bedrock of 
evidential probabilities. 
 
 To close this section, I shall state the general axioms for the EP function81. The 
domain of the probability function is a set of statements Ω that is weakly deductively closed 
and weakly consistent: 
                                                          
80 One can also view them as purely about model-theoretic relationships between statements: see Kyburg and 
Teng (2001) Chapter 10. However, this does not eliminate the importance of normativity at some point in the 
theory, since one always needs bridge statements between facts about logical models and normative principles if 
the former are to have significance for methodology or the theory of rationality. 
 
81 Kyburg (1990) p. 49. 
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Weak Deductive Closure: If Ω contains Φ and Φ implies Ψ, then Ω contains Ψ. 
 
Weak Consistency: There are no statements in Ω that are internally contradictory, like  
‘Φ ^ ¬Φ’. 
 
 The following axioms hold for EP: 
 
(1) If EP(Φ ↔ Ψ | K) = [1, 1], then EP(Φ | K) = EP(Ψ | K). 
 
(If K implies that statements have the same truth-value, then they have the same probabilities 
given K.) 
 
(2) If EP(Φ | K) = [x, y] then EP(¬Φ | K) = [1- y, 1- x] 
 
(Statements’ probabilities vary in proportion to their contradictories’ probabilities.) 
 
(3) If EP(Φ | K) = [x, y] and EP(Ψ | K) = [z, v] and K contains ¬(Φ ^ Ψ), then EP(Φ v Ψ | K) 
is equal to the interval [x + v, y + z] or the interval for EP(Φ v Ψ | K) is contained in  
[x + z, y + v]. 
 
(This axiom adapts the axiom that P(A v B) = P(A) + P(B) when A and B are mutually 
exclusive to the Evidential Probability system. One can derive that there is always at least one 
additive measure function that is consistent with the constraints provided by the intervals.) 
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(4) If EP(Φ | K) = [x, y] and EP(Ψ | K) = [z, v] and Φ implies Ψ, then z ≥ x. 
 
(Statements cannot be less probable than the statements that imply them.) 
 
(5) If T is tautologously true in Ω, then EP(T | K) = [1, 1]. 
 
(Statements that are necessarily true in Ω have a maximal probability.) 
 
(6) If K contains no explicit or implicit contradictions and K contains Φ, then EP(Φ | K) = [1, 
1]. 
 
(A statement has maximal probability given a body of statements that has no contradictions 
and that includes itself.) 
 
From these axioms, Kyburg derives the theorem: 
 
(7) For any finite set of statements, there is an additive probability function P such that its 
values are within the intervals supplied by Evidential Probability. 
 
This theorem is important for understanding the relationship between Evidential 
Probability and Bayesianism. For instance, it means that one could use Evidential 
Probabilities as constraints on the choice of a Bayesian probability function; Jon Williamson 
and Gregory Wheeler take this path in their version of Objective Bayesianism82. 
                                                          
82 Wheeler and Williamson (2011) p. 327-329. 
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5.3 Reference Class Selection 
 
Direct inference is an attractive basis for epistemic probabilities, because it seems 
very intuitive and uncontroversial, in comparison to both (a) other forms of ampliative 
inference or (b) in comparison to the choice of a prior distribution. However, direct inference 
has its own puzzles. One of the most studied issues is the Problem of the Reference Class, 
most influentially discussed by Hans Reichenbach83. Since an individual or sample will 
usually belong to many different reference classes (populations) there is a problem of 
selecting the appropriate reference class from among these rivals. For example, suppose that I 
am choosing whether to purchase an insurance policy for my laptop. I am estimating how 
likely it is that the laptop will last for more than four years. Should the evidential probability 
be an estimate of the relative frequency of laptops in general? Or this particular brand of 
laptop? Or laptops in general when used in my climate? The Problem of the Reference Class 
is the search for a systematic procedure for selecting a reference class from such a set of 
rivals. 
 
 To a large extent, the history of the development of Evidential Probability was a 
history of Kyburg’s wrestling with the Problem of the Reference Class. While this selection 
process is usually intuitive and uncontroversial, Kyburg seeks to formalise our intuitions. The 
essence of his answer is simple: in direct inference, we should use the statistical information 
that provides the most information about the conclusion84. Taking this notion as his starting 
point, Kyburg develops a set of rules for reference class selection. 
                                                          
83 Reichenbach (1949) p. 375. 
 
84 Kyburg and Teng (2001) p. 212. 
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 All Evidential Probabilities are derived from single-case probabilities, so I shall begin 
with single-case statements. Suppose H is an assertion that a particular object has a particular 
predicate and that K contains a set of statistical statements {Ra, Rb, Rc … Rn} for which  
(i) K contains the statement that the object is a member of each of the reference classes 
described by each of these statements and (ii) each statement makes a claim about the relative 
frequency of the predicate in question in that reference class. I shall call these ‘reference class 
statements’. For simplicity, I shall exclude statements that might be used (redundantly) in 
determining the evidential probabilities of statements that are known to be contradictory or 
tautologous from the extension of ‘reference class statements’. 
 
 For example, consider the hypothesis H1: ‘My first toss of this £2 coin will land 
heads.’ My background knowledge K states that the coin toss is a member of a variety of 
reference classes for which I have some statistical knowledge: my tosses of this coin, tosses 
of £2 coins, tosses of pound coins, tosses of contemporary coins, coin tosses in general, and 
so on. My estimates of the relative frequencies of landing heads in each of these coin tosses 
form a set of reference class statements. One can derive the evidential probability of the 
hypothesis given my knowledge by applying Kyburg’s rules of Sharpening, which I describe 
below. Thus, I might eliminate all the reference class statements except ‘Between 48% and 
52% of £2 coin tosses land heads’, and consequently deduce that EP(H1 | K) = [0.48, 0.52]. 
 
 The selection of an evidential probability for H given K involves applying the 
following rules of Sharpening85 in sequential order: 
                                                          
85 Kyburg and Teng (2001) p. 218-219. 
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1. Sharpening by Richness: If two statements regarding reference classes, Ra and Rb give 
incompatible frequencies, and Ra is statement about a joint distribution of random variables 
and Rb is a statement about a marginal distribution of a random variable, then ignore Rb86. At 
a broader level, if there a known full distribution for a set of random variables and this full 
distribution conflicts with a marginal distribution, then the information from the marginal 
distribution will be ignored in favour of the full distribution. Kyburg describes this rule as 
allowing Bayesian reasoning within Evidential Probability, provided that this reasoning is 
based on known relative frequencies87. 
 
Example 
 
 Imagine that I am making a selection from one of two piles of cards, Pile I and Pile II. 
I shall determine my choice of pile by tossing a fair coin. I know that there are 20 cards. I 
also know that 10 of the 20 cards are black. 
 
 Suppose I also know that Pile I has 16 cards, 10 of which are black, whereas Pile II 
has 4 cards, none of which are black. Assume that I know that the joint distribution of  
(i) selecting Pile I by using the coin and (ii) selecting a black card from Pile I is (1/2)(10/16) 
= 0.3125. Let Ra be the reference class statement derived using my knowledge of this joint 
distribution: ‘Black cards will be selected from the two piles with a relative frequency of 
                                                          
86 A random variable is a function that takes statements (or propositions or sets etc.) as its domain and real 
values as its co-domain, or vice versa. A joint distribution for a random variable is a probability distribution that 
provides probabilities that each of a set of random variables gives a value in a particular interval or has a 
particular value. A marginal distribution for a random variable provides the probability that a specific random 
variable or subset of random variables is in a particular interval or has a particular value, without taking into 
account the values of the other random variables in the set. 
 
87 Kyburg and Teng (2001) p. 217. 
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0.3125.’ Let Rb be the reference class statement that ‘Black cards will be selected from the 
two piles with a relative frequency of 0.5.’ Sharpening by Richness requires that I ignore Rb 
in favour of Ra. 
 
2. Sharpening by Specificity: Having applied the previous rule to the set, apply the 
following rule: if Ra and Rb state incompatible frequencies and it is known that all the 
members of the reference class described by Ra are members of the reference class described 
by Rb, but not vice versa (so the members of Ra are the elements of a proper subset of the set 
of members of Rb) then ignore Rb. Put simply and informally, more specific reference 
classes are favoured over less specific reference classes. 
 
Example 
 
 Imagine that I know Ra: ‘Lions attack their handlers in less than 1% of encounters.’ I 
also know Rb: ‘Very hungry lions attack their handlers in over 75% of encounters.’ Suppose I 
am handling a lion and I know that it is very hungry. I know that hungry lions are a proper 
subset of lions. Sharpening by Specificity requires that I ignore Ra in favour of Rb. 
 
 
 If either of the first two rules has reduced the set {Ra, Rb, Rc … Rn} to a single 
reference class statement Ri, then the relative frequency interval asserted in Ri is the value of 
EP(H | K). If there is still a multi-member set of statements asserting different intervals, then 
one applies Sharpening by Precision: 
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3. Sharpening by Precision: If there is a statement Ra whose relative frequency interval is a 
proper subinterval of the other statement’s relative frequency intervals, then Ra determines 
the Evidential Probability88. If there is no such statement, then one must use the cover of the 
remaining intervals: the limits of the interval are the lowest fraction and the highest fraction 
in the set of reference class statements. 
 
Examples 
 
 As an example of clause (i), suppose that I am considering the probability that a 
particular respondent to a poll chose to vote at the last UK general election. I know that  
(a) the respondent is in full-time employment, and (b) they have a university degree. Suppose 
I know Rb: ‘Between 50% and 66% of people in full-time employment voted at the last 
general election’, but I also know Ra: ‘Between 57% and 63% of university graduates voted.’ 
Sharpening by Precision in this case requires that I select the interval [0.57, 0.63] as the 
evidential probability, because this information is consistent with what Rb asserts, but it is 
also more precise. 
 
 As an example of clause (ii), consider the previous example, except that Rb states a 
relative frequency of between 50% and 60%, while Ra states a relative frequency of between 
65% and 70%. Sharpening by Precision requires that I take the cover of the intervals: [0.5, 
0.7], because this is the most precise interval that includes both of the intervals provided by 
Ra and Rb. 
 
                                                          
88 I.e. the first two rules have created a situation in which, for any two members of this set, either they give the 
same interval or one is a proper subinterval of the other, such { [0, 1], [0.6, 0.9], [0.75, 0.8], [0.75, 0.75] }. By 
contrast, there is no proper subinterval of both [0.75, 0.75] and [0.8, 0.8]. 
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 As a further example of (ii), suppose there is unseen wooden carving in a black box. I 
have reached into the box and felt the carving. I know that (a) it has a rough texture, (b) it has 
a cubic shape and (c) it is near the top of the pile of carvings in the black box. I am 
wondering whether the carving is brown. The remaining reference class statements are (1) 
Ra: ‘Between 10% and 50% of cubic carvings are brown’ (2) Rb: ‘Between 50% and 70% of 
the carvings with a rough texture are brown’ and (3) Rb: ‘Between 70% and 90% of the 
carvings near the top of the box are brown.’ Sharpening by Precision requires taking the 
cover of the intervals: [0.1, 0.9]. 
 
 Followed sequentially, these rules determine a unique Evidential Probability for any 
statement Φ and any set of statements Γ. This uniqueness is a result of the fact that any set of 
reference classes that is not eliminated by Sharpening by Richness or Sharpening by 
Specificity will provide a single interval via Sharpening by Precision, which will require 
selecting the shortest interval that is consistent with all the surviving rival intervals. The 
resulting interval might be wide, but it is always unique for a particular hypothesis and 
particular total evidence. 
 
 This uniqueness obtains even if Γ provides no relative frequency data about Φ. For 
any statement ascribing a predicate F to a particular object a, there is the reference class U 
that is the unit set89 containing only a. Either Fa or ¬Fa. If Fa, then 100% of objects in U are 
F. If ¬Fa, then 0% of objects in U are F. Consequently, one always knows the reference class 
statement Ru: ‘The relative frequency of objects that are F in U is between 0% and 100%’ 
when considering the Evidential Probability that a is F. If any more precise information is 
available, then the statement Ru will always be eliminated via Sharpening by Precision. 
                                                          
89 A unit set is a set with a single member. 
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However, if more precise information is unavailable, then Ru will remain, and Sharpening by 
Precision will require using Ru, so that the interval is the maximally wide [0, 1]. 
Accordingly, even in the special case where no precise interval can be assigned, one can 
assign the interval [0, 1]. 
 
For the application of Evidential Probability, Kyburg and Teng also restrict the use of 
direct inference to a set of reference classes that is closed under conjunction, but not closed 
under disjunction90. For instance, ‘chemical element’ and ‘laboratory sample’ might both be 
names of possible reference classes, but not ‘chemical element or laboratory sample’, unless 
the corresponding class is separately distinguished as a reference class. The choice of 
reference classes is decided on grounds that are exogenous to the formal model of Evidential 
Probability. 
 
 Plural-case probabilities, like the probability of ‘The next ten tosses of this £2 coin 
will land heads’ are derived from these single-case probabilities using the axioms that I 
described at the end of Subsection 5.2. The joint probabilities are calculated from the 
marginal probabilities, except that (if the intervals are non-degenerate) one must calculate 
two values91. For example, suppose that I know that my tosses of the £2 coin are independent. 
Let (H1 ^ H2 ^ H3 ^ H4 ^ H5) be the hypothesis that 5 tosses of the coin will land heads. The 
lower limit of the evidential probability interval is the joint product of the lower limits for 
each of the hypotheses: 
 
                                                          
90 Kyburg and Teng (2001) p. 204-207. 
 
91 Kyburg and Teng (2001) p. 263. 
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(4) (0.48)(0.48)(0.48)(0.48)(0.48) = (0.48)5 = 0.01 (2 d. p.) 
 
 One calculates the upper limit in the same manner: 
 
(5) (0.52)(0.52)(0.52)(0.52)(0.52) = (0.52)5 = 0.02 (2 d. p.) 
 
 From (4) and (5): 
 
(6) EP(H1 ^ H2 ^ H3 ^ H4 ^ H5 | K) = [0.01, 0.02] (2 d. p.) 
 
 In the special case of degenerate intervals, such a calculation is easier, since it will be 
simply a case of calculating the joint probabilities given the marginals, given the known 
logical and probabilistic relations between the statements about single-cases. For an idealized 
set-up, like a model of a gambling apparatus or an idealized model of a physical system with 
precise relative frequency claims about events in that system, one can use the standard 
probability calculus to determine the evidential probabilities. For instance, in a standard 
idealized model of tossing a die, one can calculate the evidential probability of not rolling a 
six in 10 tosses using the marginal probabilities for the individual tosses: 
 
(5/6)10 = 0.16 (2 d. p.) 
 
 Hence, using HNS for the hypothesis that die will not land on six is the following 
degenerate interval: 
 
EP(HNS | K) = [0.16, 0.16] (2 d. p.) 
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 Thus, in the special case where the relevant background knowledge is sufficiently rich 
(perhaps because the hypothesis in question concerns an idealized model) the calculation of 
plural-case probabilities is identical to the calculation of a joint probability given the relevant 
marginals using the standard probability calculus. When the relevant background knowledge 
is sufficiently rich, there can be a high degree of similarity between Evidential Probability 
and Bayesianism. 
 
The degree of similarity between Evidential Probability and Bayesianism in dynamic 
reasoning is also dependent on the richness of the background knowledge. Updating 
probabilities using Evidential Probability will sometimes, but not always, correspond to 
updating using Bayesian conditionalization. When Bayesians derived their probabilities from 
knowledge of relative frequencies, then an Evidential Probabilist can make corresponding 
inferences92. For example, suppose that I know that 90% of students who answered the final 
question in the logic exam passed. A student who is wondering about her mark, prior to her 
marks being released, tells me that she is fairly confident that she answered that question. 
Bayesian reasoning would require that I take into account both my evidence regarding the 
pass rate among those students and her degree of confidence about whether she answered that 
question. Analogously, Sharpening by Richness would favour reference class statements that 
combine these two pieces of information over those that simply used the 90% pass rate. 
 
 In the special cases in which all of the relative frequency data is precise and our new 
evidence takes the form of new joint distributions, Evidential Probabilist updating and 
Bayesian conditionalization give identical results. In a hypothetical world where all our data 
                                                          
92 Kyburg (2007) p. 291. 
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was sufficiently precise and our evidence took the form of a simple linear accumulation of 
incorrigible statistical evidence, there would be no major differences between Bayesianism 
and Evidential Probability. The differences would only involve ancillary issues like deductive 
closure or the interpretations of the probabilities. 
 
 Bayesianism and Evidential Probability diverge when the Bayesian priors are not 
based on relative frequency data. For instance, imagine that Miss Marple knows that at least 
2/10 of the guests at the dinner party are complicit in murder of the host, but she does not 
have any better information regarding the guilt of any particular guest. Miss Marple knows 
that a young woman, called Bundle, is one of the guests. Let H be the hypothesis that Bundle 
was complicit in the murder. Let K be Miss Marple’s total relevant knowledge. The 
evidential probability that Bundle was complicit in the murder is EP(H | K) = [0.2, 1], 
because Miss Marple’s best information about Bundle’s complicity is that (a) Bundle is one 
of the guests and (b) at least 2/10 of the guests are complicit in the murder. (It is consistent 
with Miss Marple’s total evidence that all the guests were complicit.) Via direct inference, 
Miss Marple can infer that the evidential probability of Bundle’s complicity is [0.2, 1]. Of 
course, if Miss Marple had some better information (such as knowing that Bundle is a 
morally upstanding woman) then the evidential probability could be very different. In 
contrast, with Bayesian reasoning Miss Marple can have a precise probability for H. It could 
be the case that P(H | K) = 0.8. As I shall soon discuss, the PIE is another example of a 
divergence between Bayesianism and Evidential Probability. 
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SECTION 6: EVIDENTIAL PROBABILISM AND THE 
PARADOX OF IDEAL EVIDENCE 
 
 I shall now analyse the PIE from the perspective of Evidential Probability. Firstly, I 
propose an analysis for relevance using Evidential Probability. Secondly, I apply this 
definition to some examples. Thirdly, I discuss the PIE using this analysis. Fourthly, I answer 
the Problem of Corroborating Evidence using my proposed definition. Fifthly, I contrast my 
proposal with some alternatives, before concluding with a general assessment of my 
definition and the goal that it is supposed to fulfil. 
 
6.1 Relevance in Evidential Probability 
 
 The standard probabilistic definition of relevance uses the values of Bayesian 
probabilities as the means of distinguishing evidence from non-evidence. In contrast, my 
proposal will focus on whether conjoining E to K adds a ‘reference class statement’ that 
could be used to determine the value of an evidential probability. 
 
 As detailed in the previous subsection, one begins to determine evidential 
probabilities by identifying reference class statements. For a given object i and predicate F, it 
will typically be the case that K contains a number of statistical generalisations about 
reference classes which, according to K, include i. The evidential probability that ‘Fi’ is 
determined by applying the Rules of Sharpening to the set {Ra, Rb, Rc … Rn} that contains 
all of these reference class statements in K. Let the ‘candidate reference class statements’ be 
the set containing only those statements that (a) are potential reference class statements for 
statements that are not known to be tautologous or contradictory and (b) state an interval 
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other than [0, 1], so that they are those that report interesting relative frequencies. 
 
 This concept forms the basis of my definition: 
 
Evidential Probabilistic Definition of Evidential Relevance: E is relevant to H relative to 
K if and only if (E ^ K) implies a larger set of candidate reference class statements for H than 
the set of candidate reference class statements implied by K. 
 
 Put more simply and informally, if learning E results in richer relevant statistical 
information (according to the rules of Sharpening) regarding H, relative to K, then E is 
relevant to H, relative to K. 
 
 To explain my definition further, I shall begin with single-case hypotheses. Suppose 
that H states that Fi for some individual i and predicate F. Assume that K contains a number 
of candidate reference classes {Ra, Rb, Rc … Rn}, each of which state the relative frequency 
of F in a reference class that (according to K) includes i. If (E ^ K) implies a candidate 
reference class statement Ro about a reference class that also contains i, then according to my 
definition E is relevant to H given K. 
 
 For instance, let F be ‘lands on a 6’ and ‘i’ be the label for a particular throw of a 
strangely shaped die with 42 sides. Let K be my background knowledge. Assume that I have 
a number of candidate reference class statements for H, like ‘Nearly symmetric objects with 
42 labelled sides will land on a 6 in about 0.01% and 0.03% of throws in the long run’, 
‘Gambling die with 42 labelled sides land on a 6 in about 0.015% to 0.025% of throws in the 
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long-run’… 
 
 If E is the information that ‘The die is one of the die from a particular board game and 
it is weighted to land on 6 in about 0.03% to 0.05% of throws in the long run’, then (E ^ K) 
implies a new candidate reference class statement. Regardless of whether this statement is the 
appropriate basis for the values of the intervals for H given K, I have acquired new evidence 
according to my definition. Similarly, suppose that E is the information that the die has 
landed on a 6 in 30/100 throws. Now, (E ^ K) implies that the die is a member of the 
reference class of 42-sided die that land on 6 in 30/100 straight throws, which is relevant to 
the hypothesis that toss i will land on 6 according to both commonsense and my definition. 
 
 In the case where H describes a set of individuals, E will be relevant to H when it is 
relevant to one or more of the members of the set. This relevance occurs because the set of 
candidate reference class statements that determine the evidential probability of H is simply 
the set that contains all the candidate reference class statements that are relevant for all of the 
individuals described by H. For example, if H is the hypothesis that ‘This set of 10 throws of 
this 42 sided die will land on a 6’ and E is relevant to a hypothesis Hn that a 6 will be thrown 
on the nth throw in that set, then E is relevant to H given K. (E might be the statement that 
the first throw landed on a 6.) Since E is relevant to that throw, it follows from my definition 
that E is relevant to H. By the same reasoning, if H is the hypothesis that ‘The male birth rate 
in humans is 0.51’ and E is a report of a sample of human births, then E will be relevant to H 
given K. 
 
 In many cases, learning relevant evidence for a hypothesis will result in a change in 
the evidential probability of that hypothesis given the total evidence: if I did not know if a job 
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candidate could speak Spanish and I subsequently learned that she was from South America, 
then that would raise my evidential probability that she could speak Spanish. (I shall discuss 
examples in which such a change does not occur when the set of candidate reference class 
statements is expanded towards the end of the next subsection.)   
 
6.2 Additional Examples 
 
  Since all evidential probabilities are derived from the available candidate reference 
class statements, Evidential Probabilities can only change when the set of available candidate 
reference class statements has changed. In other words, whenever EP(H | E ^ K) ≠ EP(H | K), 
it will be because (E ^ K) implies at least one candidate reference class statement that is not 
contained within K. Consequently, if learning E results in a change in the intervals of 
evidential probabilities, then E is relevant to H. I shall provide examples of the two ways in 
which the intervals can change. 
 
 Conjoining new evidence with the background knowledge can result in narrower 
evidential probabilities. Suppose that there is a very large treasure chamber that contains 
many items, including jewels, weapons, art, and apparently golden artefacts like cups, 
necklaces, and bracelets. You wonder about H, which is the hypothesis that a very 
inaccessible crown attached to the roof of the chamber is actually iron pyrite, i.e. fool’s gold. 
Assume that you have no reasons in your background knowledge to think that H is likely or 
unlikely, such that the evidential probability of this hypothesis given your background 
knowledge K is EP(H | K) = [0, 1]. You examine a sample of the apparently golden artefacts 
and you discover that they are all genuinely golden. Assume that your sample report E and 
background knowledge provide suitable data for a classical statistical inference from this 
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sample to the population of apparently golden items in the chamber in general93. In other 
words, (E ^ K) implies that in a long-run series of trials, such a sample would be unlikely to 
occur unless the chamber contained mostly golden artefacts. Thus, (E ^ K) implies Ra, which 
states that over 50% of the artefacts in the chamber are golden. If this reference class 
statement is the statement that is ultimately chosen by the Rules of Sharpening for the 
probability of H given E and K, then EP(H | E ^ K) = [0.5, 1] and so the interval has 
narrowed. 
 
 Evidential Probability intervals can also widen because of new evidence. For 
example, upon learning the evidence, Sharpening by Specificity might require that the 
evidential probability is derived from a reference class statement whose intervals are wider 
than the initial intervals. Imagine that you are an entomologist and you are studying the 
spread of a virus in an artificial nest of ants. You have sampled an ant a1 from the nest. You 
know that the object a1 is an ant in the nest and that 45-55% of ants in the nest have the virus. 
Initially, this might be your best statistical information regarding the probability that a1 has 
the virus, so that the evidential probability interval for the hypothesis ‘a1 has the virus’ is 
[0.45, 0.55]. You subsequently learn that a1 is a soldier ant and that only 25-40% of soldier 
ants in the nest are infected. Since you know that the soldier ants are a subcategory of ants in 
the nest, but not vice versa, Sharpening by Specificity requires that the new evidential 
probability of ‘a1 has the virus’ is the wider interval [0.25, 0.40]. This new evidence is 
relevant according to my definition, because your evidence provides a new reference class 
                                                          
93 Thus, you have no reason to think that your sample is highly atypical. For a more detailed discussion of 
inductive inferences using Evidential Probability, see Chapter 5. 
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statement (‘25-40% of soldier ants in the nest are infected’) to the set of candidate reference 
class statements to be used in determining the probability of ‘a1 has the virus’. 
 
 Furthermore, the intervals will not always change at all upon learning a reference 
class statement, because the putative relative frequencies for different reference classes do 
not have to differ: they can corroborate each other. Suppose that, in the example in the 
previous paragraph, that you learn that a1 is a soldier ants and that 45-55% of soldier ants in 
the nest are infected. Thus, your new information (which I shall call “E2”) corroborates the 
interval that Sharpening selected from the earlier information (which I shall call “E1”) that a1 
is an ant in the nest and that 45-55% of ants in the nest have the virus and the rest of your 
initial background knowledge. Some people have the intuition that E2 is relevant to the 
hypothesis that a1 has the virus, relative to E1 and your background knowledge K.  
(E1 ^ E2 ^ K) implies a reference class statement for the hypothesis that is not implied by (E1 
^ K), which is that ‘45-55% of soldier ants have the virus’. Consequently, my definition sides 
with those who have the intuition that E2 is relevant to the hypothesis that a1 has the virus, 
relative to E1 and the background knowledge
94. One justification for this intuition is the 
following: if the statistical information about the soldier ants had been different (such as ‘0-
1% of soldier ants have the virus’) then the rules of Sharpening would require a very different 
evidential probability interval, since Specificity requires using the new statistical information 
for the interval. Therefore, the additional information could have required a change in the 
evidential probability, even though it happened to repeat the existing interval. Additionally, 
                                                          
94 If one does not have this intuition, and does not consider the Problem of Corroborating Evidence (discussed 
below) to feature a case of evidence that is relevant but does not change the evidential probability, then simply 
modifying the standard probabilist definition of evidence to use Evidential Probability rather than Bayesianism 
seems to be a satisfactory analysis of evidence. I am sympathetic to such a definition, because the use of 
changes in reference class systems was initially motivated by examples such as the example in this paragraph 
and the Problem of Corroborating Evidence. It is also pleasingly close to the definition of evidence that 
Bayesians have felt is intuitive. 
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a1 might have been a worker ant, and your data about the relative frequency of the virus 
among worker ants could also be very different from 45-55%. Again, the additional 
information might have resulted in a different evidential probability, and simply happened to 
produce a value that is identical to the value given E1 and K. These aspects of the scenario 
seem to be what motivates some people’s intuition that E2 is relevant given E2 and K. 
 
 Finally, one interesting form of evidential relevance occurs when the additional 
evidence increases the reliability of existing evidence. In the previous example, you might 
merely learn evidence that supports the 45-55% figure for the relative frequency of the virus 
among soldier ants. More generally, information about the reliability of scientific 
instruments, historical sources, court witnesses, and other sources of knowledge can 
significantly corroborate our existing relative frequency information regarding a hypothesis, 
without altering the evidential probability. 
 
6.3 The Paradox of Ideal Evidence 
 
 
The essence of the PIE is that P(H | E ^ K) might be identical to P(H), even if E is 
evidentially relevant to H. In Popper’s example, E is a report of a large number of tosses of a 
coin of unknown bias/fairness, in which the tosses are evenly balanced between heads and 
tails. There are possible Bayesian probability distributions such that E is probabilistically 
irrelevant to the hypothesis that the nth toss will be heads. Popper’s example demonstrates 
that the standard probabilistic definition of evidential relevance is too narrow. 
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 I shall now examine the PIE using the definition that I developed in Subsection 6.1. H 
is the hypothesis that the coin will land on heads in the nth toss. K is your background 
information, which tells you nothing about the fairness/bias of the coin. Prior to learning E, 
your evidential probability is EP(H | K) = [0, 1]. 
 
 E is the report that the coin landed heads in 1,500 out of the 3,000 earlier tosses, 
where the nth toss is the 3,001st toss. Upon learning E, you learn that the coin is a member of 
the reference class of coins that land heads on 1,500 out of 3,000 tosses. By combining E 
with your background knowledge, you might be able to use classical statistics to infer that the 
long-run relative frequency of the coin landing heads is 0.5 ± a margin of error ε. If ε is 3%, 
then you have learned from (E ^ K) that: 
 
R1: The long-run relative frequency of heads for this coin is between 0.47 and 0.53. 
 
 Since the nth toss is a member of the reference class of long-run tosses of the coin, it 
follows that the set of reference class statements for H has expanded, because it now includes 
R1 and this statement is one of the statements that must be considered when determining 
EP(H | E ^ K). (When R1 is the appropriate reference class statement for H according to 
Sharpening, then EP(H | E ^ K) = [0.47, 0.53].) Therefore, E is relevant to H given K, 
according to my definition. 
 
 One can apply a similar analysis to the example of the team of economists studying 
whether Turkish membership of the EU would increase the GDP of the UK. Even if 
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conjoining the economists’ new data with the relevant background knowledge does not alter 
the evidential probability of the hypothesis, their data will be relevant if one could use it to 
infer reference class statements that include this event as a member of the class they describe. 
For instance, if they develop new statistical data on the effects of the regulatory 
harmonization between countries like Turkey and the UK that would result from Turkish 
membership of the EU, then they will have produced new reference class statements. In 
contrast, if there had been a bizarre miscommunication and the economists had instead 
produced data on the effects of the UK leaving the EU, with no data that one could use in 
calculating the evidential probability of Turkey’s entering the EU, then they would have 
failed to provide any new reference class statements. Consequently, they would have failed to 
provide any new relevant evidence, according to my definition. 
 
6.4 The Problem of Corroborating Evidence 
 
In my discussion of Gemes’s response to the PIE, I presented a kind of 
counterexample for his analysis, which I called the Problem of Corroborating Evidence. I 
shall now explain how my definition avoids this problem. 
 
 In the Problem of Corroborating Evidence, the task is to develop a definition of 
evidential relevance that includes the relevance that statements like ‘This is a non-white 
swan’ have to hypotheses such as ‘All swans are white’, given our background knowledge 
that there are counterexamples like non-white swans. In Bayesianism, the probability of the 
hypothesis given the evidence and the background knowledge will be equal to the probability 
given the background knowledge alone, and so many probabilistic definitions of relevance 
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will fail to register the corroborating evidence as relevant. 
 
 The same phenomenon occurs in Evidential Probability: evidence that corroborates 
the falsification of a hypothesis will not alter the evidential probability. 
 
Key 
H: All swans are white. 
¬Wb: b is a non-white swan.  
K: The background knowledge, including the knowledge that there are non-white swans. 
 
 ‘There are non-white swans’ implies ¬H. Since K is a weakly deductively closed set 
of statements (see Subsection 5.2) it will include ¬H. By Axiom (6), this inclusion entails that 
¬H has maximal evidential probability relative to K: 
 
(i) EP(¬H | K) = [1, 1]. 
 
By (i) and Axiom (2):  
 
(ii) EP(¬H | K) = [1 – 1, 1 – 1] = [0, 0]. 
 
   If ¬Wb is added to K, the interval values for EP(H | ¬Wb ^ K) cannot be any lower 
than zero95. However, if ¬Wb is conjoined with K and ¬Wb is not part of K, then this adds to 
                                                          
95 Else ¬H would be more probable than a tautology T, since it would have a value [1 – (x < 0), 1 – (x < 0)] and 
T has a probability of [1, 1]. This contradicts Axiom (5) that states that no statement can be more probable than 
a statement it implies, since ¬H implies T. In short, the interval values cannot fall below zero because zero is a 
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the set of candidate reference class statements for H. One added reference class statement 
describes the unit set containing the swan b: 
 
Rb: All members of the reference class containing b alone are non-white. 
 
Recall from Subsection 5.3 that the set of reference class statements for a plural-case 
hypothesis are just the set of reference class statements for the individual cases. Therefore, if 
the evidence ¬Wb has increased the reference statements for ¬Wb, then it has increased the 
reference class statements for H, and so it is evidentially relevant to H given K according to 
my definition, even when EP(H | ¬Wb ^ K) = EP(H | K) = [0, 0]. 
 
Since any evidence that corroborates a known falsification of a universal 
generalisation will be relevant according to my definition, my definition avoids the Problem 
of Corroborating Evidence. A report of the most recently observed black swan is as 
intuitively relevant to ‘All swans are white’ as the first such report. It seems to be an unusual 
strength of my definition that it captures this intuition. 
 
6.5 Comparison with Some Alternatives 
 
6.5.1 The Standard Definition 
 
                                                          
general minimum value for the value of either the lower limit or the upper limit of an Evidential Probability 
interval, just as it is a minimum value for a Bayesian probability. 
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My definition appears to be wider than the standard definition. Probabilistic relevance 
can only occur in Evidential Probability when the set of candidate reference class statements 
has changed. Consequently, all cases of probabilistic relevance in Evidential Probability will 
be cases of evidential relevance on my definition. Insofar as it is narrower than the standard 
definition (when the probability function in the definition is a normal Bayesian function) then 
it will presumably be because Bayesianism allows probabilistic relevance in cases where 
there is no foundation for such probabilistic relevance in the relative frequency data. 
(Bayesian reasoning that has grounds in relative frequency data is also possible in Evidential 
Probability.) Whether such cases are problematic depend on broader questions in formal 
epistemology; I shall not discuss them in this chapter. 
 
 At least under circumstances like the PIE, my definition is broader than the standard 
probabilistic definition, because it allows for (what in Bayesianism would be) 
probabilistically irrelevant statements to be evidentially relevant to a hypothesis. 
Furthermore, it includes corroborating evidence, as I noted in my discussion of the Problem 
of Corroborating Evidence in Subsection 6.4. By contrast, in the standard definition, if H and 
K are inconsistent, then E will be probabilistically irrelevant to H given K, as proven in 
Subsection 4.2.3. The PIE and the Problem of Corroborating Evidence are two cases in which 
my definition differs from the standard probabilistic definition; in both cases, the divergence 
is a strength of my proposal. 
 
6.5.2 Keynes’s Strict Definition 
 
My definition also differs from Keynes’s strict definition. In particular, it avoids 
Carnap’s trivialization proof. On Keynes’s definition, almost any arbitrarily selected 
statement E is relevant to any hypothesis H. The problem was that Keynes’s strict definition 
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entails that E is relevant to H, relative to our background knowledge K, if (E ^ K) implies any 
statement that is relevant to H, and Carnap proved that this led to excessive breadth. 
 
 In my definition, there is no such clause. If (E ^ K) does not provide us with a new 
candidate reference class statement for H, then E is not relevant to H given K, and by this 
requirement my definition avoids Carnap’s trivialization proof. For example, for my actual 
background knowledge, ‘Tweety can fly’ provides no statements about the relative frequency 
of landing heads that could be used for the evidential probability of ‘The next toss of this £2 
coin will be heads’, and thus their evidential relation is irrelevance according to both 
common usage and my definition, whereas it would be relevant on Keynes’s strict definition. 
 
6.5.3 Hempel’s Theory of Relevance 
 
In this chapter, I have not discussed Hempel’s theory of evidence. (I shall discuss his 
theory in Chapter 4. A version of the PIE is a special case of one of the objections that 
Carnap raises to Hempel’s theory96.) However, one contrast that is interesting in this context 
is that my analysis favours Keynes and Hosiasson over Hempel: evidence can be relevant to a 
hypothesis, even though it does not confirm or disconfirm that hypothesis. In the PIE, the 
report of coin tosses does not confirm the hypothesis that the nth toss will land heads, 
because the report is no more favourable towards this hypothesis than that the nth toss will 
land tails. Nevertheless, it is evidentially relevant on my definition. Put another way, in my 
analysis, evidence regarding a hypothesis can be (1) favourable, (2) unfavourable, or  
(3) neutral. Therefore, it is possible to distinguish equivocal evidence from an absence of 
evidence. 
                                                          
96 Carnap (1962) p. 480. 
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6.6 General Assessment 
 
 I have not proven that my proposal is free of counterexamples. There are two possible 
types of counterexample to my definition of evidential relevance: (a) examples in which the 
definition fails to include some intuitively relevant evidence or (b) examples in which the 
definition includes some intuitively irrelevant evidence. Popper’s PIE is an instance of (a) for 
the standard definition, whereas Carnap’s trivialization proof is an instance of (b) for 
Keynes’s strict definition. I have not proven that my definition avoids either form of 
counterexample. However, it addresses the standard problems in the literature, as well as 
some new problems that I have developed. The key positive challenge that I have not 
addressed is a very general project for an Evidential Probabilist: to establish that all (or at 
least most) reasoning can be modelled as reasoning within Kyburg’s formalism. For instance, 
it would be interesting to see if testimonial reasoning can be modelled using Evidential 
Probability and the definition of relevance I have proposed in this chapter, because 
testimonial reasoning is a crucial part of scientific, legal, and commonplace reasoning. This 
project is naturally vast and beyond the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, the potential scope 
is broad: for my definition of relevance, the evidence statements that are relevant to a 
hypothesis do not have to be relative frequency statements, provided that they imply 
reference class statements when conjoined with the background knowledge.  
 
 Furthermore, I am not anxious to avoid all counterexamples, provided that they are 
not too severe and/or general. For example, if there are counterexamples from (arguably) 
unusual areas of reasoning, like metaphilosophy or mathematics, then that would be 
consistent with using my analysis for confirmation theory and normative decision theory. My 
definition is part of a tradition of philosophical analysis in which the goal is a formalisation 
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of an ordinary concept that is useful for a specific purpose in a particular context. It is not 
intended to be a discovery of necessary and sufficient conditions for a purpose-independent 
objective concept97. If I have improved on the standard probabilistic alternatives, then I have 
accomplished my objective. 
 
 Finally, I have not discussed the question of evidence whose relevance consists in 
eliminating existing data. The removal of data from the body of science is part of scientific 
practice, but confirmation theorists generally ignore this practice. Thus far, those who have 
analysed evidential relevance have almost always discussed it in terms of background 
knowledge that stays constant over time. This is not an accurate model of how science works: 
exposing fraudulent observation reports and experimental reports is a valuable contribution to 
scientific knowledge; such debunking is intuitively relevant to the hypotheses for which the 
debunked ‘evidence’ was relevant. 
 
 My definition would have to be modified to be applied to a more realistic model of 
scientific knowledge, but it seems that the essential approach could be the same: relevant 
evidence for a hypothesis H consists of statements that change the statistical basis for 
determining the evidential probability of H. Short of discussing issues of contracting 
evidence and engaging with the literature on that subject, I cannot provide a detailed 
discussion of this issue. For this reason, I have limited my analysis to the standard 
analysandum in the literature on relevance: evidential relevance where the background 
knowledge stays constant over time. 
 
                                                          
97 Carnap (1962), Chapter I, provides a discussion of this approach to analytic philosophy. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 Probabilists can answer the PIE by using Evidential Probability as the epistemic 
probability function in a modified probabilistic definition of evidential relevance. Aside from 
the use of Evidential Probability, the salient difference between my answer to the PIE and the 
standard probabilist alternatives is that my definition uses changes in the input for the 
determination of a probability function, rather than change in the value of a probability 
function. One could use changes in the values of evidential probabilities as a sufficient but 
not necessary indicator that there is new relevant evidence. 
 
 Insofar as reasoning can be modelled using Evidential Probability, my answer 
provides a formal analysis of evidential relevance. Furthermore, for informal contexts, my 
answer provides a general answer to the question, ‘What is evidence?’ The answer is that 
evidence for a hypothesis is information that can be used (with the available background 
knowledge) to infer novel reference class data that could be used to determine the probability 
of the hypothesis via direct inference. It follows that evidential relevance is a three-place 
relation, because the putative evidence, the hypothesis, and the background knowledge are all 
vital terms in my definition. Furthermore, evidential relevance is not a matter of opinion, but 
instead it is determined by a logic of direct inference that provides unique values given 
specific inputs. 
 
 An additional feature of my analysis is that it helps clarify the concept of the quantity 
of relevant evidence, which Keynes and some other philosophers of science have regarded as 
important. On my analysis, this quantity will increase when learning evidence enables the 
inference of a new candidate reference class statement. This theory of changes in the quantity 
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of relevant evidence suggests the possibility of using imprecise probability systems like 
Evidential Probability to create a measure for this quantity. I shall explore this possibility in 
the next chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
94 Imprecise Probability and the Measurement of the Weight of Argument 
 
CHAPTER 2: IMPRECISE PROBABILITY AND THE 
MEASUREMENT OF THE WEIGHT OF ARGUMENT 
 
 
 Philosophers like Charles Sanders Peirce and John Maynard Keynes have argued that 
there is an important dimension of scientific reasoning that Keynes calls the “weight of 
argument”. As I shall use the term, the weight of argument is the quantity of relevant 
evidence cited in the premises of an argument, rather than the evidence’s balance for or 
against the conclusion of the argument. 
 
 Some imprecise probabilists have claimed that their systems can be used to measure 
this dimension of reasoning98. Kyburg seems to have been the first to propose such an 
approach99. Though imprecise probabilities are not the only proposed approach to measuring 
weight, they offer the prospect of a relatively simple measure via their degree of imprecision. 
These measures will be my focus in this chapter100. 
 
 In Section 1, I describe Keynes’s original (informal) concept of weight and explain its 
importance within epistemology and decision theory. In Section 2, I critically examine a 
measure developed by Walley, who used a system that I call “Imprecise Bayesianism”. In 
Section 3, I examine Kyburg’s proposal for measuring weight using imprecise probabilities. I 
                                                          
98 Schmeidler (1989) p. 571. 
 
99 Kyburg (1961) p. 63. 
 
100 There are alternative measures of weight in Carnap (1962) p. 554-555 and Gärdenfors and Sahlin (1982). 
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argue that this method has fewer flaws than Walley’s measure, but it nonetheless has some 
very severe problems. I finish by briefly suggesting an alternative approach. 
 
 
SECTION 1: KEYNES AND THE WEIGHT OF ARGUMENT 
 
 Keynes uses the term ‘weight of argument’ to refer to his concept, but the term 
‘weight of evidence’ is often used in the literature. I shall stick to Keynes’s terminology, 
because the phrase ‘weight of evidence’ also sometimes refers to other concepts, such as the 
degree of confirmation of a hypothesis by the evidence. Additionally, in law, the phrase 
‘weight of evidence’ is typically used to mean the balance of evidence101, so my usage avoids 
inconsistency with a large and relevant literature. 
 
 The reference to “arguments” also suggests a conception of evidence as the premises 
of an argument and the hypothesis as the argument’s conclusion. This matches Keynes’s 
conception of evidence: to say that “E is evidence for H” is to claim that an argument from E 
to H would have a premise that is relevant to the conclusion. (See Chapter 1 Section 2.2 for a 
formal discussion of Keynes’s theory of relevance.) Probabilist confirmation theorists like 
Keynes, Bayesians, and Kyburg often formalise these arguments using conditional 
probabilities. For example, in conditional probabilities like P(H | E), P(H1 ^ H2 | E), and  
EP(H | E ^ K), statements to the left of ‘|’ can be interpreted as the conclusions of arguments, 
while the statements to the right of the vertical bars can be interpreted as the premises. 
 
                                                          
4 Nance (2016) p. ix. 
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1.1 Keynes’s Concept of the Weight of Arguments 
 
 Chapter VI of Keynes’s 1921 book A Treatise on Probability is the first extended 
discussion of weight. The “weight of argument” is the quantity of relevant evidence in the 
premises of an argument for a hypothesis. Keynes uses ‘weight of argument’ in a number of 
other senses, as Jochen Runde has clarified102, but I shall focus on this particular meaning of 
the term. 
 
 Suppose that there is an argument from K to H, where H is a hypothesis and K is the 
relevant background knowledge. If some additional relevant evidence E is added to K, so that 
the new premise is (E ^ K), then the weight has increased. For example, imagine that H is the 
claim that a type of steel bar will be able to bear α newtons of force in a proposed Alaskan 
bridge and K is a conjunction of relevant background knowledge, such as descriptions of 
controlled experiments in which (under somewhat analogous conditions) this type of steel bar 
withstood this force. E is a description of experiments in which engineers were able to 
replicate more closely the conditions under which the bridge will be used (such as extreme 
cold or heavy precipitation) than in past experiments. E will add to the quantity of relevant 
evidence, regardless of whether it reports that the steel bar was able or unable to bear α 
newtons in the experiments, because it is relevant to H given the background knowledge. 
 
 Another important feature of Keynes’s concept is that weight is distinct from 
probability. Adding some relevant evidence to the background knowledge always increases 
the weight, even if the conditional probability of the conclusion given the total evidence is 
unchanged. For example, imagine that you hear a weather report stating that tomorrow will 
                                                          
102 Runde (1990) p. 279-281. 
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be windy. The conditional probability that tomorrow will not be windy, given your total 
evidence, has decreased. In contrast, the weight of argument has increased. 
  
The informal concept of weight has a long history. I. J. Good notes that, as a 
metaphor, one can trace it as far back as the Ancient Greek goddess Themis and her “scales 
of justice”103. Peirce provides one of the earliest philosophical discussions. He uses a simple 
example of its apparent significance: imagine that there is a bag with an unknown proportion 
of red beans and/or black beans. Assume that we expect a red bean or black bean with equal 
credence. There is an apparent difference between founding our expectation on a sample of 
1,000 beans drawn from the bag, rather a sample of only 2 beans. If we are extrapolating 
from the former bag, then we seem to be entitled to greater confidence (in some informal 
sense) than from the latter bag104. Peirce argues that the difference is the greater quantity of 
evidence that the larger sample provides. 
 
 James Franklin argues that weight is important in legal reasoning. According to his 
analysis, the legal concept of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” should be interpreted as two 
distinct requirements: (1) the prosecution has proven that the guilt of the accused is highly 
probable given the evidence and (2) the prosecution has provided a sufficiently large quantity 
of evidence105. For instance, a prosecutor might provide several eyewitness reports that all 
give hints that the accused murdered the victim in their home: one eyewitness claims she saw 
the accused near the house that night; another eyewitness saw them driving away quickly 
                                                          
103 Good (1985) p. 249. 
 
104 Peirce (1932) 2.677. 
 
105 Franklin (2012) p. 237. 
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within 20 miles of the crime scene; and so on. However, the cumulative weight of these 
different pieces of evidence might be jointly insufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable 
doubt. Franklin also notes that weight seems to be an almost explicit part of some legal 
reasoning. One example is that there is a “burden of production” that is required before civil 
cases can begin, which means that plaintiffs must present a significant amount of relevant 
evidence ahead of the case106. 
 
 As O’Donnell emphasises, the adjective “relevant” in front of “evidence” is very 
important107. Keynes is not referring to the sheer number of statements on the right hand side 
of a conditional probability like P(H | E) or the sheer bulk of information that these 
statements contain. By “relevant evidence”, Keynes is only referring to those statements 
contained in E that meet a suitable definition of evidential relevance. For instance, the 
argument from ‘This 300-fold sample of bees are all female’ to ‘It will be windy tomorrow’, 
relative to our actual background information, has no weight, because the premise is 
irrelevant to the conclusion. Only relevant evidence will add to the weight of argument. 
 
 Summarising, I shall understand weight as the quantity of relevant evidence for a 
hypothesis. It is a two-place relation between a conjunction of premises and a conclusion, or 
between evidence and a hypothesis. (These are equivalent in Keynes’s theory of evidence.) 
The weight of an argument is neither reducible to the absolute amount of information in the 
premises, nor to the balance of the premises in favour or against the conclusion. 
 
                                                          
106 Franklin (2006) p. 161. 
 
107 O’Donnell (1989) p. 69. 
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1.2 The Significance of Weight 
 
 Keynes does not doubt that weight is an important concept, but he is unsure about 
precisely how weight has practical significance108. In the previous subsection, I described 
some examples of the concept in action from Peirce and Franklin. To highlight the 
importance of weight, I shall now give some further instances of philosophers who have 
applied the concept. 
 
 In confirmation theory, Hosiasson uses Keynes’s concept to explain the value of 
acquiring evidence that does not confirm or disconfirm a hypothesis. As I discussed in the 
previous chapter, Hosiasson argues that weight can increase even with evidence that is 
equivocal with respect to a hypothesis. For instance, a sample report of 50 coin tosses of a 
coin with unknown bias/fairness that landed heads in 25/50 tosses and tails in the other 25  
tosses might not alter the probability of the hypothesis that the nth toss will land heads, but it 
will add to the weight for this hypothesis given the total evidence109. 
 
 In decision theory, Franklin notes that there are trade-offs between (1) the benefits of 
acquiring more evidence and (2) the cost of acquiring evidence. The choice of a particular 
balance between (1) and (2) involves Keynes’s concept of weight, because both refer to the 
notion of a greater or lesser quantity of relevant evidence110. Imagine that you are a member 
of a UK Treasury committee that the government has established to assess whether merging 
National Insurance and income tax will result (ceteris paribus) in an increase in revenues. 
                                                          
108 Keynes (1921) p. 76-77. 
 
109 Hosiasson (1931) p. 36. 
 
110 Franklin (1998) p. 112-113. 
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You aim to study a large variety of econometric, historical, and theoretical research that is 
relevant to this hypothesis before coming to a judgement. While you are amassing the 
evidence, you will make decisions about whether you have acquired a sufficiently large 
quantity of evidence to give an informed judgement. Since you cannot acquire all the relevant 
evidence, there must be a point at which you judge that “enough” evidence has been 
acquired. This process involves decisions about weight: at a given time t, have you sufficient 
relevant data to form an informed judgement? 
 
 In the philosophy of law, Barbara Davidson and Robert Pargetter use weight in their 
analysis of the legal phrase “beyond reasonable doubt”111. Like Franklin, they argue that this 
notion involves more than just the probability of guilt. They argue that it involves two other 
aspects of the evidence that the prosecution and defence present at a trial: (1) the reliability of 
the evidence and (2) the quantity of evidence presented. Davidson and Pargetter use the 
following example to illustrate their point: there are 10 suspects and the jury knows, via 
reliable evidence, that 9/10 of the suspects are guilty and one suspect is innocent. 
Furthermore, the suspects confirm this information, but they refuse to confess who is 
innocent. For any given suspect, the probability of guilt is high. Yet this high probability does 
not suffice to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Furthermore, a higher threshold of 
probability than 90% will not help either, because we can simply consider cases in which 
99/100 suspects, 999/1000 suspects etc. are known to be guilty. It is implausible that the 
problem in this case is that the threshold for guilt is a 90% probability, rather than a 99.9% 
probability or a 99.99% probability. Davidson and Pargetter justify this requirement for more 
evidence on the grounds that just one additional piece of evidence (e.g. nine of the suspects 
                                                          
111 Davidson and Pargetter (1987) p. 187. 
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confessing without coercion or incentives) would radically alter the probability of any 
particular suspect being guilty, so that a small quantity of weight is sufficient to change the 
balance of the evidence in the case112. They also note that judges can dismiss cases on the 
grounds of insufficient evidence, regardless of the balance of the evidence or the evidence’s 
reliability113. Davidson and Pargetter argue for explicitly incorporating weight into juries' 
reasoning and they suggest that the standards for weight in determining guilt should vary with 
the seriousness of crimes, just as the seriousness of crimes affects the standards for the 
reliability of evidence and the probability of guilt. 
 
Keynes doubts that weight can be measured quantitatively, though he nonetheless 
thinks that it can be incorporated into decision theory114. Nonetheless, given weight’s many 
applications, a quantitative formalization of weight could be useful. Imprecise probabilities 
offer one possible formal basis for such measurement. In the rest of this chapter, I shall 
critically examine two quantitative measures of weight. Insofar as such measures are 
successful, they offer the prospect of better theories of evidence and rational decision-
making. However, I shall argue that the proposed measures have several exigent problems. 
 
 
 
                                                          
112 Davidson and Pargetter (1987) p. 183. 
 
113 Davidson and Pargetter (1987) p. 184. 
 
114 Keynes (1921) p. 72-73. 
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SECTION 2: IMPRECISE BAYESIANISM AND THE WEIGHT 
OF ARGUMENT 
 
In this section, I examine Walley’s measure of weight, which uses a probability 
theory that I shall call ‘Imprecise Bayesianism’. I describe an existing objection to this 
measure, which derives from a problem called “dilation”. I also adapt a standard general 
objection to Imprecise Bayesianism into an objection against Walley’s measure. I finish by 
developing several novel objections to Walley’s measure. 
 
2.1 Imprecise Bayesianism 
 
 I provided an outline of Bayesianism and its different forms in Chapter 1 Section 2.1. 
As I shall use the term, ‘Imprecise Bayesians’ are a subgroup of Subjective Bayesians who 
retain much of standard Bayesianism, but with two important differences. Firstly, they drop 
the requirement that all probabilities must be additive. Secondly, they allow probability 
functions to take values that are not real numbers. I outline the formal framework of 
Imprecise Bayesianism, before describing the updating process within this system. 
 
2.1.1 The Formal Framework 
 
 In Imprecise Bayesianism, the probability of a statement is determined by a 
continuous set of ordinary Bayesian probability functions, instead of via a single function. 
Each individual function produces a distribution that satisfies the axioms of additive 
probability. Imprecise Bayesians interpret these values as subjective degrees of belief, where 
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this magnitude is represented by a pair of real numbers, rather than a single-number. This set 
of probability functions is sometimes called a “representor”115, a “credal set”, or a 
“committee”116. I shall use the last term for the set. This committee, as a whole, represents 
the credences of the agent being modelled. 
 
 Before explaining how the membership of the committee is determined, I shall outline 
the terminology that I shall use. As in previous chapters, Ω is the domain of the function, 
which is a set of statements, while other Greek letters represent arbitrarily selected members 
of that domain. I shall use ‘P’ to refer to a function whose values are determined by a 
committee. I shall add labels to ‘P’ to refer to individual members of that committee. In 
particular, Pi will refer to an arbitrarily selected member of the set of functions. I shall use  
‘𝑃 (Φ)’ to denote the lower bound of the interval for a statement Φ, which is given by the 
function in the committee that gives Φ the lowest probability. I shall use ‘𝑃(Φ)’ to denote the 
upper bound of the interval for Φ, which is given by the function in the committee that gives 
Φ the highest probability. Thus, when P(Φ) = [0.3, 0.7], then the function in the committee 
that has the lowest value for Φ’s probability assigns Φ a value of 0.3, while the function that 
has the highest value for this statement assigns Φ a value of 0.7. When there is only one value 
that the members of the set assign to Φ, I shall simplify the equations by using a single real 
number r for the value of the Imprecise Bayesian probability, instead of a degenerate interval, 
so that ‘P(Φ) = r’ obtains when every member of the committee assigns Φ a value of r.  
Finally, I shall add the mark ‘ ´ ’ to ‘P’ to indicate that the distributions in the members of the 
committee have been updated. 
 
                                                          
115 Van Fraassen (1990) p. 347. 
 
116 Bradley (2015). 
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 The following axioms govern Imprecise Bayesian probabilities: 
 
(i) 𝑃(Φ) = x and 𝑃(Φ) = y in the committee that determines P(Φ) = (x, y). 
 
(This axiom defines how P’s value is determined by the set of probability functions that 
compose the committee.) 
 
(ii) If P(Φ) = [x, y], then 0 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ 1. 
 
(The values for x and y are an ordered pair of real numbers between 0 and 1 inclusive; they 
are ordered by their numerical value.) 
 
(iii) 𝑃(Φ) = 1 – 𝑃(¬Φ). 
 
(The lower bound of a statement and the upper bound of its negation vary in proportion.) 
 
(iv) If P(Φ ^ Ψ) = 0, then 𝑃(Φ) + 𝑃(Ψ) ≤ 𝑃(Φ v Ψ) ≤ 𝑃(Φ v Ψ) ≤ 𝑃(Φ) + 𝑃(Ψ). 
 
(This axiom adapts axiom (iii) from Chapter 2 Section 2 for imprecise probabilities. For each 
of the extreme functions in the set, the sum of the probabilities of two statements cannot 
exceed the probability of their disjunction.) 
 
(v) If P(Φ) = [x, y] and x = y, i.e. the interval is a degenerate interval, then P(Φ) obeys the 
axioms of additive probability. 
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(Precise Bayesian probabilities are a special case of Imprecise Bayesian probabilities.)117 
 
 Subject to these axioms, the choice of P(Φ) for any given statement in the domain is 
subjectively determined by the Imprecise Bayesian. One approach to calculating these values 
is to let x / y characterise the least favourable betting odds at which, under special 
conditions118, you will buy a bet on a statement. The value of 𝑃(Φ) is determined by the 
following definition: 
 
Implied Lower Bound Probability: z / w are your minimum buying odds for Φ if and only 
if 𝑃(Φ)⁡= ⁡
𝑤
𝑤+𝑧
.  
 
 In contrast to precise Subjective Bayesianism, the minimum buying odds and the 
minimum selling odds can be unequal. When they are unequal, the Imprecise Bayesian 
interval for a statement Φ will be imprecise. When the minimum buying odds are equal to the 
minimum selling odds, then the intervals are degenerate, such that 𝑃 (Φ) = 𝑃(Φ)119. For 
example, suppose that the minimum odds at which your will buy a bet on Φ are 4/1, so that 
𝑃(Φ) = 0.2, but that the minimum odds at which your will sell a bet on Φ are 1/4, so that 
𝑃(Φ) = 0.8. Your Imprecise Bayesian probability for Φ is P(Φ) = [0.2, 0.8]. 
 
 Full distributions are determined in the same way: for a given committee S, the value 
                                                          
117 These axioms are adapted from Howson and Urbach (1993) p. 88. 
 
118 These are the same conditions that precise Bayesians often use to characterise precise probabilities in terms 
of fair betting odds. 
 
119 Bradley (2015), formal appendix. 
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of each joint distribution is determined by (1) the function that is a member of S and which 
gives the lowest value for that joint distribution and (2) the function that is a member of S and 
which gives the highest value for that joint distribution. For both marginal probabilities and 
joint distributions, it is the committee that determines the values of P. Membership of the 
committee is a matter of the Imprecise Bayesian’s choice; the procedure I outlined above that 
uses minimum buying/selling odds is one method for determining such choices. 
 
 If an Imprecise Bayesian has a joint distribution from which they want to obtain a 
marginal distribution, then they can do so by deriving the marginal probabilities for the lower 
and upper members of the committee. Suppose that Ψ ∈⁡Ω, Φ ∈⁡Ψ, and Ω is the Cartesian 
product of Ψ and Γ, denoted as (Ψ x Γ)120. Let 𝑃1 be the agent’s probability distribution 
defined over Ω and 𝑃2 be the probability distribution for the agent defined over Ψ. Under 
such circumstances, 𝑃2(Φ) = 𝑃1(Φ x Γ). The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for the value of 
𝑃2(Φ)121. 
 
 The goal of the Imprecise Bayesian formalism is a more faithful and philosophically 
fecund representation of psychological states than a single precise probability function. 
Imprecise Bayesians view the intervals as bona fide epistemic probabilities, just like precise 
probabilities. They do not regard the intervals as mere computational expedients or as a 
method for handling the problems of eliciting precise credences from an agent. The intervals 
are intended to be a superior formalism for epistemic probability theory, not a second-best 
option that must be adopted for pragmatic reasons. 
                                                          
120 The Cartesian product of two sets is the set that contains all the possible ordered pairs of members of those 
sets. For example, the Cartesian product (Φ x Ψ) where Φ = {Heads, Tails} and Ψ = {1, 2} is {(Heads, 1), 
(Tails, 1), (Heads, 2), (Tails, 2)}. 
 
121 Walley (1991) p. 181-182. 
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 It is also important to distinguish Imprecise Bayesian probabilities from interval-
valued estimates of a single number, such as a relative frequency or value of a propensity. For 
both uses of interval-valued probabilities, we might articulate a probability of P(H | E) = [0.4, 
0.6], as “The probability is between 0.4 and 0.6”. However, in Imprecise Bayesianism, the 
interval value is not a range that includes the value of a precise objective probability, where 
this precise value is the “real” probability. In addition, the interval value is not an estimate of 
a real-valued number that is the actual value of the probability for that agent. Instead, it is an 
interval that describes the values that different members of the committee give for a particular 
statement. 
 
2.1.2 Updating with Imprecise Bayesian Probabilities 
 
In Imprecise Bayesianism, conditionalization of a statement H takes the form of 
conditionalizing for the entire committee, using the equation: 
 
𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸) = {⁡𝑃𝑖(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸), 𝑃𝑖 ∈ 𝑃, 𝑃𝑖(𝐸) > 0⁡} 
 
- which says that the conditional probability for the committee is determined by the 
conditional probability for each member Pi of the set, provided that Pi(E) exceeds 0. 
 
 Naturally, examining every probability function in the continuous distribution is 
normally out of the question. (The exceptions occur when the interval is degenerate.) Instead, 
Imprecise Bayesian conditionalization begins via examining 𝑃 and 𝑃. Suppose that an agent 
is conditioning H on E. They must undertake the following two procedures in sequential 
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order: 
 
(1) Does 𝑃(E) > 0? If not, determine the remaining function in the set that has the highest 
prior probability for H; this function is the new upper limit function in the set. They must 
then performs the same process, mutatis mutandis, for 𝑃. 
 
(2) Let 𝑃𝑟 and 𝑃𝑟 be the remaining upper/lower limit functions for H after carrying out 
procedure (1). The agent’s conditional probabilities for H given E are the new upper/lower 
values for H in the new distribution P´ that has been conditioned on E. The other functions in 
the new set are the functions that provide the continuum of intermediate values between 
𝑃𝑟(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸) and 𝑃𝑟(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸). 
 
 For example, imagine that you are making a random draw of a card from a deck of 
uncertain composition: 
 
Key 
H: An Ace of Spades will be selected. 
E: A black card will be selected. 
 
 You feel that the deck might be slightly stacked in favour of Aces of Spades. You 
decide that it plausible that there are 3 Aces of Spades in the deck, but no more than this 
amount. You also feel that it is plausible that the deck has the normal ratio of 1/52 Aces of 
Spades, but not any lower proportion. 1/52 is your lower bound prior probability for H. The 
3/53 is your upper bound prior probability for H. An Imprecise Bayesian represents this state 
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of belief as 𝑃(𝐻) = [
1
52
,
3
52
]. 
 
 Suppose that E has the following probability according to 𝑃⁡and 𝑃: 
 
𝑃(𝐸) =
26
52
=
1
2
 
 
𝑃(𝐸) =
28
52
=
7
13
 
 
For both functions, the likelihood of E given H is 1. By Bayes’s Theorem: 
 
𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸) =
𝑃(𝐸⁡|⁡𝐻)𝑃(𝐻)
𝑃(𝐸)
=
1
26
 
 
𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸) =
𝑃(𝐸⁡|⁡𝐻)𝑃(𝐻)
𝑃(𝐸)
=
3
26
 
 
 Hence: 
 
𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸) = [
1
26
,
3
26
] 
 
 Thus, after updating with E: 
 
𝑃´(𝐻) = [
1
26
,
3
26
] 
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 As the example illustrates, conditionalization in Imprecise Bayesianism is somewhat 
more complex than in precise Bayesianism, but it is not always computationally difficult. 
(There are other general computational problems in Imprecise Bayesianism: Kyburg notes 
that assigning a prior distribution requires assigning probabilities to each subset of state 
descriptions, in addition to each individual state description122.) The salient mathematical 
difference is that Imprecise Bayesian updating does not involve conditionalization for a 
function. Instead, one eliminates functions for which Pi = 0 and updating the remaining 
members of the committee. 
 
 Updating with conditionalization is not the only possible updating method for 
imprecise probabilities. Evidential probabilities are updated by conditionalization under some 
circumstances and by different rules in other circumstances, as described in Chapter 1 
Subsection 5.3. It would also be possible to develop systems that were similar to Imprecise 
Bayesianism, but had weaker or stronger updating rules. A very weak updating rule could 
turn membership of the set into a matter of personal caprice. A stronger updating rule could 
involve conditionalization plus additional requirements that a function must satisfy in order to 
remain in the committee. I shall discuss some modifications of Imprecise Bayesian updating 
in Subsection 2.4. 
 
 Finally, I shall state the principal contrasts between Imprecise Bayesianism and 
Evidential Probability. Firstly, the two systems use different interpretations of probabilities. 
Imprecise Bayesian probabilities are psychological statements about the credences of an 
                                                          
122 Kyburg (1992) p. 192-193. A state description is a conjunction of assertions/negations of each statement in 
the domain of P. 
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imaginary agent, where their states of belief are represented by intervals determined by the 
set. In contrast, evidential probabilities are normative claims about purely formal evidential 
relations between statements. Secondly, there are formal differences. Imprecise Bayesian 
probabilities are intervals that range over a set of precise probability functions. Evidential 
Probability intervals range over values from the relative frequency statements that survive the 
rules of Sharpening. Imprecise Bayesian probability statements describe sets of functions, 
whereas Evidential Probabilities are akin to deductive logical entailment relations because 
they are derived via formal rules. Thirdly, there is a difference in the updating method. 
Imprecise Bayesian updating is always a modified form of conditionalization. Evidential 
Probability updating involves adding E to an agent’s body of statements and checking, for 
each statement H, whether E contains information about relative frequencies that alters the 
evidential probability of H relative to the agent’s total evidence. Therefore, despite the fact 
that both systems are imprecise probability systems, they have many important differences. 
These differences will be crucial to my arguments in this chapter. 
  
2.2 Imprecise Bayesianism and Weight 
 
 
 Using Imprecise Bayesianism, Walley proposes the following measure for the weight 
of E with respect to H: 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 = ⁡𝐷𝐼 = 𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸) − 𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸)123 
                                                          
123 Walley (1991) p. 522. 
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 Informally, Walley’s DI measure of weight involves using the difference between the 
lower bound value and the upper bound of the Imprecise Bayesian probability to measure the 
weight of an argument from E to H. 
 
 Part of the appeal of this measure is that the representative richness of imprecise 
probabilities is one of primary arguments for Imprecise Bayesianism. For instance, the theory 
seems particularly suitable for modelling differences of ignorance. An Imprecise Bayesian 
can argue that imprecise values seem most natural when one is in a position of ignorance: if I 
am confronted with the question, ‘Are tardigrades carnivorous?’, when I know very little 
about tardigrades (or microscopic organisms in general) then it seems strange to assign a 
precise probability to the hypothesis that they are carnivorous, whereas it is relatively 
intuitive for me to claim that the hypothesis’s probability is greater than 1% and less than 
99%. If I were to acquire more information and reduce my ignorance, a more precise 
probability would arguably become more intuitive. 
 
 Conversely, many of the circumstances in which precise probabilities seem most 
natural are situations in which there is a rich body of evidence. People typically learn about 
precise probabilities via gambling devices like coins, cards, balls in urns, and so on, where 
these devices and their historical antecedents have been used for hundreds or even thousands 
of years. The behaviour of these devices is fairly well-grasped by ordinary folk physics, while 
the behaviour of the users of these devices is also typically well-grasped by ordinary folk 
psychology, and when issues that could require acquiring more evidence are raised (e.g. the 
possibility of a coin landing on its side) these are typically removed by assumption or 
idealization. At least in some cases, there is a prima facie relationship between the degree of 
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imprecision of the intuitively appealing probabilistic statements and the quantity of relevant 
evidence, so that Walley’s measure of weight has some initial plausibility. 
 
 Before going further, I shall make an important formal point. Usually, an agent’s 
background knowledge will provide some relevant evidence about a hypothesis. In precise 
Bayesianism or Imprecise Bayesianism, P(H) can be regarded as the probability of H given 
the background knowledge. If I feel that H has a probability of [0.5, 0.9] given what I already 
know, then this value can serve as both my prior probability and my probability for H given 
my background knowledge. In my discussion below, the DI measure for P(H) will be the 
value for the weight of H given the agent’s background knowledge. 
 
 I shall now look at an example using Walley’s measure. Imagine that an Imprecise 
Bayesian has inherited a specially designed Magic 8-Ball. She is wondering what answer the 
ball will give to her next question when she shakes it. H is the hypothesis that ‘This unusual 
Magic 8-Ball will give an equivocal answer’. Suppose that she knows that the Magic 8-Ball is 
designed to give equivocal answers at a long-run relative frequency of ≥ 0.5. Furthermore, 
she has already shaken it several times and its answer was equivocal in each case. For all she 
knows, the Magic 8-Ball’s internal design causes it to always give equivocal answers. 
Assume that her prior probability for H is: 
 
𝑃(𝐻) = [0.5, 1] 
 
Using the DI measure, the weight for P(H) is: 
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𝐷𝐼(𝐻) = 1 − 0.5 = 0.5 
 
 Subsequently, she discovers a manual for the 8-Ball. The manual tells her that the 
ball’s relative frequency of equivocal answers is about 70% to 80%. Let E represent what she 
has learned from the manual. Suppose that: 
 
𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸) = [0.7, 0.8] 
 
 Intuitively, E is relevant evidence for H, given her background knowledge. The DI 
measure registers this increase in the quantity of relevant evidence, because the interval has 
narrowed: 
  
𝐷𝐼(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸) = 0.8 − 0.7 = 0.1 
 
 
 However, Walley’s formalism for his measure can be a little confusing, because the 
degree of imprecision has fallen as relevant evidence has increased. The values of DI and the 
quantity of relevant evidence will vary inversely, so that Walley’s measure is linguistically 
awkward. A trivial modification makes the measure more verbally felicitous: 
 
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 = 𝐷𝐼 = 1 − (𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸) − 𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸)) 
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  Thus, the DI measure’s values are 1 minus the degree of imprecision. DI will be a large 
fraction when weight is high according to the measure and a small fraction when weight is 
low according to the measure. 
 
 Walley provides an informal example of this sort of measure in action124. Let H be a 
prediction about the next trial in a series of probabilistically independent trials, like a toss of a 
coin of unknown bias or fairness. Let E1, E2 … En be a set of reports of individual trials, such 
as the tosses of the coin. Under appropriate values for the full probability distribution, it is 
intuitive that the weight of argument will vary in proportion to n, where n is the number of 
reports. Similarly, the DI measure will increase (in the limit) as the number of trials increases, 
because the conditional probabilities of the n + 1 toss will converge (again, given an 
appropriate full distribution) towards a single value. Therefore, if the probability distributions 
for the functions in the set have suitable values, then weight will increase (in the limit) 
according to both intuition and the DI measure. 
 
 However, the DI measure does not always perform so adroitly. In the next five 
subsections, I shall present problems for this method of measuring weight. 
 
2.3 Dilation 
 
Dilation is a well-established paradox in Imprecise Bayesianism, in which imprecise 
posteriors can be wider than their priors, because of the updating procedure in the system. 
                                                          
124 Walley (1991) p. 211. 
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Some philosophers use dilation as an objection to Imprecise Bayesianism in general125 and 
defenders of imprecise probabilities have made rebuttals to this criticism126. In contrast, in 
this chapter I shall only discuss dilation as a problem for the DI measure, because I am 
concerned with the measurement of weight, as opposed to providing an overall evaluation of 
Imprecise Bayesianism. In this subsection, I shall explain how learning new evidence can 
widen the probabilities in Imprecise Bayesianism and why this presents a problem for the DI 
measure. Seamus Bradley has also made this point127. 
 
 For example, suppose that I am about to randomly select a card from a pile of 40 
cards. I know that 20 of the cards are red and 20 of the cards are black. However, I do not 
know exactly which cards are in the pile. In particular, I do not know the proportion of odd-
numbered cards to even-numbered cards. Assume that the following Imprecise Bayesian 
distribution characterises my degrees of belief: 
 
Key 
H: The card is red. 
X: The card is even. 
Y: The card is red if and only if it is even. 
 
(1) 𝑃(𝐻) = 0.5 
(2) 𝑃(𝑋) = ⁡ [0, 1] 
(3) 𝑃𝑖(𝑋⁡|⁡𝐻) ⁡= ⁡𝑃𝑖(𝑋) (For any function i in the set, X is independent of H.) 
                                                          
125 White (2010). 
 
126 Pedersen and Wheeler (2014). 
 
127 Bradley (2015). 
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 The value of P(Y) can be determined from the probabilities above. I shall prove this 
by deriving the value for an arbitrarily selected function Pi and generalising via mathematical 
induction that the entire set of functions must have this value. 
 
Proof 1 
 
Claim: That (1) and (3) imply that P(Y) = 0.5. 
 
 By the symmetry of probabilistic independence, it follows from (3) that: 
 
(4) 𝑃𝑖(𝐻⁡|⁡𝑋) ⁡= ⁡𝑃𝑖(𝐻) 
 
 (H ↔ X) is logically equivalent to ((H ^ X) v (¬H ^ ¬X)). By Axiom (iii) in Chapter 1 
Subsection 2.1.2, which I shall call the ‘Additivity Axiom’: 
 
(5) 𝑃𝑖((𝐻⁡^⁡𝑋)⁡𝑣⁡(¬𝐻⁡^⁡¬𝑋)) = 𝑃𝑖(𝐻⁡^⁡𝑋) ⁡+⁡𝑃𝑖(¬𝐻⁡^⁡¬𝑋) 
 
 The challenge is now to determine the value of each disjunct without assigning a 
particular value to Pi(X). H is logically equivalent to ((H ^ X) v (H ^ ¬X)). Hence, from (1): 
 
(6) 𝑃𝑖(𝐻) = 𝑃𝑖((𝐻⁡^⁡𝑋)⁡𝑣⁡(𝐻⁡^⁡¬𝑋)) = 0.5 
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 From (6) and the Additivity Axiom: 
 
(7) 𝑃𝑖((𝐻⁡^⁡𝑋)⁡𝑣⁡(𝐻⁡^⁡¬𝑋)) = 𝑃𝑖(𝐻⁡^⁡𝑋) ⁡+⁡𝑃𝑖(𝐻⁡^⁡¬𝑋) = 0.5 
 
 Since (3) and (4) state that H and X are both independent of each other, it must be the 
case that: 
 
(8) 𝑃𝑖(𝐻⁡^⁡𝑋) = ⁡𝑃𝑖(𝐻⁡^⁡¬𝑋) 
 
- else an assertion of X would be relevant to the probability of H. Therefore, Pi((H ^ X) v (H 
^ ¬X)) is the sum of two equal numbers, one of which is Pi(H ^ X). From (7) and (8): 
 
(9) 𝑃𝑖(𝐻⁡^⁡𝑋) ⁡=
0.5
2
= 0.25 
 
 This provides the probability for the first disjunct in (5). Since H and X are 
independent: 
 
10) 𝑃𝑖(𝐻⁡^⁡𝑋)⁡𝑣⁡𝑃𝑖(𝐻⁡^⁡¬𝑋) = 𝑃𝑖(¬𝐻⁡^⁡𝑋)⁡𝑣⁡𝑃𝑖(¬𝐻⁡^⁡¬𝑋) 
 
- else the truth of H would be probabilistically relevant to X. From the Additivity Axiom: 
 
(11) 𝑃𝑖((¬𝐻⁡^⁡𝑋)⁡𝑣⁡(¬𝐻⁡^⁡¬𝑋)) = 𝑃𝑖(¬𝐻⁡^⁡𝑋) +⁡𝑃𝑖(¬𝐻⁡^⁡¬𝑋) 
119 Confirmation, Decision, and Evidential Probability  
 
 
 
 From (7), (10), and (11): 
 
(12) 𝑃𝑖(¬𝐻⁡^⁡𝑋) +⁡𝑃𝑖(¬𝐻⁡^⁡¬𝑋) = 0.5 
 
 Since H and X are independent: 
 
(13) 𝑃𝑖(¬𝐻⁡^⁡𝑋) = ⁡𝑃𝑖(¬𝐻⁡^⁡¬𝑋) 
 
- else the truth of H would be relevant to the probability of X. Hence, Pi((¬H ^ X) v (¬H ^ 
¬X)) is the sum of two equal numbers, one of which is Pi(H ^ X). From (12) and (13): 
 
(14) 𝑃𝑖(¬𝐻⁡^⁡¬𝑋) ⁡=
0.5
2
= 0.25 
 
 From (5), (9), and (14): 
 
(15) 𝑃𝑖((𝐻⁡^⁡𝑋)⁡𝑣⁡(¬𝐻⁡^⁡¬𝑋)) = 𝑃𝑖(𝐻⁡^⁡𝑋) ⁡+⁡𝑃𝑖(¬𝐻⁡^⁡¬𝑋) = 0.5 
 
 By (15) and the logical equivalence of (H ↔ X) and ((H ^ X) v (¬H ^ ¬X)): 
 
(16) 𝑃𝑖(𝐻⁡ ↔ ⁡𝑋) ⁡= ⁡0.5 
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 Finally, substituting Y for (H ↔ X): 
 
(17) 𝑃𝑖(𝑌) ⁡= ⁡0.5 
 
 As Pi was arbitrarily selected from the committee, it follows that Y’s probability is 0.5 
in all members of the set that determines the values of the function P. Therefore, (1) and (3) 
imply that P(Y) = 0.5. 
 
 The problem of dilation concerns the value for P(H | Y) in a distribution for which (1), 
(2), and (17) all hold. Imagine that you select the card from the pile behind a screen, and give 
me only the cryptic clue that ‘Either (a) the card is red and even or (b) black and odd’. This is 
logically equivalent to telling me that Y is true. If Y is true, then H and X must have the same 
truth-values: 
 
(18) 𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝑌) = 𝑃(𝑋⁡|⁡𝑌)⁡  
 
 The problem is now to determine the values of the probabilities in (17). As neither 𝑃 
nor 𝑃 assign a probability of zero to Y, both will remain in the committee. The other 
functions in the committee give the continuum of values between the values for these extreme 
functions. Thus, to calculate P(H | Y), it is sufficient to calculate 𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝑌) and 𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝑌). 
 
 From (2): 
 
(19) 𝑃(𝑋) = 0 
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 The conditional probability of a statement with an extreme prior probability is 
identical to the statement’s prior, so from (19): 
 
(20) 𝑃(𝑋⁡|⁡𝑌) = 0 
 
 Y states that H is true if and only if X is true. Hence, from (20): 
 
(21) 𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝑌) = 𝑃(𝑋⁡|⁡𝑌) = 0 
 
 For 𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝑌), the proof is almost identical. From (2): 
 
(22) 𝑃(𝑋) = 1 
 
 For reasons analogous to the derivation of (20): 
 
(23) 𝑃(𝑋⁡|⁡𝑌) = 1 
 
 For reasons analogous to the derivation of (21): 
 
(24) 𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝑌) = 1 
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 Finally, from (21) and (23): 
 
(25) 𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝑌) = [0, 1] 
 
 Hence, in a new committee P´ that is conditioned on Y: 
 
(26) 𝑃´(𝐻) = [0, 1]  
 
 This completes a proof that, in Imprecise Bayesianism, learning that a statement Φ 
that has a precise probability is equivalent to a statement Ψ with a relatively imprecise 
probability can lead to an imprecise value for the posterior probability of Φ. 
 
 Dilation presents a problem for using DI as a measure of weight, because the 
imprecision of the probabilities can increase without removing relevant evidence. (This is 
problematic regardless of whether one believe that Y is intuitively relevant to H.) In the proof 
above, P(H) initially has a precise value, meaning that I consider its probability to be exactly 
0.5 given my background knowledge. According to the DI measure, this entails that my total 
evidence (prior to learning Y) has maximal weight with respect to H: 
 
𝐷𝐼(𝑋) = 1 − (0.5 − 0.5) = 1 
 
 However, the derivation of (26) proves that learning Y results in minimal weight for 
H given my new total evidence: 
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𝐷𝐼(𝐻⁡|⁡𝑌) = 1 − (1 − 0) = 0 
 
 Consequently, according to the DI measure, learning E has reduced my total quantity 
of relevant evidence regarding X. 
 
 Dilation presents several problems for the Imprecise Bayesian. Firstly, one might 
have the intuition that Y ought to have the opposite effect on the degree of precision: the 
precision of P(H) should dominate the imprecision of P(X). Secondly, it is strange that adding 
information can lead to a decrease in weight. For my purpose, it is the second aspect of 
dilation that is important. 
 
 An Imprecise Bayesian might respond by forbidding any precision in the prior 
distribution. If one assigned [0, 1] to every statement as its prior probability, then dilation 
would be impossible. In the example above, if it were the case that P(H) = [0, 1], then there is 
no value that P(E) might have such that learning (H ↔ E) increases the imprecision of H’s 
probability, because H’s initial probability (prior to learning E) is already maximally 
imprecise. As a result, it would not be possible to dilate the probability for H. 
 
 There are two problems with this suggestion. The first is that, assuming it is possible 
to narrow the [0, 1] interval, then the DI measure would still have problems with sequences 
of updating events. 
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Proof 2 
 
Claim: Dilation is possible even without precision in the prior probabilities.  
 
 Again, consider the random draw of a card from a pile of unknown composition. 
Suppose that my Imprecise Bayesian prior distribution is the following: 
 
Key 
H: The card is red. 
X: The card is even. 
Y: The card is red if and only if it is even. 
E: Exactly 1/2 of the cards in the deck are red. 
 
(1) 𝑃(𝐻) = ⁡ [0, 1] 
(2) 𝑃(𝑋) = ⁡ [0, 1] 
 
 Suppose, for the sake of argument, that it is possible to conditionalize H on E to 
narrow it, such that: 
 
(3) 𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸) = ⁡0.5 
 
Hence, conditioning H on E produces the new distribution P´, such that: 
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(4) 𝑃´(𝐻) = 0.5 
 
The probability of X is unchanged. As a result, P´(X) is still [0, 1]. However, (4) can 
simply be substituted for (1) in the derivation of (25) in Proof 1. Therefore, by the same 
reasoning, dilation will occur upon learning Y128. Forbidding precise prior probabilities (even 
prior probabilities with any precision) does not avoid the problem of dilation. 
 
Secondly, even aside from the problem of sequences of conditionalization, the [0, 1] 
interval poses its own problems for the DI measure of weight, due to the problem of inertia. I 
shall discuss this problem in the next subsection. For this subsection, the significance of these 
problems is that there is a price for avoiding initial precision in response to dilation problems. 
 
2.4 The Problem of Inertia 
 
 Like dilation, the phenomenon of inertia is a well-established challenge to Imprecise 
Bayesianism. However, unlike dilation, the challenge that inertia poses for the DI measure 
does not seem to have been previously noted. Walley provides an early discussion in his 
                                                          
128 If one learns (E ^ Y) together, then there is neither a narrowing nor a dilation of the precision of H’s 
probability, because the probability values for precise Bayesian probability functions in the committee are 
invariant to the order in which evidence is acquired, such that learning E and Y together is equivalent to learning 
them one-by-one in either order. (See Howson and Urbach p. 26-27 for a discussion of the time-invariance of 
Bayesian probability functions.) Again, regardless of whether this is problematic for the system of Imprecise 
Bayesianism, it is problematic for Walley’s measure, since E will not add to H’s weight when it is learned 
alongside Y, even though it is assumed that the probability distributions in the committee are such that E would 
have added to the weight had Y not been learned. 
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study of imprecise probabilities129. 
 
  To set up the problem of inertia, it is helpful to examine the Imprecise Bayesian 
updating of the [0, 1] interval via conditionalization on deductively conclusive evidence. 
Consider the following probability distribution: 
 
Key 
H: There are Edwardian buildings on Old Elvet. 
E1: There are no Edwardian buildings on Old Elvet. 
E2: The Old Shire Hall is an Edwardian building and it is on Old Elvet. 
 
(1) 𝑃(𝐻) ⁡= ⁡ [0, 1] 
(2) 𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸1) ⁡= ⁡0 
(3) 𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸2) ⁡= 1 
 
  If an Imprecise Bayesian with this distribution learned E1, then she should eliminate 
the function 𝑃, because (1) implies that: 
 
(4) 𝑃(H) = 1   
 
From (4) and the logical incompatibility of H and E1, it follows that: 
                                                          
129 Walley (1991) p. 367-369. 
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(5) 𝑃(E1) = 0  
 
  Thus, we must exclude 𝑃 from the committee upon learning E1. For the remaining 
probability functions, it follows from (2) that Pi(H | E1) = 0. Since the conditional probability 
for the new committee of functions is P(H | E1) = 1, the probability of H in the Imprecise 
Bayesian distribution P´ that has been conditioned on E1 is P´(H) = 0. 
 
 Similarly, consider E2, which implies H. Upon learning E2, we can eliminate the 
function 𝑃, because (1) implies that: 
 
 (6) 𝑃(𝐻) ⁡= ⁡0  
 
 From (6) and the logical incompatibility of H and E2, it follows that: 
 
(7) 𝑃(𝐸2) ⁡= ⁡0 
 
 Thus, we must exclude 𝑃 from the committee upon learning E2. For the remaining 
probability functions, it follows from (2) that Pi(H | E2) = 1. Since the conditional probability 
for the new committee of functions is P(H | E2) = 1, the probability of H in the Imprecise 
Bayesian distribution P´´ that has been conditioned on E2 is P´´(H) = 1. 
 
 Inertia occurs when the following assumptions hold: 
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(i) P(H) = [0, 1]. 
  
(ii) E neither implies nor contradicts H. In other words, E is not deductively conclusive 
evidence for or against H. 
 
(iii) Pi(E) > 0 for 𝑃 and 𝑃. This condition entails that neither extreme member is eliminated 
when conditioning on E. 
 
 Suppose that 𝑃(H) = 1 and 𝑃(E) > 0. According to the updating procedure in 
Imprecise Bayesianism, this function cannot be eliminated from the committee. Furthermore, 
𝑃 cannot be altered by conditionalization, because a statement with an extreme probability is 
probabilistically independent of any other statement. Thus, when 𝑃 is conditioned on E, the 
probability of H is unchanged, such that 𝑃´(H) = 1. Analogously, 𝑃 cannot be eliminated, 
because 𝑃(E) > 0. Since probability of H in 𝑃 cannot be altered by conditionalization, the 
value is unchanged: 𝑃´(H) = 0. The committee is a continuous set between these values. 
Consequently, the overall picture is unchanged: P´(H) = P(H | E) = [0, 1]. Hence the name 
“inertia”, because an Imprecise Bayesian who starts in a state of absolute ignorance with 
respect to a hypothesis will be stuck there, except in special circumstances. 
 
One way to understand inertia is to take the metaphor of the “committee” very 
literally: imagine that the committee consists of a group of Bayesians who choose 
intermediate opinions between two extreme members. When the probability of H is [0, 1], the 
extreme member 𝑃 takes H to be utterly impossible and the other extreme member 𝑃 takes H 
to be proven beyond any doubt. When the evidence either deductively implies or contradicts 
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the hypothesis, one of the extreme members leaves the committee and the remaining 
members change their opinions to fit the other extreme member’s view. However, if the 
evidence neither implies nor contradicts the hypothesis and neither member regards the 
evidence as impossible, then the extreme members will stay in the committee, and they will 
not change their views. The remaining committee members are still balanced across the 
continuum of degrees of belief that exist between the two extreme members’ opinions, such 
that the committee’s view on the hypothesis remains unchanged. 
 
 I shall use examples of direct inferences, since these raise fewer ancillary 
controversies than other non-deductive inferences like induction or analogy. If P(H) = [0, 1] 
and H is ‘If I see a swan, then it will be white’ and E is ‘75% of swans are white’, then the 
posterior value for H given E will still be [0, 1]. One particularly counterintuitive aspect of 
inertia is that the same result obtains with alternative non-deductively conclusive evidence, 
like ‘95% of all swans are white’ or ‘10% of swans are white’. Additionally, inertia means 
that (3) in Proof 2 must be false, because E is deductively independent of H, and accordingly 
an Imprecise Bayesian with such a maximally imprecise prior distribution would be ‘stuck’ 
unless they acquired deductively conclusive evidence regarding H. 
 
 The problem for the DI measure is that such intuitively relevant information will not 
add to the weight on this measure, because the degree of imprecision will not fall. For 
instance, in the swan example above, ‘Jupiter is larger than the Earth’ will be just as 
(ir)relevant to H as ‘95% of swans are white’ according to the DI measure, because neither 
will narrow the [0, 1] interval. Our intuitions about quantities of evidence and the DI measure 
diverge in cases of inertia. 
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Susanna Rinard has suggested a possible Imprecise Bayesian response to inertia, 
when this problem is presented as an objection to the overall system. She suggests that the 
Imprecise Bayesian should completely avoid the [0, 1] interval and uses inertia as a reason to 
forego assigning [0, 1] values130. Her response seems plausible for most uses of imprecise 
probabilities in statistics and philosophy. In practice, there is typically some relevant 
evidence regarding any particular statement that interests us. Even if we are reluctant to 
assign precise probabilities in some context, we might still be willing to make an assignment 
with at least some precision. 
 
 For example, if there is a very strangely shaped Ancient Egyptian coin, I would be 
reluctant to assign P(H) = 0.5, where H is the hypothesis that it will land heads. However, if it 
has a shape that is quite similar to normal coins, then I might comfortably assign [0.05, 0.95] 
as my credence, because I feel that it is unlikely that tossing this coin will result in a very 
high long-run frequency of either heads or tails. Such an interval will not generate the 
problem of inertia, because the limits are non-extreme and so they can be altered by 
conditionalization. By assumption, I know very little about the Ancient Egyptian coin; a 
fortiori, in scientific investigations with rich background knowledge, it is very plausible that 
there will be some basis for an interval that is narrower than [0, 1]. 
 
 However, Walley suggests a number of interesting applications for the [0, 1] 
interval131. Firstly, it is a plausible way of representing the epistemic state of an agent who 
has never considered the sample space before. For example, most people have never 
considered the possibilities associated with the Urim and the Thummim in the Old Testament. 
                                                          
130 Rinard (2013) p. 4-5. 
 
131 Walley (1991) p. 227. 
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The Ancient Hebrews used these objects for divination, but their method is unknown. In the 
absence of more information about the Urim, the Thummim, and the divination techniques 
used by the Ancient Hebrews, a [0, 1] interval is a plausible representation of many people’s 
beliefs about hypotheses like ‘The Urim and the Thummim would tend to counsel against 
going to war’. Secondly, the [0, 1] interval is useful when there are words with unknown 
meanings in the hypothesis, as in ‘All Fregons are zull’. In such circumstances, an agent 
trying to set prior probabilities would lack any sort of information about “Fregons” and “zull” 
with which to choose any degree of precision for their priors, and the [0, 1] interval offers a 
plausible means of representing this ignorance. One might argue that there is always some 
background evidence available when one encounters new words, such that weight never 
reaches a value of zero, but this position does not entail that this background information is 
sufficient to determine precision in one’s priors. 
 
Additionally, following Rinard’s proposal would be incompatible with the claim that 
the [0, 1] interval is an example of the expressive power of Imprecise Bayesianism. For 
example, Joyce argues that [0, 1] is the proper probability value to assign when there is no 
evidence (and thus no weight) instead of the value of 0.5, because it is well-known that 
assigning 0.5 will lead to paradoxes132. Thus, forbidding the [0, 1] interval comes at a price 
for Imprecise Bayesians, since it requires abandoning one reason why their system is 
attractive for measuring weight: in an Imprecise Bayesianism that includes the [0, 1] interval 
as an option, one can consistently represent a total lack of weight using a value that is 
                                                          
132 Joyce (2003) p. 171. It is easy to generate such paradoxes where the [0, 1] interval is a better assignment. For 
example, suppose that {Φ, Ψ, χ} are a set of contraries. I cannot consistently assign 0.5 to all of them. In 
contrast, I can coherently assign [0, 1] to each of them. Such a maximally imprecise assignment simply asserts 
that, for each member of this set, the committee includes functions that assign a value r to that statement, for all 
values r such that 0 ≤ r ≤ 1. 
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unavailable to precise probabilists. 
 
 One might add/subtract a constant C from the limits of [0, 1] to represent the sort of 
strong ignorance that Joyce is discussing when using the DI measure, so that it is represented 
as [0 + C, 1 – C]. However, this method would arbitrarily conflate the total absence of weight 
with instances of the value [0 + C, 1 – C] when this value involves some quantity of 
evidence. Furthermore, assuming that C is a real value, there will be some value r such that r 
< C. Thus, according to a DI measure that has [0 + C, 1 – C] as its minimum value, a 
hypothesis whose probability given the total evidence is [0 + r, 1 – r] will have negative 
weight, and this seems nonsensical. One might try to use an infinitesimal value for C, but this 
would come at the cost that the co-domain of the DI function would no longer be the set of 
real numbers, and it is not clear how the outputs of such a function could then be incorporated 
into formal epistemology and decision theory. 
 
 Finally, it is plausible that there is a minimum value for weight that corresponds to 
absolute ignorance. Rinard’s proposal would eliminate the possibility of using DI = 1 – (1 – 
0) = 0 as this minimum value. Whatever the general merits of Rinard’s proposal as a defence 
of Imprecise Bayesianism from the problem of inertia, it would not help the DI measure, 
because it would avoid inertia at the cost of losing the use of a minimum value for weight. 
 
 Another Imprecise Bayesian response to inertia is to modify the update rule. Such a 
change requires abandoning normal conditionalization. Joyce considers the possibility of 
simply ignoring the probability functions at the extreme ends of the set when one updates the 
[0, 1] interval133. This response has several problems. Firstly, this sort of response has not yet 
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133 Confirmation, Decision, and Evidential Probability  
 
 
been developed into a comprehensive and tested updating rule; as Bradley notes, it constitutes 
a leap in the dark134. 
 
 Secondly, Joyce himself notes that modifying conditionalization to sometimes allow 
the exclusion of extreme members is an ad hoc departure from normal conditionalization, 
since it lacks any motivation other than the avoidance of inertia. It would be preferable to 
have some non-ad hoc means of escaping this problem. 
 
 Thirdly, Joyce raises the problem that such an updating method would involve an 
additional and significant element of arbitrariness. There is no formal reason to remove the 
“extreme” probability functions rather than the other, “moderate”, probability functions in the 
set. If we excluded the moderate functions, then there would still be two extreme probability 
functions 𝑃(H) = 0 and 𝑃(H) = 1; the committee containing these functions still provides an 
interval of [0, 1]. Joyce argues that such updating constitutes a non-evidence based inference, 
because there is no reason in the evidence itself (from an Imprecise Bayesian standpoint) for 
excluding the extreme members. 
 
 An Imprecise Bayesian who adopts this new updating rule might respond to Joyce’s 
arbitrariness criticism in the following way: the reason to exclude  𝑃⁡and 𝑃 in this case is that 
E is intuitively relevant to H, but according to these extreme functions, it is irrelevant. After 
all, the apparent relevance of the evidence is why there is a problem of inertia in the first 
place: when E is not intuitively relevant to H, there is no paradox. 
 
                                                          
 
134 Bradley (2015). 
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 However, this appeal to intuition does not avoid the charge of arbitrariness. Firstly, 
modifying the updating rule to take intuitions about evidence into account introduces a new 
role for exogenous judgements into the framework. By “exogenous judgements”, I mean 
decisions that are not determined by the formalism of the Bayesian model. Of course, there is 
always some degree of exogeneity in formal epistemology. For standard Subjective 
Bayesians, the most notable exogenous judgement is the choice of a prior distribution, since 
neither coherence nor conditionalization uniquely determines a prior distribution. Yet 
Bayesians can correctly assert that, once a prior distribution has been set and 
conditionalization has been adopted as the updating rule, then every judgement involved in 
updating a hypothesis by that evidence is determined by mathematics and logic. 
 
 For some philosophers, this seems to be one of the attractions of Bayesian 
confirmation theory. If a Bayesian is applying their confirmation theory to problems in areas 
like the philosophy of economics or medicine, then they might hope to reach a point where 
all the philosophical issues become computable. There are obviously many other reasons to 
become a Bayesian, but rendering important philosophical issues into questions of calculation 
would be a rare and precious prize in philosophy. Indeed the computability of important 
issues in Bayesianism, once certain conditions have been satisfied, can give the attractive 
impression that these questions can be resolved objectively and uncontroversially. 
 
 However, suppose that Imprecise Bayesians adopt an updating rule according to 
which one excludes the extreme members in inertia when (and only when) it is intuitive that 
they should be excluded. This means that exogenous judgements are involved in both the 
prior distribution and the updating rule. To call something ‘arbitrary’ typically means that it 
is a matter of personal judgement, rather than a matter of rules, and so introducing an 
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updating rule that involves intuition would be arbitrary. This arbitrariness is not trivial: 
introducing arbitrariness into the updating rule would undermine one of the appeals of 
Bayesianism. For the project of measuring weight, it would entail that some values of the DI 
measure would be arbitrary: if P(H) = [0, 1] and P(H | E) = [0 – C1, 1 – C2], where C1 and C2 
are arbitrarily selected constants, then the weight for H given E would be arbitrary, since 
different choices of C1 and C2 would provide different values on the DI measure. Finally, 
even if a systematic version of such a rule is possible, the DI measure as it currently exists 
would still be inadequate, since it uses probabilities from the Imprecise Bayesian system. 
 
Another possible response would be to contest the intuition: if there is no relevant 
background knowledge regarding H, then perhaps it is intuitive that non-deductive evidence 
will fail to modify H’s probability. Many confirmation theorists now believe that background 
knowledge is essential to non-deductive inference. However, this response is an acceptance 
of inertia, rather than an elimination of the phenomenon, because it does not deny that the 
evidence in inertia scenarios is evidentially relevant (though not probabilistically relevant) to 
the hypothesis. The problem for the DI measure remains: even if inertia is an acceptable part 
of the Imprecise Bayesian formalism, it still entails that intuitively relevant evidence is 
unregistered by the DI measure. Regardless of whether inertia is a genuine flaw in Imprecise 
Bayesianism, it remains a severe problem for Walley’s measure of weight. 
 
2.5 The Problem of Corroborating Evidence 
 
I discussed the Problem of Corroborating Evidence as a challenge for probabilistic 
definitions of relevance in Chapter 1. The essential idea is that sometimes a piece of evidence 
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is relevant because it corroborates existing data, yet it does not alter the conditional 
probability of the hypothesis. For instance, imagine that scientists test the universal 
generalization H ‘All metal rods expand when heated’ via an experiment in which a rod is 
gradually compressed by a machine while it is heated. Suppose that E states that ‘The tested 
rod did not expand when heated’. Assume that P(E) > 0. Since E is inconsistent with H, it 
follows that P(H | E) = 0. The weight, using the DI measure, is: 
 
𝐷𝐼(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸) = 1 − (1 − 0) = 0 
 
However, the scientists could repeat the experiment; intuitively this would provide 
more evidence. E´ might state that another rod also did not expand when heated and 
compressed. The probability of H would be unchanged, since an extreme probability cannot 
be changed by adding evidence, but E´ still seems to be relevant to H, because corroborating 
evidence with independent sources of information will often increase the reliability of the 
original evidence. In such circumstances, the DI measure will not reflect the increases in 
weight. 
 
An Imprecise Bayesian might respond that while E´ does not increase H’s probability, 
it does increase the probability of E. Thus, even assuming that P(H | E) = 0, we can still alter 
the probability of H by learning E´. If P(E) < 1, then it is possible that P(E | E´) > P(E) and 
P(H | E´) < P(H). However, this claim could only be true if the scientists have not yet 
accepted E. Once E has a probability of 1, the probability of H will be zero and thus it cannot 
be altered by conditioning on E´. This is not necessarily problematic for Bayesian updating: it 
is plausible that if one accepts E and E is inconsistent with H, then one should assign a 
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probability of zero to H and this should not alter when additional evidence E´ is acquired. 
However, the problem for measuring weight remains, because E´ adds to the total quantity of 
relevant evidence regarding H, even though it does not alter the probability of H, but the DI 
measure does not register this fact. 
 
 One alternative Bayesian approach to modelling learning is Jeffrey 
Conditionalization135. In this method of updating, P(E) is altered to an exogenously 
determined value r such that 0 ≤ r ≤ 1. For any statement H in the domain of P, the posterior 
probability P´(H) is determined by the following rule: 
 
Rule of Jeffrey Conditionalization: P´(H) = P(H | E) P´(E) + P(E | ¬H) P´(¬E), where 
P´(¬E) = 1 − P´(E). 
 
 P´(E) and P´(¬E) are the probabilities of E and ¬E in the new probability distribution 
P´. Thus, upon exogenously determining that E has a probability r, P´(E) = r and  
P´(¬E) = 1 − r. 
 
 This rule contains ordinary conditionalization as a special case in which 
r = 1. When r < 1, it offers an interesting alternative to conventional Bayesian updating. For 
example, suppose that P(E) = 0.5. Something exogenous changes, such that P´(E) = 0.9. 
Using Jeffrey Conditionalization, we can alter the probability distribution to reflect this 
change, and thus we can model ‘learning E’ in a weaker sense than ‘becoming absolutely 
certain that E is true’. 
 
                                                          
135 Jeffrey (1965). 
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 This will enable the Imprecise Bayesian to avoid the Problem of Corroborating 
Evidence under some assumptions. Suppose that H and E are inconsistent. Suppose that E 
confirms E´ in all members of the committee. Assume the following values: 
 
(1)⁡𝑃(𝐸) = [0.75, 0.85] 
(2)⁡𝑃(𝐸´) = [0.1, 0.9] 
(3)⁡𝑃(𝐻) = [0.3, 0.5] 
(4)⁡𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸) = 0 
(5)⁡𝑃(𝐸⁡|⁡𝐸´) > 𝑃(𝐸) 
 
 Assume that, as a result of an experiment in which the event described by E´ occurs, 
its probability shifts to [0.8, 0.9]. From (1), (2), and this new value for the probability of E´, 
Jeffrey Conditionalization requires that this change must result in an increase in the 
probability of E in the new distribution: 
 
(6)⁡𝑃´(𝐸) > 𝑃(𝐸) 
 
 From (3), (4), and (5), we know that an increase in the probability of E must reduce 
the probability of H, so that: 
 
(7)⁡𝑃´(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸´) < 𝑃(𝐻) 
 
 Therefore, by modelling the process of learning using updating via Jeffrey 
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Conditionalization rather than ordinary conditionalization, it is possible to corroborate 
existing evidence that is inconsistent with a hypothesis and thereby reduce the probability of 
that hypothesis. 
 
  While this will work for some cases of corroborating evidence, it will not always 
work. There is nothing in Jeffrey Conditionalization that excludes the possibility of assigning 
P´(E) = 1 when modelling the learning event. It would still be permissible, in Imprecise 
Bayesianism, to assign P´(E) = 1. Thus, since P(H | E´) = 0, it follows that P´(H) = 0. From 
this point, the Problem of Corroborating Evidence re-emerges: no amount of corroborating 
evidence will increase the weight of H given the total evidence, but the quantity of relevant 
evidence has increased. Consequently, there is a type of evidence that the DI measure does 
not register. 
 
SECTION 3: EVIDENTIAL PROBABILITY AND WEIGHT 
 
 
 I shall now examine an alternative proposal for using imprecise probabilities to 
measure Keynes’s concept of weight. Kyburg discusses weight on several occasions: for 
example, he makes the negative claim that the probability theories of Keynes and Carnap 
cannot provide a formal measure of weight; he argues that this shortcoming is a weakness of 
their systems136. He also makes the positive claim that his own system of Evidential 
Probability can serve as the basis of a measure of weight. Originally, in Probability and the 
Logic of Rational Belief (1961), he claims that evidential probabilities represent both (1) the 
                                                          
136 Kyburg (1961) p. 52. 
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support that a set of statements Γ gives to Φ and (2) the quantity of relevant evidence that Γ 
provides regarding that Φ137. If this claim were true, then evidential probabilities would be 
comparable to vectors. (A vector has both a magnitude and a direction, in contrast to a scalar, 
which has only a magnitude.) Analogously, evidential probabilities would state both an 
evidential relation and the quantity of relevant information in that relation.. 
 
 In his article “Bets and Beliefs” (1968), Kyburg makes the more modest claim that 
differences in the quantity of “evidence of the same sort” could be measured using the degree 
of imprecision of evidential probability intervals138. In this section, I shall mostly criticise his 
1968 claim. Since his 1961 claim entails the 1968 claim, my reasons for rejecting the 1968 
claim will also constitute reasons for rejecting the 1961 claim. 
 
 Kyburg’s proposed measure uses the imprecision of evidential probabilities to 
measure weight: 
 
𝐾𝑦𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑔′𝑠⁡𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 = 𝑊𝐾(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐾) = 1 − (𝑦 − 𝑥) 
 
- where x is the lower bound of the evidential probability of H given K and y is the upper 
bound. I have modified Kyburg’s proposal in the same way that I modified Walley’s in order 
to make the discussion more verbally felicitous. 
 
                                                          
137 Kyburg (1961) p. 225. 
 
138 Kyburg (1968) p. 63. 
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 I shall now review the problems from the previous section. I shall conclude that the 
WK measure is better than DI measure for some of these problems, but not all of them. 
 
3.1 Dilation 
 
 In Imprecise Bayesianism, the problem of dilation occurs when an Imprecise 
Bayesian has a precise probability for Φ, a precise probability for Ψ, and they learn that (Φ ↔ 
Ψ). The imprecise probability will dominate the precise probability, so that P(Φ) becomes 
imprecise. In contrast, the precise probability will always be chosen in Evidential Probability, 
such that X will stay precise and Y will become precise. Thus, unlike Imprecise Bayesianism, 
dilation is not a feature of Evidential Probability. Some imprecise probabilists have noted that 
Evidential Probability avoids dilation139. However, it has not been previously noted that this 
is an advantage for the WK measure. 
 
 This contrast is a result of a difference in the method of updating. Imprecise 
Bayesians update by using conditionalization for each member of the continuous set of 
probability functions, as described in Section 2. By comparison, Evidential Probabilists 
update via direct inference using the relative frequency data that has been selected by the 
rules for Sharpening reference classes, which I described in Chapter 1 Subsection 5.3. One of 
these rules is Sharpening by Precision. This rule requires that, given the choice between two 
otherwise unsharpenable reference class statements140 R1 and R2 for which R1 provides an 
interval that is a proper subinterval of R2, an Evidential Probabilist will use R1 rather than R2 
                                                          
139 Pedersen and Wheeler (2014) p. 1307. 
 
140 A reference class statement is either a claim about the relative frequency of a predicate in a reference class or 
a claim that an object is a member of a reference class. 
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to determine the evidential probability. For example, imagine that you are calculating car 
insurance premiums for Mr. Smith. You know that Mr. Smith is a young man and that 2-10% 
of young men crash their car within 5 years. You also know that Mr. Smith has undergone 
special driving courses and he has acquired driving qualifications; among those with these 
qualifications, only 3-5% of people (of any age or gender) crash their car within 5 years. 
However, your full distribution does not contain the joint distribution for young men who 
have obtained these qualifications. Therefore, you cannot use a known full distribution to 
Sharpen by Richness. Furthermore, neither reference class is a subclass of the other. 
Therefore, you cannot Sharpen by Specificity. If there are no rival reference classes, then 
Sharpening by Precision requires that you use the second reference class, so that the 
evidential probability is [0.03, 0.05]. 
 
 To illustrate how this rule addresses the problem of dilation, I shall return to the 
example from Subsection 2.3. Imagine that I am about to randomly select a card from a pile 
of 40 cards: 
 
Key 
H: The card is red. 
X: The card is even. 
Y: The card is red if and only if it is even. 
K: My total relevant evidence, in which the best reference class information for X’s 
probability is that 1/2 of the cards in the pile are red, whereas the proportion of even-
numbered cards r in the pile is only known to be 0 ≤ r ≤ 1. 
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(1) 𝐸𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐾) = [0.5, 0.5] 
(2) 𝐸𝑃(𝑋⁡|⁡𝐾) = [0, 1] 
 
 Imagine I learn Y. I must now decide how the probabilities of H and X will change in 
response to this information. I can either use my information about the proportion of red 
cards in the pile or my information about the proportion of even-numbered cards. I must 
choose between the following equations: 
 
(3) 𝐸𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝑌⁡^⁡𝐾) = [0.5, 0.5] 
 
(4) 𝐸𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝑌⁡^⁡𝐾) = [0, 1] 
 
Since [0.5, 0.5] is a proper subinterval of [0, 1], Sharpening by Precision requires 
selecting (3), so there is no dilation in this scenario and the WK measure provides the 
intuitively sound output that learning Y has not affected the weight of H with respect to the 
total evidence: 
 
𝑊𝐾(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐾) = 1 − (0.5 − 0.5) = 1 
 
𝑊𝐾(𝐻⁡|⁡𝑌⁡^⁡𝐾) = 1 − (0.5 − 0.5) = 1 
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 By the same reasoning, mutatis mutandis, the evidential probability for X becomes 
precise, because I now know that the card is even-numbered if it is red and that 1/2 of cards 
in the pile are red. Hence: 
 
(5) 𝐸𝑃(𝑋⁡|⁡𝑌⁡^⁡𝐾) = [0.5, 0.5] 
 
  Adding Y to my total evidence has increased the weight of argument according to the 
WK measure: 
 
𝑊𝐾(𝑋⁡|⁡𝐾) = 1 − (1 − 0) = 0 
 
𝑊𝐾(𝑋⁡|⁡𝐸⁡^⁡𝐾) = 1 − (0.5 − 0.5) = 1 
 
 These are both intuitive results. The WK measure tracks the intuition that Y is 
relevant to X, but irrelevant to H. By using Evidential Probability to measure weight, it is 
possible to avoid one of the problems of the DI measure. 
 
3.2 Inertia 
 
 Inertia is the feature of Imprecise Bayesianism that an Imprecise Bayesian reasoner 
might learn some intuitively relevant evidence, but their updated probability will be equal to 
their prior probability. For the DI measure, the problem is that there will be no increase in the 
intervals’ precision and thus no increase in weight according to the DI measure. One possible 
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answer is to create an exception to standard conditionalization, but the suggested alternative 
updating methods are arbitrary and ad hoc. 
 
 Unlike the Imprecise Bayesian, an Evidential Probabilist can have a rule-governed 
and independently motivated escape from inertia. Indeed, even rival imprecise probabilists 
agree that Evidential Probabilists avoid the problem of inertia141. Imagine that there is a card 
that will be drawn from a deck using a randomized procedure. Prior to learning the 
composition of the deck, your best statistical information regarding the card is the statement: 
 
K: The card will be drawn from a deck of cards. Either 0%, 100%, or some intermediate 
proportion of these cards are red. 
 
 H is the hypothesis that the card is red. Thus: 
 
⁡𝐸𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐾) ⁡= ⁡ [0,1] 
 
 Subsequently, you learn: 
 
E: 50% of the cards in the deck are red. 
 
 Since [0.5, 0.5] is a proper subinterval of [0, 1], Sharpening by Precision requires that: 
 
EP(H⁡|⁡E⁡^⁡K) ⁡= ⁡ [0.5, 0.5] 
 
                                                          
141 Levi (2007) p. 265. 
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 Kyburg’s system thus avoids inertia in this example, because any precise reference 
class data will be more precise than the [0, 1] interval and Sharpening by Precision requires 
that we must use this data for the new probability. A further virtue of this solution to inertia is 
that it is non-ad hoc, because Kyburg’s rules are the product of an independent project of 
developing a formal logic of direct inference. 
 
 I shall return to the Swans example from Subsection 2.4 to further illustrate this point. 
Here, H is ‘If I see a swan, then it will be white’ and E is ‘75% of swans are white’. Assume 
that EP(H | K) = [0, 1], which corresponds to P(H) = [0, 1] in the Imprecise Bayesian version 
of this scenario. Suppose that I learn E and that (E ^ K) provides no better basis for the 
probability of H other than the reference class statement that ‘75% of swans are white’. 
Sharpening by Precision requires that: 
 
EP(H⁡|⁡E⁡^⁡K) ⁡= ⁡ [0.75, 0.75] 
 
 The interval has narrowed, so that the weight has increased on the WK measure. In 
contrast to the DI measure, the WK measure can register increases in the quantity of relevant 
evidence that occur when non-deductively conclusive evidence is discovered in a state of 
absolute ignorance. 
 
 As a final note on inertia, Isaac Levi criticises the Evidential Probabilist’s avoidance 
of inertia as “creatio ex nihilo”142. His worry seems to be that Kyburg’s system makes it 
possible to move from a state of complete ignorance to a precise probability distribution for 
H, without making a presupposition about the joint distribution of H and E in a prior 
                                                          
142 Levi (2007) p. 265. 
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distribution. If we interpret imprecise probabilities as sets of probability functions (as 
Imprecise Bayesians interpret them) then Levi has a point. In Imprecise Bayesianism if I 
assign P(H) = [0, 1], then I am not dismissing any possible fraction as the prior probability of 
H. For the reasons I described in Subsection 2.4, I cannot conditionalize upon some non-
deductively conclusive evidence to shift my credence to a more committal state. Thus, Levi 
would be right that Kyburg’s avoidance of inertia is counterintuitive, if evidential 
probabilities were the same as Imprecise Bayesian probabilities and if conditionalization is 
the only possible method for updating a probability distribution. 
 
 Neither antecedent is true. As I have described, Evidential Probability updating does 
not proceed by conditionalization. (I discuss arguments that conditionalization is the only 
rational form of updating in Chapter 3 Subsection 5.1.) Furthermore, evidential probabilities 
are very different from Imprecise Bayesian probabilities. Despite the lexicographical 
similarity between (i) and (ii): 
 
(i) 𝑃(𝐻) ⁡= ⁡ [0, 1] 
 
(ii) 𝐸𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐾) ⁡= ⁡ [0, 1] 
 
- these are actually two very different claims. The claim (i) makes an assertion about a set of 
precise Bayesian functions. The claim (ii) makes an assertion about the formal relations 
between the statements H and K, where these formal relations are determined by Kyburg’s 
rules for selecting reference classes. For the two systems of imprecise probability, there is a 
difference both in how these equations are obtained and how they are used, so that there can 
be an evidence-based reason to change an evidential probability that would not suffice to 
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change an Imprecise Bayesian probability. Consequently, Levi’s objection to the Evidential 
Probabilist solution of inertia is mistaken. 
 
 Returning to the topic of weight, the WK measure performs better than the DI 
measure in both dilation scenarios and inertia scenarios. The contrast in performance is due to 
fundamental differences between the relevant imprecise probability systems, and in particular 
in the updating method. 
 
3.3 The Hollow Cube 
 
 While WK overcomes some of the challenges of DI, there are still serious problems 
with the measure. One flaw involves Teddy Seidenfeld’s Hollow Cube scenario143. 
Seidenfeld presents his scenario in order to demonstrate that Evidential Probabilists cannot 
always make use of Bayesian statistical methods and that the intervals of Kyburg’s system 
can widen. However, he does not note the Hollow Cube scenario also proves that WK is a 
problematic measure of weight. 
 
 In Seidenfeld’s scenario, we are measuring the volume of a hollow cube. We 
hypothesise that the cube has a volume of V millilitres, where V is an interval-value. Assume 
that we have two available measurement methods: 
 
(1) We could fill the cube with a liquid of a known density. We can then calculate the 
conditional probability that the cube will have a volume V given that it has been filled by the 
measured quantity of that liquid. 
                                                          
143 Seidenfeld (2007) p. 276-277. 
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(2) We could cut a rod that has a length equal to the cube’s edge and measure the length of 
this rod. We can then calculate the conditional probability that the cube will have a volume V 
given the results of this cutting and measuring procedure. 
 
 Seidenfeld notes that Bayesians can always combine these results to calculate a 
posterior probability for the hypothesis: it is simply a matter of using the relevant priors and 
likelihoods from our existing full distribution to calculate the conditional probability of the 
hypothesis given the conjunction of the measurements’ results. In contrast, using Evidential 
Probability, we can only use these Bayesian methods if there is relative frequency data that 
provides a conditional probability for the hypothesis given both measurements. However, it is 
possible that such rich information will not be available. Potentially, a very wide interval 
might result from applying the rules of Sharpening. If the report of (2) is added after the 
report of (1) or vice versa, then the evidential probability can become wider as more evidence 
is acquired. 
 
 For example, it is possible that using method (1) produces a measurement that 
strongly indicates that the cube’s volume is in the interval V, whereas using method (2) 
produces a measurement that strongly indicates that the volume is not in the interval V. I 
shall use the following abbreviations: 
 
Key 
E1: The estimate for the volume of the cube from the measurement that used the liquid. 
E2: The estimate for the volume of the cube from the measurement that used the rod. 
H: The hypothesis that the volume of the cube lies within a particular interval V. 
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K: Our background knowledge. By assumption, K does not provide sufficiently rich 
statistical information to use Bayesian methods to calculate a conditional probability for H 
given E1 and E2. However, it does contain enough information to enable the calculation of 
probabilities for H given E1 and H given E2 via classical statistical methods. 
 
 Since we have assumed that Bayesian inference that only uses known frequencies is 
impossible, Evidential Probability requires that we use confidence-interval methods from 
classical statistics (as the necessary background knowledge is available in K) as an 
alternative144. Suppose that H is extremely unlikely given E1 and that we are using a 
confidence level such that the inference that ¬H has a ± 2% margin of error. Assume that: 
 
(1)⁡𝐸𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸1⁡^⁡𝐾) = [0.01, 0.03] 
 
 With comparable assumptions, suppose that E2 provides an evidential probability that 
is almost a mirror image, such that H is very likely given our measurement using the rod: 
 
(2) 𝐸𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸2⁡^⁡𝐾) = [0.95, 0.97]⁡ 
 
 Sharpening by Richness is not available in this case, since we have assumed that there 
is no available joint distribution for (H ^ E1 ^ E2 ^ K). Sharpening by Specificity is not 
available, since neither (1) nor (2) is based on a reference class that we know to be a subset of 
the other. Finally, the Sharpening by Precision rule requires that the cover of the intervals 
becomes the new evidential probability, since neither the interval in (1) nor the interval in (2) 
is a proper subinterval of the other. Hence: 
                                                          
144 Kyburg and Teng (2001) p. 263-265. 
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(3) 𝐸𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸1⁡^⁡𝐸2⁡^⁡𝐾) = [0.01, 0.97]⁡ 
 
 Therefore, if we learned E1 and obtained (1) as the probability of H, then subsequently 
learning E2 would result in a much wider imprecise probability. 
 
 Seidenfeld’s example demonstrates that is possible to acquire new evidence that is 
intuitively relevant, but which increases the degree of imprecision of the evidential 
probabilities. If we use the WK measure, we can obtain counterintuitive results: learning E2 
after E1 can actually reduce the weight of argument. This presents a powerful counterexample 
to the WK measure of weight, since combining different types of measurement methods is a 
perfectly normal part of science. 
 
 Kyburg accepts Seidenfeld’s example without objection145. Seidenfeld’s example is 
not problematic in itself for an Evidential Probabilist: if we discover that our initial 
probability for H was radically dependent on our choice of measurement method, then a less 
precise interval seems to provide an appropriate representation of our greater uncertainty 
upon learning this dependence. Informally, our evidence is providing a much murkier picture 
regarding the hypothesis. Insofar as Kyburg is aiming to formalise evidential relations, there 
does not seem to be anything problematic here: sometimes, learning new evidence can create 
greater uncertainty, and this is represented in this case by the increase in imprecision. The 
Hollow Cube nevertheless poses a problem for Kyburg’s measure, because the measure is 
registering what is clearly new evidence as a reduction in the quantity of evidence. 
                                                          
145 Kyburg (2007) p. 289-290. 
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 The Hollow Cube involves multiple forms of evidence. Kyburg seems to have 
anticipated such problems, because he claims that evidential probabilities can only be used to 
measure weight in the context where the evidence is the “same sort”. Seidenfeld’s scenario 
therefore goes beyond Kyburg’s intended area of application of the WK measure, at least 
under his 1968 restriction. However, in the next section I shall argue that Kyburg’s restriction 
does not avoid all the problems for the WK measure. 
 
3.5 The Problem of Corroborating Evidence 
 
 The WK measure does not avoid the Problem of Corroborating Evidence, where it 
behaves in a very similar way to the DI measure. Suppose that, as a result of many 
experiments, scientists accept that there exists at least one metal rod that was heated but did 
not expand. For example, they might have used magnets or vices to prevent the expansion of 
rods. There will be statements that are inconsistent with this existential claim; one will 
obviously be the denial of existence of such a rod. Repetitions of this experiment seem to be 
relevant to this denial of existence. 
 
Key 
H: There are no metal rods that are heated and do not expand. 
E1: The exists a metal rod that was heated but did not expand. 
E2: In additional experiments, metal rods were headed and sometimes were measured as not 
expanding. 
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  Since E1 is inconsistent with H, the scientists’ acceptance of E1 reduces the evidential 
probability of H to zero: 
 
(1) 𝐸𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸1⁡^⁡𝐾) = [0, 0] 
 
- and the weight is - 
 
(2) 𝑊𝐾(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸1⁡^⁡𝐾) = 1 − (0 − 0) = 1 
 
 Learning E2 and conjoining it with (E1 ^ K) will not provide a different value to (1). 
Therefore, the WK measure value for H given (E1 ^ E2 ^ K) will not be different from (2). 
The WK measure once again fails to match our intuitions about evidential relevance: 
acquiring corroborating evidence will not register as an increase in evidence. The Problem of 
Corroborating Evidence remains. Additionally, the evidence here is entirely of the same sort, 
because it consists simply of repetitions of a type of experiment. 
 
 One might object that, even on the basis of multiple experiments, scientists would 
never accept a statement like E1, so the probability of H given the total evidence would never 
drop to zero. However, unless one forgoes the idea of accepting evidence altogether146, there 
will be some statements that are inconsistent with the evidence that one has accepted, and in 
either Evidential Probability or Bayesianism, the statements will have a conditional 
probability of zero given the evidence. Such statements need not constitute anything that one 
                                                          
146 Kyburg, at least, would not take such a position: see Chapter 5 Section 2. 
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might call a “scientific theory”, because the problem is that even after one has accepted 
evidence that is inconsistent with these statements, one can still acquire further evidence 
about them. 
 
Kyburg might respond that the value of ‘1’ for the WK measure is merely an 
idealization; it just reflects a quirk of how accepted evidence is treated in many probabilistic 
models of scientific reasoning. Certainly, the Problem of Corroborating Evidence is not a 
great problem in itself. In many interesting applications of the measure, such as testing 
unrestricted statistical generalizations like ‘51% of human births are male’ or ‘95-100% of 
applications of this insecticide will result in the infertility of wheat in the area of application’, 
finite samples cannot falsify the hypotheses in question. Similarly, in experimental contexts, 
where scientists must use fallible instruments, the distribution of measurement errors in the 
instruments means that while experimental results might be extremely improbable given a 
theory and auxiliary hypotheses about the instruments involved, the results are still logically 
consistent with the theory. If the WK measure is applied to such contexts, then the Problem 
of Corroborating Evidence will not arise. The problem only occurs in relatively trivial 
scenarios, where one statement (which need not be a ‘scientific theory’ in any but the 
broadest sort of sense of this term) is accepted and another is inconsistent with the accepted 
statement. 
 
 Yet this response does not dismiss the Problem of Corroborating Evidence entirely. 
Instead, it gives us reason to regard the problem as a minor flaw of the WK measure. In 
particular, someone using the WK measure will have to be alert to the idealization involved 
in the value  of ‘1’. It would be preferable to have a measure of the weight of argument that 
did not have this feature (and was otherwise at least as satisfactory as the WK measure) but if 
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such a measure is unavailable, then very limited scope of the Problem of Corroborating 
Evidence does not give sufficient reason to reject the WK measure. In short, the Problem of 
Corroborating Evidence is a small imperfection of the measure, in contrast to the more 
worrying problems that the WK measure faces in the Hollow Cube case where multiple sorts 
of evidence are involved. 
 
 Using Evidential Probability as the basis of our quantitative measure of weight can 
avoid some of the problems that the DI measure faced, but not all of them. As such, it 
performs better in some applications, but does not offer a general quantitative formalization 
of the weight of argument, even within the restricted field of application that Kyburg 
suggested. An alternative Evidential Probabilist measure might involve combining a 
quantitative measure from information theory with the definition of relevance that I 
developed in Chapter 1. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Keynes’s concept of weight is an interesting notion, but it is extremely difficult to 
formalize. The results of my discussion confirm Keynes’s scepticism that weight is 
quantitatively measurable. It might be possible to measure the quantity of relevant evidence 
using imprecise probabilities, but neither Walley’s measure nor Kyburg’s measure succeeds. 
The DI measure works well in some simple contexts, but it faces a number of problems that 
make it unsatisfactory as a measure of weight. Kyburg’s WK measure avoids some of the 
strange outputs of the DI measure, but it is still imperfect. In particular, as Kyburg hinted, it 
has a limited scope of acceptable application: it does not work well when applied to different 
sorts of evidence, as I illustrated using Seidenfeld’s Hollow Cube scenario. 
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 An alternative option is to combine the qualitative definition of evidential relevance 
that I developed in Chapter 1 with a suitable metric from information theory. Such a measure 
of weight would first identify relevant data in the premises using my qualitative definition. 
We could apply a measure of information to this data and thus obtain a measure of the weight 
of an argument. Assuming my analysis of evidential relevance in Chapter 1 is adequate, the 
only remaining task in developing this measure is the selection of a satisfactory and 
applicable measure of information. 
 
 Despite my criticisms of their measures, I agree with Walley and Kyburg that there is 
something epistemically significant that is reflected in the width of imprecise probability 
intervals. I disagree that this “something” is the weight of argument, but there are other 
possible uses for degrees of imprecision. In the next chapter, I shall argue that we can use 
imprecise probabilities to measure the extent that our choice of expected utilities for decision-
making involves “going beyond the evidence”. I shall use this measure to develop a novel 
answer to a paradox in decision-theory. 
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CHAPTER 3: EVIDENTIAL PROBABILITY AND THE 
ELLSBERG PARADOX 
 
 In the previous chapter, I argued that the degree of imprecision of either Imprecise 
Bayesian or Evidential Probabilist intervals does not provide a general measure of the 
weights of arguments. However, I agree with philosophers like Kyburg and Walley that there 
is something important tracked by the width of these intervals. In this chapter, I shall argue 
that the degree of imprecision of evidential probabilities can be used to formulate a novel 
answer to the Ellsberg Paradox. This paradox challenges the standard assumption that 
expected utility is sufficient to identify rationality in all decisions, because it involves a type 
of decision problem in which most people consistently violate the axioms of maximizing 
expected utility, yet there is no received account (independent of those axioms) as to why 
their decision-making is problematic. I shall focus on providing reasons for someone 
attracted to the standard decision theory framework to adopt the decision theory that I 
develop in this chapter. 
 
 In Section 1, I introduce the standard approach to normative decision theory. In 
Section 2, I explain the Ellsberg Paradox. In Section 3, I provide a brief overview of the main 
types of response to the paradox. In Section 4, I critically assess Kyburg’s answer to the 
Ellsberg Paradox, which takes advantage of the imprecision of his system. In Section 5, I 
propose an alternative Evidential Probabilist decision theory. Finally, in Section 6, this 
decision theory is applied to the Ellsberg Paradox. I argue that my answer avoids the paradox, 
while also preserving standard decision theory for most static decision problems. Thus, I 
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provide a fairly conservative answer to the Ellsberg Paradox. My answer will be interesting 
for decision theorists who are attracted to standard decision theory, but who are dissatisfied 
by its treatment of the Ellsberg Paradox. Like Kyburg’s response to this problem, my answer 
uses Evidential Probability, and I argue that it improves on his answer in some respects. 
 
 
SECTION 1: MEU DECISION THEORY  
 
1.1 Normative and Descriptive Decision Theory 
 
 Decision theory is the study of rational choice. In particular, it can be broadly defined 
as the theory of rational choice147. It is usually divided into two categories: (1) descriptive 
decision theory, the investigation of how people actually make decisions, and (2) normative 
decision theory, the investigation of how people ought to make decisions. One can also view 
this split as a difference in the interpretations of the same theory148. 
 
 Whether a topic is treated as a descriptive or normative issue is extremely significant. 
Nevertheless, empirical facts about people’s actual decisions can be relevant in either form of 
decision theory. If people’s behaviour conflicts with a normative decision theory and they do 
not regard their choices as irrational when they are given an evaluation using that decision 
theory, then this empirical fact is a prima facie problem for that theory. Furthermore, our 
cognitive capacities set a limit on what constitutes rationality for us: it would be problematic 
if a normative decision theory were a mere counsel of perfection and lacked clear 
                                                          
147 Steele and Stefánsson (2015). 
 
148 Michael D. Resnik (1987, p. 4) argues that “abstract” and “experimental” are better distinctions, with the 
former tending (non-uniformly) towards normative questions and the latter tending (non-uniformly) towards 
descriptive inquiries. However, the normative/descriptive distinction is the standard bifurcation in the literature. 
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implications for computationally restricted reasoners. Finally, as Hempel points out, calling 
an action (like a decision) “rational” involves both (a) an empirical conjecture about people’s 
reasoning and (b) a normative appraisal of that reasoning, because such an assertion entails 
both that those particular reasons explain the action and that the reasons were sufficient for 
their choice to be rational in that context149. 
 
 In the Ellsberg Paradox, an empirical fact about most people’s decision-making under 
uncertainty poses a problem for the standard framework of normative decision theory. I shall 
discuss this paradox as a normative problem. My proposals will be logically compatible with 
a very large variety of descriptive explanations of the Ellsberg Paradox. 
 
1.2 MEU Decision Theory 
 
 Decision theorists use idealized scenarios. A common idealization is that a decision-
maker is considering an algebra of statements that is strongly deductively closed, so that it 
contains every deductive implication of every set of members of the algebra. Each statement 
in the algebra describes possible circumstances. In standard decision theory, there are the 
further idealizations that (1) the decision-maker’s beliefs can be represented using an additive 
probability function that has the algebra as its domain and (2) the decision-maker has 
preferences that can be formalised using a utility function that takes the statements of the 
algebra as its domain and provides cardinal utilities as its range. (The range of a function is 
the set of its outputs for all the members of its domain.) A cardinal utility is a real number; 
                                                          
149 Hempel (1965) p. 463. 
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they can be contrasted with ordinal utilities, which have only a ranked order150. 
 
 To determine a cardinal utility, one ranks the statements in the algebra (to order one’s 
preferences for the different possible circumstances) and arbitrarily chooses two numerical 
points. The chosen numbers are unique up to a positive affine transformation, which means 
that one could obtain different numbers by multiplying, adding, or subtracting constant values 
without altering the cardinal utility. Formally, this means that if U is a cardinal utility 
function of an agent and u is the value of each of the function’s outputs, then a utility 
function U´ where U(x) = u, U´ = a + bu, and (b > 0) is just as satisfactory a formalisation of 
the agent’s preferences151. For instance, suppose that I am standing on a river and I have 
dropped two sticks into the water; I might represent my utility for successfully predicting 
which of two sticks will travel underneath the bridge as U(S) = 0.7 and my utility for being 
unsuccessful as U(H) = 0.3, where S is the circumstance of making a successful prediction. 
However, I could perform a positive affine transformation by multiplying both numbers by a 
constant value of 10, such that U´(S) = 7 and U´(H) = 3, and my cardinal utilities would be 
unchanged. 
 
 It is important to stress that, in decision theory, cardinal utilities are not measures of 
intensities of pleasure, but rather they are formal representations of people’s preferences. You 
and I might have the same cardinal utilities for each of two possibilities, but our 
psychological states could nonetheless be very different. Like ordinal utility functions, 
cardinal utility functions are still fundamentally concerned with orderings of preferences, but 
                                                          
150 John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, in (1953), develop a method by which such utilities could be 
derived by an agent who could not introspect them directly, but who had suitably rich preferences among the 
different circumstances and possible lotteries. 
 
151 Reiss (2013) p. 45. 
 
161  Evidential Probability and the Ellsberg Paradox 
 
 
unlike ordinal utility functions, they provide a numerical scale for these orderings152.  
 
 The Maximizing Expected Utility (MEU) approach requires that the agent maximize 
expected utility, as defined below, by choosing the action with the highest expected utility. If 
two actions have equal expected utilities, such that the agent is indifferent between them, then 
MEU allows either action to be chosen. 
 
Key 
X1-n: Possible states of the world. 
A1-n: Possible alternative actions that the decision-maker can perform in a particular decision-
problem. 
E: The total evidence available to the decision-maker. 
U(Xi, A): The cardinal utility of the action A given that Xi obtains. 
 
Expected Utility 
∑𝑈(𝑋𝑖 , 𝐴)𝑃(𝑋𝑖 ⁡|⁡𝐸)⁡
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
Maximizing Expected Utility: An action A1 maximizes expected utility if and only if there 
is no alternative action A2 such that the expected utility for A2 is higher than the expected 
utility for A1. 
 
 Using this rule, one can always identify a unique action or a set of actions that will be 
                                                          
152 Kreps (1990) p. 30. 
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rational for an individual possessing the functions U and P. 
 
 I shall illustrate the MEU theory of rationality in a simple and uncontroversial 
example. Imagine that you have a choice between two actions: 
 
A1 – Betting that a fair die will land on a 1, 2, 3 or 4. 
A2 – Betting that the die will land on a 5 or 6.  
 
 It is assumed that your algebra distinguishes the following states of the world that are 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive given your evidence E: 
 
X1: The die lands on a 1. 
X2: The die lands on a 2. 
X3: The die lands on a 3. 
X4: The die lands on a 4. 
X5: The die lands on a 5. 
X6: The die lands on a 6. 
 
 Assume that your utility from winning either bet is 100 units. Among other things, E 
states that the die is a fair die; thus, there is a 1/6 probability of the die landing on each side, 
such that P(Xi | E) = 1/6 for each outcome Xi. Recalling the definition of expected utility: 
 
∑𝑈(𝑋𝑖 , 𝐴)𝑃(𝑋𝑖 ⁡|⁡𝐸)⁡
𝑛
𝑖=1
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- the expected utilities are 100(4/6) = 100(2/3) for A1 and 100(2/6) = 100(1/3) for A2. MEU 
requires that you choose A1 rather than A2, because 100(2/3) > 100(1/3). Clearly, in this 
scenario MEU theory corresponds to ordinary intuitions about rationality. Furthermore, the 
theory seems fruitful, since we can clearly extend it to situations in which most people’s 
intuitions are not so clear or where different people disagree. 
 
There is a gargantuan critical literature on the MEU framework, but I shall put these 
debates to one side and generally assume that it is worth attempting to retain either MEU or a 
similar decision theory, if possible. I shall also assume that, while people obviously do not 
always act in accordance with MEU theory, it can sometimes provide valuable formal 
rationalisations of what is ordinarily regarded as reasonable behaviour. 
 
 
SECTION 2: THE ELLSBERG PARADOX 
 
2.1 The Ellsberg Paradox 
 
 Daniel Ellsberg’s paradox has been one of the most influential challenges to 
conventional MEU theory153. He developed the paradox as a PhD student and published in an 
article one year prior to completing his thesis154. Ellsberg presents two situations that are 
paradoxical for MEU. However, since a single example can illustrate the basic problem, I 
shall focus on his second scenario, which I shall call ‘the Ellsberg Scenario’. 
 
                                                          
153 Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009) p. 249-250. 
 
154 Ellsberg (1961). 
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THE ELLSBERG SCENARIO 
 
Suppose you know that there are 90 balls in an urn. Exactly 30 of these balls are red. 
The other 60 balls are black and yellow in some unknown proportion. In this scenario, a 
decision maker has two choices among bets about the colour of a ball that will be randomly 
selected from the urn: 
 
Red: Betting that the ball will be red. 
Black: Betting that the ball will be black. 
Black or Yellow: Betting that the ball will not be red. 
Red or Yellow: Betting that the ball will not be black. 
 
 The utilities are the same for winning with each bet. In experiments, most people 
prefer Red to Black and Black or Yellow to Red or Yellow, when given each choice 
between each pair of alternative actions155. Thus, in either choice, most people prefer the bet 
for which there is a precisely known relative frequency of the type of ball they are 
anticipating. 
 
 However, there is no probability distribution under which their behaviour satisfies the 
axioms of maximising expected utility under the standard axioms, because Red is preferable 
to Black if and only if Red or Yellow is preferable to Black or Yellow in MEU
156. This can 
be demonstrated formally. By assumption, the expected utilities for each bet are equal, so that 
                                                          
155 Ellsberg (1961) p. 653-654. 
 
156 Ellsberg (1961) p. 655. 
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the only way that an action could have a greater expected utility than another is via a higher 
probability. The following is a list of the relevant circumstances: 
 
R: The ball will be red. 
B: The ball will be black. 
¬R: The ball will not be red. 
¬B: The ball will not be black.  
 
 From the probability calculus: 
 
(1) 𝑃(𝑅) ⁡= ⁡1⁡– ⁡𝑃(¬𝑅)  
 
 From the composition of the urn and the random selection of the ball: 
 
(2)⁡𝑃(𝑅) ⁡= ⁡
1
3
 
 
- hence - 
 
(3) 𝑃(¬𝑅) ⁡= ⁡
2
3
 
 
 If R has a greater expected utility than B and they each have equal utilities, then P(R) 
> P(B). Hence, from (2): 
 
(4) 
1
3
> 𝑃(𝐵) 
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 By the probability calculus: 
 
(5) 𝑃(𝐵) ⁡= ⁡1⁡– ⁡𝑃(¬𝐵) 
 
 From (4) and (5), it follows that: 
 
(6) 
1
3
> ⁡1⁡– ⁡𝑃(¬𝐵) 
 
 From (6): 
 
(7) −
2
3
>⁡−⁡𝑃(¬𝐵) 
 
 From (7): 
 
(8) 𝑃(¬𝐵) >
2
3
 
 
 Finally, from (3) and (8), it follows that: 
 
(9) P(¬B) > P(¬R) 
 
 (9) and the assumption that the utility of correctly betting that ¬B is equal to the 
utility of correctly betting that ¬R entail that Red or Yellow must be preferable to Black or 
Yellow, no matter the particular values of P(¬R) and P(¬B). This is contrary to most people’s 
preferences, as they prefer betting that ¬R to betting that ¬B. 
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 Thus, if someone is maximizing their expected utility and they prefer betting that R to 
betting that B, then they must also prefer betting that ¬B to betting that ¬R. The same 
follows, mutatis mutandis, for preferring betting that ¬R to betting that ¬B: one cannot 
simultaneously prefer betting that R to betting that B. Therefore, a preference for both Red 
over Black and Black or Yellow over Red or Yellow is inconsistent with MEU theory. 
 
 I shall demonstrate this point using a decision matrix. Firstly, to simplify the 
discussion, I shall use monetary values and assume (counterfactually) that these monetary 
values correspond unproblematically to utilities. The outcome of winning any of the bets 
shall be £10. From Matrix I, it can be seen that Red is more likely to yield £10 than Black if 
and only if Red or Yellow is more likely to yield £10 than Black or Yellow, because if the 
proportion of red balls to black balls is high, such that R is probable relative to B, then there 
must be fewer black balls relative to red balls in the urn, so that the probability of (R v Y) is 
greater than the probability of (B v Y). 
 
Matrix I 
 
    R    B   Y 
 
Red    £10    0   0 
Black    0    £10   0 
Black or Yellow  0    £10   £10 
Red or Yellow  £10    0   £10 
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Key 
R: The ball will be red. 
B: The ball will be black. 
Y: The ball will be yellow. 
Red: Betting that the ball will be red. 
Black: Betting that the ball will be black. 
Black or Yellow: Betting that the ball will not be red. 
Red or Yellow: Betting that the ball will not be black. 
 
 Contrary to some people’s intuitions, a proponent of MEU cannot use risk-aversion to 
explain this divergence between their theory and people’s behaviour. In MEU, a difference of 
“risk” is a difference of probabilities, because MEU decision theories identify risk is with an 
agent’s personal probabilities157. I have assumed that monetary values and utilities 
correspond, but this is not an essential assumption for the use of MEU. In particular, a utility-
maximising agent can have preferences for both monetary values and the risks involved in 
decisions. For example, suppose that you are offered a choice between (a) betting that a fair 
die will land on a 5 or 6 with a payout of £24 and (b) a guaranteed £2, so that the expected 
value of (a) is 2/6(£24) = £8 and the expected value of (b) is £2158. A preference for (b) over 
(a) is consistent with MEU, because you might assign a sufficiently low utility value to the 
risk of losing the bet that this overwhelms the £6 difference between the bets’ expected 
values. If your utilities had this structure, then you would be maximising expected utility by 
“playing it safe” and choosing (b), because you are risk-averse. 
 
                                                          
157 Reiss (2013) p. 48. 
 
158 The expected value of a bet is its probability-weighted mean value in an indefinitely long series of trials. 
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 However, as I demonstrated above, Red can only be riskier than Black if Red or 
Yellow is riskier than Black or Yellow, because P(R) > P(B) can only be true if P(¬B) > 
P(¬R). Similarly, Red or Yellow can only be riskier than Black or Yellow if Red is riskier 
than Black. Therefore, even if people are being risk-averse (in the MEU sense) their 
behaviour is still inconsistent with MEU. There does seem to be something “cautious” or 
“risk-averse” about the standard preferences, but if this characteristic exists, then the MEU 
formalisation of risk cannot capture it. 
 
 From a normative perspective, the most interesting feature of Ellsberg’s scenario is 
that people’s behaviour in the Ellsberg Scenario is (at least superficially) rationally 
permissible. Firstly, there does not seem to be anything prima facie strange with such 
preferences. Secondly, there are no formal problems with the Ellsberg preferences that are 
independent of the axioms of MEU. For example, there is no proof that people with the 
standard Ellsberg preferences are certain to lose money, or certain to not win money, or even 
less likely to win money that an MEU player. Even at a superficial level, there seems to be 
something that A1 and A3 have in common that makes them different from A2 and A4, so that 
it is conceivable that someone could reasonably regard this difference as significant for their 
preferences. (This is a much weaker claim than that only the standard Ellsberg preferences 
are reasonable.) In contrast, for some other violations of MEU, one can point to formal 
problems with the recalcitrant preferences. To summarise, there is neither a pre-theoretical 
intuition against the standard Ellsberg preferences, nor an independent (in the sense of not 
presupposing MEU theory) formal argument in favour of rejecting them as irrational. 
Consequently, we have a case where many people’s behaviour does not match the MEU 
theory, but it is plausible that the problem might be the theory rather than the behaviour. 
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SECTION 3: RESPONSES TO THE ELLSBERG PARADOX 
 
3.1 Ambiguity Aversion Responses 
 
 A notable empirical explanation of people’s choices in the Ellsberg Scenario is the 
Comparative Ignorance Hypothesis of Craig R. Fox and Amos Tversky159. According to this 
hypothesis, many people have a comparative preference against ambiguous decisions. An 
“ambiguous” decision is one that is made without the statistical information to create a 
relative frequency-based probability distribution. According to this hypothesis, when people 
have a choice between a relatively ambiguous decision and a relatively unambiguous 
decision, people will choose the latter. The preference is ‘comparative’ in the sense that 
people have a linear ordering for the actions. 
 
 Another related explanation is the hypothesis that most people have an absolute 
preference for relatively unambiguous decisions. Such a preference is different from a mere 
comparative preference, because it implies that people will be willing to bet greater sums on 
the less ambiguous bets. In the context of the Ellsberg Scenario, this explanation in terms of 
absolute preference has the same observational prediction as the Comparative Ignorance 
Hypothesis: people with the preference for unambiguous decisions will opt for the less 
ambiguous bets, which are Red over Black and Black or Yellow over Red or Yellow. 
 
 The ambiguity aversion explanations are empirical. However, there is a similar 
literature of normative answers to the Ellsberg Paradox, which holds that normative decision 
theory should be reconciled with ambiguity-averse decision-making. Nabil I. Al-Najjar and 
                                                          
159 Fox and Tversky (1995). 
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Jonathan Weinstein call this approach the “ambiguity aversion literature”160. This Ambiguity 
Aversion response to the Ellsberg Paradox combines several positions: (1) the standard 
preferences are rational; (2) ambiguity aversion is a factor in rational decision-making; and 
(3) MEU theory is modified to reconcile ambiguity aversion with the decision theory by 
incorporating a preference for information into the utility function. James Dow and Sérgio 
Ribeiro da Costa Werlang161 provide an example of how one can carry out part (3) of this 
strategy: they adopt a decision theory in which ambiguity aversion is quantified via imprecise 
probabilities. These values are incorporated into a decision theory that is a strong departure 
from MEU, in the sense that the ambiguity aversion factor is a non-MEU element of 
decision-making that is relevant to a large variety of choices. 
 
 William A. Huber motivates such uses of an ambiguity parameter in decision theory 
by arguing that, when decisions are ambiguous, then there is uncertainty (in an intuitive, pre-
theoretical sense) regarding the correspondence between the probabilities one uses in 
decision-making and the real world162. This distinction between probabilities based on 
knowledge and probabilities based on ignorance does not play a role in MEU. However, as 
Huber argues, there is a commonsense distinction here that an MEU analysis of the Ellsberg 
Paradox does not capture: the MEU framework contains probabilities as a parameter for risk, 
but no parameter for ignorance about the relative frequencies. In the Ellsberg Paradox, most 
players are averse to the choices for which the relevant proportions of balls are unknown. An 
ambiguity aversion approach might seem to provide a natural means of addressing this 
lacuna in MEU theory by providing the ‘missing’ parameter for such ignorance and by using 
                                                          
160 Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009) p. 250. 
 
161 Dow and Werlang (1992). 
 
162 Huber (2010) p. 374. 
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an apparently relevant feature of Ellsberg’s scenario. 
 
 However, allowing ambiguity aversion in this way creates new paradoxes when we 
examine dynamic settings with series of choices, in comparison to the static situation in 
which there is just one choice, like the Ellsberg Paradox163. For instance, allowing ambiguity 
aversion can result in a decision theory that permits decision-makers to take sunk costs into 
account, which is the “Sunk Cost fallacy”. A sunk cost is something that has been given up in 
the pursuit of a goal and that cannot be recovered. For example, in the Robert E. Howard 
story “The Tower of the Elephant”, the adventurer Conan is breaking into a sorcerer’s tower 
to retrieve a famous gem called the “Heart of the Elephant”. Having braved several lethal 
perils and just survived a close fight against a giant spider, Conan finds himself in a treasure 
chamber. He can proceed into the next room and continue to pursue the Heart of the Elephant 
or he can take the wealth that he can carry (which is presumably less valuable than the Heart) 
from this chamber. Conan reasons that, given all the danger that he has risked thus far to steal 
the Heart, he will continue in his adventure and step into the next chamber in the tower164. 
Since Conan is taking past costs into account, he has committed the Sunk Cost fallacy. 
 
 To illustrate this problem, I shall slightly adapt an example from Al-Najjar and 
Weinstein. The set-up of the scenario is similar to the Ellsberg Paradox scenario. A randomly 
selected choice ball will be drawn from an urn. The player knows that the urn contains 30 red 
balls, 0-60 black balls, and 0-60 yellow balls. In this scenario, the player is assumed to be 
risk-neutral, in the sense that they do not have a preference for taking risks, nor are they risk-
averse. As in the Ellsberg Paradox, we assume counterfactually that monetary values 
                                                          
163 Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009) p. 258-271. 
 
164 Howard (2006) p. 94. 
173  Evidential Probability and the Ellsberg Paradox 
 
 
correspond to utilities. 
 
 Unlike the Ellsberg Paradox, the ball is drawn behind a screen, so that the player 
cannot see which ball was selected. Before this occurs, the player can choose to invest a sum 
G, such that G ≥ 0. The value of G is fixed ahead of their choice and the selection of the ball. 
If the player chooses to invest G and the ball is yellow, then they will receive their investment 
back, plus a sum of (£10 – G). If they invest G and the ball is not yellow, then they receive 
their investment back. In essence, G is a hedge against yellow balls. 
 
 If the ball is not yellow, then the player is offered a second choice between (1) betting 
that the ball is red and (2) betting that the ball is not black. If the player has invested G, then 
she receives (£10 – G) for correctly guessing the colour of the ball. If she guesses incorrectly, 
then she loses her initial investment. If the player has not invested G, then she receives £10 
for guessing correctly and she gains/loses nothing if she guesses incorrectly. 
 
 It is never rational to invest G ≥ £10, because not investing G yields an equal or 
greater sum under any possible outcome when G takes this value. Similarly, it is always 
rational to invest G = 0, because if the ball is yellow then investing G provides a gain of £10 
and not investing G provides no gain, whereas if the ball is not yellow then investing G 
provides equal gains or losses to not investing G. The rationality of choosing to invest a sum 
0 < G < £10 will depend on a player’s probabilities and utilities. 
 
 The player might face two decision problems: 
 
Choice 1: Whether to invest a given value of G as a hedge against yellow balls. 
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Choice 2: If the ball is not yellow, then whether to bet (a) that the ball is red or (b) that the 
ball is black. 
 
I shall represent this scenario using a decision matrix for a player who has chosen to 
invest G. It is assumed that the players’ preferences are (weakly) dynamically consistent, so 
that their ordinal preferences for different series of decisions do not change upon learning 
probabilistically irrelevant information. This entails that their preferences between Red and 
Black will be the same after learning that the ball is not yellow. It is also assumed that their 
preferences are additive invariant, so that the addition of a constant G does not change the 
ordering of their preferences. Therefore, if they prefer betting £10 on an outcome Φ to £10 on 
an outcome Ψ, then they prefer betting £10 ± G on Φ to £10 ± G on Ψ. A player who chooses 
not to invest G faces Matrix II, which is equivalent to the top two rows of Matrix I above. If 
someone has the standard Ellsberg Paradox preferences and they have not invested G, then 
they prefer Red to Black, because this part of Matrix II is identical to the relevant part of 
Matrix I. 
 
 
 
Matrix II 
 
   R    B   Y 
 
Red   £10    0   0 
Black   0    £10   0 
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 However, suppose that they have chosen to invest G. The player thus faces a choice 
that is characterised by Matrix III. 
 
Matrix III 
 
   R    B   Y 
 
Red   £10 – G   0   £10 – G 
Black   0    £10 – G  £10 – G 
 
 
 
 Returning to the standard Ellsberg Paradox, we know that the player in question 
prefers ‘Black or Yellow’ to ‘Red or Yellow’ in Matrix IV. The only differences between 
Matrix III and Matrix IV are the information that the ball is not yellow and the constant G. 
Given the assumptions of dynamic consistency, the information that the ball is not yellow 
does not change the order of the preferences for the rows of the matrices. Furthermore, the 
constant G in Matrix III cannot change the player’s ordinal preferences, because their 
preferences are assumed to be additive-invariant. Since the ambiguity-averse agent now faces 
an identical choice problem in Matrix IV to Matrix III and they prefer Black or Yellow to 
Red or Yellow in Matrix IV, they must also prefer Black to Red in Matrix II. Thus, a player 
who has chosen to invest G and who knows that the ball is not yellow will prefer Black to 
Red. 
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Matrix IV 
 
   R    B   Y 
 
Red or Yellow £10    0   £10 
Black or Yellow  0    £10   £10 
 
 
 However, from their preference in Matrix I, we know that they would prefer Red to 
Black had they not invested G. Therefore, their choice to bet Red or Black depends purely 
on their earlier decision to invest G. This means that a dynamically consistent ambiguity-
averse player with additive-invariant preferences will commit the Sunk Cost fallacy in Al-
Najjar and Weinstein’s scenario. 
 
 By contrast, a standard MEU player will prefer Red to Black in one of the matrices 
above if and only if they prefer Red to Black in all the matrices. For example, if P(R) > P(B), 
then they will prefer Red to Black in Matrix II, but they will also prefer betting Red to Black 
in Matrix III and Matrix IV. Their choices will be independent of the decision to invest G. 
 
 A supporter of ambiguity aversion responses might try to avoid this consequence by 
dropping the assumption of additive invariance. However, at least in this case, the assumption 
that investing G should not modify one’s ordinal preferences is a plausible assumption. 
Furthermore, to drop it would be to accept outright that investing G makes a difference to the 
player’s decision-making, because their preference for Red or Black would depend on the 
value of the constant G, which is a sunk cost. In short, this strategy would commit the 
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ambiguity-averse player to the Sunk Cost fallacy from the outset. 
 
 Alternatively, they might contest the status of the Sunk Cost fallacy as a genuine 
“fallacy”. For instance, Robert Nozick argues that taking sunk costs into account can be 
rational under some circumstances165. The circumstances which he discusses can be classified 
into two general categories: (1) taking sunk costs can be advantageous for an irrational agent, 
because they can provide a counterbalance to irrational tendencies like being tempted by 
short-term benefits that have greater long-term costs, and (2) our commitments to past 
projects is part of what provides structure to our sense of selfhood and meaning to our lives, 
so that it is arguably permissible for a rational agent to take them into account, even if this 
involves the Sunk Cost “fallacy”. While (1) is not straightforwardly relevant to normative 
decision theory as a theory of rational behaviour, (2) is very relevant. 
 
  However, even if one believes that taking sunk costs into account is not fallacious in 
general, it seems irrational in this case, because there is nothing in the notion of ambiguity 
aversion that motivates a concern for sunk costs. There are no long-term projects, promises, 
or principles involved; the influence of the earlier decision to hedge G does not have the same 
significance as commitments like promising to avenge a family member’s death or deciding 
to devote one’s life to medicine; the Sunk Cost reasoning in this scenario is merely an 
unmotivated consequence of such a preference structure. It is one thing to believe that the 
Sunk Cost “fallacy” is non-fallacious when a player has an explicit rationale for such 
behaviour, but quite another thing to think that it is non-fallacious without such a rationale. 
 
 Nevertheless, it would be possible for me to explore this debate in more detail. I shall 
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simply note that the scenario developed by Al-Najjar and Weinstein proves that the 
Ambiguity Aversion response comes at a price: a normative decision-theorist who adopts this 
response to the Ellsberg Paradox (and accepts dynamic consistency as a norm) no longer has 
to address an inconsistency between apparently rational behaviour and their theory, but they 
must then defend a further controversial position. Regardless of one’s views on the Sunk Cost 
fallacy, it would be attractive ceteris paribus to have a response to the Ellsberg Paradox that 
did not incur this obligation. 
 
 Furthermore, the result in this second scenario is comparable to the Ellsberg Paradox: 
it seems like it should be rationally permissible to have most people’s Ellsberg Paradox 
preferences, but still prefer Red to Black in Matrix II. However, such preferences are 
excluded by the Ambiguity Aversion response that Al-Najjar and Weinstein criticise. 
Consequently, their example suggests that both forms of decision theory face the same sort of 
problems with Ellsberg-type scenarios. 
 
 
3.2 Conservative Responses 
 
 Supporters of the MEU theory must argue that, contrary to most people’s intuitions, 
the standard Ellsberg Paradox choices are actually mistakes. Such responses cannot be 
straightforwardly formal, because one cannot prove that the standard Ellsberg preferences are 
always produced by a mathematical error, such as miscalculating the expected values of the 
various bets. Additionally, there is no proof that people who make standard choices are more 
likely to lose money in the long-run. 
 
 Some conservative decision theorists have attempted to explain people’s behaviour as 
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heuristic reasoning. Al-Najjar and Weinstein have recently developed a response of this 
nature166. They argue that the experimental subjects with the standard preferences are 
misapplying heuristics for avoiding deception. These heuristics are reasonable in non-
experimental settings, but people can lead to irrational behaviour in a deception-free 
experimental context. For instance, if the bookie could change the proportion of the black 
balls from any proportion from 0 to 2/3, whereas the proportion of red balls must be 1/3, then 
it would make sense for people to take a precaution against this possibility by avoiding 
betting on the black balls. According to the conjecture of Al-Najjar and Weinstein, people fail 
to modify this heuristic for the circumstances in which they know that there is no deception, 
and this causes them to violate MEU theory. 
 
 There are strong advantages to such conservative responses. As Al-Najjar and 
Weinstein note, they are consistent with the experimental data, but they do not require any 
revision of the MEU theory167. Furthermore, they seem just as good (or bad) explanations, 
prima facie, as the explanations in the ambiguity aversion literature, since both accounts 
make an appeal to internal psychological features of the test subjects’ minds in the Ellsberg 
Paradox experiments. 
 
 From the standpoint of normative decision theory, there are even stronger advantages 
of the response of Al-Najjar and Weinstein. While it is widely regarded as counterintuitive to 
say that people are being irrational in the Ellsberg Paradox, there are many cases in which 
MEU theory either (a) formalises our intuitions about rationality or (b) enables an 
                                                          
166 Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009) p. 276-277. 
 
167 Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009) p. 278. 
 
180 Confirmation, Decision, and Evidential Probability 
 
unproblematic extension of these intuitions to contexts in which our intuitions are unclear. 
We should be reluctant to abandon such a powerful framework, even if this means sometimes 
making counterintuitive judgements about rationality. 
 
 However, the Ellsberg Paradox is still worth avoiding, ceteris paribus. If we use the 
definition of ‘rational’ that Al-Najjar and Weinstein themselves use, then a decision is 
rational if it is immune to introspection: if I choose an action A and you can make me regret 
A by using an analysis of my reasoning that does not involve providing any new non-formal 
information, then it was irrational for me to choose A168. Here, ‘formal’ information involve 
be mathematics, logic, or the acceptance of a decision theory like MEU. ‘Non-formal’ 
information could be the result of a bet or learning a scientific fact. For example, suppose that 
I am playing Blackjack. I am aiming to win money, rather than enjoy risky decision-making 
or any other motive. Suppose that I have the 10 of Diamonds and the 2 of Clubs. I choose to 
“Hit” and I receive the 10 of Hearts. I shall regret my decision, but my regret is not due to 
learning that I made a formal error in my reasoning; I am simply disappointed that I was 
unlucky. In contrast, suppose that, instead of choosing “Hit”, I accept a bet from the dealer 
that I can win by having five cards, two of which are 10’s. It is easy to prove that I cannot 
win money with such a bet, because this outcome is impossible. 
 
 What counts as an adequate ‘formal’ reason to regret one’s decision will vary with the 
context, since it will depend on the accepted formal decision theory. In the Ellsberg Paradox, 
MEU theory is the subject of the debate, and therefore, the formal information cannot include 
the fact that the standard preferences violate MEU theory. Consequently, it is insufficient to 
note that the standard Ellsberg preferences violate the MEU Axiom of Independence: 
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Axiom of Independence: If Ax and Ay have the same consequences when X is believed to be 
false, then an agent will prefer Ax or Ay if and only if these actions have different expected 
utilities given X. 
 
 Put informally, the Axiom of Independence requires that only a difference in expected 
utility can provide grounds for a difference in preference, so that the ordering of an MEU 
agent’s preferences is independent of information that does not alter either the probability or 
expected utility of the items on the ranking. Such an axiom is a necessary condition of 
representing someone’s preferences using an expected utility function169. 
 
 Unfortunately for the MEU approach, there are no known formal grounds (other than 
MEU) to regret having the standard Ellsberg preferences. There is no proof that is analogous 
to the second Blackjack example above. The conservative response might be a correct 
empirical explanation, but it does not solve the Ellsberg Paradox as a normative problem. 
Additionally, even if telling someone with the standard Ellsberg preferences about the 
heuristic explanation of Al-Najjar and Weinstein will induce regret in that person, the 
explanation is psychological information, rather than formal information. A conservative 
decision theorist might be willing to tolerate the Ellsberg Paradox and retain MEU theory, but 
Al-Najjar and Weinstein’s response does not provide any reasons to do so. 
 
 Neither the ambiguity aversion literature, nor the conservative responses are entirely 
satisfactory. Contrary to MEU theory, the standard choices seem to be rationally permissible, 
even if they do not seem to be mandatory. However, incorporating an absolute preference 
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against ambiguity into decision theory creates a new set of paradoxes. In the next two 
sections, I shall discuss two Evidential Probabilist answers to the Ellsberg Paradox. 
 
 
SECTION 4: KYBURG AND THE ELLSBERG PARADOX 
 
 Modifying MEU theory is natural for Evidential Probabilists, because MEU 
probabilities are always precise, whereas the probabilities in Evidential Probability can be 
imprecise. However, Evidential Probability as a theory of epistemic probability does not 
entail any particular normative decision theory. In this section, I shall outline Kyburg’s own 
decision theory. I shall describe his answer to the Ellsberg Paradox. His response preserves 
the intuition that the standard preferences are permissible but not mandatory, while avoiding 
the Sunk Cost fallacy, but it has its own challenges. In the next section, I shall develop a 
more conservative response. 
 
4.1 Kyburg’s Decision Theory 
 
 In Kyburg’s decision theory, the expected utility of an action A given an agent’s total 
evidence K is determined by multiplying the utility of performing A under circumstance Ci 
for each of the n possible circumstances i by the probability of Ci given A. Formally, this 
involves calculating: 
 
∑𝑈(𝐶𝑖 , 𝐴)𝐸𝑃(𝐶𝑖 ⁡|⁡𝐸⁡^⁡𝐾)⁡
𝑛
𝑖=1
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However, since the probabilities in Evidential Probability are interval-valued, it is 
possible that the expected utilities will also be interval-valued170. 
 
 For example, imagine I know that: 
 
(1) Between 0% and 50% of the balls in a bag are red and the evidential probability that a 
randomly selected ball is red given K is EP(R | K) = [0, 0.5], where R is ‘The ball is red’.  
 
(2) There is a payout of £10 for correctly betting that the ball is red. 
 
(3) Between 50% and 100% of the balls in the bag are oblate spheroids and the evidential 
probability that a randomly selected ball is an oblate spheroid given K is EP(O | K) = [0.5, 1] 
where O is ‘The ball is an oblate spheroid’. 
 
(4) There is a payout of £30 for betting that the ball is an oblate spheroid. 
 
Assume that utilities correspond to monetary values. The expected utilities are [0, 5] 
for betting that the ball is red and [15, 30] for betting that it is an oblate spheroid. 
 
 Kyburg endorses an intuitive principle for circumstances when the minimum expected 
utility of an action exceeds the maximum expected utility of the other action: 
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Principle of Dominance: If there is a choice between A1 and A2, where the minimum 
expected utility of A1 is greater than the maximum expected utility of A2, then a rational agent 
will choose A1
171. 
 
 In the example of the balls in the bag, this principle requires that I choose to bet that 
the ball will be an oblate spheroid, rather than betting that it is red. 
 
 Kyburg discusses but does not endorse any further decision rules for when the 
Principle of Dominance does not fully determine a choice172. However, he suggests a number 
of possible decision rules for imprecise expected utilities: 
 
Maximin: Choose the action with the highest minimum expected utility. For example, if the 
expected utility of betting that the ball is red is [0, 1] and the expected utility of betting that 
the ball is green is [0.5, 0.75], then a maximin rule would require betting that the ball is 
green. 
 
Maximax: Choose the action with the highest maximum expected utility. For example, in the 
above situation where the expected utility of betting that the brick is spherical is [0, 1] and the 
expected utility of betting that the brick is green is [0.5, 0.75], then a maximax rule would 
require betting that the brick is spherical. 
 
                                                          
171 Kyburg uses ‘dominance’ to refer to an action having a minimum expected utility that exceeds another 
action’s maximum expected utility. It is important to distinguish his usage from the use of this term in other 
fields, like game theory. 
 
172 Kyburg (1990) p. 233. 
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Combining the Limits: Choose the action that has the highest value for some function that 
combines the upper and lower limits of the expected utility interval. One simple function is 
the mean of the limits. If the expected utility of betting that the brick is spherical is [0, 1] with 
a mean of 0.5 and the expected utility of betting that the brick is green is [0.5, 0.75] with a 
mean of 0.625, then this rule would opt for betting that the brick is green. 
 
4.2 The Ellsberg Paradox 
 
 Kyburg claims that the Ellsberg Paradox is an example of the advantages of an 
imprecise probability theory, because it illustrates how precise probabilities do not always 
provide the right inputs for decision-making173. His answer begins with the assumption that 
people with the standard choices are acting in accordance with a Maximin rule: choose the 
option with the greatest minimum expected utility. 
 
 If people’s probabilities are interval-valued and based on the statements of the relative 
frequencies in the set-up, then a Maximin strategy requires choosing the standard choices. As 
before, suppose that I know that 1/3 of the balls in the urn are red, that between 0 and 2/3 are 
black, and that I am betting on a randomly selected ball. Returning to Matrix I, my Evidential 
Probability for R is [1/3, 1/3], so my minimum expected utility is 1/3(£10) = £3.33. My 
Evidential Probability for B is [0, 2/3], so the minimum expected utility is 0(£10) = 0. If I am 
following a Maximin rule, then I shall choose Red over Black, because the minimum 
expected utility of Red is greater. Consequently, if I am a Maximin Evidential Probabilist 
player, then my preferences will correspond to most people’s behaviour for the first choice. 
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Matrix I 
 
    R    B   Y 
 
Red    £10    0   0 
Black    0    £10   0 
Black or Yellow  0    £10   £10 
Red or Yellow  £10    0   £10 
 
 
 
 The second choice in the Ellsberg Paradox is between Black or Yellow and Red or 
Yellow. My Evidential Probability for (B v Y) is [2/3, 2/3]. Hence, my minimum expected 
utility is 2/3(£10) = £6.67. My Evidential Probability for (R v Y) is [1/3, 3/3] and the 
minimum expected utility is 1/3(£10) = £3.33. If I am following a Maximin rule, then I shall 
choose Black or Yellow over Red or Yellow, because the minimum expected utility is 
greater. Thus, Kyburg’s response replicates the standard responses in the Ellsberg Paradox, if 
the player has adopted a Maximin strategy. 
 
4.3 Evaluation 
 
 Kyburg’s answer to the Ellsberg Paradox has some apparent advantages. Some are 
real, whereas others are questionable. One real advantage is that a player using Kyburg’s 
version of the Maximin scenario will avoid the Sunk Cost fallacy in the dynamic choice 
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context that I discussed earlier. Suppose that the player has been offered the choice to hedge 
G against the possibility of the ball being yellow. The ball is drawn behind a screen and the 
player is told that the ball is not yellow. They are now offered a choice between Red and 
Black in Matrix III. Since the player knows that the ball is not yellow, the evidential 
probability of Y is [0, 0]. Consequently, it is irrelevant to the probability of a disjunction that 
includes it. The probability of R is [1/3, 1/3], whereas the probability of B is [0, 2/3]. Hence: 
 
𝐸𝑃(𝑅⁡𝑣⁡𝑌) = [
1
3
,
1
3
] 
𝐸𝑃(𝐵⁡𝑣⁡𝑌) = [0,
2
3
] 
 Matrix III 
 
  R    B   Y 
 
Red  £10 – G   0   £10 – G 
Black  0    £10 – G  £10 – G 
 
 
 
 The minimum expected utility for Red is 1/3(10 – G) and the minimum expected 
utility for Black is 0(10 – G) = 0, so that a player following an Evidential Probabilist 
Minimax strategy will prefer Red, just as they did in Matrix II. The earlier choice to invest G 
makes no difference to their choice in this case. Therefore, the Minimax Evidential 
Probabilist player avoids the Sunk Cost fallacy, while also avoiding the Ellsberg Paradox. 
There is more to say here, but it would be very similar to my discussion of this scenario in 
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Subsection 6.3. At the very least, Kyburg’s answer does not face a prima facie problem from 
Al-Najjar and Weinstein’s scenario. 
 
 Kyburg’s answer might seem to have another advantage, which is that (unlike 
standard decision theory) it seems to capture that most people’s choices in the Ellsberg 
Paradox seem more “risk-averse” or “cautious”, in some informal sense of these terms. One 
might think that Maximin is a cautious decision rule, because a Maximin agent tries to 
optimize the worst-case scenario. Kyburg’s decision theory might seem to capture an aspect 
of cautiousness and a sense of ‘risk-aversion’ that cannot be formalised in MEU. 
 
 However, this claim for Kyburg’s answer is debatable. Williamson argues (in a 
different context from the Ellsberg Paradox) that a different method for determining expected 
utilities using evidential probabilities produces a more cautious long-run sequence of 
decisions174. If Williamson is correct, then it is arguable175 that the Minimax rule with 
evidential probabilities does not characterise an ideally rational cautious agent, and one could 
not claim that Kyburg’s answer captures the intuition that players with the standard 
preferences are following an (ideally rational) cautious rule. 
 
 Significantly, Williamson’s method produces a different result in the Ellsberg 
Paradox from Minimax. He is an Objective Bayesian (as described in Chapter 1 Section 2.1) 
and so he interprets the probabilities in the calculation of expected utilities as “rational 
degrees of belief”. In Williamson’s form of Objective Bayesianism, these probabilities are 
                                                          
174 Williamson (2007) p. 170. 
 
175 It follows if one adds the additional premise that the asymptotic properties of a decision-rule are suitable for 
characterising it in a single-case decision like the Ellsberg Scenario. Exploring this premise further would lead 
me far away from the central thrust of this chapter. 
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determined in two steps: (1) calibration, in which a rational agent determines the constraints 
that their available statistical information places on their degrees of belief and  
(2) equivocation, in which the agent selects a probability function that minimizes the distance 
between P(Φ) and 0.5 for every Φ in the domain of the function given the constraints from 
calibration. The distribution for this function becomes the rational agent’s degrees of belief. 
 
  In the Ellsberg Paradox, the relevant statistical information regarding the statement R 
‘The ball will be red’ is that 1/3 of balls in the urn are red, so that calibration requires that 
P(R) = 1/3. For B, calibration requires that P(B) must be in the interval [1/3, 2/3], since this is 
the player’s best statistical information regarding B. For the statement Y, calibration also 
requires that P(Y) must be in the interval [1/3, 2/3]. The player knows that R, B, and Y are a 
set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive statements. A value of 1/3 minimizes the distance 
between P(B) and 0.5, as well as P(Y) and 0.5. Therefore, a rational agent who uses 
Williamson’s Objective Bayesianism to determine probabilities for calculating expected 
utilities will be indifferent in the Ellsberg Scenario: Red and Black have equal expected 
utilities, as do Black or Yellow and Red or Yellow176. 
 
 In the absence of a convincing reason to consider Maximin or Objective Bayesianism 
as more cautious (and thus indifference or the standard preferences as more “cautious” in the 
Ellsberg Paradox) it seems that cautiousness is still a concept without a clear explication. 
Perhaps no general formalisation of this concept is possible. It is unproven that Kyburg’s 
response captures the intuition that the standard preferences are cautious, because the concept 
of cautiousness is still not clearly explicated and plausible alternative explications can 
                                                          
176 For precise expected utilities, the expected utilities of Red and Black are equal if and only if the expected 
utilities of Black or Yellow and Red or Yellow are equal, since the expected utility of Red is equal to 1 minus 
the expected utility of Black or Yellow and the same mutatis mutandis for Black and Red or Yellow. 
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produce different results. 
 
Additionally, Kyburg’s answer to the Ellsberg Paradox faces some positive 
objections. Firstly, it is relative only to a Maximin strategy, so that if one thinks that it is 
always rational to have the standard preferences in the Ellsberg Paradox, then Kyburg’s 
account will not justify this belief. For example, if we combine the limits to compute an 
expected utility, then the expected utilities are as follows: 
 
(1) Expected utility of betting that the ball is red: 
1
2
(
1
3
+
1
3
) £15 = £5. 
 
(2) Expected utility of betting that the ball is black: 
1
2
(0 +
2
3
) £15 = £5. 
 
(3) Expected utility of betting that the ball is not red: 
1
2
(
2
3
+
2
3
) £15 = £10.  
 
 (4) Expected utility of betting that the ball is not black: 
1
2
(
1
3
+ 1) £15 = £10. 
 
- so that one should be indifferent in both choices. On the other hand, the Ellsberg Paradox is 
usually understood to be the problem that the standard choices are permissible, not that they 
are mandatory. It does not seem to be a problem that Kyburg’s decision theory only enables 
us to establish the possibility of a rational agent making the standard choices. 
 
 A more serious objection is that Kyburg’s use of decision rules to characterise the 
choice of actions (when such choices are not determined by the Principle of Dominance) is 
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unnecessary given the rest of his formal epistemology. Kyburg also has a notion of “practical 
probabilities”, which are precise probabilities that are introduced for when precise 
probabilities are needed for calculating mathematical expectations177. For example, the 
Evidential Probability that a normal coin will land tails in a long series of trials is not exactly 
[0.5. 0.5], but this degenerate interval is a subinterval of the actual evidential probability, and 
so it is suitable for practical purposes. The only endogenous constraints on the choice of 
practical probabilities are that they must be within the relevant Evidential Probability 
intervals and they must be consistent with the axioms of the precise probability calculus. 
Since neither the choice of practical probability nor the choice of decision rule (like Minimax 
or Maximax) is determined within Kyburg’s model, there seems nothing to be gained by 
introducing the latter for decision-making. Decision rules are no more objective than practical 
probabilities, especially since Kyburg does not require that the choice of rule stays constant 
over time. 
 
 This point is pertinent, because there are reasons why Minimax should not be a 
decision rule for all choices. In particular, when the potential losses are very small and the 
potential losses are very great, Minimax can become a very implausible rule178. To use an 
extreme example, imagine you are offered a choice between (a) investing a £1 coin in a 
lottery with a 99% chance of a £1 billion prize and (b) a guaranteed sum of eleven 10p coins. 
Since the worst-case scenario if you choose (a) is a loss of £1, whereas the worst (and best) 
case scenario for (b) is a gain of £1.10, if you follow the Minimax decision rule, then you 
must choose (b). Yet such a choice is highly counterintuitive. Even if someone chooses to 
                                                          
177 Kyburg (1990) p. 66. 
 
178 Resnik (1987) p. 27. 
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follow a Minimax rule in the Ellsberg Scenario, it is implausible that ordinary people could 
follow such a rule in all possible decision problems179. 
 
 The issue of different decisions over time raises the further problem of dynamics. 
Kyburg does not provide an account of how different rules should be combined over a series 
of decisions. If I am playing a strategy game and I face a large number of optimization 
decisions over the course of the game, then it is unclear whether Kyburg’s decision theory 
allows me to switch mid-game between Minimax, Maximax, Combining the Limits, a 
Williamson-style approach, or other rules. My point here is not that Kyburg’s theory of 
dynamic decision-making is positively flawed, but that it is undeveloped. It would be 
preferable to have a decision theory that provided a similarly intuitive answer to the Ellsberg 
Paradox, while also having an account of decision-making over time. Kyburg’s suggestion of 
practical probabilities that are within the Evidential Probability intervals could provide such a 
theory, because he has a well-developed theory of updating these intervals. 
 
 Finally, the redundancy of rules introduces inelegance into Kyburg’s decision-theory. 
He requires that a decision-maker must check the coherence of their choice of betting-odds, 
but this is a distinct step from the choice of decision-rule180. Yet, if an agent acts in 
accordance with a practical probability distribution, then their choice of odds will be coherent 
(see the end of Subsection 5.2 in Chapter 1) and they will not require any additional choice of 
rule. It would be more elegant to remove the redundant element and simply use practical 
                                                          
179 There are other versions of the Maximin rule, such as the Maximin Regret rule, that avoid this particular 
problem, but a discussion of such rules would be extensive and would not address Kyburg’s actual position, 
which involves Maximin. 
 
180 Kyburg (1978) p. 160-161. 
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probabilities. 
 
 However, Kyburg’s approach might be attractive as a decision theory that is less 
computationally demanding than MEU or my proposal in the next section. Imagine that I 
have evidential probabilities for a set of different possible outcomes given a statistical 
database, but calculating a coherent additive probability distribution over the range of 
possibilities is impractical. Assume that a particular computationally undemanding rule like 
Minimax or Maximax is acceptable in this context: for example, if I am working in a high-
risk investment fund, Maximax might be appropriate, whereas Minimax might be a better 
rule when the ‘utilities’ I am maximizing are the number of people who survive a possible 
landslide. As a normative theory of ideal decision-making given computational constraints, 
an expanded version of Kyburg’s theory might be an attractive option181. 
 
 I shall not explore this suggestion further in this thesis, and continue on the 
assumption that computational constraints are unimportant. I have no fundamental objections 
to Kyburg’s theory, but I shall argue that an Evidential Probabilist can do better in the realm 
of ideal normative decision theory. Practical probabilities and a principle like MEU seem 
capable of doing everything that Kyburg’s approach can do for modelling ideal rational 
agents, but with greater clarity and elegance. I shall develop this proposal in the next section. 
 
 
 
                                                          
181 It might also have useful applications when the utilities in a context do not have a proper structure to be 
represented by anything richer than an interval-valued function. 
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SECTION 5: EVIDENTIAL PROBABILITY, PRACTICAL 
PROBABILITY AND DECISIONS 
 
In this section, I shall propose a new Evidential Probabilist decision theory. Firstly, I 
shall offer a method to determine precise expected utilities with imprecise evidential 
probabilities. This provides a simulacrum of orthodox decision theory. Secondly, I shall 
propose a quantitative measure of how far we have to speculate beyond the evidence when 
determining these expected utilities. Thirdly, I shall use this measure to make an addition to 
orthodox decision theory, which will be vital for my answer to the Ellsberg Paradox in 
Section 6. 
 
5.1 Practical Probabilities 
 
 Practical probabilities are Kyburg’s device for determining precise probabilities given 
imprecise evidential probabilities. He does not provide an interpretation for what they mean, 
but I shall interpret them as the postulation of the relative frequency information that would 
be required for a precise probability distribution given the background knowledge. 
 
 I shall illustrate this idea with an example. Imagine that an Evidential Probabilitist is 
betting on a toss of a £1 coin. She is calculating her expected utilities for choosing heads or 
tails. Her best statistical information is that £1 coins land heads with a relative frequency that 
is very close to 50%. The same holds for £1 coins landing tails. H is the hypothesis that the 
£1 coin will land heads and T is the hypothesis that it will land tails. The evidential 
probabilities could be: 
 
𝐸𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐾) = [0.49, 0.51] 
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𝐸𝑃(𝑇⁡|⁡𝐾) = [0.49, 0.51] 
 
 Neither of the above evidential probabilities is sufficient to calculate an expected 
utility for her bets, even if precise utilities are available. However, evidential probabilities do 
not have to represent someone’s actual knowledge: they can be a hypothetical body of 
knowledge182. Thus, she could calculate that the evidential probability that she would have if 
she had the statistical information to calculate a precise probability. This probability would be 
speculative, in the sense that she has used more information about relative frequencies than 
she has in her evidence. We can represent this additional speculative information as S and 
conjoin it with K to generate a practical probability statement. For example, let S1 be the 
conjecture that the long-run relative frequency of £1 coins landing heads is exactly 1/2 and S2 
be the conjecture the long-run relative frequency of landing tails is exactly 1/2. If these are 
suitable reference class statements for H and T, then the following equations hold: 
 
𝐸𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝑆1⁡^⁡𝐾) = [0.5, 0.5] 
𝐸𝑃(𝑇⁡|⁡𝑆2⁡^⁡𝐾) = [0.5, 0.5] 
 
 These degenerate intervals are the agent’s practical probabilities, which can be used 
as inputs for calculating expected utilities. I shall require that the speculated relative 
frequency must be within the relevant Evidential Probability intervals for the hypothesis in 
question, because these intervals represent what guidance the Evidential Probabilist has from 
her evidence. Additionally, the relative frequency statement must describe a reference class 
that will provide a precise probability in these circumstances: it must be in a class that 
contains this particular £1 coin as a random member. 
                                                          
182 Kyburg (1974) p. 317. 
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 Formally, suppose that x and y, which are the limits of the evidential probability, have 
values such that x ≠ y, so that the interval is not degenerate. Then, when: 
 
𝐸𝑃(𝐴⁡|⁡𝐾) = [𝑥, 𝑦] 
 
- an Evidential Probabilist can calculate a practical probability by supposing an S such that - 
 
𝐸𝑃(𝐴⁡|⁡𝑆⁡^⁡𝐾) = [𝑧, 𝑧] 
 
- where x ≤ z ≤ y. By doing so, the Evidential Probabilist can always obtain a practical 
probability for decision-making. 
 
 In this thesis, I shall take the choice of speculated relative frequency to be exogenous, 
except for (1) the constraints above and (2) the important constraint that any resulting 
practical probability distribution is consistent with the axioms of additive probability. In the 
coin-tossing case, it is permissible to choose any relative frequency within the [0.49, 0.51], 
provided that this does not create an incoherent practical probability distribution. 
 
 Additionally, S is not incorporated into the total evidence. Thus, if an Evidential 
Probabilist learns some new statement E, then her new evidential probability for a hypothesis 
H is EP(H | E ^ K), not EP(H | E ^ S ^ K). For example, in the coin-tossing example, imagine 
that the Evidential Probabilist learns that this particular £1 coin is weighted towards tails, so 
that it lands heads with a relative frequency of 40-48%. Consequently, the updated evidential 
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probabilities are: 
 
𝐸𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸⁡^⁡𝐾) = [0.40, 0.48] 
𝐸𝑃(𝑇⁡|⁡𝐸⁡^⁡𝐾) = [0.52, 0.6] 
 
 The calculation of a new set of expected utilities will require a new speculative 
statement, S´, because the earlier speculation S results in a probability that conflicts with the 
new evidential probabilities. She might choose S´ the midpoints of the intervals, such that: 
 
𝐸𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡⁡𝐸⁡^⁡𝑆´⁡^⁡𝐾) = [0.44, 0.44] 
𝐸𝑃(𝑇⁡|⁡𝐸⁡^⁡𝑆´⁡^⁡𝐾) = [0.56, 0.56] 
 
Alternatively, she might try to minimize the distance between the practical 
probabilities and 0.5, and choose a statement S´´: 
 
𝐸𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡⁡𝐸⁡^⁡𝑆´´⁡^⁡𝐾) = [0.48, 0.48] 
𝐸𝑃(𝑇⁡|⁡𝐸⁡^⁡𝑆´´⁡^⁡𝐾) = [0.52, 0.52] 
 
 My proposal is similar to Kyburg’s approach, in that the evidential probabilities put 
constraints on the expected utilities and there is an exogenous choice. In Kyburg’s decision 
theory, the exogenous choice is the selection of a decision rule. In my proposal, the choice is 
the selection of a speculative statement. In both decision theories, the updating involves 
Kyburg’s rules for reference class selection rather than Bayesian updating. 
 
 My proposal is also similar to some forms of Objective Bayesianism, such as the 
198 Confirmation, Decision, and Evidential Probability 
 
“Evidential Probability-Calibrated Objective Bayesianism” of Williamson and Wheeler183. 
As in my proposed decision theory, they use intervals from Evidential Probability to provide 
constraints on the choice of probabilities for decision-making. The principal differences are 
that (1) their theory involves additional constraints on the choice of probability, (2) the 
selection in my procedure is formalised in Evidential Probability alone, whereas Williamson 
and Wheeler use an Objective Bayesian formalism, and (3) they also discuss degrees of belief 
and my decision theory is silent on degrees of belief. These differences should not be 
overestimated. Firstly, nothing I say is inconsistent with the additional constraints that 
Williamson and Wheeler propose. I merely do not endorse these requirements as part of the 
general theory of decision-making. Secondly, my choice of formalism is only a method to 
emphasise the distinction between (a) our evidence and background knowledge (E ^ K) and 
(b) the speculative statement S which we are only pretending to know; this distinction is 
important for my answer to the Ellsberg Paradox. Thirdly and finally, since my decision 
theory is silent on degrees of belief, it does not explicitly contradict anything that Williamson 
and Wheeler have to say about such quantities. 
 
 I shall immediately address three possible objections. The first is whether my 
proposal creates the possibility of synchronic Dutch Books. A Dutch Book is a set of 
minimum acceptable odds such that, if a player commits to betting positive sums on them, it 
is possible for the bookie to have a strategy that guarantees that the player loses money. 
Synchronic Dutch Book Arguments are intended to prove that one should adopt odds that 
correspond to an additive probability distribution in order to avoid the possibility of a Dutch 
Book, such that: 
 
                                                          
183 Wheeler and Williamson (2011) p. 327-329. 
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𝑘(𝐻) =
𝑃(𝐻)
1 − 𝑃(𝐻)
 
 
- where k(H) is the minimum betting odds-ratio that the player will accept on a statement H. 
Such a probability distribution is allegedly a necessary and sufficient condition for avoiding 
Dutch Books. 
 
 Rather than review the various synchronic Dutch Book Arguments and the many 
criticisms that have been made of them, I shall simply note that my proposal does involve 
betting on a practical probability distribution that satisfies the axioms of additive probability. 
(There are reasons to weaken this requirement if the Dutch Book scenario is insufficiently 
constrained184.) As I described in Subsection 5.2 of Chapter 1, it can be proven that there is 
always a coherent additive probability function whose values are within the intervals of 
evidential probabilities. It is uncontroversial that having such a function is a sufficient 
condition for avoiding Dutch Books. Provided that a player ensure that her choice of practical 
probabilities are not in conflict within her Evidential Probability intervals, she will not be 
vulnerable to Dutch Books, even if the synchronic Dutch Book Arguments are sound. 
 
 The second possible objection that I shall address comes from diachronic Dutch Book 
Arguments, which are intended to establish conditionalization as the sole updating rule. 
Allegedly, such arguments establish that someone who does not update via conditionalization 
alone will be diachronically incoherent: they can become committed to a series of bets such 
that they will necessarily lose money overall, but updating via conditionalization alone avoids 
this possibility. Since evidential probabilities are not always updated via conditionalization 
                                                          
184 Rowbottom (2007). 
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(as discussed in Chapter 1 Subsection 5.3) a Bayesian might object that my proposal will lead 
to diachronic incoherence. 
 
 However, as Howson and Urbach note, there are no arguments that prove 
conditionalization is a necessary condition of diachronic coherence185. For example, one of 
the most prominent Diachronic Dutch Book Arguments comes from Paul Teller, but it is 
provable that deductive consistency and a desire not to lose money is sufficient to avoid 
diachronic incoherence in Teller’s scenario186. In general, there is no established argument in 
the literature that proves that a rational decision-maker must always update by 
conditionalization. 
 
 Furthermore, even if there were such an argument, it would be problematic for all 
decision theories that require coherent precise probabilities, including Bayesian decision 
theories. If a person’s initial probability distributions are incoherent, then it can be proven 
that no amount of conditioning will enable them to attain coherence187. Let P be an incoherent 
probability function such that P(H | E) is inconsistent with the axioms of additive probability; 
let P´ be a coherent probability function; let E be the total evidence that a decision-maker 
using P will ever have. For P(H) to be altered to P´(H) by conditionalizing on E, it must be 
the case that: 
 
𝑃´(𝐻) = 𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸) = ⁡
𝑃(𝐻⁡^⁡𝐸)
𝑃(𝐸)
 
                                                          
185 Howson and Urbach (1993) p. 103. 
 
186 Bacchus, Kyburg, and Thalos (1990) p. 486-487. 
 
187 Bacchus, Kyburg, and Thalos (1990) p. 494. 
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- but if the equation above is true, then P(H | E) is coherent, which is contrary to the initial 
assumption that P(H | E) is incoherent. It follows that an incoherent probability distribution 
can never become coherent via conditionalization. 
 
 Therefore, if there was a sound Diachronic Dutch Book Argument and if incoherence 
is irrational, then there would be a problem for both my proposal and normative decision 
theories that have conditionalization as their sole updating norm. Anyone who had incoherent 
initial probabilities and who unwisely chose to update using only conditionalization would be 
eternally irrational. Since, in the real world, nobody is born as a perfectly coherent Bayesian, 
this would be a non-trivial problem for Bayesian decision theory. 
 
 A supporter of conditionalization could object that normative decision theory 
concerns ideally rational decision-making and an ideally rational agent would not have 
incoherent initial probabilities. However, while it is theoretically interesting to imagine 
ideally rational agents, the primary appeal of normative decision theory is the advice that they 
can provide for real people, and a theory in which one can never move from incoherence to 
coherence (even for simple problems) is a counsel of irrationality. If I am betting on a horse 
race and I realise that my initial choice of odds was inconsistent with the probability calculus, 
and I have the option to change my choice, then intuitively I should change my odds, 
regardless of the fact that this requires that I do not change them via conditionalization. 
Fortunately for both Bayesians and Evidential Probabilists, there is no established Diachronic 
Dutch Book Argument. Updating using Evidential Probability does not commit us to 
diachronic incoherence. 
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 Those who think that epistemic probabilities must be imprecise might also object to 
my proposal. They could argue that I am assuming away the problem of ambiguous 
probabilities and ignoring the difference between situations where imprecise probabilities are 
appropriate and where precise probabilities are appropriate. However, practical probabilities 
are not epistemic probabilities, in the sense that they do not describe evidential relations. 
Instead, they are simply inputs for decision-making. Furthermore, unlike standard decision 
theorists, I do make a distinction between (a) precision that comes from evidence and 
(b) precision that comes from speculation. In the next subsections, I shall use this distinction 
to provide the basis for my answer to the Ellsberg Paradox. 
 
 There are many other reasons for adopting a purely imprecise probability framework 
for decision-making. Since the intended target of my argument is primarily those seeking a 
purely precise decision theory akin to MEU, I shall not discuss the many interesting reasons 
to adopt other heterodox alternatives. 
 
5.2 A Degree of Uncertainty Measure 
 
 For most contexts, my proposal produces a decision theory that is similar to MEU 
theory: an ideally rational agent has precise probabilities and precise utilities; she multiplies 
these to calculate her expected utilities; she acts so that she maximizes expected utility. The 
similarity will be especially strong when the decision problem is static or the MEU agent is 
conditioning on new statistical knowledge. 
 
 Before I introduce the important difference between my proposal and orthodox 
decision theory, I shall introduce an additional function. This function measures the ‘Degree 
of Uncertainty’ (DU) of an agent’s epistemic state with respect to a hypothesis. By 
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“uncertainty”, I mean the extent to which the evidence does not mandate a particular practical 
probability distribution. Informally, DU function measures the distance from (a) the 
evidential probability of a statement given the total evidence, to (b) a practical probability 
obtained by speculating relative frequency statements. Put another way, the function 
measures the extent to which the practical probabilities involve speculation beyond the 
evidence. Formally, for a hypothesis H and total evidence K, the function DU is the 
following: 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦 = 𝐷𝑈(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐾) = (𝑦 − 𝑥) 
 
- where x and y are the upper and lower bounds of the evidential probability of H given K. 
 
 This function is formally identical to the degree of imprecision measures that Walley 
and Kyburg proposed for quantifying the weight of argument. In Chapter 2, I argued that 
such measures were unsatisfactory for the concept of weight. However, I shall instead use 
them to measure the ‘speculativeness’ of the practical probabilities. Another way of 
characterising the DU measure is that it measures the extent to which the possible practical 
probabilities can be ‘evidence-based’. 
 
 This function is notably simple, because it contains just two variables and a single 
operation. Furthermore, some other very simple functions would have significant problems. 
For instance, suppose that one used the ratio of the limits rather than the difference, such that 
the function is DU´(H | K) = (y ÷ x). Such a measure would mean that [0.01, 0.02] would 
provide a different uncertainty value from [0.03, 0.04], since (0.01 ÷ 0.02) = 0.5 and (0.03 ÷ 
0.04) = 0.75. However, it is intuitive that the entering into a lottery in which I have 1-2% of 
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the tickets involves the same degree of uncertainty as entering into a lottery in which I have 
3-4% of the tickets. In contrast, the DU measure gives the same value, 0.01, for the 
uncertainty involved in either lottery. There might be more complex functions that are also 
satisfactory measures, but it is reasonable to use such a simple function in the absence of a 
reason to consider the DU function inadequate. 
 
 I shall provide some examples of the DU measure in action. Firstly, the evidential 
probability might be a degenerate interval, so that a practical probability is entirely 
determined by applying Kyburg’s system to the hypothesis and total evidence in question. 
For instance, suppose that I know that a card will be randomly drawn from a normal playing 
deck and this is my best statistical information about which card will be drawn: 
 
Key 
H: The card drawn will be the Queen of Diamonds. 
K: My total relevant evidence. 
 
𝐸𝑃(𝑄⁡|⁡𝐾) = [
1
52
,
1
52
] 
𝐷𝑈(𝑄⁡|⁡𝐾) =
1
52
−
1
52
= 0 
 
 My evidence uniquely determines a practical probability and so the DU value is zero. 
Generally, whenever the Evidential Probability is a degenerate interval, then the DU function 
gives its minimum value. 
 
 Secondly, suppose that the evidential probability is very close to a precise value. For 
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example, when tossing a £1 coin, I know that the relative frequency of such coins landing 
heads is close to 50%. Suppose that my best statistical information is that £1 coins land heads 
in tosses with a long-run relative frequency of 49-51%. 
 
Key 
H: The coin will land heads. 
K: My total relevant evidence. 
 
𝐸𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐾) = [0.49, 0.51] 
 
𝐷𝑈(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐾) = 0.51 − 0.49 = 0.02 
 
 The DU value in this case is higher than when choosing the card, but it is still small. 
 
 In contrast, consider tossing a gömböc. A gömböc is a homogenous three-dimensional 
solid that has just two equilibria on a flat surface, one stable and the other unstable. The 
standard construction is similar to a sphere, but with a sharp top. Given my (very limited) 
knowledge of gömböcs and physics, I am very ignorant regarding the relative frequency of 
tossed gömböcs settling on either of these points. Suppose that someone tells me that 
gömböcs settle on their stable point at least 10% of the time. For all that I know, it is possible 
that gömböcs always settle on their stable point. Hence: 
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Key 
H: The coin will settle on its stable equilibrium point. 
K: My total relevant evidence. 
 
𝐸𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐾) = [0.1, 1] 
𝐷𝑈(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐾) = 1 − 0.1 = 0.9 
 
 This DU value reflects the high level of uncertainty regarding my choice of a precise 
relative frequency, because it would have been consistent with my evidence to choose any 
precise relative frequency from 0.1 to 1. In contrast, in the case of tossing the £1 coin, my 
choice of practical probability was limited to the interval from 0.49 to 0.51. 
 
 Finally, the DU measure will have a maximum value if Evidential Probability does 
not provide any non-vacuous probability. For instance, suppose that I must bet on the 
hypothesis that ‘Most things are gavagai’. Since I do not know what ‘gavagai’ means, I lack 
any statistical basis for the probability value. An Evidential Probabilist can represent this 
state of great uncertainty as: 
 
Key 
G: Most things are gavagai. 
K: My total relevant evidence. 
 
𝐸𝑃(𝐺⁡|⁡𝐾) = [0, 1] 
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𝐷𝑈(𝐺⁡|⁡𝐾) = 1 − 0 = 1 
 
  When the value of DU is maximal, the selection of any S for any practical probability 
would be consistent with the evidential probability of G given H. The only additional 
constraint is that any practical probability distribution created by this procedure must not 
violate the axioms of additive probability. Such a purely speculative choice of probability 
distribution is akin to the choice of a Subjective Bayesian prior. 
 
5.3 The Principle of Lesser Uncertainty 
 
 Intuitively, the DU measure seems to be tracking something that is important for 
decision-making. Ceteris paribus, it would be preferable to make decisions where the degree 
of uncertainty is zero. For example, if we are gambling, we would ideally like our choice of 
odds to be grounded on evidence about relative frequencies, rather than probabilities based on 
speculations. (This desire for guidance by evidence is distinct from the desire for an extreme 
probability.) Intuitively, DU is also relevant because a rational agent should (when possible) 
avoid making decisions that are based on speculation. This normative constraint also seems to 
admit of degrees: a practical probability that was determined from an evidential probability of 
[0.74, 0.76] is preferable to one determined via [0.5, 1]. Even if the choice of practical 
probability (perhaps 0.75) was identical in both cases, the former provides the basis for a 
more evidence-based decision. 
 
 However, these preferences are comparative, rather than absolute. I am not claiming 
that one should want to stake more decisions when the practical probabilities are relatively 
evidence-based. Instead, I am merely claiming that a rational agent should use DU as a 
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potential tiebreaker when expected utility requires indifference. Importantly, this means that I 
am not claiming that DU should always be part of our decision-making, as practical 
probabilities and utilities should be. 
 
 I shall now present a principle that formalises these intuitions. ‘Utilities’ will refer to 
precise utilities that satisfy all the normal axioms in MEU theory, except for a decision 
problem in which the expected utilities are identical. 
 
Principle of Lesser Uncertainty: When the expected utilities for a set of mutually exclusive 
and exhaustive circumstances are equal, then choose from among the set of actions that yield 
the highest expected utility given the circumstance with the lowest DU value relative to your 
total evidence. 
 
 Thus, DU provides an additional dimension of assessment for choosing between 
actions with equal expected utilities. Consequently, an agent’s preferences will be modelled 
using two parameters: a cardinal utility and the DU measure. 
 
 Before returning to the Ellsberg Paradox, I shall illustrate the Principle of Lesser 
Uncertainty with some other examples. Firstly, imagine that you have a choice between 
betting on a toss of one of two coins. Coin A is a perfectly normal 50p coin. Coin B is a very 
unevenly shaped Ancient Greek coin from the Island of Patmos, with a face of Saint Paul on 
one side. Someone offers you a choice between betting heads and betting tails. You know 
that 50p coins land heads with a relative frequency of about 50%, whereas you are ignorant 
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with respect to the relative frequency of Coin B landing heads. Assume that the utilities for 
winning with each bet are equal. 
 
Key 
Ha: Coin A will land heads. 
Hb: Coin B will land heads. 
K: Your total relevant evidence. 
 
𝐸𝑃(𝐻𝑎⁡|⁡𝐾) = [0.49, 0.51] 
𝐸𝑃(𝐻𝑏⁡|⁡𝐾) = [0, 1] 
 
 Suppose that you determine the expected utilities by postulating S and S´: 
 
𝐸𝑃(𝐻𝑎⁡|⁡𝑆⁡^⁡𝑆´⁡^⁡𝐾) = [0.5, 0.5] 
𝐸𝑃(𝐻𝑏⁡|⁡𝑆⁡^⁡𝑆´⁡^⁡𝐾) = [0.5, 0.5] 
 
 Given that Ha and Hb have equal payouts and equal practical probabilities, they have 
equal expected utilities. Using the DU measure: 
 
𝐷𝑈(𝐻𝑎⁡|⁡𝐾) = 0.51 − 0.49 = 0.2 
𝐷𝑈(𝐻𝑏⁡|⁡𝐾) = 1 − 0 = 1 
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 Since the DU for Ha is less than the DU for Hb, it follows from the Principle of Lesser 
Uncertainty that you ought to have a comparative preference for betting that Ha to betting that 
Hb. 
 
 To summarise, I am suggesting the following constraints for the practical 
probabilities: 
 
(1) The practical probabilities must be within the Evidential Probability intervals. In the 
special case of degenerate intervals, this fully determines the probability distribution. 
 
(2) If you have formulated the practical probabilities using speculated relative frequency 
statements, then the resulting distribution for the domain must be consistent with the axioms 
of additive probability. 
 
(3) An agent should maximize the product of their practical probabilities and a special type of 
cardinal utility function. (Special, because the outputs do not fully represent the agent’s 
preferences.) In the special case where outcomes have equal values for this product, but one 
outcome (or set of outcomes) has a lesser DU value given the total evidence, the agent should 
prefer actions with the highest expected utility given this outcome. This modification of the 
standard MEU approach is motivated by the intuition that reducing the uncertainty involved 
in one’s decisions is preferable, ceteris paribus. 
 
 It is worth stressing that I have said nothing about degrees of belief. Practical 
probabilities are not degrees of belief, but devices for decision-making; evidential 
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probabilities are not interval-valued degrees of belief, but formal representations of evidential 
relations. My decision theory is compatible with a large variety of perspectives on the role of 
beliefs in formal epistemology and the philosophy of science: ranging from philosophers like 
Popper who argue that belief should not be at the heart of epistemology188, to philosophers 
like Haack who consciously reject the Popperian approach and put the subjective experiences 
of a knowing subject at the centre of their epistemology of science189. In short, my decision 
theory is not a theory of degrees of belief. I shall now apply this theory to the Ellsberg 
Paradox. 
 
 
SECTION 6: THE ELLSBERG PARADOX AND THE 
PRINCIPLE OF LESSER UNCERTAINTY 
 
 In this section, I shall examine the Ellsberg Paradox using the DU measure and a 
decision theory that uses the Principle of Lesser Uncertainty. I shall demonstrate how this is 
sufficient to rationalise the standard choices that people make. My answer is essentially that if 
people have practical probabilities such that the expected utilities are equal, then the Principle 
of Lesser Uncertainty can be used as a tiebreaker that mandates the standard Ellsberg 
Scenario preferences. 
  
 
                                                          
188 Popper, ‘Epistemology Without a Knowing Subject’ in (1972). 
 
189 Haack (2003) p. 57-88. 
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6.1 The Ellsberg Scenario 
 
 In this subsection, I begin by presenting a general algebraic proof that my proposed 
decision theory permits, under particular circumstances, the standard Ellsberg Scenario 
preferences. I shall then discuss the classic version of the Ellsberg Scenario to illustrate this 
answer. 
 
 Firstly, I shall describe what is required (on my proposed decision theory) for the 
practical probabilities and a cardinal utility function to underdetermine the choices in an 
Ellsberg Paradox decision problem: 
 
Key 
Red: Choosing to bet that the ball will be red. 
Black: Choosing to bet that the ball will be black.  
Black or Yellow: Choosing to bet that the ball is not red. 
Red or Yellow: Choosing to bet that the ball is not black. 
R: The ball will be red. 
B: The ball will be black. 
Y: The ball will be yellow. 
¬R: The ball is not red. 
¬B: The ball is not black. 
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¬Y: The ball is not yellow. 
K: The agent’s background knowledge, including the information that there are 90 balls, and 
that 30 of the balls in the urn are red, 0-60 are black, and 0-60 are yellow, and that all the 
balls in the urn have one and only one of these colours. 
 
 Assume equal monetary gains190 for successfully betting on R, B, Y, ¬R, ¬B, and ¬Y. 
I shall now calculate the evidential probabilities that an agent would need for equal expected 
utilities for (1) Red and Black and (2) Black or Yellow and Red or Yellow. This is very easy 
in the case of R. From the agent’s knowledge E about the relative frequencies, they know 
that: 
 
𝐸𝑃(𝑅⁡|⁡𝐾) = [
1
3
,
1
3
] 
 
- because 30 out of the 60 balls are red. Thus, their knowledge of the relative frequencies 
provides a degenerate interval. Similarly, for ¬R, the evidential probability is precise: 
 
𝐸𝑃(¬𝑅⁡|⁡𝐸) = [
2
3
,
2
3
] 
 
- because they know that exactly 1/3 of the balls in the urn are red, and therefore that 2/3 of 
the balls in the urn are not red. 
 
 For B, Y, ¬B, and ¬Y, their evidential probabilities are imprecise, because their 
                                                          
190 Again, monetary values are assumed to correspond unproblematically to utilities. 
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knowledge of the relative frequencies is imprecise. The evidential probabilities are as 
follows: 
 
𝐸𝑃(𝐵⁡|⁡𝐾) = [0,
2
3
] 
𝐸𝑃(𝑌⁡|⁡𝐾) = [0,
2
3
] 
𝐸𝑃(¬𝐵⁡|⁡𝐾) = [
1
3
, 1] 
𝐸𝑃(¬𝑌⁡|⁡𝐾) = [
1
3
, 1] 
 
 Suppose that the agent uses the mid-points of the intervals to decide their choice of 
their speculative relative frequency statements. This is permissible, though not mandatory. 
Thus, they have the following practical probabilities: 
 
𝐸𝑃(𝑅⁡|⁡𝑆1⁡^⁡𝐾) = [
1
3
,
1
3
] 
𝐸𝑃(𝐵⁡|⁡𝑆2⁡^⁡𝐾) = [
1
3
,
1
3
] 
𝐸𝑃(𝑌⁡|⁡𝑆3⁡^⁡𝐾) = [
1
3
,
1
3
] 
𝐸𝑃(¬𝑅⁡|⁡𝑆4⁡^⁡𝐾) = [
2
3
,
2
3
] 
𝐸𝑃(¬𝐵⁡|⁡𝑆5⁡^⁡𝐾) = [
2
3
,
2
3
] 
𝐸𝑃(¬𝑌⁡|⁡𝑆6⁡^⁡𝐾) = [
2
3
,
2
3
] 
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 To simplify, suppose that ‘1’ is the cardinal utility for winning with each choice of 
bet. Thus, the expected utilities for Red and Black are both 1/3. The expected utilities for 
Black or Yellow and Red or Yellow are both 2/3. 
 
 The standard choices in the Second Ellsberg Scenario are a choice of Red over Black 
and Black or Yellow over Red or Yellow. Assuming the above practical probabilities, such 
choices are irrational according to MEU theory: the rule of maximizing expected utility 
requires that an agent must be indifferent. 
 
 Here, the difference between my proposal and MEU theory becomes apparent. The 
DU values are not identical for the possible outcomes: 
 
𝐷𝑈(𝑅⁡|⁡𝐾) =
1
3
−
1
3
= 0⁡ 
𝐷𝑈(𝐵⁡|⁡𝐾) = ⁡
2
3
− 0 =
2
3
⁡ 
𝐷𝑈(𝑌⁡|⁡𝐾) = ⁡
2
3
− 0 =
2
3
⁡ 
𝐷𝑈(¬𝑅⁡|⁡𝐾) =
2
3
−
2
3
= 0 
𝐷𝑈(¬𝐵⁡|𝐾⁡) = 1 −
1
3
=
2
3
⁡⁡ 
𝐷𝑈(¬𝑌⁡|⁡𝐾) = 1 −
1
3
=
2
3
⁡⁡ 
 
 Using the Principle of Lesser Uncertainty, an agent has a reason to favour Red over 
Black, because Red pays out if R obtains and there is no DU for this hypothesis, whereas 
Black pays out if B obtains and there is some DU for this hypothesis. Similarly, they have a 
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reason to favour Black or Yellow over Red or Yellow, because Black or Yellow pays out if 
¬R obtains and there is no DU for this hypothesis, whereas Red or Yellow pays out if ¬B 
obtains, and there is some DU for this hypothesis. In short, the standard preferences minimize 
DU. Therefore, my proposal rationalises the standard preferences: they are permissible, but 
not mandatory. 
 
 I provide a general algebraic proof below: 
 
Key 
 
A1, A2, A3, and A4: An exhaustive and mutually exclusive set of actions for an agent. 
H1, H2, and H3: An exhaustive and mutually exclusive set of possible circumstances. 
U: The agent’s utility function. 
K: The agent’s total relevant evidence. 
 
(1) 𝑈(𝐴1) > 𝑈(𝐴2) ↔ 𝐻1 
 
(2) 𝑈(𝐴2) > 𝑈(𝐴1) ↔ 𝐻2 
 
(3) 𝑈(𝐴3) > 𝑈(𝐴4) ↔ ¬𝐻1 
 
(4) 𝑈(𝐴4) > 𝑈(𝐴3) ↔ ¬𝐻2 
 
(5) 𝐷𝑈(𝐻1⁡|⁡𝐾) ⁡< ⁡𝐷𝑈(𝐻2⁡|⁡𝐾) 
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(6) 𝐷𝑈(¬𝐻1⁡|⁡𝐾) ⁡< ⁡𝐷𝑈(¬𝐻2⁡|⁡𝐾) 
 
 We assume that the choice between A1 and A2 is otherwise undetermined. We also 
assume that the choice between A3 and A4 is otherwise undetermined. From (1), (2), (5), and 
the Principle of Lesser Uncertainty: 
 
(7) The agent should choose A1 over A2. 
 
 From (3), (4), (6), and the Principle of Lesser Uncertainty: 
 
(8) The agent should choose A3 over A4. 
 
 Therefore, if the agent has utilities such that (1-4) are true, their evidential 
probabilities are such that (5) and (6) are true, and they are otherwise indifferent in each 
choice, then they should have the standard preferences of (7) and (8). 
 
 The standard preferences are not obligatory, because the derivation above depended 
on the choice of practical probabilities. If the agent had chosen to speculate that 2/3 of the 
balls in the urn are black, then (ceteris paribus) they would be committed to Black rather 
than Red and Red or Yellow rather than Black or Yellow, In general, my rationalisation 
depends on the assumption of equal expected utilities for each of the two choices.  
  
 An additional feature of my answer to the Ellsberg Paradox is that it is an example of 
how Keynes’s concept of the weight of argument (the quantity of relevant evidence) can have 
practical consequences for rational decision-making. Although there is no established 
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quantitative measure of weight, intuitively there is more evidence (in an informal sense of 
‘more evidence’) in the Ellsberg Paradox for the conjectures that ‘The ball is red’ and ‘The 
ball is not red’ than ‘The ball is black’ and ‘The ball is not black’. This difference in the 
quantity of evidence produces a difference in the DU measure. As I argued in Chapter 2, this 
will not always occur: an increase in relevant evidence can occur without narrowing the 
width of evidential probability intervals. Nonetheless, the Ellsberg Paradox is an example of 
how differences in weight can have important consequences for rational decision-making. 
 
 
 
6.2 Degree of Uncertainty and Sunk Costs 
 
Now that I have demonstrated how the Principle of Lesser Uncertainty justifies the 
standard Ellsberg Paradox choices, I shall show how it also avoids the Sunk Cost fallacy in 
the scenario that I described in Subsection 3.1. 
 
 In this scenario, the set-up is the same as the Ellsberg Paradox scenario, except that 
the player has the option to invest a sum G to hedge against the risk of a yellow ball. 
Someone other than the player draws the ball behind a screen. If the ball that is drawn is 
yellow, then a player who invested R will receive a net gain of £10 – G. If the ball that is 
drawn is not yellow, then the player is offered a choice between (a) betting that the ball is red 
or (b) betting that the ball is black. A player who guesses incorrectly receives no net gain. If 
the player guesses correctly, then a player who has invested G receives £10 – G, whereas a 
player who has not invested G receives £10. 
 
  As discussed earlier in Subsection 3.1, an MEU player avoids the Sunk Cost fallacy 
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in this scenario. By the same reasoning, a player in the Ellsberg Scenario who follows my 
proposal will not take sunk costs into account in cases where an MEU player would be not be 
indifferent, because the Principle of Lesser Uncertainty only applies when an MEU player 
would be indifferent. 
 
 Additionally, when the Principle of Lesser Uncertainty applies, a player using my 
decision theory will avoid taking G into account and thus avoid the Sunk Cost fallacy. Thus, 
their choices will depend purely on their expected utilities and the degree of uncertainty of 
the different options. I shall begin by considering a player who has not chosen to invest G. I 
shall represent the information that the ball is not yellow by ¬Y. The player faces the 
following decision-matrix upon learning ¬Y: 
 
Matrix II 
 
    R    B   Y 
 
Red    £10    0   0 
Black    0    £10   0 
 
 
 By assumption, the practical probabilities and the cardinal utility function 
underdetermine choice. Since the potential gains are the same and we assume that the 
monetary sums represent utilities, a player with equal expected utilities must have speculated 
that 1/3 of the balls are black. Therefore, they have speculated that 1/3 of the balls are black 
and 1/3 of the balls are yellow. (They know without speculation that 1/3 of the balls are red.) 
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Suppose that they have learned that ¬Y. Assume that R and B still have equal probabilities. 
Their new practical probabilities and degrees of uncertainty, given their knowledge and 
speculations, must be: 
 
𝐸𝑃(𝑅⁡|⁡⁡¬𝑌⁡^⁡𝑆⁡^⁡𝐾) = [
1
2
,
1
2
] 
𝐸𝑃(𝐵⁡|⁡⁡¬𝑌⁡^⁡𝑆⁡^⁡𝐾) = [
1
2
,
1
2
] 
𝐸𝑃(𝑌|⁡⁡¬𝑌⁡^⁡𝑆⁡^⁡𝐾) = [0, 0] 
𝐷𝑈(𝑅⁡|⁡⁡¬𝑌⁡^⁡𝑆⁡^⁡𝐾) = 0 
𝐷𝑈(𝐵⁡|⁡⁡¬𝑌⁡^⁡𝑆⁡^⁡𝐾) =
2
3
 
𝐷𝑈(𝑌|⁡⁡¬𝑌⁡^⁡𝑆⁡^⁡𝐾) = 0 
 
 The value of DU for B above might require some explanation. While learning that ¬Y 
informs the player that the ball is either red or black, they are no wiser regarding the 
proportion of black balls in the urn. It is consistent with ¬Y and K that the proportion of 
black balls is 0, 2/3, or any possible point between. By the Principle of Lesser Uncertainty, a 
player ought to choose to bet Red rather than Black, for the same reasons as in the Ellsberg 
Paradox scenario: the degree of uncertainty of Red is 0, whereas the degree of uncertainty of 
Black is 2/3. Such preferences are identical to the preferences of an ambiguity-averse player 
with the standard Ellsberg Paradox preferences. 
 
 The interesting difference from an ambiguity-averse player emerges when we 
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consider what happens if the player has decided to invest G. Such a player faces Matrix III. 
Once again, we assume that Red and Black have equal expected utilities. 
 
Matrix III 
 
  R    B   Y 
 
Red  £10 – G   0   £10 – G 
Black  0    £10 – G  £10 – G 
 
 Since the player knows ¬Y, choosing Red provides a payout if (R v Y) occurs. 
Similarly, choosing Black provides a payout if (B v Y) occurs. R, B, and Y are mutually 
exclusive outcomes, relative to the total evidence K. From (1) the fact that practical 
probabilities satisfy the probability calculus and (2) the evidential probabilities described 
above, the practical probabilities of (R v Y) and (B v Y) must be: 
 
𝐸𝑃(𝑅⁡𝑣⁡𝑌⁡|⁡⁡¬𝑌⁡^⁡𝑆⁡^⁡𝐾) =
1
2
+ 0 =
1
2
 
𝐸𝑃(𝐵⁡𝑣⁡𝑌⁡|⁡⁡¬𝑌⁡^⁡𝑆⁡^⁡𝐾) =
1
2
⁡+ 0 =
1
2
 
 
(For ease of reading, I have used single real values rather than degenerate intervals.) 
 
 The evidence that ¬Y does not remove the equality of probability for the two 
disjunctions, but it does change the degrees of uncertainty. The degree of uncertainty of  
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(R v Y) is still zero. In contrast, the degree of uncertainty of (B v Y) is 2/3, because it can 
only occur if the ball is black, and the agent only knows that between 0 and 2/3 of the balls 
are black. Consequently, under these conditions, a player following the Principle of Lesser 
Uncertainty should bet Red once again. Therefore, their investment of G makes no difference 
to their choice, and the Sunk Cost fallacy is not committed. 
 
 This is surprising. For reasons given in Subsection 3.1, Matrix III is equivalent (under 
plausible assumptions) to Matrix IV. Surely, one might think, this is equivalent to the 
decision problem faced in the standard Ellsberg Paradox scenario and the player whom I am 
modelling prefers Black or Yellow in that version of the scenario. Either some trickery is 
involved or they should be committed to (Black or Yellow) in Matrix III. 
 
Matrix IV 
 
   R    B   Y 
 
Red or Yellow  £10    0   £10 
Black or Yellow 0    £10   £10 
 
 However, there is an important difference. From ¬Y, the agent knows that the ball is 
not yellow and this knowledge removes Y as a possible way that either action can provide its 
payout. Consequently, choosing Black or Yellow involves speculating on the unknown 
proportion of black balls in the urn, rather than speculating on the known proportion that are 
black or yellow. This creates a difference in the DU measure. 
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 By contrast, in the original version of the scenario, choosing Black or Yellow 
involves betting on a possibility with a precisely known relative frequency: that the ball is 
one of the 2/3 that are black or yellow. By comparison, choosing Red or Yellow involves 
betting on a possibility with an imprecisely known relative frequency: that the selected ball is 
one of the 1/3 to 2/3 red or yellow balls. The order of the degrees of uncertainty is the reverse 
of Matrix IV. 
 
  My decision theory does not reject additive invariance (at least in this scenario) 
because the above reasoning holds even if we remove G from the scenario: what makes the 
difference is the knowledge that ¬Y, which alters the degrees of uncertainty. Instead, an agent 
using my decision theory avoids the Sunk Cost fallacy because my decision theory does not 
produce an expected utility function that fully represents an agent’s preferences. There are 
probabilities and utilities in my decision theory, but they do not suffice to characterise 
rational preference in my model; it is the combination of probabilities, utilities, and (in some 
circumstances) degrees of uncertainty that determine what an agent should choose. Since the 
standard axioms of MEU imply that an agent’s preferences are fully represented by an 
expected utility function, it follows that my decision theory violates at least one of those 
axioms. In this context, what is significant is that my decision theory does not satisfy the 
Axiom of Independence: 
 
Axiom of Independence: If Ax and Ay have the same consequences when X is believed to be 
false, then an agent will prefer Ax or Ay if and only if these actions have different expected 
utilities given X. 
 
 A preference can exist in my theory due to a difference in degrees of uncertainty (as 
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measured by the DU function) and so this axiom cannot hold. The advantage is that an agent 
can have the standard Ellsberg preferences, while also avoiding the Sunk Cost fallacy, as I 
have described above. I discuss whether this sacrifice of the Axiom of Independence is 
justified in the next subsection. 
 
 The avoidance of the Sunk Cost fallacy in this scenario is a definite strength for my 
proposal over the Ambiguity Aversion response to the Ellsberg Paradox. Of course, I have 
not proven that there are no circumstances under which an agent following the Principle of 
Lesser Uncertainty commits the Sunk Cost fallacy or other fallacies. All I have provided is a 
detailed argument that they avoid the prima facie irrational decision-making that the 
ambiguity-averse player committed in Subsection 3.1. 
 
6.3 Objections 
 
 The most obvious objection to my use of the Principle of Lesser Uncertainty is that it 
is a deviation from MEU theory. However, such a deviation is a necessary condition of 
rationalising the standard Ellsberg Scenario preferences, because they are inconsistent with 
MEU theory. One important difference (aside from the updating method) is that MEU 
preferences satisfy the Axiom of Continuity: 
 
Axiom of Continuity: It is possible an rational agent’s preferences can be fully represented 
by a continuous expected utility function. 
 
 By contrast, on my proposal, rational preference is formalised using both an expected 
utility function and the degree of uncertainty measure. Thus, whereas MEU involves two 
225  Evidential Probability and the Ellsberg Paradox 
 
 
factors (probability and cardinal utility) my proposal involves three factors: probability, 
cardinal utility, and uncertainty. 
 
 Additionally, as noted earlier, my proposal is inconsistent with the Axiom of 
Independence. For example, suppose that a player has equal expected utilities for two actions 
A1 and A2 and neither action minimizes DU. If they learn a statement X, such that (a) 
learning this information does not affect the expected utilities and (b) this information 
reduces the DU for A1 below that of A2, then the player will choose A1. This violates the 
Axiom of Independence. 
 
 Rejecting Independence does not entail that it is always permissible to violate this 
axiom. In particular, I am not rejecting this axiom for any cases in which either (a) the 
expected utilities of the actions are not equal or (b) there are no differences in DU such that 
an agent can minimize the uncertainty of their actions by choosing one action over another. It 
does entail the rejection of a potentially appealing axiom (though this is one of the most 
controversial axioms of MEU theory191) but rejecting at least one of the axioms is a necessary 
condition of an intuitive answer in the Ellsberg Paradox, because the standard preferences are 
inconsistent with the axioms. 
 
 The general consequences of the Principle of Lesser Uncertainty are unexplored. It 
follows that it is entirely plausible that my theory will create new paradoxes, and these 
paradoxes might be more severe than the Ellsberg Paradox. To be confident in my answer, I 
would need to discuss a greater range of potential problems. Concomitantly, my answer is 
                                                          
191 Steele and Stefánsson (2015). 
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very tentative. 
 
 From an MEU perspective, one problem with my proposal is that the rule of 
maximizing expected utility can no longer be derived from the standard axioms of decision 
theory. Those who place a great emphasis on an axiomatic derivation of MEU reasoning will 
regard this feature as a major cost. However, this form of justification of a theory of 
rationality is only one among many options192. One alternative is Carnap’s justification of 
MEU, which uses our intuitions in particular examples as the grounds for choosing among 
possible decision theories. Carnap justifies the MEU principle via a case-by-case analysis of a 
set of plausible alternatives193. My strategy has been similar to this methodology: I began 
with an established decision rule (MEU) and considered an example where it fails to match 
standard intuitions about rational choice. The rule was subsequently modified to address the 
example. Different supporters of MEU will place different values on the alternative 
approaches to its justification. Thus, the significance of losing an axiomatic derivation is 
partly a matter of preference. 
 
 One might ask whether the Principle of Lesser Uncertainty is ad hoc, given that I have 
not derived it from subjective preference against uncertainty, nor from any theory of 
probability. There are least three forms of ad hoc-ness charges that one could make: (1) other 
decision theories could make use of this principle, because it is logically independent of the 
account of practical probabilities that I gave in Subsection 5.1194; (2) there could be other 
                                                          
192 Hindmoor (2006) p. 182-183. 
 
193 Carnap (1962) p. 252-279. 
 
194 In the sense that one could consistently (a) view practical probabilities as exogenously determined within the 
bounds of the pertinent evidential probabilities and the axioms of additive probability, without also adopting the 
Principle of Lesser Uncertainty, or (b) adopt the Principle of Lesser Uncertainty but have an otherwise different 
decision theory e.g. Bayesian decision theory with conditionalization instead of Evidential Probability updating. 
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principles that do the same work; and (3) the Principle of Lesser Uncertainty lacks 
independent motivation. I shall deal with these charges separately and in turn. 
 
 With respect to (1), it is logically consistent to adopt the Principle and otherwise 
adopt a different decision theory, but mere logical consistency is a very weak criterion for a 
decision theory. One might also want (ceteris paribus) a decision theory to be conceptually 
parsimonious, in the sense of introducing comparatively few primitive concepts. If a decision 
theory does not otherwise feature Evidential Probability, then the introduction of the 
Principle of Lesser Uncertainty and the concomitant primitive concepts from Evidential 
Probability (the limits of the probability intervals, the rules of Sharpening, the basic 
semantics of the system etc.) will decrease the parsimony of the system. Unless the 
alternative system is at least as parsimonious as my proposal and able to handle the same 
problems in a satisfactory manner, then it will be less parsimonious195. For example, 
importing the Principle of Lesser Uncertainty into orthodox Subjective Bayesian decision 
theory would effectively double the number of probability systems used in the decision 
theory. Furthermore, parsimony is only one problem for the introduction of the Principle 
wholesale into a rival decision theory. (Another might be that the Principle is conceptually 
incoherent, e.g. because the probability/uncertainty distinction cannot be formulated in the 
rival decision theory.) Thus, while it is logically consistent to introduce the Principle of 
Lesser Uncertainty into rival decision theories, it is not necessarily without cost, and there 
                                                          
195 With respect to the second condition, my proposed decision theory is identical to MEU for most static 
decision problems, and Kyburg’s procedures for updating via Evidential Probability are at least a serious rival to 
Bayesian conditionalization, so it can apparently handle many problems as least as well as MEU decision 
theory. Furthermore, since I am more committed to Evidential Probability than any decision-theoretic principle, 
I am very open to modifying the decision theory on the basis of criticisms of MEU decision theory, though I do 
not discuss these in this thesis. 
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would be burdens of proof on someone who undertook such a project196. 
 
 Of course, such a straight introduction of the Principle of Lesser Uncertainty (without 
any reinterpretation) is not the only option. Nothing I have said in this chapter rules out the 
possibility of different principles (perhaps very similar principles) being incorporated into an 
alternative modification of standard MEU decision theory or some other rival to my proposal. 
Hence charge (2) – the possibility of different principles that can do the same work. To assess 
all such alternatives is well beyond the scope of this chapter, in which I simply seek to 
formulate and motivate one possible novel answer to the Ellsberg Paradox; the mere 
existence of rivals is not a strong objection to this aim. However, I can at least put forward an 
argument as to why the Principle is better (ceteris paribus) than some possible rivals, whose 
comparable principles are unmotivated, which requires answering charge (3). 
 
 The distinction between speculation and evidence-based opinion has a pre-theoretical 
significance: while we seem to make decisions on a more or less arbitrary basis under 
different circumstances, there seems to be something rational, all else considered, about 
reasoning when the evidence guides us to a greater extent. This intuition is why, when 
decision theories prescribe the avoidance of free evidence, philosophers regard this feature as 
a severely problematic feature of those theories197. One motivation for the Principle of Lesser 
Uncertainty is that it enables a (partial) incorporation of this pre-theoretical significance of 
                                                          
196 One way of doing so without introducing new primitives seems to be the importation of the Principle into an 
MEU decision theory based on the Objective Bayesianism of Williamson. (I briefly discussed his version of 
Objective Bayesianism in Subsection 4.3) The reason this would not require new primitives is that he already 
uses Evidential Probability to provide constraints on probability assignments; the difference from my proposal is 
that he puts forward further restrictions. A fair evaluation of such a rival would require developing it in detail 
and considering a wide variety of issues, such as Williamson’s arguments for these constraints, and thus it is 
outside the scope of this thesis. I shall simple acknowledge that this seems to be a promising rival, and not an 
implausible one. 
 
197 Bradley and Steele (2016). 
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guidance by the evidence into formal decision theory: when the Degree of Uncertainty can 
serve as a tiebreaker between otherwise underdetermined courses of action, then one should 
choose the course of action with minimal DU. Of course, one does not share the intuition that 
guidance by the evidence has an independent significance for rationality or one does not 
agree that the DU measure is a good formalization of a lack of guidance by the evidence, then 
this reasoning will be unpersuasive. Nonetheless, it does mean that the Principle of Lesser 
Uncertainty is not ad hoc in the sense of lacking an independent motivation: even before 
Ellsberg formulated his paradox, Knight had an intuition that there was something special 
about uncertainty, as distinct from probability198. 
 
 Furthermore, this intuition of the comparative rationality of avoiding uncertainty 
seems to have applications to other problems in formal epistemology. For example, as 
mentioned in my discussion of Popper’s Paradox of Ideal Evidence in Chapter 1 Section 3, 
one aspect of the paradox that Popper raises is the problem of distinguishing two situations 
involving the hypothesis that the nth toss of a coin with heads and tails on either side will 
land ‘heads’: 
 
(A) When you have no idea about the bias/fairness of the coin. 
 
(B) When you have subsequently acquired evidence from a sample (presumably one that is 
random, large, and otherwise suitable) of coin tosses, which landed ‘heads’ in half of the 
tosses. 
 
                                                          
198 See Subsection 5.2 for more discussion, as well as Knight (2006, first published in 1921) for Knight’s views. 
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 For many epistemic probability systems, your degree of belief might be the same in 
both scenarios, so that an additional parameter is needed to represent the difference between 
(A) and (B). One possible candidate for this parameter is the Degree of Uncertainty: given 
suitable background knowledge, the Evidential Probability that the nth toss will land ‘heads’ 
could be a very wide interval like [0, 1] in situation (A) and a narrower interval such as [0.45, 
0.55] in situation (B)199. One might have the intuition that one could be more confident in the 
choice of 50/50 odds, ceteris paribus, in situation (B) than in (A), and the basic intuition 
behind the Principle of Lesser Uncertainty (i.e. the intuition that there is something 
comparatively rational in avoiding uncertainty in one’s decisions) could motivate this 
distinction. I shall not develop this suggestion further200, but the relevant point for my 
response to the ad hoc charge (3) is that the Principle is motivated by an intuition with more 
general applications than just the Ellsberg Paradox. 
 
 Finally, it is important to note that the Ellsberg Paradox is not merely a gambling 
problem: one can develop similar problems in a vast number of other possible contexts, from 
medicine to the design of experiments, and from the choice of nuclear strategy to the choice 
of shoes. For example, you might have a choice between two possible treatments for your 
brain cancer: the first is estimated to work for patients in your condition in 0-10% of cases, 
whereas the second treatment is estimated to work in 4-6% of such cases. You have no better 
information on which to estimate the desirability of adopting either course of treatment. (For 
                                                          
199 The limits in situation (A) could be narrower if you know that the coin will land heads or tails in some tosses. 
In situation (B), the width of the interval might depend on your ability to estimate the relative frequency of the 
nth toss landing heads, given your sample and the background knowledge. Either value is very sensitive the 
background knowledge, and thus I stress that these values are illustrative, even though the evidential 
probabilities are unique once the total evidence has been specified. 
 
200 For example, a serious development of this suggestion would involve far more detail, a consideration of 
objections, and a critical comparison with the standard Bayesian answer to this aspect of the Paradox of Ideal 
Evidence, as well as Popper’s own answer, and other alternatives. I do not pretend to have done any of these in 
this response. 
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instance, you are indifferent between their respective side-effects, neither will be more 
expensive for you, and so on.) Many people would have the intuition that the second 
treatment is preferable, and the Principle of Lesser Uncertainty can rationalise this 
preference: if one is otherwise indifferent between the treatments, then the lesser uncertainty 
regarding the efficacy of the second treatment can serve as a tiebreaker. Thus, even if it is 
true that there is no motivation for the Principle of Lesser Uncertainty beyond the Ellsberg 
Paradox, then the Principle still has a significant motivation, because Ellsberg’s problem is 
not a small or recondite issue. 
 
 Beyond the charge that it is ad hoc, my answer rules out the possibility of rational 
indifference between the choices in the Ellsberg Scenario: if the expected utilities are equal, 
then the standard choices are mandatory. This might seem objectionable, but there does not 
seem to be a strong intuitive basis for thinking that indifference must be possible in Ellsberg’s 
scenario. (If we adopt a strict revealed preference approach, it is impossible to be indifferent 
in any decision-problem201.) Furthermore, I am not rejecting indifference in very similar but 
distinct scenarios. For instance, a rational agent would be indifferent for both choices of bets 
if she knew that 1/3 of the balls in the urn are black, as opposed to speculating this 
information. Additionally, sacrificing the possibility of rational indifference in one 
circumstance and for one choice of practical probabilities seems worth the benefits of 
preserving most people’s intuitions. 
 
 Finally, one might wonder what my answer offers to those who have already rejected 
MEU theory. There are at least several useful properties of my answer for such decision 
theorists. Firstly, the rejection is not ad hoc, because it is grounded in a pre-theoretical 
                                                          
201 Rothbard (2009) p. 307. 
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intuition about rational decision-making: ceteris paribus, it is better to avoid uncertainty; put 
differently, evidence-based decisions are superior, all else being equal, to speculation-based 
decisions. Secondly, I have specified exactly when we can depart from MEU theory and 
when we cannot. (There are other paradoxes, like the Allais Paradox, which might require 
additional departures from MEU theory, but these are different issues.) Thirdly, unlike the 
Ambiguity Aversion response, my answer does not seem to raise the problems of the Sunk 
Cost fallacy, and offers a path that avoids the Ellsberg Paradox while not requiring that one 
take a stand on that issue. Finally, my answer offers one way of doing justice to the intuition 
that there is something “cautious” about the standard preferences, in that these preferences 
are due to the avoidance of uncertainty. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 In this chapter, I have offered an answer to the Ellsberg Paradox that uses  
the DU measure and Evidential Probability to develop an alternative normative decision 
theory for a computationally unbounded ideal reasoner. This theory enables one to retain 
something that is similar to MEU theory (especially in contexts of rich background 
knowledge or static decision problems) while avoiding the Ellsberg Paradox. It also provides 
an interesting illustration of how Keynes’s concept of the weight of argument can be 
significant for decision theory: sometimes, a greater quantity of relevant evidence about some 
conjecture can reduce the degree of uncertainty for that conjecture, and this difference can 
sometimes affect what constitutes rational decision-making. 
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CHAPTER 4: FORMALISM, RELIABILITY, AND THE 
NEW RIDDLE OF INDUCTION 
 
 
 Many of the early confirmation theorists, including Kyburg202, aimed to develop 
purely formal confirmation theories, which are those that involve no discriminations among 
the predicates or individuals in the evidence or hypothesis. However, most confirmation 
theorists now regard this project as unachievable due to Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction 
(NRI)203. I shall argue against this consensus: formalists can answer the NRI by using a 
confirmation theory that incorporates the importance of reliable evidence. 
 
 In Section 1, I describe the formalist project and the relevance of the NRI to 
formalism. In Section 2, I consider the NRI as a challenge to Hempel’s confirmation theory; I 
focus on this theory because it was Goodman’s initial target and if the NRI has been 
rigorously established as problematic for any formalist, it is Hempel. Finally, in Section 3, I 
use the concept of the reliability of evidence to develop a formalist response to the NRI. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
202 Kyburg (1961) p. 40. 
 
203 Goodman (1946) and Chapter III of Goodman (1983). 
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SECTION 1: FORMALISM AND THE NRI 
 
1.1 Formalist Theories of Confirmation 
 
 In the 20th century, many philosophers of science attempted to develop a purely 
formal definition of confirmation. The efforts of Keynes204, Carnap205, and Hempel206 are the 
most famous. Goodman directs his attention towards the theories of Carnap, Hempel, Paul 
Oppenheim, and Olaf Helmer in particular207. These philosophers had many disagreements, 
but one idea they share is that confirmation can be analysed as a formal relationship between 
statements (or sentences or propositions or whatever analogous relata one chooses) without 
any restrictions on the non-logico-mathematical terms in the sentences related, like ‘flames’ 
or ‘hot’ in ‘Most flames are hot’. Thus, they aimed to analyse confirmation and 
disconfirmation in a way that is independent of the subject matter of the hypothesis and 
evidence208. Additionally, in formalism, no predicates receive special status (like the status of 
“natural kinds”) from the confirmation theory itself. Of course, a formalist might favour some 
predicates on grounds that are exogenous to the confirmation theory. For example, they might 
favour ‘oxygen’ over ‘phlogiston’ on empirical grounds, but this preference is not part of 
their confirmation theory as such. Hempel provides a list of the terms which he will use in his 
                                                          
204 Keynes (1921) p. 54-55. 
 
205 Carnap (1962) p. 19. 
 
206 Hempel (1943). 
 
207 Goodman (1946) p. 383. 
  
208 Hempel (1945a) p. 9. Stove (1965) notes that this ambition is in tension with Hempel’s logical empiricism, 
because Hempel would both like to have a purely formal definition of confirmation and to use confirmability to 
demarcate empirical statements from other statements; so he restricts the evidence to observation-statements. 
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analysis, which he calls “syntactic” terms: the universal and existential quantifiers, individual 
constants, individual variables, predicate constants, parentheses, and commas209. Some 
formalists, like Keynes and Carnap, also incorporate a probability function and auxiliary 
mathematical terms into their theories. 
 
 Even some critics of formalism have acknowledged its attraction. Helen Longino 
notes that if confirmation is a purely formal relation, then analysing evidential relations in 
science would be a comparatively straightforward project, because many salient 
philosophical questions about science would become formally decidable210. If Longino is 
correct about formalism’s potential and if Goodman’s NRI successfully proves the 
impossibility of a formalist confirmation theory, then his accomplishment seems regrettable. 
 
1.2 The New Riddle of Induction 
 
 I shall now pinpoint Goodman’s charges against Hempel’s theory, before generalising 
them to all formalist confirmation theories, and briefly explaining their historical 
significance. Goodman argues that there are an indefinite number of predicates that are 
unsuitable for inductive inferences (they are not “projectable”) because they generate 
unacceptable paradoxes, but these predicates cannot be excluded from inductive inference on 
purely formal grounds. Therefore, formalist theories are incomplete, so non-formal 
considerations must be part of any satisfactory confirmation theory. The most famous of 
these predicates is ‘grue’, which can be very loosely defined as ‘green if observed prior to t 
                                                          
209 Hempel (1943) p. 123. 
 
210 Longino (1990) p. 23-24. 
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and blue if observed after t’. I shall discuss its definition in more detail in Section 2. 
 
 Branden Fitelson provides a helpful taxonomy of Goodman’s criticisms of Hempel’s 
theory: 
 
(1) The Qualitative Claim: According to Hempel’s theory, reports of green emeralds prior to t 
confirm both 'All emeralds are grue' and 'All emeralds are green'. 
 
(2) The Quantitative Claim: According to Hempel’s theory, reports of green emeralds prior to 
t confirm the hypotheses 'All emeralds are grue' and 'All emeralds are green' to an equal 
extent. 
 
(3) The Triviality Claim: According to Hempel’s theory, anything confirms anything211. 
 
 For the purposes of this chapter, I shall ignore the triviality claim (3), because unlike 
(1) or (2), it has not gained widespread acceptance. Goodman simply asserts, without 
argument, that (3) follows from (1) and (2). 
 
 The qualitative claim (1) requires some elaboration. The problem is that if ‘All 
emeralds are green’ and ‘All emeralds are grue’ are contraries, and some evidence confirms 
both hypotheses according to Hempel’s theory, then contrary hypotheses can be confirmed by 
the same evidence according to his confirmation theory. This criticism can be generalised to 
all formalist theories: 
                                                          
211 Fitelson (2008) p. 617-618. 
237 Formalism, Reliability, and the New Riddle of Induction 
 
 
 
(4) The Qualitative NRI: In all purely formal confirmation theories, it is possible for the same 
evidence to confirm contrary hypotheses. 
 
 Similarly, (2) generalises into: 
 
(5) The Comparative NRI: In all purely formal confirmation theories, it is possible that the 
same evidence can equally support contrary hypotheses, in circumstances in which they are 
clearly not equally supported212. 
 
 Most confirmation theorists believe that ‘grue’ proves that a purely formal analysis of 
confirmation cannot succeed. Thus, Goodman’s view on formalism’s viability has become 
the consensus. To give a small sample, Susan Haack213, James Ladyman214, George 
Couvalis215, Michael Williams216, David Stove217, Timothy McGrew et al218, John Vickers219, 
                                                          
212 The last clause is required, because some confirmation theories allow for the equal confirmation of 
contraries, but obviously there are some cases where contraries are clearly not equally confirmed. 
 
213 Haack (1996) p. 369. 
 
214 Ladyman (2002) p. 43. 
 
215 Couvalis (1997) p. 46. 
 
216 Williams (2001) p. 213. 
 
217 Stove (1986) p. 139. 
 
218 McGrew, Timothy et al (2009) p. 382. 
 
219 Vickers (2016). 
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Richard Miller220, Ruth Weintraub221, Alan Weir222, and Timothy Williamson223 all agree that 
the NRI is fatal to the formalist project. A rare exception in the literature is C. J. Nix and J. B. 
Paris224. Another dissenting view is developed by J. B. Paris and Alena Vencovská225. 
However, it is safe to say that most philosophers regard the formalist programme as hopeless 
because of Goodman’s criticisms. 
 
 I shall make some clarificatory points before continuing. I am not presenting a general 
defence of inductive inference, so I shall set aside a number of related issues, like Hume’s 
Problem of Induction. (Goodman also sees Hume’s problem as distinct from the NRI226.) I 
shall also put aside other underdetermination problems, like the issues regarding curve-fitting 
or the Duhem-Quine Problem. 
 
SECTION 2: HEMPEL’S CONFIRMATION THEORY AND 
THE NRI 
 
 Despite the consensus regarding formalism and the NRI, there has never been a 
general proof that the NRI poses a problem for all formalist theories. In his most influential 
discussion of the Riddle, Goodman simply criticises Hempel’s theory227. In the absence of a 
received general argument against formalism, I shall begin by following Goodman and 
                                                          
220 Miller (1995) p. 223. 
 
221 Weintraub (2008) p. 147. 
 
222 Weir (1995) p. 27. 
 
223 Williamson (1998) p. 91. 
224 Nix and Paris (2007) p. 738. 
 
225 Paris and Vencovská (2015) p. 5-6. 
 
226 Goodman (1983) p. 62-66. 
 
227 Goodman (1983) p. 72-73. 
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examining the NRI as an objection to Hempel’s theory. Even if I am mistaken that the NRI 
poses no direct problem for this theory, Goodman would still not have proven the unviability 
of formalism. However, if the NRI has been proven to be problematic for any (plausible) 
formalist theory of confirmation, it is Hempel’s, and if the NRI poses no problem for 
Hempel, then this substantially increases the apparent propitiousness of formalism. 
 
 I shall argue against both Goodman’s Qualitative Claim and his Quantitative Claim. 
To do this, I shall prove that contrary hypotheses cannot be confirmed in Hempel’s theory, 
before examining some popular versions of the NRI, and I shall finish by noting that the NRI 
highlights some major limitations of Hempel’s system. These limitations give a formalist 
some independent reasons to seek a better theory. 
 
2.1 Hempel’s Confirmation Theory 
 
 Hempel offers both a quantitative theory228 and a qualitative theory229. Quantitative 
theories of confirmation assign degrees of confirmation, like ‘H is confirmed by E to a degree 
of confirmation r.’ In contrast, qualitative theories only licence classificatory claims like ‘H 
is confirmed by E’. I shall not discuss Hempel’s quantitative theory, because Goodman 
directs the NRI at Hempel’s qualitative theory. 
 
 Hempel takes sentences of a first-order language-schema L as the basic relata of his 
qualitative theory. L is like a natural language whose non-logical terms have been removed 
                                                          
228 Hempel and Oppenheim (1945) p. 108. 
 
229 Hempel (1943). 
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and whose sentences have been transformed into first-order logic230. For these relata, Hempel 
proposes the following definition: 
 
Hempel's Qualitative Definition of Confirmation: A statement H is confirmed by E if and 
only if either (i) E implies the development of H for the individual constants in E or (ii) E 
implies H231. 
 
 The ‘development’ of H for a class of individual constants is the sentence that results 
from replacing the variables in H with the individual constants in E. For example, (Ra → Ba) 
is the development of ∀x(Rx → Bx) for the individual constant a. 
 
 In Hempel’s theory, E disconfirms H when E confirms ¬H. If E neither confirms nor 
disconfirms H, then E is neutral with respect to H232. 
 
 An example of the satisfaction of clause (ii) is the following: let H be ‘There is a 
green frog’, translated as ∃x(Fx ^ Gx). The statement E is ‘Alec is a green frog’, translated as 
(Fa ^ Ga). Since E implies H, it confirms H. Clause (ii) is satisfied in this example: let H be 
‘All things are positively charged or negatively charged’, translated as ∀x(Px v Nx). Let E be 
‘Particle a is positively charged or negatively charged’, translated as (Pa v Na). Since E is the 
development of H for a, it confirms H. Finally, I shall give an example of confirmation in this 
system in which the evidence implies a development. If H is ∀x(Px v Nx) and E is Pa, then E 
                                                          
230 Hempel (1943) p. 124. 
 
231 For simplicity, I have only provided Hempel’s definition for non-analytic statements. 
 
232 Hempel (1943) p. 127. 
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implies the development of H, because Pa implies (Pa v Na), and thus E confirms H. 
 
 A peculiar feature of Hempel’s definition is that if E is contradictory, then E confirms 
every statement in L. Hempel uses ‘implies’ to mean strict implication, but a contradiction 
strictly implies every statement: via clause (i), this results in contradictions ‘confirming’ 
every statement in L. However, Hempel notes that this is an inessential feature of his 
system233. It is intuitive and simpler to exclude such cases, so I shall define ‘Hempel-
confirms’ as: 
 
Revised Hempelian Qualitative Definition of Confirmation: A statement H is Hempel-
confirmed by E if and only if (i) E is consistent and either (ii) E implies the development of H 
for the individual constants in E or (iii) E implies H. 
 
2.2 Proof That Hempel’s System Satisfies the General Consistency Condition 
 
 I shall begin my discussion by providing a general proof that the Hempel-
confirmation of contraries is impossible. It follows that Goodman’s claims regarding 
Hempel’s system are false: it is not the case that Goodman’s examples prove that contraries 
can be confirmed in Hempel’s theory, nor equally confirmed in Hempel’s theory. Hempel 
requires that confirmation theories satisfy the following condition: 
 
General Consistency Condition (GCC): The set of statements that are confirmed by a 
                                                          
233 Hempel (1945b) p. 103. He also excludes contradictory evidence in his quantitative theory: see Hempel and 
Oppenheim (1945) p. 102. 
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consistent sentence must form a consistent conjunction234. 
 
 Clearly, Hempel intended his definition to exclude contrary hypotheses being 
Hempel-confirmed. Hempel actually suggests a proof that his definition satisfies the GCC235, 
but subsequently he strongly hints that his system fails to satisfy the GCC236. Hempel’s 
suggestion of a proof is a reference to an earlier proof in that article; in the earlier proof, he 
proves that a different analysis of confirmation satisfies the GCC. Since a proof does not 
seem to exist in the literature, I shall provide an explicit proof of the GCC for his system. 
 
 A preliminary clarification of Hempel’s concept of the “development” of a sentence 
will be useful. The development of a hypothesis H is a statement that entails H when 
conjoined with the premise that only the individuals in the development exist. The 
development is an atomic statement of L. When the development is consistent, it can only be 
entailed by consistent statements, like any other statement. If there is a set of hypotheses and 
the evidence-statement E entails the development of every member of the set, then there will 
be a statement that is the development of the conjunction of the hypotheses in the set. 
 
Key 
E: Any consistent evidence-statement. 
SH: Any set of inconsistent hypotheses. 
 
                                                          
234 Hempel (1943) p. 127. 
 
235 Hempel (1943) p. 142. 
 
236 Hempel (1965) p. 50-51. 
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Premises 
 
(1) If E Hempel-confirms every member of SH, then E entails every member of SH or  
E entails the development of every member of SH237. 
 
(2) If E entails every member of SH, then it entails the conjunction of the members of SH. 
 
(3) If E entails a development of every hypothesis in SH, then there is a consistent statement 
that is the development of the conjunction of the hypotheses in SH for the individuals 
mentioned in E. 
 
(4) The conjunction of the members of SH is contradictory. 
 
(5) A contradictory statement has no consistent development. 
 
(6) No contradictory statements can be entailed by E. 
 
Proof 
 
Claim:  There is no E such that E Hempel-confirms every member of SH. 
 
 By a categorical syllogism from (4) and (6): 
                                                          
237 If E entails some members of SH and E entails the development of other members, then E entails the 
development of every member, since if E implies H, then it must imply the development of H for the individuals 
mentioned in E. 
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(7) E does not entail the conjunction of the members of SH. 
 
 By modus tollens from (2) and (7): 
 
(8) E does not entail every member of SH. 
 
 By modus ponens from (4) and (5): 
 
(9) The conjunction of all the members of SH has no development. 
 
 By modus tollens from (3) and (9): 
 
(10) E does not entail the development of every member of SH. 
 
 By conjunction introduction and De Morgan’s Theorem from (8) and (10): 
 
(11) E neither entails every member in SH, nor does it entail the development of every 
member of in SH. 
 
 By modus tollens from (1) and (11): 
 
(12) E does not Hempel-confirm every hypothesis in SH. 
  
245 Formalism, Reliability, and the New Riddle of Induction 
 
 
 Since E and SH are arbitrarily selected, (12) can be generalised for any consistent 
statement and any set of contraries. Thus, Hempel’s confirmation theory satisfies the GCC 
and so Goodman’s Qualitative Claim must be false. By extension, Goodman’s Quantitative 
Claim must also be false, since contraries cannot be equally Hempel-confirmed if they cannot 
be Hempel-confirmed. 
 
 Given that the Qualitative NRI involves the logically weaker thesis, it is the natural 
place to look for counterexamples to my metatheoretic claim. Before looking at individual 
versions of the Qualitative NRI, I shall provide a complete list of the three ways that a 
statement E might fail to Hempel-confirm the conjunction of two putatively contrary 
hypotheses H1 and H2: 
 
(i) E is inconsistent. 
 
(ii) E does not Hempel-confirm both H1 and H2. 
 
(iii) E does not Hempel-confirm either H1 or H2. 
 
(iv) H1 and H2 are not contraries. 
 
 I shall argue that at least one of (i) to (iv) is true in all the standard versions of the 
Qualitative NRI. 
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2.3 The Colour-Change NRI 
 
 In this version of the Qualitative NRI, one defines ‘grue’ so that grue objects must 
change colour. Tom Settle238, John Wright239, David Armstrong240, and Jerold Abrams241 use 
this type of definition. For an emerald to satisfy the colour-change version of ‘grue’, it must 
be observed to be green before some future time t (like 3,000 AD) and subsequently change 
colour to blue at t. I shall now define this version of ‘grue’ formally: 
 
Key 
CCG: Colour-change grue. 
OT: First observed before 3,000 AD’. 
G: Green. 
B: Blue. 
EM: Emerald. 
 
D1: x is CCG ↔ ((OTx ^ Gx) v (¬OTx ^ Bx)) 
 
 (Throughout this chapter, the application of a colour predicate to an object means that 
the object is monochromatically that colour. I shall also ignore, in line with tradition, that if 
‘emerald’ has its usual gemmological sense, then ‘All emeralds are green’ is true by 
definition, because ‘emeralds’ are defined by gemmologists as green beryls.) 
                                                          
238 Settle (1974) p. 743. 
 
239 Wright (1991) p. 41. 
 
240 Armstrong (1983) p. 57. 
 
241 Abrams (2002) p. 544. 
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 The hypothesis ‘All emeralds are colour-change grue’ is typically formalized as: 
 
(1) ∀x(EMx → CCGx) 
 
- which is logically equivalent to - 
 
(2) ∀x(EMx → ((OTx ^ Gx) v (¬OTx ^ Bx))) 
 
 The development of (2) for a is: 
 
(3) EMa ^ ((OTa ^ Ga) ^ (¬OTa ^ Ba)) 
 
- and the evidence-statement used in the colour-change NRI is typically - 
 
(4) (EMa ^ OTa ^ Ga) 
 
 The colour-change challenge to Hempel is that, allegedly, in Hempel’s theory the 
evidence-statement (4) confirms the hypothesis: 
 
(5) ∀x(EMx → Gx) 
 
- as well as the hypothesis (1). Thus, if this version of the NRI is correct, Hempel’s system 
allows for the confirmation of contraries. It was this version of the NRI (using 2000 AD as t) 
that inspired Kyburg's joke that Goodman’s Riddle “… is thus surely one of the most 
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important problems to come out of recent discussions of inductive logic. It is also one of the 
most pressing, since there are now only thirty years left in which to solve it.”242  
 
 However, Robert T. Pennock points out that, while it is true that (4) Hempel-confirms 
(5), it is not true that (4) Hempel-confirms (3)243. The evidence-claim (4) entails (EMa → 
Ga), which is the development of (5) for the individual a, but it does not entail (3), which is 
the development of (1) for a. Informally, the evidence (4) tells us that a is a green emerald, 
but not that it will change colour after t, so that there is no instance of the grue-hypothesis in 
(4) according to Hempel’s theory. 
 
 Consequently, the Colour-Change NRI is not an example of the Hempel-confirmation 
of contraries. Frank Jackson makes a similar point regarding the Straight Rule of 
Induction244. 
 
2.4 The Disjunctive NRI 
 
 Goodman’s version of ‘grue’ is not the colour-change version245. He defines ‘grue’ as: 
 
D2: x is grue ↔ ((OTx → Gx) ^ (¬OTx → Bx)) 
 
                                                          
242 Kyburg (1970) p. 174. 
 
243 Pennock (1998) p. 107-110 
244 Jackson (1994) p. 81. As Jackson defines it, Straight Rule of Induction is the principle that instances of a 
predicate F that correlate with a predicate G are prima facie evidence (perhaps with background information) 
that other instances of F correlate with G. 
 
245 Goodman (1983) p. 74. 
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  This definition is also used in some other philosophers’ presentations of the NRI246. 
Something will be ‘grue’ on the D2 definition if it satisfies one of the following truth-
conditions: 
 
(i) It is first observed before t and it is green. 
 
(ii) It is not first observed before t and it is blue. 
 
 The truth-conditions of D2 are the same as the truth-conditions of D3: 
 
D3: x is grue ↔ ((OTx ^ Gx) v (¬OTx ^ Bx)) 
 
- which perhaps makes the logical form of Goodman’s version of ‘grue’ more manifest and 
which some philosophers use when discussing the NRI247.  
 
 Using Goodman’s definition, we can formalise the alleged contraries ‘All emeralds 
are green’ and ‘All emeralds are grue’ as: 
 
H1: ∀x(EMx → Gx) 
 
H2: ∀x(EMx → GRx) 
                                                          
246 Antony (2004) p. 12 and Huemer (2001) p. 379. 
247 E.g. Pennock (1998) p. 103 and Horwich (1982) p. 67. 
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- using ‘GR’ as an abbreviation of ((OTx ^ Gx) v (¬OTx ^ Bx)). 
 
 However, H1 and H2 are not contraries: if there were no emeralds, then both would be 
true, since any material conditional is true when the antecedent is false. Adding existential 
import to the hypotheses avoids this particular problem: 
 
H3: ∀x(EMx → Gx) ^ ∃x(EMx) 
 
H4: ∀x(EMx → GRx) ^ ∃x(EMx) 
 
- so that both would both be false if there were no emeralds. 
 
 The evidence that Goodman considers is: 
 
(5) (EMa ^ Ga ^ OTa) ^ (EMb ^ Gb ^ OTb) ^ (EMc ^ Gc ^ OTc) ... (EMn ^ Gn ^ OTn) 
 
 From (5), the developments of H3 for any given individual i in the evidence-report can 
be deduced: 
 
(6) (EMi → Gi) ^ EMi 
 
- and similarly for H4 - 
 
(7) (EMi → GRi) ^ EMi 
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Hence, the statement (5) Hempel-confirms both hypotheses. However, the hypotheses 
are still not contraries, because it is logically possible that all the emeralds that will ever exist 
are green and first observed before t. If that were true, then both H3 and H4 would be true. For 
example, imagine a universe in which (a) all matter becomes grey goo forever at t, (b) no new 
matter ever comes into existence, and (c) all the emeralds that ever existed were first 
observed before t. In such a universe, all emeralds were green, but they were also all grue, 
because they were green and observed prior to t. Therefore, in Hempel’s system, evidence 
can confirm H3 and H4, but these hypotheses are not contraries. 
 
 Pennock also notes that there is no incompatibility between the two hypotheses, but 
tries to reformulate the NRI to deal with this logical point248. He asserts that if we add our 
background knowledge that there will be emeralds that we do not observe prior to t, then the 
hypotheses will be contraries and confirmed249. Pennock claims that we can conjoin our 
background knowledge with the evidence, so that we have contraries that will be Hempel-
confirmed. In particular, we can add our background knowledge that there exists one object b 
that is an emerald and it is not first observed prior to t. The new evidence-statement is: 
 
(8) EMa ^ Ga ^ OTa ^ EMb ^ ¬OTb 
 
 We now need some contrary versions of the green and grue hypotheses. By 
conjoining (EMb ^ ¬OTb) with the H3 and H4, we obtain: 
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(9) ∀x(EMx → Gx) ^ EMb ^ ¬OTb 
 
(10) ∀x(EMx → ((OTx ^ Gx) v (¬OTx ^ Bx))) ^ EMb ^ ¬OTb 
 
- which are contraries, because (9) implies that b is green and (10) implies that b is blue. 
 
 However, while Pennock is correct that (9) and (10) are contraries, he is incorrect in 
claiming that they are Hempel-confirmed by (8). Firstly, it is obvious that (8) does not entail 
(9) or (10). Secondly, (8) does not entail the developments of (9) and (10) for the individuals 
mentioned in (8). These developments are the following: 
 
(11) (EMa → Ga) ^ (EMb → Gb) 
 
(12) (EMa → ((OTa ^ Ga) v (¬OTa ^ Ba))) ^ (EMb → ((OTb ^ Gb) v (¬OTb ^ Bb))) 
 
 (8) does not entail (11) or (12), because it is consistent with the falsity of either 
statement. For example, consider the logically possible world in which b is red. In this world, 
(8) might be true, but (11) and (12) are false. Therefore, (8) does not entail (11) or (12). Since 
(8) does not entail (9) or (10) or their developments, it follows that (8) does not Hempel-
confirm these hypotheses. Pennock has not provided an example of the confirmation of 
contraries in Hempel’s system. 
 
 One might object that (8) entails (EMa ^ Ga ^ OTa), and this Hempel-confirms the 
green and grue hypotheses. It is true that (8) entails this report about a and that this report 
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confirms both of the hypotheses. However, the fact that (8) entails a report that Hempel-
confirms these hypotheses does not imply that (8) also Hempel-confirms the hypotheses. In 
Hempel’s system, confirmation does not ‘flow up’ the entailment relation. Formally, it is 
possible in Hempel’s system that Φ entails χ and χ confirms Ψ, but nonetheless Φ does not 
confirm Ψ250. For example, in Hempel’s system, the hypothesis: 
 
(13) EMa ^ Ga ^ OTa ^ EMb ^ ¬Gb ^ ¬Bb 
 
- also entails (EMa ^ Ga ^ OTa), but it disconfirms (9) and (10). Thus, the fact that (8) entails 
(EMa ^ Ga ^ OTa) does not imply that (8) Hempel-confirms (9) or (10). 
 
 However, Pennock’s arguments do highlight a genuine limitation of Hempel’s system.  
A Hempelian will presumably want to make predictions based on the formal fact that the 
green hypothesis H3 is confirmed in Hempel’s system. Yet, Carnap251 and Hooker252 
independently discovered that Hempel’s system provides no help in selecting among contrary 
predictions. The good news for Hempel is that he does not propose any method by which his 
system can be used to make contrary predictions. The bad news is that Hempel does not 
provide any method for making predictions using formal facts about the confirmation 
relations that hold in his system. Thus, a Hempelian could not directly use his confirmation 
theory to predict that an emerald that has not been observed prior to t will be blue, but nor 
                                                          
250 This feature of Hempel’s system can be missed due to the occasional (and misleading) description of his 
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could she directly use the Hempelian theory to predict that the emerald is green. This fact 
about the application of Hempel’s system is a major limitation, but it is distinct from the NRI, 
which is a problem that contraries can be confirmed within Hempel’s system. I shall discuss 
more limitations in Subsection 2.6. 
 
 In my discussion above, I have interpreted Pennock’s claim as an assertion that we 
can confirm contrary hypotheses in Hempel’s system. However, one could also interpret his 
revision of the Riddle in the following way: suppose that M is a claim about Hempel’s theory 
that ‘H3 and H4 are both confirmed by E according to Hempel’s theory’. In other words, M is 
the formal fact that in Hempel’s system, it is possible for reports of green emeralds to 
confirm both ‘There are emeralds and that they are all green’ and ‘There are emeralds and 
that they are all grue’. If we combine M with our background knowledge, then we know that 
these hypotheses cannot both be true, yet both are confirmed by the same evidence in 
Hempel’s system. Therefore, if M is combined with our background knowledge, Hempel’s 
system would underdetermine a theory-choice between two hypotheses that are consistent but 
(in a non-logical sense) rivals. 
 
 Pennock’s problem seems to be different from the problem above, because he talks 
about a “background premise” that is presumably being conjoined with the evidence in 
Hempel’s system, as I have interpreted his position above253. However, this is still an 
interesting problem concerning the application of the formal facts of Hempel’s system (like 
M) and their usage in areas like theory-choice. In contrast to formalists like Carnap254, 
Hempel does not provide a discussion of how to use his confirmation theory for resolving 
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such methodological issues. As Fitelson argues, it is possible for a defender of Hempel’s 
theory to take a number of views on how M should be used in such examples255. Unless it is 
proven that there is no way that Hempel’s system can be integrated into a methodology that 
addresses theory-choice, then this problem has not proven to be fatal for Hempel’s system. 
 
 One can make a comparison to certain features in the formal parts of other 
methodologies. For instance, according to Rudolf Carnap, Imre Lakatos, and Karl Popper, the 
prior probability of a contingent universal generalisation over an infinite number of 
individuals is zero256. However, this formal fact does not commit them to the claim that one 
should disbelieve all contingent universal generalisations over an infinite number of 
individuals. Similarly, Hempel could reasonably argue that that there are grounds in our 
background knowledge (like the fact that Goodmanian hypotheses would not have been 
successful in the history of science) to overcome any underdetermination problems caused by 
combing M with our background knowledge. 
 
 One might think that a formalist who made such a response is begging the question. 
Yet Pennock’s version of the NRI requires taking our background knowledge for granted and 
conjoining it with M. Otherwise, there is no reason to regard H3 and H4 as leading to contrary 
predictions about the emeralds that are unobserved prior to t. Put another way, the hypothesis: 
 
H3: ∀x(EMx → Gx) ^ ∃x(EMx) 
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- implies that there exists some x such that (EMx ^ Gx), but it does not imply that x or any 
other emerald exists after t. The most that we can derive from H3 about an object b that is not 
observed prior to t is the conditional prediction: 
 
(14) ((EMb ^ ¬OTb) → Gb) 
 
 Thus, if b is an emerald that is unobserved prior to t, then it will be green. 
Analogously, the grue hypothesis H4 implies that there is some x such that (EMx ^ GRx), but 
it is silent on the existence of emeralds after t. For b, the grue hypothesis ∀x(EMx → GRx) ^ 
∃x(EMx) only implies that: 
 
(15) ((EMb ^ ¬OTb) → GRb) 
 
- which in turn implies- 
 
(16) ((EMb ^ ¬OTb) → Bb) 
 
 By themselves, (14) and (16) are compatible, since they will both be true if their 
antecedent is false. A sceptical problem only exists given our background knowledge that the 
antecedents of both conditionals are true, so background knowledge is available from the 
outset of Pennock’s version of the paradox, so Hempel would not beg the question by using 
background knowledge to decide how to use M for theory-choice. 
 
 Therefore, even if we introduce background knowledge into the analysis, it is still not 
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the case that we can use the disjunctive version of ‘grue’ to confirm contraries with the same 
evidence in Hempel’s system. However, the debate over the Disjunctive NRI does highlight 
some serious limitations of that system. In particular, Hempel has a large number of 
unanswered questions regarding the broader application of his system. Such questions are 
important, but they are distinct from Goodman’s Riddle. 
 
2.5 The Predictive NRI 
 
 Goodman phrases much of his most influential discussion about the NRI as a problem 
about confirming predictions257. His assertion is that it is possible to Hempel-confirm: 
 
P1: EMb ^ Gb 
 
- and - 
 
P2: EMb ^ Bb 
 
- with the statement - 
 
E: EMa ^ Ga ^ OTa 
 
 Goodman’s implicit argument seems to be that, in Hempel’s system, E confirms the 
hypotheses: 
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H1: ∀x(EMx → Gx) 
 
H2: ∀x(EMx → GRx) 
 
- and if (i) H1 entails P1 and (ii) H2 entails P2, then E confirms both P1 and P2 because, in 
Hempel’s system, the Special Consequence Condition is satisfied: 
 
Special Consequence Condition: If A confirms B, then A confirms every consequence of 
B258. 
 
 Put another way, confirmation ‘flows down’ the consequence relation in Hempel’s 
system: if a prediction is entailed by a hypothesis, then that prediction is confirmed by all the 
evidence that confirms that hypothesis: if E confirms H1 and H1 entails P1, then E confirms 
P1. Similarly, if E confirms H1 and H1 entails P2, then E confirms P2. Consequently, it would 
be possible to confirm a set of contraries in Hempel’s system. 
 
 The mistaken premise in this argument is that H1 does not entail P1 and H2 does not 
entail P2. For example, imagine a universe in which a is the only emerald that ever exists and 
a is a green emerald observed prior to t. In that universe, H1 and H2 are true, but P1 and P2 are 
both false, because they imply the existence of an emerald b that never exists. Therefore, the 
hypotheses do not entail the predictions. 
 
 One might try to salvage Goodman’s implicit argument by adding background 
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knowledge into the scenario. For instance, we can conjoin our knowledge that b is observed 
after t with the hypotheses, and then they will entail their respective predictions. However, 
the resulting conjunctions are not confirmed by E. The hypotheses: 
 
H5: ∀x(EMx → Gx) ^ EMb ^ ¬OTb 
 
H6: ∀x(EMx → GRx) ^ EMb ^ ¬OTb 
 
- are not confirmed by E, since E does not entail the development of the last two conjuncts in 
H5 and H6, because Hempel defines the development of atomic statements like EMb as the 
atomic statements themselves and E does not entail EMb, as it only describes a. 
 
 One might try to avoid this problem by adding (EMb ^ ¬OTb) to E. However, the 
resulting evidence-statement: 
 
E´: EMa ^ Ga ^ OTa ^ EMb ^ ¬OTb 
 
- does not confirm H5 or H6, for reasons that are analogous to those given for (8), (9) and (10) 
in the previous subsection: E´ is silent on the colour of b, and this content is needed to deduce 
the developments of H5 and H6. 
 
 One could try to keep modifying the scenarios and definitions to Hempel-confirm 
contrary hypotheses with the same evidence. However, unless my argument that Hempel’s 
system satisfies the GCC is unsound, this is a hopeless exercise. The predicate ‘grue’ poses 
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no direct problem to Hempel’s system. However, my discussion has already touched on some 
of the limitations of the theory, and I shall now discuss these in more detail. 
 
2.6 The Limitations of Hempel’s System 
 
 A familiar complaint regarding Hempel’s theory is that it is extremely limited. Carnap 
presents a wide variety of types of cases in which E intuitively confirms H, but it does not in 
Hempel’s system259. For instance, suppose that E is ‘95% of observed swans are white’ and H 
is ‘Most swans are white’. E does not entail H and E is not a development of H, so E does not 
Hempel-confirm H. In general, his definition of confirmation is clearly too narrow. 
 
 My discussion of the NRI raises two further problems with Hempel’s system. I shall 
discuss each in turn in this subsection. 
 
 
2.6.1 Comparative Judgements 
 
 My arguments imply that Goodman’s Quantitative Claim (that the green and the grue 
hypotheses can be equally confirmed by the same evidence) is false in Hempel’s system, but 
there is an all-too-quick argument that will do the same work. As Stove notes260, Hempel’s 
definition of confirmation is purely classificatory, in the sense that it only enables 
classificatory judgements like: 
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J1: (EMa ^ Ga ^ OTa) confirms both ∀x(EMx → Gx) and ∀x(EMx → GRx). 
 
- but not - 
 
J2: (EMa ^ Ga ^ OTa) confirms ∀x(EMx → Gx) to the same degree as ∀x(EMx → GRx) 
 
 Aside from distinguishing cases of confirmation from cases of disconfirmation and 
neutrality, Hempel’s theory provides no comparative guidance. Consequently, Goodman’s 
Quantitative Claim must be false. However, it is false because of a limitation of Hempel’s 
system. 
 
 This limitation is very significant, because it entails that Hempel’s system is silent 
about many important questions. For instance, do 3,000 developments of a hypothesis 
confirm it more strongly than one development? If so, how much more strongly? Does this 
difference depend on the available background knowledge? Hempel’s definition is silent on 
these issues. In the context of the NRI, this limitation entails that Hempel’s theory cannot tell 
us whether the green hypothesis is better confirmed than the grue hypothesis, which is an 
issue that most philosophers would expect a confirmation theory to resolve. 
 
2.6.2 The General Consistency Condition 
 
 That the set of statements that are confirmed by a consistent statement must itself be 
consistent (Hempel’s GCC) can seem like an intuitive requirement. However, as Carnap 
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argues, it is much too strong261. For example, suppose that the sample mean in our data for 
the height of British adult males is 183 cm. Assume that our data confirms the statistical 
generalization that average British adult male height is 183 cm. It is still perfectly plausible 
that there is a slight difference between the sample mean and the population mean, such that 
actual British adult male average height is close to 183 cm, but not exactly 183 cm. The 
sample report intuitively confirms each of the hypotheses stating that the population mean is 
182 cm, 184 cm, 182.5 cm, and so on. 
 
 Similarly, Cavendish’s measurements of the weight of the Earth in 1797-1798 
confirmed his estimate that density of the Earth was approximately 5.48 times the density of 
water, but his measurements also confirm our best modern estimates that the density was 
approximately 5.52 times the density of water. In such situations, it is natural to say that there 
are multiple confirmed contraries, even if one believes that some of the confirmed contraries 
are better confirmed than others. 
 
 Standard Bayesian confirmation theory is firmly committed to Carnap’s side on this 
dispute. According to the standard Bayesian definition, a hypothesis H is confirmed by some 
evidence E if P(H | E) > P(H). Obviously, it is possible for E to have favourable probabilistic 
relevance towards contraries. In addition to the above examples, consider the simple case in 
which we are making a random draw from a normal playing deck of cards: 
 
Key 
H1: The card will be a Spade. 
H2: The card is a Club. 
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E: The card is black. 
 
 Since the draw is random and the deck is normal, one can easily calculate the relevant 
parts of the probability distribution: 
 
𝑃(𝐻1) = 0.25 
𝑃(𝐻2) = 0.25 
𝑃(𝐸) = 0.5 
𝑃(𝐻1⁡|⁡𝐻2) = 0 
𝑃(𝐻2⁡|⁡𝐻1) = 0 
𝑃(𝐻1⁡|⁡𝐸) =
𝑃(𝐸⁡|⁡𝐻1)𝑃(𝐻1)
𝑃(𝐸)
= 0.5 > 𝑃(𝐻1) 
𝑃(𝐻2⁡|⁡𝐸) =
𝑃(𝐸⁡|⁡𝐻2)𝑃(𝐻2)
𝑃(𝐸)
= 0.5 > ⁡𝑃(𝐻2) 
 
 It follows that E confirms both H1 and H2 in standard Bayesian confirmation theory. 
In this particular case, Bayesian confirmation theory seems to match our ordinary intuitions: 
E supports both hypotheses. Of course, it would be disastrous if all contraries were equally 
confirmed by all evidence in a confirmation theory, but that is very different from some 
contraries being merely (or even equally) confirmed by some evidence. 
 
 In response to Carnap’s arguments, Hempel suggests dropping the GCC, but notes 
that this would require further fundamental changes to his theory262. If an alternative 
confirmation theory CT satisfies the GCC and another of the features of his system, which he 
                                                          
262 Hempel (1965) p. 49. 
264 Confirmation, Decision, and Evidential Probability 
 
calls the “General Consequence Condition”: 
 
General Consequence Condition: If a set of statements SH is confirmed by an evidence-
statement E, then E also confirms every statement H that can be implied by some 
combination of the statements in SH. 
 
- then, in CT, every evidence-statement that confirms a set of contrary hypotheses would also 
confirm every hypothesis in the language-schema L. Hempel does not provide the proof for 
this claim, but it is simple. As in Hempel’s theory, we assume classical logic. 
 
Key 
E: Any consistent statement. 
SH: Any inconsistent set of hypotheses. 
CH: The conjunction of the members of SH. 
 
Premises 
 
(1) CH implies every statement in L. 
 
(2) The conjunction of SH can be deduced from a combination of the members of SH. 
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Proof 
 
Claim: If E confirms every member of SH, then E confirms every statement in L. 
 
 From the General Consequence Condition and (2): 
 
(3) If E confirms every member of SH, then E confirms CH. 
 
 From the General Consequence Condition and (1): 
 
(4) If E confirms CH, then E confirms every statement in L. 
 
 By a Hypothetical Syllogism from (3) and (4): 
 
(5) If E confirms every member of SH, then E confirms every statement in L. 
 
 Therefore, if Hempel modified his theory to CT, then he is committed to the 
trivialization result that E confirms every statement in L. To avoid this problem, Hempel 
could take the further step of abandoning the General Consequence Condition, but this step 
would involve rejecting one of the distinctive features of his system, which is that 
confirmation always ‘flows down’ the deductive consequence relation. It is not clear how 
such a confirmation theory would be ‘Hempelian’ in any meaningful sense. 
 
 However, despite Hempel’s own concerns, he could retain something resembling his 
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theory despite abandoning the GCC. It is possible to avoid the trivialization result above and 
retain the General Consistency Condition. If Hempel were to modify his definition to exclude 
contradictory evidence (a step that I made as a simplification of his definition in Subsection 
2.2) then he could avoid the inference of sub-premise (4) in my proof above. Consequently, 
the GCC is neither an essential nor an attractive feature of Hempel’s underlying theory of 
confirmation. Ironically, Hempel’s theory meets his desideratum of the GCC, but this is a 
weakness rather than a strength of his system. The NRI is not fatal to Hempel’s system, but 
his system is objectionable on other grounds. Hempel’s definition of confirmation is too 
narrow, which is a point that he later grants to Carnap263. 
 
 If Hempel’s system does not offer an adequate option for a formalist, then she might 
consider Bayesianism. However, the standard Bayesian answers to the NRI are not available 
to formalists, as I have defined ‘formalist’. The most common response is to discriminate 
against ‘grue’ in the prior distribution264. For example, a Bayesian can obtain unequal 
antecedent probabilities by giving lower priors to ‘grue’ or obtain unequal degrees of 
confirmation (at least on standard definitions of ‘degree of confirmation’) by giving a higher 
likelihood for the evidence to green hypotheses rather than grue hypotheses. Such options are 
unavailable to formalists, because they involve discriminating against ‘grue’, so I shall not 
explore them. 
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SECTION 3: RELIABILITY OF THE EVIDENCE 
 
 In this section, I shall propose a strategy that a formalist can use to answer the NRI. 
My idea is essentially that formalists can avoid the various incarnations of the NRI by 
appealing to an aspect of evidential support that is distinct from confirmation: the reliability 
of evidence. Concomitantly, even supposing that the formalist must say that Goodmanian and 
non-Goodmanian hypotheses are equally confirmed or probable (when the hypotheses are 
clearly not equally supported) she can appeal to this additional aspect of evidential support to 
answer the Riddle. 
 
 I shall begin by arguing that the Qualitative NRI is not inherently problematic for 
formalists. My next step will be to provide a general formalist response to the Quantitative 
NRI, using the concept of the reliability of evidence. I shall also consider some possible 
objections to my basic strategy. Having answered these objections, I shall apply my strategy 
to the underlying worry in the NRI, which is the possibility of a global underdetermination of 
equiprobable hypotheses. Finally, I shall generalise my answer beyond Goodman’s version of 
‘grue’, which will also illustrate that my answer does not depend on the particular details of 
greenness, grueness, or emeralds. 
 
3.1 The Qualitative NRI 
 
 In the Qualitative NRI, the challenge for a purely formal confirmation theory is that 
one might know: 
 
E: All observed emeralds are green and observed prior to t. 
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- and this confirms both - 
 
H1: All emeralds are green. 
 
H2: All emeralds are grue. 
 
 I shall assume that H1 and H2 are contraries. (Perhaps we are interpreting them with a 
logical form such that they have contrary counterfactual consequences.) In addition, I shall 
assume that E confirms both H1 and H2 in a formalist confirmation theory. Even granting 
these assumptions, there is no genuine problem for the formalist, because the fact that H1 and 
H2 are confirmed does not imply that they are equally confirmed. An increase in probability 
for two contrary hypotheses is not a Riddle: this is a normal part of science, as I argued in 
Subsection 2.6.2. 
 
 I stress that this scenario is based on a number of assumptions that need not always 
hold. A formalist can argue that we must always consider our background knowledge when 
assessing confirmation. One way to incorporate this information into confirmation theory is 
to conjoin our relevant background knowledge K with the evidence E. It might be the case 
that (E ^ K) does not confirm the grue hypothesis, even though the conjunction of E and 
some other hypothetical background information does confirm the grue hypothesis. For 
example, K might contain the knowledge that emeralds are uniform in their colours, so that if 
one emerald is green, then all emeralds are green. Suppose that K also contains the 
knowledge that there are emeralds that are not observed prior to t. In that case, (E ^ K) 
falsifies the grue hypothesis H2. Of course, this is not a good response to Goodman’s version 
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of the NRI (he could simply raise the question of how we know that emeralds are uniform in 
their colours) but it does prove that learning E need not always confirm both H1 and H2 in a 
formalist theory. Therefore, the mere possibility of confirming contraries like H1 and H2 is 
not inherently problematic. I shall now consider the other versions of the Riddle. 
 
3.2 The Quantitative NRI 
 
 In the Quantitative NRI, the alleged problem for the formalist is that the evidence that 
Goodman considers would (in a purely formal confirmation theory) confirm the grue 
hypothesis just as well as the green hypothesis. This equivalence would be contrary to most 
confirmation theorists’ intuitions. 
 
 The absence of a received measure of degrees of confirmation complicates a 
discussion of this issue. There is not even a consensus within specific confirmation theories 
such as Bayesianism265. However, my answer to the Riddle will not depend on any particular 
definition of degrees of confirmation, because I shall simply assume that the degrees of 
confirmation are equal for both hypotheses. This enables me to obviate the voluminous 
debate and simply to assume that a formalist is confronted by an apparent 
underdetermination. 
 
 Assuming that the degrees of confirmation are equal, there is still a relevant 
asymmetry. Suppose that we learn: 
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E: All observed emeralds are green and observed prior to t. 
 
- and (relative to our background knowledge) this confirms both - 
 
H1: All emeralds are green. 
 
H2: All emeralds are grue. 
 
- to an equal degree. In practice, we derive our knowledge that observed emeralds are grue 
from (a) our knowledge that they are green and (b) that they have been observed prior to t. 
Thus, the knowledge that the emeralds are green depends only on the veracity of our colour-
perception, whereas the knowledge that they are grue depends on both (a) the veracity of our 
colour-perception and (b) the veracity of our measurement of time. This creates an 
asymmetry of reliability that breaks the underdetermination of H1 and H2 given E and our 
background knowledge. 
 
 By ‘reliability’, I mean apparent reliability, rather than objective reliability. Our 
perception might be entirely unreliable, in some objective sense, for detecting either green or 
grue. However, if our beliefs about our sensory apparatus are correct, then we can observe 
that an object is green by observing it under ordinary lighting conditions, whereas we would 
need the additional information that it was observed prior to t in order to determine that it is 
grue. Thus, there is a (possibly minute) difference in the reliability: we can reasonably be 
more confident that the emeralds are green than that they are grue, even though we are 
obviously confident in both evidence statements. 
 
271 Formalism, Reliability, and the New Riddle of Induction 
 
 
 This difference intuitively makes a difference: we would like to have hypotheses that 
are plausible given the evidence and to have reliable evidence. In the NRI, a formalist who 
incorporates the reliability of the evidence into her model of evidential support can use this 
asymmetry to say that the green hypothesis H1 is better supported by its evidence, even 
though the degrees of confirmation are equal, because H1’s evidence is more reliable than 
H2’s evidence. In other words, when the degrees of confirmation are equal, the asymmetry in 
the reliability of the evidence statements can function as a tiebreaker, so that the 
underdetermination between the two hypotheses is resolved. Even assuming that they are 
equally confirmed, they are not equally supported. By this reasoning, the formalist can avoid 
the Quantitative NRI. 
 
 I am not proposing an empirical explanation of why we regard H1 as better supported 
by our actual evidence than H2. Relative to our actual background knowledge, most 
confirmation theorists agree that the degrees of confirmation are unequal. (Strictly speaking, 
the green hypothesis is necessarily true, because emeralds are green by definition.) 
Obviously, if we consider a hypothesis like ‘Most grass is green’, then we do not have to 
appeal to the greater reliability of ‘Most observed grass is green’ in comparison to ‘Most 
observed grass is grue’. For instance, we can refer to our background knowledge that types of 
plants, such as grasses, tend to be mostly uniform in their greenness. 
 
 Instead of explaining why we do not believe hypotheses like ‘Most grass is grue’, my 
argument is that the formalist does not have to refer to such background knowledge to resolve 
Goodman’s Riddle. She can use relevant background knowledge if it is available, but she can 
also point to the asymmetry in the reliabilities of the evidence, and thereby reason that ‘Most 
grass is green’ would be better supported by ‘Most observed grass is green’ in comparison to 
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‘Most grass is grue’, even assuming equal degrees of confirmation. 
 
 In the case of emeralds and grue, the asymmetry of reliability is very minute and 
perhaps not immediately clear, but the difference in reliability can be greater. Imagine that 
you are working down an extremely deep mineshaft. All your devices for measuring time 
have stopped working. You have been counting the days, so that you are quite confident that 
the month is December 2999 AD. However, you are not sure of the exact date: you think it 
might be 10/12/2999, 22/12/2999, or even 31/12/2999. Suppose that we define ‘grue’ in the 
following way: 
 
D7: x is ‘grue’ ↔ (1) x is first observed prior to 3000 AD and green or (2) x is first observed 
from 3,000 AD onwards and x is blue. 
 
 In this imaginary world, emeralds only exist deep below the Earth’s surface and they 
have never been observed before. You become the first person to observe emeralds. You 
observe a large number and you see that they are green, but you also note that your 
observations are prior to 3000 AD and the emeralds are green, so you infer that they are also 
grue. It is clearly rational to be more confident that the observed emeralds are green rather 
than grue (you could have easily made a mistake in counting the days while underground) 
and based on this asymmetry, the formalist can say that your total evidence better confirms 
‘All emeralds are green’ rather than ‘All emeralds are grue’. The distinction between 
observing emeralds in 2017 AD and 2999 AD is a matter of degrees; in either version of grue, 
there is still an asymmetry of reliability between (a) the evidence that the emeralds are green 
and (b) the evidence that they are grue. 
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 Another way to elicit this intuition is by considering the following alternative 
definition of ‘grue’: 
 
D8: x is grue ↔ x is green and first observed in a virgin forest or x is blue and not first 
observed in a virgin forest. 
 
 When Alexander von Humboldt was exploring the Amazon rainforest, he encountered 
many new species of plants. Suppose that, when observing an apparently virgin area, he 
encountered a species of plant S, whose leaves were almost always green. If von Humboldt 
was using ‘grue’ and ‘green’ in his language, then he could infer both that a particular leaf of 
S is green and that it is grue. However, his evidence that the leaves of S are almost always 
green is more reliable than his evidence that they are almost always grue, because he knew 
that he might be mistaken in his belief that this part of the Amazon was virginal266. The 
formalist can point to an asymmetry in the reliability of von Humboldt’s evidence in this 
scenario to conclude that (assuming that the hypotheses were otherwise underdetermined) the 
hypothesis ‘Most leaves of S are green’ was better supported by von Humboldt’s evidence 
than ‘Most leaves of S are grue’. 
 
 I shall stress that my answer does not involve any appeal to simplicity267. I am not 
claiming that the green hypothesis or the green evidence is simpler than the grue hypothesis 
or the grue evidence. I am also neither affirming nor denying that any such simplicity would 
                                                          
266 Historically, von Humboldt greatly underestimated the impact of humans on the Amazon region and he was 
incorrect about the virginity of much of the rainforest. 
 
267 See Slote (1967) and Friedman (1973) for some clear appeals to simplicity in the NRI literature. 
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be epistemically significant. Instead, in my answer to the NRI, I am only appealing to 
asymmetries in the reliability of the evidence. 
 
 There are several methods for modelling this asymmetry of reliability. Kyburg’s 
model of levels of corpora is one method. Kyburg aims to develop a theory of evidence that 
allows for more fine-grained distinctions of reliability than a straightforward distinction 
between ‘accepted evidence’ and ‘probable hypotheses’. He developed this framework in 
books like The Logical Foundations of Statistical Inference (1974), Science and Reason 
(1990), and Uncertain Inference (2001). Kyburg formalises scientific knowledge as a set of 
statements at different levels in a hierarchy. The upper parts of the hierarchy are the most 
certain statements in the model, while admission to the lower levels is dependent on having a 
sufficiently high probability given the upper levels. 
 
 Suppose that ‘All observed emeralds are green’ is at a high level in the hierarchy, 
whereas the conjunction of this statement with ‘All observed emeralds are observed prior to t’ 
is only at lower levels. This formal asymmetry in the position of the statements in the 
hierarchy corresponds to the difference in reliability between ‘All observed emeralds are 
green’ and ‘All observed emeralds are grue’. Kyburg’s approach to modelling scientific 
knowledge is more complex than the standard Bayesian idealizations, but it offers one means 
of modelling science in which variations in the reliability of the evidence can be modelled. 
 
 Kyburg’s approach is not the only possibility for a formalist. There is also Jeffrey 
Conditionalization, which I discussed in Chapter 2 Subsection 2.5. I shall not advocate any 
particular approach. My aim has simply been to argue that, by modelling the reliability of 
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evidence and including it within their theory of evidential support, the formalist can avoid the 
NRI. 
 
3.3 Objections 
 
 Before discussing the most fundamental worry that the NRI presents to a purely 
formal confirmation theory, I shall consider some objections to my answer. The NRI has been 
a severe problem for formalist theories of confirmation for 70 years, and so it is prima facie 
unlikely that any particular answer will be satisfactory. Since it is probable that my answer is 
somehow defective, each of the objections I shall consider is worth taking seriously.  
 
 Firstly, one might question whether a purely formal theory of confirmation can 
involve the reliability of evidence. After all, reliability is presumably not a purely formal 
matter. However, a confirmation theory is a theory of evidential relations, rather than 
evidence in general. Reliability can function as an exogenous factor in the theory, just as the 
evidence is an exogenous factor. Different formalists might adopt different theories of 
reliability, just as they might adopt different theories of observation, measurement, testimony, 
a priori knowledge, and so forth. The formalist’s appeal to the reliability of evidence is no 
more objectionable than their appeal to the claim that the evidence-statements are known, and 
no-one considers this latter appeal a problem for formalism per se. 
 
  Secondly, one might think that I have simply changed the question: I am introducing 
the issue of the uncertainty and corrigibility of evidence to address Goodman’s problem, 
whereas the NRI and typically confirmation theorists make the idealization that the evidence 
is certain and incorrigible. However, this idealization is not essential to the study of 
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confirmation. Jeffrey (1992) offers a sophisticated form of Bayesianism in which evidence is 
not modelled as certain and incorrigible. Even Carnap, who modelled the evidence as certain, 
regarded this idealization as a formal artefact of standard confirmation theories, rather than a 
basic commitment of the discipline268. Similarly, Hempel models evidence as certain, but he 
also notes that, in practice, the acceptability of scientific hypotheses depends on both (1) their 
confirmation by the evidence and (2) the reliability of that evidence269. There is nothing 
fundamental in the classic confirmation theories that requires the idealization of certain 
evidence when analysing paradoxes like the NRI. Even if all historical confirmation theories 
involved this idealization, then my answer would be simply an instance of a normal strategy 
in formal modelling: when one encounters a problem and one can avoid the problem by 
relaxing an idealization, then one might relax the assumption. 
 
 Furthermore, the assumption that our evidence is incorrigible is not attractive for its 
own sake, because it is perfectly common scientific practice to dismiss previously accepted 
data. Critics of a scientific theory can legitimately pursue either presenting problematic data 
or critically examining the existing supporting data as their critical strategy. The assumption 
of incorrigible evidence in confirmation theory has (at best) pragmatic justification. If this 
idealization proves to be problematic when considering a paradox like the NRI, then it is 
reasonable to relax the assumption, so that the model becomes both more realistic and less 
problematic. 
 
 A third objection is that we might learn ‘All observed emeralds are green’ and ‘All 
                                                          
268 Carnap (1968). p. 146. Hempel and Oppenheim (1945) p. 114-115 regard distinguishing between different 
degrees of reliability as an important step in the development of a confirmation theory, so my step is also 
consistent with Hempel’s broader project for formalism. 
 
269 Hempel (1945a). p. 25. 
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observed emeralds are grue’ by independent and equally reliable means, so that we did not 
derive the latter using the former. In such circumstances, my response to the NRI will not 
apply. If we assume further that there is no background knowledge available that can break 
the symmetry, then both the green and the grue hypotheses would be underdetermined. 
However, I am not claiming that my answer can (or should) resolve all underdetermination 
problems involving ‘grue’. Formalists can comfortably believe that evidence sometimes 
underdetermines hypotheses, especially when we assume that our evidence is far more 
austere than in reality. In contrast, the NRI is a problem of underdetermination in an 
indefinitely large number of scenarios in which it is strongly intuitive that our evidence is 
unequivocal. My answer to the Riddle is unscathed by this objection. 
 
 One might also object that non-Goodmanian hypotheses are still intuitively better 
confirmed than Goodmanian hypotheses even when there is no asymmetry in the reliability of 
the evidence and nothing in our background knowledge to resolve the underdetermination. 
However, it is doubtful that we have any intuitions about such alien scenarios. It is reasonable 
to put the burden of proof on a philosopher who claims to have a strong feeling about the 
evidential relations of a sample report of emeralds towards ‘All emeralds are grue’ in the 
absence of any background knowledge and when they are no more certain that the observed 
emeralds are green than that they are grue. 
 
 Fourthly, my answer might seem ad hoc, because I am introducing the importance of 
the reliability of the evidence to avoid a particular problem for formalist theories. Even if this 
was true, it is not a powerful objection: the NRI allegedly proves that a purely formal theory 
is untenable, rather than the mere claim that formalism must be somewhat ad hoc. However, 
philosophers have sought to model the reliability of evidence for reasons that are independent 
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of the NRI270. Furthermore, the importance of obtaining reliable evidence is a basic point in 
applied methodology; incorporating it into formal models of scientific reasoning can be seen 
as doing justice to its importance in scientific practice, with the additional benefit (from a 
formalist’s perspective) of answering the NRI. 
 
 Fifthly, I might appear to be discriminating in some way against ‘grue’, because I am 
saying that our evidence that emeralds are grue is less reliable than our evidence that they are 
green. There is a discrimination here, but it is not an internal discrimination in the 
confirmation theories I am recommending. The reliability of evidence is an external factor, 
just as the content of the evidence is an external factor. 
 
 This absence of discrimination can be seen from the fact that it is consistent with my 
account that some grue evidence is more reliable than some green evidence. For example, 
imagine that scientists observed a new type of star in distant galaxies using an instrument that 
could only detect if the star was grue or not grue. Suppose they discover that all stars of this 
type are grue. Assume that they have no ancillary reason in their background knowledge to 
favour ‘green’ over ‘grue’. My response to the NRI means that their evidence favours ‘Most 
stars of this type are grue’ more than ‘Most stars of this type are green’, because the evidence 
for the former hypothesis is more reliable. 
 
 Additionally, on my answer, it is possible that ‘All emeralds are grue’ could be better 
supported than ‘All emeralds are green’. Imagine a universe in which emeralds were no 
different to our own, but our eyes could directly observe whether things were grue or bleen, 
but not green or blue. (The predicate ‘bleen’ is defined as ‘Blue and observed prior to t or 
                                                          
270 See Roush (2005), as well as Fennell and Cartwright (2010). 
279 Formalism, Reliability, and the New Riddle of Induction 
 
 
green and not observed prior to t.’) In such a universe, we could look at an emerald and see 
that it is green if we are observing it prior to t. To know that it is green, we shall have to use 
some additional instruments for measuring time. My answer would require that if ‘All 
emeralds are green’ and ‘All emeralds are grue’ were otherwise equally supported given our 
evidence, then we should opt for the grue hypothesis. We might be mistaken, but the 
possibility of error is not a sound objection to a confirmation theory. The important point is 
that hypotheses like ‘All emeralds are grue’ can be favoured over hypotheses like ‘All 
emeralds are green’. There is no fundamental discrimination in favour of ‘green’ over ‘grue’ 
in my answer to the Riddle. 
 
 Sixthly, a critic might claim that my answer depends on how we describe the 
observations. They might argue that, if we used a language with ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’ rather 
than ‘green’ and ‘blue’, then we could have described our observations of green emeralds as 
“This emerald is grue, that emerald is grue…” Consequently, my answer would be relative to 
a particular choice of language, and thus it would not be a general formalist answer to the 
NRI. However, there is a false premise in this argument: simply observing that an emerald e 
is green does not prove that ‘e is grue’. If we spoke such a language, but our senses were 
unchanged, then we could observe that: 
 
O1: ‘e is grue and observed prior to t or bleen and not observed prior to t.’ 
 
 This statement O1 is simply the way of saying, in such a language, that e is green. It is 
logically distinct from: 
 
O2: ‘e is grue.’ 
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- because O1 will be true and O2 false if the emerald is green and first observed after t. My 
answer to the Riddle would still be correct if we spoke such a language, because we would 
still have to infer statements like O2 from O1 and our background knowledge that the emerald 
was first observed prior to t. In general, a difference in description does not create a 
difference in reliability and I am using a difference in the reliability of evidence in my 
answer, as opposed to a difference in the language of evidence. Since my answer is 
independent of any linguistic properties of ‘green’ and ‘blue’ over ‘grue’ or ‘bleen’, but 
instead involves an epistemic asymmetry in the case of emeralds, it follows that my answer is 
not language-relative. 
 
 Seventhly, one might worry that my answer only establishes the comparative claim 
that the green hypothesis is better supported than the grue hypothesis, when it should really 
establish the claim that it is much better supported. From the outset, it must be noted that this 
is not any version of the classic NRI: proving such a claim from a formalist perspective 
would be contrary to what Goodman asserts, but he only argues that purely formal theories 
cannot identify an asymmetry of support between the two hypotheses, rather than that they 
cannot appropriately assess the strength of this asymmetry. More importantly, when our 
actual background knowledge is available, a formalist can use it to establish asymmetries of 
strength of confirmation: for example, we might empirically know that ‘green’ refers to a 
natural kind and ‘grue’ does not, and that hypotheses that refer only to natural kinds are much 
more likely to be true given inductive evidence than those that make no such reference. The 
precise details will involve attention to the relevant scientific and historical background 
knowledge in the context under analysis, but the point is that the formalist can do justice to 
the claim that the green hypothesis is much better supported given the evidence and our 
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background knowledge. 
 
 This point is important, because a simple appeal to background knowledge on the part 
of a formalist is likely to leave critics unsatisfied: if a critic assumes that the relevant 
background knowledge has been obtained by inductive reasoning, then a mere appeal to this 
information simply pushes Goodman’s Riddle back to the underdetermination of the 
background knowledge in contrast to gruesome alternatives. For example, if we learned that 
hypotheses non-gruesome properties tend to produce better science than their gruesome 
alternatives, but this information was inferred inductively from the past experience of 
scientists, then a critic of formalism could simply adapt the Riddle for this inductive 
inference. An appeal to the reliability of the evidence offers a formalist a means of breaking 
the symmetry of support without recourse to such background knowledge. 
 
 This consideration raises the issue of the origin of the beliefs about the reliability of 
evidence. Are they not part of our inductively-acquired background knowledge? Certainly, 
experience can lead us to modify beliefs about the reliability of some type of evidence. For 
instance, almost everyone today rejects the notion that clairvoyance is a reliable source of 
evidence, but this scepticism has not always been so widespread. Since formalism is 
compatible with a wide range of epistemologies, there is no single response that a formalist 
must make and defend to this query, but a fallibilist foundationalist (i.e. one who holds that 
our knowledge is ultimately justified by a bedrock of basic beliefs, but these beliefs are open 
to revision) could hold that some beliefs about the reliability of different sources of evidence 
are part of the foundations of our knowledge: I might believe that my faculties of perception 
or logical reasoning are reliable but fallible sources of knowledge under some circumstances; 
that my hands are a better means of determining solidity than my eyes; and so on. However, 
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there is nothing essentially foundationalist about my answer: that we have knowledge of the 
reliability of some forms of evidence, prior to acquiring inductive knowledge, is consistent 
with multiple epistemologies – even those that dispense with justification. Thus, even if the 
formalist is driven back to very exiguous background knowledge that cannot break the 
asymmetry between the gruesome and non-gruesome hypotheses, they might still be able to 
appeal to the reliability of evidence, and thus avoids the danger of a vicious regress in their 
appeals to background knowledge. 
 
 One might reply that, intuitively, the two hypotheses are clearly very asymmetrically 
supported even when our relevant background knowledge is unavailable. However, appeals 
to intuition about such scenarios are very suspect. Indeed, the case of green and grue 
emeralds is itself a reason to be sceptical about such arguments: in reality, ‘All emeralds are 
green’ is true by definition (if ‘emerald’ has its usual gemmological acceptation) whereas 
‘All emeralds are grue’ can only be contingently true. A critic could further argue that, even 
for claims like ‘Most grass is green’ and ‘Most grass is grue’, the former is intuitively much 
better supported when our relevant background knowledge (or any other background 
knowledge that might provide a strong asymmetry) is unavailable. Here, I shall simply 
demand more than an appeal to intuition: there needs to be an argument for why such a 
classificatory claim must be honoured by a formalist, given that the relevant comparative 
claim that ‘Most grass is green’ is better confirmed than ‘Most grass is grue’ can be provided 
by a formalist theory. 
 
 Eighthly, some philosophers might claim that the NRI is unsolved unless one can 
prove that the grue hypothesis is not confirmed at all. However, intuitions are divided on this 
question: the standard Bayesian responses of providing a higher prior probability to the green 
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hypothesis or a higher likelihood for the evidence given the green hypothesis do not satisfy 
this intuition either. Few philosophers, if any, regard this feature of the standard Bayesian 
answer to the NRI as a fatal flaw in Bayesianism. Yet, if it is not a severe problem for 
Bayesianism, then it does not seem to be a severe problem for formalism either, provided that 
the formalist can preserve the intuition that the green hypothesis is better confirmed than the 
grue hypothesis, so that the evidence does not underdetermine them. That is precisely what 
my answer enables the formalist to do. 
 
 Finally, one might doubt that my answer is a formalist answer, because I am 
suggesting the use of probabilities as well as the terms from first-order logic that Hempel 
used. There is certainly an important sense of ‘formalist’ in which Hempel’s theory is 
formalist and which is incompatible with my proposal. However, Carnap also used 
probabilities and he is just as paradigmatically a ‘formalist’ as Hempel. (Indeed, Goodman 
targets both Carnap and Hempel, alongside Oppenheim and Helmer, in his first presentation 
of the NRI.) Perhaps ‘syntacticist’ would be a useful label for Hempel’s approach, 
‘probabilist’ for Carnap’s approach, and ‘formalist’ for their shared ambition of a subject-
matter independent theory of confirmation. For my purposes, it is unnecessary to insist on 
terms: the important point is that fundamental discriminations among predicates are 
superfluous in confirmation theory. If one wants to reserve ‘formalist’ for some other 
position, then I shall simply need another appellation for what I mean by ‘formalist’. 
 
3.4 Equal Probability 
 
 At the heart of the NRI is the worry that our total evidence might underdetermine 
theory-choice in an indefinite number of absurd cases, because it is possible to formulate 
284 Confirmation, Decision, and Evidential Probability 
 
arbitrarily many predicates like ‘grue’ to create rivals to any given hypothesis. A formalist 
confirmation theorist forswears any discrimination among the rivals in the prior distribution. 
However, if there is no prior discrimination against any of the rival hypotheses, such that the 
rivals have both (1) equal prior probabilities and (2) equal posterior probabilities given the 
total evidence, then the formalist might confront a very general underdetermination problem. 
It is this general underdetermination problem that is the greatest single challenge to the 
formalist, and which seems to be the central reason why the NRI is regarded such an 
intolerable defect in formalist confirmation theories. 
 
 However, even granting the assumption of equiprobability for all the rivals, there can 
still be an asymmetry in the reliability of the evidence. Provided that a formalist’s definition 
of support incorporates the reliability of the evidence as a potential tiebreaker between rival 
hypotheses, then such a formalist can say that the Goodmanian hypotheses like ‘All emeralds 
are grue’ are not as well-supported as their non-Goodmanian rivals. A typical formalist 
definition of comparative evidential support might be: 
 
Comparative Evidential Support (1): H1 is better supported by its total evidence E1 than H2 
is supported by its total evidence E2 if and only if P(H1 | E1) > P(H2 | E2). 
 
- whereas a formalist following my proposal could make a simple and intuitive modification 
to this definition - 
 
Comparative Evidential Support (2): H1 is better supported by its total evidence E1 than H2 
is supported by its total evidence E2 if and only if either: 
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(I) P(H1 | E1) > P(H2 | E2) 
 
- or - 
 
(II) P(H1 | E1) = P(H2 | E2) but E1 is more reliable than E2. 
 
(This second definition leaves open how one models the difference in reliability.) 
 
 However, my answer to the Riddle does not depend on the exact details of this second 
definition, provided that a clause that is analogous to Clause (II) is in the definition or can be 
derived from the definition. Firstly, a non-probabilistic definition of evidential support can be 
consistent with my proposal: one might use a Popperian notion of corroboration, a 
hypothetico-deductive notion of confirmation, or some other approach to evidential support. 
Secondly, my answer is consistent with a more general incorporation of the reliability of 
evidence into the analysis of evidential support. One might think that a large difference in the 
reliability of evidence should be able to offset a small difference in the conditional 
probability. Provided that the reliability of evidence can perform the function of a tiebreaker 
in cases like the NRI, such theories are consistent with my answer. 
 
 One might think that this modification is unnecessary. It might seem that, if one 
defines ‘reliability’ in terms of marginal probability in a Bayesian probability distribution, 
then the probability calculus will guarantee that the asymmetry in the reliabilities of the 
evidence will require an asymmetry in the probabilities of the hypotheses. Thus, clause (II) 
would be redundant. 
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 Formally, the objection is the claim that (1) and (2) imply (3): 
 
(1)⁡𝑃(𝐻1⁡|⁡𝐸1) ⁡= ⁡𝑃(𝐻2⁡|⁡𝐸2) 
(2)⁡𝑃(𝐸1) > ⁡𝑃(𝐸2) 
(3) 𝑃(𝐻1) ⁡> ⁡𝑃(𝐻2) 
 
 While there is a plausible line of thinking that almost leads from (1) and (2) to (3), 
they are actually logically independent of (3), since they are also consistent with P(H1) = 
P(H2). Therefore, it is possible that (1) and (2) are true, but nonetheless the prior probabilities 
underdetermine a choice between the hypotheses. 
 
 To prove this, I shall first examine the line of thought that suggests that (1) and (2) 
imply (3). I shall prove that an additional assumption is required. In my second proof, I shall 
demonstrate that when the extra assumption is removed and an alternative postulate is 
introduced, then it follows that P(H1) = P(H2). I shall further prove that (1) and (2) are even 
consistent with P(H2) > P(H1), such that H2 has a greater probability in the marginal 
distribution. These first three proofs will be algebraic, but to make the point clearer I shall 
finish with a proof that P(H1) = P(H2) in a joint distribution using numerical values. 
 
Proof 1 
 
Claim: (1) and (2) do not imply (3), but imply (3) with an additional assumption regarding 
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the relative values of P(E1 | H1) and P(E2 | H2). 
 
  Premise (1) implies that P(E1) and P(E2) are both greater than zero, because the 
conditional probabilities must be defined in order to be equal. (I am using the simple 
definition of conditional probability; there would be nothing essentially different in my 
argument if I were using a more general measure-theoretic definition that did not have this 
property.) Using Bayes’s theorem: 
 
(4) 𝑃(𝐻1⁡|⁡𝐸1) =
𝑃(𝐸1⁡^⁡𝐻1)
𝑃(𝐸1)
=
𝑃(𝐸1⁡|⁡𝐻1)𝑃(𝐻1)
𝑃(𝐸1)
 
 
(5) 𝑃(𝐻2⁡|⁡𝐸2) =
𝑃(𝐸2⁡^⁡𝐻2)
𝑃(𝐸2)
=
𝑃(𝐸2⁡|⁡𝐻2)𝑃(𝐻2)
𝑃(𝐸2)
 
 
 By substitution from (1), (4), and (5): 
 
(6) 
𝑃(𝐸1⁡|⁡𝐻1)𝑃(𝐻1)
𝑃(𝐸1)
=
𝑃(𝐸2⁡|⁡𝐻2)𝑃(𝐻2)
𝑃(𝐸2)
 
 
 The equation above puts no constraints on the values of the terms in the numerators. 
Furthermore, (2) and (6) only require that the denominators are unequal and they have a non-
zero value. Otherwise, the values of the denominators are unconstrained. Therefore, P(H1) 
can have any value r such that 0 ≤ r ≤ 1. The same is true, mutatis mutandis, for P(H2). 
Consequently, the prior probabilities are unconstrained, such that (1) and (2) are logically 
independent of (3). 
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  The line of thought that leads from (1) and (2) to (3) seems to involve the implicit 
assumption that the likelihoods in the numerators of (6) are equal: 
 
(7) 𝑃(𝐸1⁡|⁡𝐻1) = 𝑃(𝐸2⁡|⁡𝐻2) 
 
 This equation does not follow from (1) or (2), because they put no constraints on 
either term, though it is consistent with those assumptions. Once (7) has been assumed, the 
derivation of (3) is possible. The equality in (6) can be rewritten by removing the likelihoods 
from the numerators: 
 
(8) 𝑃(𝐸1⁡|⁡𝐻1)
𝑃(𝐻1)
𝑃(𝐸1)
= 𝑃(𝐸2⁡|⁡𝐻2)
𝑃(𝐻2)
𝑃(𝐸2)
 
 
 From (7) and (8), it follows that the likelihoods can be removed from both sides of the 
equality, such that: 
 
(9) 
𝑃(𝐻1)
𝑃(𝐸1)
=
𝑃(𝐻2)
𝑃(𝐸2)
 
 
 Rewriting (9) to position the priors and the expectedness terms together provides the 
useful equation (11): 
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(10) 
𝑃(𝐻1)𝑃(𝐸2)
𝑃(𝐸1)
= 𝑃(𝐻2) 
 
(11) 
𝑃(𝐸2)
𝑃(𝐸1)
=
𝑃(𝐻2)
𝑃(𝐻1)
 
 
 Thus, the probabilities of the hypotheses and the probabilities of the evidence vary in 
proportion, so if P(E1) > P(E2) and the likelihoods are equal, it must be the case that P(H1) > 
P(H2) to a proportionate degree. Hence, (1), (2), and (7) imply that (3) is true. It is this sort of 
reasoning that seems to suggest that (1) and (2) imply (3), so that relatively improbable 
evidence for the grue hypothesis seems to imply a relatively lower prior probability for that 
hypothesis given the underdetermination in the probability distribution. 
 
Proof 2 
 
Claim: There are probability distributions in which (1) and (2) are true, but P(H1) = P(H2), 
such that (3) is false. 
 
 As previously noted, (1) and (2) place no constraints on the likelihoods, so it is 
possible that the likelihoods vary with P(E1) and P(E2) such that: 
 
(12) 
𝑃(𝐸1⁡|⁡𝐻1)
𝑃(𝐸2⁡|⁡𝐻2)
=
𝑃(𝐸1)
𝑃(𝐸2)
 
 
 Since the likelihoods are unconstrained, this is consistent with the assumption (2) that 
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P(E1) > P(E2). Dividing both sides of (12) by 
𝑃(𝐸1)
𝑃(𝐸2)
 provides: 
 
(13) 
𝑃(𝐸1⁡|⁡𝐻1)𝑃(𝐸2)
𝑃(𝐸2⁡|⁡𝐻2)𝑃(𝐸1)
= 1 
 
 Reiterating and reformulating (6): 
 
(6) 
𝑃(𝐸1⁡|⁡𝐻1)𝑃(𝐻1)
𝑃(𝐸1)
=
𝑃(𝐸2⁡|⁡𝐻2)𝑃(𝐻2)
𝑃(𝐸2)
 
 
(14) 
𝑃(𝐸1⁡|⁡𝐻1)𝑃(𝐻1)
𝑃(𝐸2⁡|⁡𝐻2)𝑃(𝐸1)
=
𝑃(𝐻2)
𝑃(𝐸2)
 
 
(15) 
𝑃(𝐸1⁡|⁡𝐻1)
𝑃(𝐸2⁡|⁡𝐻2)𝑃(𝐸1)
=
𝑃(𝐻2)
𝑃(𝐸2)𝑃(𝐻1)
 
 
(16) 
𝑃(𝐸1⁡|⁡𝐻1)𝑃(𝐸2)
𝑃(𝐸2⁡|⁡𝐻2)𝑃(𝐸1)
=
𝑃(𝐻2)
𝑃(𝐻1)
 
 
 From (13) and (16): 
 
(17) 1 =
𝑃(𝐻2)
𝑃(𝐻1)
 
 
 Finally, from (17), it follows that H1 and H2 must be equiprobable, since if both sides 
of the equation are multiplied by P(H1), then we obtain: 
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(18) 𝑃(𝐻1) = 𝑃(𝐻2) 
 
 Therefore, (1) and (2) are consistent with the falsity of (3). Furthermore, (1) and (2) 
are possible in a probability distribution with equal conditional probabilities for the 
hypotheses given their evidence and greater probability for one hypothesis, so that the 
hypotheses can be underdetermined in spite of an asymmetry in the reliability of evidence. 
 
 Interestingly, since a difference in the proportions of the likelihoods can offset a 
difference in P(E1) and P(E2), it is even possible that P(H2) exceeds P(H1) given the 
assumptions (1) and (2), as I shall now prove. 
 
Proof 3 
 
Claim: There are possible distributions in which (1) and (2) are true, but P(H2) > P(H1). 
 
 Since the likelihoods are unconstrained by (1) and (2), it is consistent with those 
assumptions that (12) is replaced by the following inequality: 
 
(19) 
𝑃(𝐸1⁡|⁡𝐻1)
𝑃(𝐸2⁡|⁡𝐻2)
>
𝑃(𝐸1)
𝑃(𝐸2)
 
 
 Dividing both sides by 
𝑃(𝐸1)
𝑃(𝐸2)
: 
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(20) 
𝑃(𝐸1⁡|⁡𝐻1)𝑃(𝐸2)
𝑃(𝐸2⁡|⁡𝐻2)𝑃(𝐸1)
> 1 
 
 Recalling (16), which was derived from (1) and (2): 
 
(16) 
𝑃(𝐸1⁡|⁡𝐻1)𝑃(𝐸2)
𝑃(𝐸2⁡|⁡𝐻2)𝑃(𝐸1)
=
𝑃(𝐻2)
𝑃(𝐻1)
 
 
 From (16) and (20): 
 
(21) 
𝑃(𝐻2)
𝑃(𝐻1)
> 1 
 
(22) 𝑃(𝐻2) > 𝑃(𝐻1) 
 
 Thus, (1) and (2) are consistent with P(H2) > P(H1) as well as P(H1) > P(H2) and 
P(H1) = P(H2). 
 
 Proofs 1 to 3 are purely algebraic. It might help if I give a specific numerical example 
of a distribution in which, despite (1) and (2), H1 and H2 are equiprobable. 
 
Proof 4 
 
Claim: In the particular probability distribution that I discuss below, P(H1) = P(H2) despite 
the fact that (1) and (2) are also true in this distribution.  
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 It is consistent with (1), (2), and Bayes’s Theorem that: 
 
(23) 𝑃(𝐻1⁡|⁡𝐸1) = 𝑃(𝐻2⁡|𝐸2) = ⁡0.3⁡ 
        
 (2) implies that P(E1) > P(E2) and (23) implies that P(E1) and P(E2) are both greater 
than zero, but they do not provide any further constraints on their values. It is consistent with 
(1), (2), and (23) that: 
 
(24) 𝑃(𝐸1) = 0.6 
 
(25) 𝑃(𝐸2) = 0.5 
 
 Assume that (12) is true in this distribution, so that: 
 
(12) 
𝑃(𝐸1⁡|⁡𝐻1)
𝑃(𝐸2⁡|⁡𝐻2)
=
𝑃(𝐸1)
𝑃(𝐸2)
 
 
 (24) and (25) can be combined with (12) to calculate the quotient of the likelihoods: 
 
(26) 
𝑃(𝐸1⁡|⁡𝐻1)
𝑃(𝐸2⁡|⁡𝐻2)
=
𝑃(𝐸1)
𝑃(𝐸2)
=
0.6
0.5
= 1.2 
 
 The likelihoods are still otherwise unconstrained. Additionally, their quotient does not 
imply their individual values. It is consistent with (26), as well as (1) and (2), that: 
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(27) 
𝑃(𝐸1⁡|⁡𝐻1)
𝑃(𝐸2⁡|⁡𝐻2)
=
0.9
0.75
=
𝑃(𝐸1)
𝑃(𝐸2)
=
0.6
0.5
= 1.2 
 
  It is now possible to derive P(H1) and P(H2). Substituting the values from (27) into 
(23): 
 
(28) 
0.9𝑃(𝐻1)
0.6
=
0.75𝑃(𝐻2)
0.5
= 0.3 
 
 I shall first derive P(H1) from (28): 
 
(29) 
0.9
0.6
𝑃(𝐻1) = 0.3 
 
(30) 0.9𝑃(𝐻1) = 0.18 
 
(31) 𝑃(𝐻1) = 0.2 
 
 Secondly, by the same reasoning, I shall derive P(H2) from (28): 
 
(32) 
0.75
0.5
𝑃(𝐻2) = 0.3 
 
(33) 0.75𝑃(𝐻2) = 0.15 
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(34) 𝑃(𝐻2) = 0.2 
 
 From (31) and (34): 
 
(35) 𝑃(𝐻1) = 𝑃(𝐻2) = 0.2 
 
 Proofs 2 and 4 imply that a difference in the reliability of two hypotheses’ evidence 
(defined as a difference in marginal probabilities) is consistent with the underdetermination 
of those hypotheses within a probability distribution that conforms to the probability calculus. 
Such an underdetermination poses a sceptical problem, because (1) and (2) do not set any 
constraints on P(H1 | H2) and P(H2 | H1). Since the hypotheses’ probabilistic relations are 
unconstrained by the initial assumptions, it is possible that these hypotheses are logically 
inconsistent. Consequently, the underdetermination of contraries with (1) equal conditional 
probabilities and (2) asymmetrically probable total evidence is possible in a coherent 
probability distribution. 
 
  However, a formalist can avoid this possibility once she incorporates the reliability of 
the evidence into her confirmation theory. Suppose that the green H1 and grue hypotheses H2 
are contrary hypotheses, such that: 
 
(a) P(H1) = P(H2). 
 
(b) The total evidence in favour of the green hypothesis is more reliable than the total 
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evidence in favour of the grue hypothesis. 
 
  The formalist can use a definition of comparative support in which the reliabilities of 
the hypotheses’ evidence can function as a tiebreaker. Thus, there will be no 
underdetermination. By considering the reliabilities of the evidence as well as the differences 
in conditional probability, the formalist can avoid this version of the NRI. 
 
 Furthermore, as noted earlier this development of formalist theories is desirable for 
independent reasons. Scientists ideally want both (i) that their hypotheses are strongly 
confirmed by their total evidence and (ii) that their total evidence is reliable. Just as we want 
our houses to be both strongly connected to their foundations and based on solid foundations, 
so we ideally want our scientific hypotheses to be both well-connected to the evidence and 
based on solid evidence. If one regards this simile as objectionably foundationalist, then I can 
make the same point using Otto Neurath’s raft metaphor271. Just as we want the parts of the 
raft to be strongly connected and individually sturdy, so we ideally want our scientific 
hypotheses and evidence to be strongly confirmed and individually reliable.  
 
 Even in a scenario in which the grue and green hypotheses are equally probable given 
the total evidence, one can answer the NRI using a purely formal confirmation theory. For 
formalists, this strategy offers a strong incentive to consider the reliability of the evidence, as 
well as conditional probabilities, in their theories of evidential support. 
 
3.5 Generalisation 
 
                                                          
271 Neurath (1973) p. 199. 
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 Throughout my discussion of the NRI, I have mostly followed Goodman’s own 
choice of predicates for his Riddle: ‘emerald’, ‘green’, ‘grue’, and ‘observed prior to t’. 
However, the NRI can be adapted using a wide variety of different predicates. Goodman 
could have used a spatial predicate such as ‘observed within the known universe’ rather than 
‘observed prior to t’ and still generated the essence of his paradox. Furthermore, the use of 
two colour-predicates rather than one is inessential: Goodman could have used ‘not-green’, 
so that ‘grue’ means ‘green and first observed before t or non-green and not first observed 
before t’. This definition would also be somewhat simpler, since we would not need to use 
the potentially controversial claim that we know a priori that it is impossible for an object to 
be monochromatically green and monochromatically blue. 
 
 The general recipe for a Goodmanian predicate is: 
 
Key 
 
F: Some uncontroversially genuine and unproblematic predicate. 
A: Some auxiliary predicate that is known to be satisfied by all observed instances of F. 
 
D9: x is GP  ↔ ((Ax ^ Fx) v (¬Ax ^ ¬Fx)) 
 
 For example, all observed emeralds weigh less than 400 kg. Plausibly, somewhere in 
the universe, there is an emerald that weighs more than 400 kg. Using the above formulas for 
constructing Goodmanian predicates, one could define ‘GP1’ as: 
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D10: x is GP1 ↔ (1) x weighs more than 400 kg in diameter and green or (2) x weighs more 
than 400 kg and x is not green. 
 
 Such variations do not pose a problem for my answer. In NRI scenarios, the predicate 
A is always some additional predicate we have separately inferred about each known x. Our 
knowledge that the instances in the Riddle satisfy A is combined with our knowledge that 
they satisfy F, in order to infer that they are GP. Thus, when some Goodmanian and non-
Goodmanian hypotheses are equally probable given the evidence, we can typically appeal to 
the asymmetry of reliability. Similarly, we can typically appeal to the asymmetry in 
reliability of the evidence for equiprobable Goodmanian and non-Goodmanian hypotheses to 
avoid underdetermination versions of the NRI. 
 
 In the example of GP1 it is possible that we have somehow incorrectly measure the 
weight of some emeralds (the largest observed emerald is approximately 380 kg) such that 
they are green but also over 400 kg. Of course, it is extremely likely that all observed 
emeralds are grue (in the D10 sense) but it is still slightly less likely than that they are green. 
 
 To give another example of a Goodmanian predicate that does not use a temporal 
predicate: 
 
D11: x is GP2 ↔ (1) x dissolves in water under laboratory conditions and x is within the 
known universe or (2) x does not dissolve in water under laboratory conditions and x is not 
within the known universe. 
 
299 Formalism, Reliability, and the New Riddle of Induction 
 
 
 All of our observed samples of sodium are GP2. Even if we assume a body of 
background knowledge that equally confirms: 
 
H: All sodium dissolves in water under laboratory conditions. 
 
H´: All sodium is GP2. 
 
- using my strategy to answering the NRI, we could still reasonably predict that if there is 
sodium outside of our region of the cosmos, then it would also dissolve in water under 
laboratory conditions, because the evidence for H is more reliable than the evidence for H´. 
The difference might be very slight, but it is still enough to rank H as the better-supported 
hypothesis. 
 
 I shall now give a scenario in which the ascription of the additional predicate A to our 
samples is more obviously corrigible than the above example. (This example is not intended 
to be strongly analogous with the sort of scenario that Goodman discusses: for instance, in 
Goodman’s original NRI scenario, he is assuming that our total evidence solely consists of 
observation reports of green emeralds, whereas I am not assuming such austere total evidence 
in this scenario.) I shall define a ‘geodesic’ as: 
 
D12: x follows a ‘geodesic’ path ↔ (1) x moves along a Euclidean straight line and x is in a 
Euclidean space or (2) x does not move along a straight line and x is not in a Euclidean space. 
 
 Imagine that we are confident that all observed moving objects will travel along a 
Euclidean straight line in the absence of an external force. Thus, they conform to Newton’s 
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First Law, as he presumably intended it. However, imagine that we believe that we exist in a 
Euclidean space, but we are less confident about this conjecture than we are that all objects 
conform to Newton’s First Law. We consider the two hypotheses: 
 
S: In the absence of an external force, all objects move along a Euclidean straight line. 
 
G: In the absence of an external force, all objects move along geodesics. 
 
  Hypotheses S and G, when conjoined with the auxiliary hypothesis that an object a is 
travelling in a non-Euclidean space, make contrary predictions about the paths that a will take 
in the absence of an external force. Relative to our evidence in this hypothetical scenario, my 
answer to the NRI entails that the prediction that a will follow a Euclidean straight line in the 
absence of an external force is better supported than the prediction that a will not travel along 
such a path, because the evidence for S is more reliable. 
 
 One interesting aspect of this scenario is that my strategy could lead to a false 
prediction, according to modern physics. While the overall geometry of the total universe is 
still a subject of ongoing debate (a Euclidean “flat” universe is one of many possibilities) the 
local geometry of the universe is non-Euclidean, given Einstein’s General Theory of 
Relativity. Thus, S is better supported than G by our actual total relevant evidence. However, 
this total evidence is far greater than the simple generalisation that objects would travel along 
Euclidean straight lines in the absence of external forces. Of course, this possibility is not 
surprising: philosophers of science have long agreed that even the best-supported scientific 
hypothesis can be false. As Joseph Butler noted, it is probability, not certainty, which must be 
301 Formalism, Reliability, and the New Riddle of Induction 
 
 
“the very guide of life”272. 
 
 Finally, one might wonder about the significance of this answer to the NRI for 
practicing scientists, as gruesome hypotheses are very far from their consideration. For my 
purposes, this answer to the NRI is important because it answers a philosophical objection to 
formalist approaches to confirmation theory and thus helps legitimate the adoption of such 
theories, but that response simply raises a further query: what use are formalist theories of 
evidence for practicing scientists? There are many answers to this question, but I shall focus 
on three points. 
 
 Firstly, in some cases, a formalist theory can answer some debates about evidence that 
can result from philosophical controversies about evidence, without requiring that the 
scientist adopt logically contingent a priori claims. For instance, a scientist might think that it 
is impossible that quantum mechanics could be false, given our evidence that there are many 
well-functioning technologies that were designed using quantum mechanics; another scientist 
might disagree. One might think that the issue ultimately is one of metaphysical 
presuppositions: perhaps the first scientist is presupposing the uniformity of nature, while the 
other is not. Some philosophers have argued that such questions about evidential import are 
fundamentally metaphysical: Arthur W. Burks developed a “Presuppositional Theory of 
Induction” on these grounds273. More broadly, one might think that the adoption of one set of 
prior probabilities that are favourable towards some predicates rather than another is a choice 
of metaphysics. Thus, the first scientist might claim that she is entitled to her metaphysics 
                                                          
272 Butler (1736) p. iv. 
 
273 Burks (1953). 
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and therefore to believing that the technologies’ success proves the truth of quantum 
mechanics. The formalist offers a different view: such a dispute is ultimately a formal 
dispute, and its resolution depends solely on the formal relations between the total evidence 
and quantum mechanics. A more systematic controversy along these lines is the debate in 
statistics over the use of Bayesian methods or classical methods. Such disputes frequently 
raise what are philosophical issues about evidence: what role do prior probabilities have to 
play in statistics? Should one reject a hypothesis that is logically consistent with the 
evidence? If one adopts a pluralistic and contextually-dependent attitude towards the choice 
of statistical methodology, then how does one choose which method to use and when? 
Kyburg took an interest in these questions; in fact, Evidential Probability was partly designed 
to help resolve such controversies274. Essentially, his answer is that Bayesian methods should 
be used in areas where we have rich statistical background knowledge that either provides 
precise knowledge of frequencies or enables the use of approximation techniques to generate 
such precision (so that Sharpening by Richness plays the central role in updating) but 
classical methods should be used when such rich statistical background knowledge is not 
available275. As a result, an Evidential Probabilist would tend to be favourable towards the 
use of Bayesian methods in many areas of sciences such as solid-state physics, where we can 
use probability distributions that are empirically-based, but be very suspicious of their use in 
areas like the social sciences, where precise probability distributions would require 
speculating far beyond the available evidence. Consequently, for practicing scientists who are 
averse to grounding scientific methodology on contingent a priori claims, formalism offers 
an alternative route to the resolution of such disputes. 
 
                                                          
274 Kyburg (1974) Chapter VI. 
 
275 Kyburg and Teng (2001) p. 263-265. 
303 Formalism, Reliability, and the New Riddle of Induction 
 
 
 Secondly, formalist theories can offer relatively neutral (in the sense of minimizing a 
priori presuppositions) answers to important methodological questions in science. The crucial 
element in having a formalist answer to such questions is that it reduces the role of 
presuppositions: formalists will tend to agree with the somewhat widespread view (held by 
more than a few scientists but one that is anathema to some academic philosophers) that the 
scientific method is about reasoning logically from the evidence; it does not depend leaps of 
faith or a priori intuitions about the structure of the universe. For many scientists, there is 
something special about science in contrast to other sources of beliefs about the world, and 
the perspective that I have briefly characterised is one way of cashing-out this ‘specialness’. 
Therefore, while the NRI does not seem to be directly relevant to the practice of scientists, it 
is indirectly relevant to the defence of a certain theory of the scientific method that guides 
and motivates many scientists. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 I have argued that the NRI does not present a direct problem for Hempel’s theory. 
There are major problems with Hempel’s theory (such as its very limited scope of 
application) but these are logically independent of the NRI. Additionally, I have proposed 
and illustrated a very generally applicable strategy that formalists can use to answer the NRI, 
which is that formalists can incorporate the reliability of evidence as well as confirmation 
into their model of evidential support. I have not ruled out the possibility of finding a 
predicate that presents serious problems for formalism. It might be possible to formulate a 
predicate that (1) can be used to construct a severe NRI-type problem and that (2) the 
formalist cannot handle using my answer to the NRI (or via any other strategy) but this would 
not be Goodman’s Riddle. It is the NRI and its simple variations that are supposed to be fatal 
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for formalism, and those are the Riddles that I have sought to answer. The burden of proof 
rests on the anti-formalist to present such a New New Riddle of Induction; the Old New 
Riddle of Induction is answerable by a formalist. 
 
 For my thesis in toto, there are two main lessons. Firstly, the principal objection to 
purely formal confirmation theories, like Evidential Probability, does not hit its mark. There 
might be other reasons to reject formalism, but the NRI is not such a reason. Secondly, when 
faced with underdetermination problems like the NRI, it can sometimes be advantageous to 
attend to other aspects of evidential support, such as the reliability of the evidence. I have not 
provided a detailed discussion of the alternative methods for formalising reliability of 
evidence. However, I have provided an additional reason for formalists to undertake the 
project of incorporating this aspect of scientific reasoning into their theories of evidential 
support. 
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CHAPTER 5: PROBABILITY AND BALANCE OF 
EVIDENCE 
 
 
 In the preceding chapters, I have applied Evidential Probability to several problems in 
confirmation theory and decision theory. In this chapter, I shall apply this approach to 
analysing the balance of evidence, which has been the traditional focus of confirmation 
theory. In particular, I shall argue that supporters of probabilistic analyses of the balance of 
evidence can address some of Norton’s criticisms of such analyses of inductive reasoning by 
adopting Evidential Probability as their epistemic probability theory. 
 
 In Section 1, I narrow the scope of my discussion by drawing some important 
distinctions. In Section 2, I provide an overview of Kyburg’s theory of inductive inference. In 
Section 3, I argue that this theory can respond to Norton’s criticisms. 
 
SECTION 1: AMPLIATIVE INFERENCE AND INDUCTIVE 
INFERENCE 
 
 
 Before discussing Kyburg’s analysis, I shall clarify the analysandum. There is an 
important distinction between (i) ampliative inference and (ii) inductive inference. As I shall 
use these terms, ‘ampliative inference’ refers to any non-deductively valid inference. One can 
model a deductively valid inference as a deductively valid argument in which the inferred 
proposition is the conclusion, while the implicit and explicit premises of the inference are the 
premises of the argument. In the sense that I am using the term, a ‘deductively valid 
306 Probability and the Balance of Evidence 
 
argument’ is one in which the premises are inconsistent with the negation of the conclusion. 
(There are many alternative ways of characterising deductive validity; in this chapter, I use a 
classical definition.) Aside from induction, there are many other types of ampliative 
inference, including abductive inference, analogical inference, and direct inferences276. I shall 
use ‘inductive inferences’ to mean inferences from observational evidence to logically 
contingent non-observational conclusions. For example, the inference from ‘All observed 
metals conduct electricity’ to ‘All metals conduct electricity’ is an inductive inference. 
Inductive arguments per se are invalid, although some inductive inferences can be modelled 
as deductive arguments, as I shall discuss later in this section. These definitions follow 
Peirce’s definition of ‘ampliative’277 and Stove’s definition of ‘induction’278. They are 
stipulative rather than descriptive definitions, because some philosophers take these two 
terms to be synonymous; for instance, Carnap defines ‘induction’ as “nondeductive” 
inference279. As I am using the terms, neither category fully includes the other. 
 
 There is also an important distinction between inductive inference and scientific 
inference. As Larry Laudan notes, many philosophers confuse these two categories by 
assuming that the scientific method in toto could be justified by the justification of induction 
alone, whereas it is consistent to think that (a) induction is a part of the scientific method and 
(b) induction is not the whole of science or the crux of science280. Instead of endorsing any 
                                                          
276 When the proportion cited in the direct inference is not 0% or 100%. When the proportion takes these values, 
a direct inference is a deductively valid categorical syllogism. 
 
277 Peirce (1932) 2.680. 
 
278 Stove (1982) p. 56. 
 
279 Carnap (1962) p. 580. 
 
280 Laudan (1981) p. 240-241. 
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precise thesis about the scope of induction in science, I shall simply assume that it is an 
interesting topic within confirmation theory. 
 
 A further useful distinction is between (1) those probabilists who believe that it is 
sometimes rationally permissible (or even obligatory) to accept a highly probable theory and 
(2) those probabilists who think that scientific theories can be assigned new probabilities in 
the light of inductive evidence, but never accepted as true, such that even very high 
probability is insufficient for the rational acceptance of a theory. There are not standard labels 
for (1) and (2), but I shall use ‘acceptance-theories’ for probabilist theories of type (1) and 
‘ascription-theories’ for probabilist theories of type (2). Henry Kyburg was an acceptance 
theorist281, whereas Carnap was an ascriptionist282. 
 
 Finally, there are some inductive arguments that have peculiar and interesting logical 
forms that distinguish them from other forms of induction. These are demonstrative 
inductions, which are inductive arguments whose conclusions are intended to be deductively 
implied by the total available evidence. For example: 
 
A1 
 
(1) All observed pure samples of the alkali metals dissolve in water.  
 
                                                          
281 Kyburg (1990) p. 60-61. 
 
282 Carnap (1968). p. 146. 
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Therefore, with deductive certainty, (C) All pure samples of alkali metals dissolve in water. 
 
 On the surface, A1 is a poor argument, because premise (1) does not imply (C), yet it 
is supposed to be deductively valid. The argument seems to overstate the support that the 
premise (1) provides to C. However, in good demonstrative inductions, there is at least one 
known implicit premise (what Stove calls a “validator”283) that results in a deductively valid 
argument when one makes it explicit: 
 
A2 
 
(1) All observed pure samples of the alkaline metals dissolve in water. 
 
(2) The alkaline metals are elements and if some pure samples of an element dissolve in 
water, then all pure samples of that element will dissolve in water. 
 
Therefore, (C) All pure samples of alkaline metals dissolve in water. 
 
 Demonstrative inductions are inferences from the observed to the unobserved, and 
thus they are ‘inductive’ in the sense I am using that term. However, demonstrative induction 
is distinct from standard inductive reasoning, because it does not have to be formalised as an 
ampliative argument: articulating the validator as well as the explicit premises creates a 
deductively valid argument. Ideally, a theory of induction should provide a thorough, 
intuitive, and useful analysis of both demonstrative and non-demonstrative inductions. 
                                                          
283 Stove (1982) p. 66. 
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SECTION 2: EVIDENTIAL PROBABILITY AND INDUCTION 
 
 I shall now outline Kyburg’s theory of induction. I shall begin by providing a 
description of the formal framework he uses. Using this framework, I shall propose a 
probabilistic definition of confirmation that is essentially very similar to the standard 
Bayesian definition. To close the section, I shall illustrate this definition via a discussion of 
some types of inductive inference. 
 
2.1 The Formal Framework 
 
 Kyburg’s formal framework is the application of a metalinguistic function EP to a 
domain Ω. A metalinguistic function takes sentences of a language as its domain. The 
function EP itself is not part of that language. The domain Ω is a body of statements, which 
are an idealized model of our actual total knowledge. Ω includes set theory and any other 
requisite mathematics for the analysis. Ω is weakly deductively closed, but not strongly 
deductively closed: 
 
Weak Deductive Closure: If a statement Φ is in Ω and Φ implies Ψ, then Ψ is in Ω. For 
example, if Ω contains ‘Ruthenium is a transitional metal and an element’, then Ω contains 
‘Ruthenium is a transitional metal’. 
 
Strong Deductive Closure: If Ω  contains a finite conjunction of statements Γ and Γ implies 
χ, then Ω contains χ. For example, if Ω contains ‘Ruthenium is a transitional metal’ and 
‘Ruthenium is an element’, then Ω contains ‘Ruthenium is a transitional metal and an 
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element’. 
 
 Strong deductive closure implies weak deductive closure, but not vice versa. Both 
requirements are unattainable ideals, given our cognitive limitations: no person has explicitly 
derived all the deductive consequences of every statement in which she believes. However, 
for each form of closure, there are some philosophers who argue that it captures part of how 
an ideally rational being would reason, as well as providing some important guidance to 
imperfect reasoners like ourselves. 
 
 There are several reasons why one might require weak deductive closure rather than 
strong deductive closure. Kyburg’s primary motivation for endorsing weak closure but not 
strong closure was his Lottery Paradox284. Suppose that there is a fair lottery of 100 tickets in 
which you will make a random selection. Your best statistical information about whether a 
particular ticket will be selected is that the ticket will be randomly selected from the 100 
tickets. It is assumed that your acceptance standard is such that you will accept any statement 
H such that EP(H | K) = [x, 1] and x ≥ 0.9285. 
 
 The evidential probability that the ticket i will not be selected is [0.99, 0.99] and so 
you must accept that i will not be selected. Since the draw is random, the probability that any 
other ticket is selected is equal to the probability for i and thus there is a [0.99, 0.99] 
probability that any given ticket will be selected, so you must accept that each ticket will not 
                                                          
284 Kyburg (1990) p. 64-66. 
 
285 The value of x is constrained using ‘≥’ rather than ‘=’ in order to allow acceptance when x is greater than the 
minimum standard. 
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be selected. This information is incorporated into Ω. If Ω is strongly deductively closed, then 
you must conjoin all these individual statements regarding each ticket. However, this 
conjunction implies that none of the tickets will be selected. Yet this is absurd: you know that 
you will select one of the tickets; you just know that any particular ticket is very unlikely to 
be selected. In contrast, if Ω is merely weakly closed, then Ω can contain ‘Ticket i will not be 
selected’, for each ticket i, but nevertheless Ω does not include the claim that no ticket will be 
selected and a contradiction is avoided. 
 
 It is important for Kyburg’s paradox that you only know that ticket i is a randomly 
selected lottery ticket. Suppose that w is a name whose reference is identified via the definite 
description ‘The winning ticket’. The statement ‘The ticket w will be selected’ has an 
evidential probability of [1, 1], because if a ticket is selected, then it will be w, and your 
background knowledge implies that a ticket will be selected. Kyburg aims to develop a 
formal framework in which a body of statements can include both ‘Ticket w will be selected’ 
and ‘Ticket i will not be selected’, for any given numerical value of i, while also avoiding any 
explicit contradictions. 
 
 The Lottery Paradox is not simply a paradox of gambling, because there are similar 
problems with mensuration. (Mensuration is the process of measurement.) Imagine a group of 
scientists at Chernobyl, who know that each of a very large set of measurements using their 
Geiger counter is probably within the standard margin of error ε for that instrument. They 
also believe that at least one measurement had an error outside of ε, because there will almost 
certainly be such errors in a very large set of measurements. If the scientists accept both 
claims into Ω, then they would believe the contradictory claims that ‘All of the measurements 
were accurate within ε’ and ‘At least one of the measurements was not accurate within ε’. 
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Requiring only weak deductive closure allows the scientists to believe that each particular 
measurement was within ε, but not that all of them were. 
 
 Another reason for rejecting strong deductive closure is that it creates problems when 
discussing sets of mutually inconsistent scientific theories. Kyburg does not discuss this 
motivation, but it is an added benefit of his model of scientific knowledge. Assume that the 
Standard Model of Particle Physics and the Standard Model of Cosmology are inconsistent. A 
formal analysis of a model of scientific knowledge that contained both models could be 
interesting, but if the conjunction of these models is contradictory and we are using classical 
logic, then there will be problems due to logical explosion. In Kyburg’s framework, Ω will 
contain the consequences of a conjunction (Φ ^ Ψ) only if either (1) it is learned directly or 
(2) it is acceptable given the evidence. If (Φ ^ Ψ) is a contradiction, then it cannot be learned 
directly, nor can it be highly probable given Ω, and thus neither condition (1) nor condition 
(2) can be satisfied. Therefore, even if the domain Ω contains both Φ and Ψ, the domain will 
not contain (Φ ^ Ψ), so that Kyburg’s framework enables us to apply the EP function to a 
domain Ω that includes mutually inconsistent scientific theories. 
 
 There are some statements in Ω which are our most certain evidence. Kyburg calls 
such statements the “Ur-Corpus”. Other statements can be acceptable as evidence if they are 
sufficiently probable relative to the Ur-Corpus. He calls these statements the “Evidential 
Corpus”. Finally, some statements are acceptably probable relative to the Evidential Corpus. 
This last category are the “Practical Certainties”. I shall not discuss, in this section, Kyburg’s 
views on which statements should be included in the different corpora, because such a 
discussion would raise questions of general epistemology, not confirmation theory or 
decision theory, which are my focus in this thesis. However, it is significant that Evidential 
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Probability is consistent with a multiplicity of different theories of evidence. As in 
Bayesianism, the acquisition of evidence that can be included in Ω is an exogenous matter 
and different Evidential Probabilists can have different views on such questions. 
 
 I shall use the following definition of ‘inductive argument’: 
 
Inductive Argument: An argument Ai is inductive if and only if it is a formalisation of an 
inductive inference such that the explicitly cited premises in Ai are known via observation. 
 
 Finally, one can measure the strength of such an argument by determining the 
evidential probability of the conclusion relative to the premises and any other relevant 
statements in Ω286. 
 
2.2 Confirmation 
 
 One theme of my thesis is that there are many important aspects of scientific 
reasoning that should be formalised when modelling confirmation. In this chapter, I am 
interested in the balance of evidence. To simplify, in this chapter I shall use ‘confirmation’ to 
mean a positive change in the balance of evidence, as opposed to a broader notion of 
evidential support. The standard Bayesian definition of this sense of confirmation is very 
straightforward: 
 
Bayesian Definition of Confirmation: E confirms H if and only if P(H | E) > P(H). 
                                                          
286 Kyburg (1990) p. 69. 
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- and disconfirmation occurs when P(H | E) < P(H). 
 
Kyburg never offered an explicit definition like this, but the Bayesian definition can 
be adapted into the Evidential Probabilist framework. I shall analyse confirmation as a three-
place relation between a hypothesis H, an evidence-statement E, and the relevant background 
knowledge K: 
 
Evidential Probabilist Definition of Confirmation: E confirms H relative to K if and only 
if EP(H | E ^ K) = [x, y], EP(H | K) =[z, w], and 1/2(x + y) > 1/2(z + w). 
 
- and disconfirmation will occur when 1/2(x + y) < 1/2(z + w)287. 
 
 Clearly, the Evidential Probabilist definition of confirmation is very similar to the 
Bayesian definition. The salient differences are (a) Kyburg allows the acceptance of 
hypotheses and (b) the probabilities are interval-valued. I shall not discuss (a) and the 
surrounding controversies about acceptance theories of induction versus ascription theories. 
Although (b) shall be important for much of the discussion below, it does not significantly 
affect the basic definition of confirmation, since using the mean of an interval’s limits 
provides a number that is formally very similar to precise probabilities288. 
                                                          
287 The use of 1/2(x + y) for converting an imprecise probability into a single number was proposed by Walley 
(1991) p. 522. 
 
288 There are some differences, e.g. there can be a change in the evidential probability without a change in the 
mean of the interval. For example, 1/2[0.2, 0.4] is identical to 1/2[0.23, 0.27]. 
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2.3 Statistical Induction 
 
 In his theory of induction, Kyburg’s primary focus is statistical induction. An 
induction is a “statistical induction” in his theory if H is a hypothesis about a population, E is 
a sample-report about that population, and K is the relevant background knowledge. 
 
 On Kyburg’s analysis, learning E confirms H relative to K when it is probable that E 
describes a representative sample of the population described by H289. Like Bayesians, 
Evidential Probabilists do not require that this sample is randomly selected. Instead, what 
matters is whether it is probable (relative to K) that the sample is representative. Furthermore, 
the uniformity of nature as a whole is not important for a particular statistical inductive 
inference: what matters in Kyburg’s theory is the probability that this particular sample is 
representative of the particular population under investigation. Methodologically, Kyburg’s 
analysis of statistical induction directs our attention to examining issues of probable 
representativeness given our total evidence, in contrast to a fundamental focus on 
randomization or postulates about uniformity.  
 
 Background knowledge plays an important role: what we know about the parameters 
of the population can affect the evidential probability of the hypothesis given the sample-
report. For example, if K includes the claim that the population is approximately normally 
                                                          
289 We can define ‘representative sample’ for different contexts using margins of error. For example, in political 
opinion polling, psephologists (statisticians who study voting patterns) generally aim for margins of error of 
about 3% at a confidence of level of 95%, so that at least 95% of samples with this size will match the actual 
population frequency within ± 3%. (The precise margin of error increases as the sample mean for a party 
becomes further from 50%.) In other contexts, we might be willing to use much wider or narrower margins of 
error. The evidential probabilities will vary (ceteris paribus) in proportion to the width of the margins of error: 
the larger margin of error, the more probable the statistical generalization will be given the evidence, because 
there will be a greater proportion of possible samples with means within this margin of error of the population 
mean. (Additional issues are raised when the population in a statistical induction is infinite, but I shall not 
discuss them here.) 
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distributed, then someone who accepts K can use E for parametric statistical tests about H. 
(Parametric tests require some information about the parameters of the population like its 
distribution; non-parametric tests can be used even if this information is unavailable.) For 
example, suppose that we know that the weighting of a sample is such that the sample is 
probably representative, in the sense that (1) it will produce results within a margin of error 
of ± 3% in at least 95% of a long-run series of trials and (2) this long-run tendency is our best 
statistical information regarding the representativeness of the sample. We assume that the 
population is normally distributed. Under these assumptions, the evidential probability of a 
claim like ‘30% ± 3% of voters intend to vote Labour at the next UK general election’ would 
be EP(H | E ^ K) = [0.95, 1]. 
 
 There is a clear similarity between this approach and confidence interval methods. 
Indeed, the choice of 95% corresponds to the standard choice of a confidence level in 
classical statistics. If 1/2[0.95 + 1] = 0.975 > 1/2(z + w), where w and z are the limits of the 
interval EP(H | K), then learning E has confirmed H relative to K by statistical induction. 
 
 In contrast, if K includes reasons to believe that the sample described in E is probably 
not a representative sample, then E might not confirm H relative to K, because EP(H | E ^ K) 
= EP(H | K). For instance, K could include the information that a bitter employee has selected 
the sample from a larger and unknown sample and that the employee intends to mislead the 
company. Thus, we know that the sample is probably unrepresentative and E does not 
confirm H relative to K. 
 
 Under some circumstances and for a fixed margin of error, the probability of 
representativeness will increase in a linear fashion as the sample size increases, but there is 
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no simple universal relationship between sample size and the probability that the sample is 
representative. (Except for trivial facts, like that the sample must have more than zero 
members and that a sample size that is equal to the population size will always be 
representative.) Relative to some background knowledge, a small sample might be more 
probably representative than a large sample. For example, we might know that the large 
sample will contain a large and unspecified number of voters who have been selected from a 
highly unrepresentative region of the country, so that the sample mean of the large sample is 
comparatively less likely to be representative of the population mean. More generally, there 
is no mechanical relationship in Evidential Probability between sample size and probability; 
the data from both E and K are important. Scientists can sometimes use small samples for 
powerful statistical inductions, as in well-controlled laboratory experiments. Relative to some 
background knowledge, one can infer (within a margin of error) the acidity of all pure 
instances of a new compound from a few tests of its acidity. Consequently, in Kyburg’s 
theory of statistical induction, it is the probability that a sample is representative that is 
always the salient issue, and sample size (such as whether the selection procedure was 
random) is only important insofar as it is relevant to representativeness. 
 
2.4 Eduction 
 
 Eduction is a form of induction with the following pattern: 
 
(1) A particular set of individuals a1-an are F in some proportion p. 
 
Therefore, probably, (C) An individual an+1 is F. 
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 Imagine that an alien is eating some green apples for the first time. The labels a1-an 
refer to each of the green apples that the alien tastes. Suppose that the alien’s taste buds are 
very similar to human taste buds and she experiences a sour taste for each of the apples. The 
alien eductively infers that the an+1 apple will also be sour. I take the term ‘eduction’ from W. 
E. Johnson290. Other names for this form of inference are “singular predictive induction”291 or 
“instantial induction”292. Some philosophers of science, like Rudolf Carnap293 and John 
Stuart Mill294, have regarded this form of induction as particularly important. 
 
 Kyburg models eduction as two separate inferences, in contrast to Carnap and Mill 
who model it as a single inference295. Firstly, there is the statistical inference from (1) the 
conjunction that (Fa1 ^ Fa2 ^ … ^ Fan), which I shall abbreviate to E, to (2) a statistical 
generalisation H about a population, whose members are a1-an and an+1, where H states that 
this population’s proportion of F matches the proportion in E. If the evidential probability of 
H given E and the background knowledge is greater than the acceptance threshold, then she 
can accept H into K. 
 
 Secondly, there is the direct inference from (H ^ K) to Fan+1. Assume that the 
evidential probability of this direct inference is EP(Fan+1 | H ^ K) = [0.99, 1]. Provided that 
the mean, 0.995, exceeds the mean for Fan+1 relative to K alone, learning that E has 
confirmed the prediction Fan+1 via the indirect route of H. When 0.99 exceeds the agent’s 
                                                          
290 Johnson (1924) Chapter IV. 
 
291 Carnap (1962) p. 569. 
 
292 Kyburg (1990) p. 59. 
 
293 Carnap (1962) p. 574-575. 
 
294 Mill (1882) p. 142. 
 
295 Kyburg (1990) p. 68-69. 
319 Confirmation, Decision, and Evidential Probability 
 
 
acceptance threshold, then the agent must add Fan+1 to the corpus of Practical Certainties. 
 
 Background knowledge can bar either inferential step in eduction. The statistical 
induction might be blocked due to concerns about the sample’s representativeness, as I have 
already discussed in Subsection 2.3. The direct inference could also be blocked because the 
population described in H is not the proper reference class for the probability of Fan+1. In the 
apple example, the alien might know that the apple an+1 has been injected with a substance 
that will give it a sweet flavour, such that she should use a statistical generalisation about 
sweetness in the reference class of injected green apples. 
 
 A more complex example can be taken from psephology (the study of voting patterns) 
in order to illustrate the subtle manner in which background knowledge of relative 
frequencies can affect inductive inference. Imagine that we are campaigners in a political 
party and we are wondering whether to send our literature to Ms. Smith. We have two recent 
opinion polls: one poll for voters in Great Britain as a whole and another poll for the voting 
intentions of voters in Scotland296. From these polls, we inferred statistical generalisations for 
Great British voters and Scottish voters. Suppose that part of our decision regarding whether 
we should send her campaign literature depends on whether we expect Ms. Smith to vote for 
the Scottish National Party (SNP). From our statistical database, we know that Ms. Smith is 
eligible to vote in the next UK general election. If we use the information from the Great 
Britain poll, then the probability that she will vote SNP might be a very low value, like [0.03, 
0.04]. However, if we know that Ms. Smith lives in Scotland, then Evidential Probability 
means that we should use the Scottish poll, for which the probability of her intending to vote 
                                                          
296 Usually, psephologists in the UK only study Great Britain (England, Scotland, and Wales) and exclude 
Northern Ireland due to the extreme differences in voting patterns. 
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SNP might be something like [0.36, 0.38]. 
 
 Summarising, Kyburg models eduction as two inferences rather than one. It can be 
blocked due to problems with either inference: (1) relative to K, the sample cannot be used 
for the statistical induction and/or (2) relative to K, the population consisting of the sample 
and the individual under inquiry does not provide the appropriate reference class for the 
direct inference. 
 
2.5 Eliminative Induction 
 
 Kyburg does not provide an extensive account of eliminative induction. However, he 
regards it as appropriate in contexts of relatively rich background knowledge297. A strong 
version of eliminative induction occurs when K contains the knowledge that one of a finite 
partition of hypotheses (H1 v … v Hn) is true, while E implies that all of the hypotheses other 
than H1 are false. If (E ^ K) is acceptable, then learning E implies that H1 is true. For 
instance, if Miss Marple accepts the conjunction of clues that (1) one member of a set of 
suspects committed the murder and (2) all the suspects except the Under Secretary have an 
acceptable alibi, then she can deduce that the suspect without an acceptable alibi committed 
the murder. 
 
 A weaker version of eliminative induction can occur when there is a known Bayesian-
style joint distribution for the partition of hypotheses. Under such circumstances, learning 
that one particular hypothesis is false will lead to the reallocation of the probability among 
the surviving hypotheses. For example, imagine that I have randomly drawn a card from a 
                                                          
297 Kyburg (1980) p. 628. 
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normal deck behind a screen. Initially, the probability that the card is a particular type i is 
1/52, but if you accept my claim that the card is not the Ace of Diamonds, then the 
probabilities for every other type i will increase to 1/51. 
 
 This theory of eliminative induction is similar to Bayesian analyses. One difference is 
that Bayesians typically require strong deductive closure, whereas Evidential Probabilists do 
not. For Kyburg, there is an important question of the acceptability of the conjunction of the 
claims that (1) (H1 v … v Hn) is a finite partition and (2) some number x of the members of 
this partition are false. If the conjunction of (1) and (2) is insufficiently probable relative to 
the Ur-Corpus, then it cannot be accepted as evidence (i.e. into the Evidential Corpus) and 
thus the probability might be unchanged after learning (2). 
 
2.6 Demonstrative Induction 
 
 Kyburg also discusses demonstrative induction298. In some cases, K might include the 
claim that a sample is representative of a population, such that the conjunction of our 
evidence E with K might deductively imply a hypothesis H about that population. If (E ^ K) 
is acceptable, then H will also be acceptable. For instance, if we know that the melting point 
of an element A is a physical constant and that a single sample of A has a melting point of r ± 
ε, then we can infer that the melting point of the element A is r ± ε. I shall discuss this form 
of induction in more depth in Subsection 3.3. 
 
                                                          
298 Kyburg (1976). 
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Summary 
 
 In Kyburg’s theory of induction, the interaction of evidence and background 
knowledge is crucial. Additionally, the use of probability enables a quantitative analysis: an 
Evidential Probabilist is not limited to qualitative claims like ‘E confirms H relative to K’, 
but she can also say that ‘H has a probability of [x, y] relative to E and K’. In contrast to 
Bayesianism, there is no prior distribution: all the probabilities are ultimately derived from 
information about relative frequencies. Indeed, perhaps Kyburg’s most interesting 
contribution to the theory of induction is an epistemic theory of probability that can analyse 
inductive reasoning and which involves no prior probabilities. The absence of a prior 
distribution will be crucial to many of my arguments in the next section. 
 
SECTION 3: NORTON’S CRITICISMS OF PROBABILISTIC 
THEORIES OF INDUCTION 
 
 
 Norton makes several criticisms of Bayesianism, which is currently the predominant 
probabilistic theory of induction. I shall argue that Evidential Probability enables a 
probabilist to avoid the criticisms he develops for Bayesian theories of induction. I shall also 
argue that a general problem that he raises for what he calls “formal” theories of induction 
does not apply to an Evidential Probabilist theory. Finally, I shall explain how Evidential 
Probabilists can analyse a puzzle that Norton raises for all theories of induction. 
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3.1 Norton’s Criticisms of Bayesianism 
 
 Norton has been one of the most notable critics of probabilistic theories of induction 
in recent years. Since Bayesianism is the most common probabilistic theory of induction, it 
has been his principal target. In this section, I shall not take a position on whether his 
problems are insurmountable for Bayesianism. Instead, I shall merely argue that they are not 
problematic for an Evidential Probabilist. 
 
3.1.1 Bayesianism and Precision 
 
 Norton claims that Bayesianism involves “spurious precision”, in the sense that a 
Bayesian theory enables inductive reasoning that involves a level of exactitude that exceeds 
what the evidence can intuitively provide299. Kyburg makes a similar criticism of 
Bayesianism: he even uses an almost identical phrase, “implausible precision”, to describe 
many Bayesian probability statements300. He gives the example of the statement ‘A ball is 
purple’. For an agent who is a Subjectivist, Objectivist, or Logicist Bayesian, the prior 
probability of this statement might be 0.01. The conditional probability of ‘A ball is purple’ 
given ‘This other ball is purple’ might be 0.02. Intuitively, according to both Norton and 
Kyburg, the evidence does not warrant this degree of precision. 
 
 Naturally, Kyburg would disagree that this charge applies to his own system. As I 
explained in Chapter 1 Subsection 5.3, Evidential Probabilists regard the precision of 
Bayesian analyses of induction as appropriate only when there is sufficient relative frequency 
                                                          
299 Norton (2011) p. 402. 
 
300 Kyburg (1974) p. 282. 
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data. Thus, Kyburg’s examples of Bayesian reasoning in Evidential Probability tend to 
involve simple and well-understood gambling apparatuses301. In contexts like the evaluation 
of interesting hypotheses, he regards imprecise probabilities as better representations of the 
evidential relations. Thus, Evidential Probabilists agree with Norton that Bayesian 
probabilities can be inappropriately precise. In contrast to the Bayesian, the Evidential 
Probabilist restricts the precision of Bayesianism to circumstances where our statistical 
information is precise, and under such circumstances, such precision is not counterintuitive. 
 
 Of course, there is always some degree of idealization in formal epistemology, and 
the limits of an Evidential Probability interval will typically be precise. However, even 
idealized precision in Kyburg’s system cannot exceed the idealized precision of the evidence, 
because all intervals must be based on relative frequency data. Consequently, any precision in 
Evidential Probabilism does not appear to be spurious: if the intervals seem too precise, then 
one can always reduce the precision by weakening the relevant statistical evidence. For 
instance, if our initial evidence includes the claim that 49-51% of rabbits in the laboratory 
warren are female and the class of ‘rabbits in the laboratory warren’ is the appropriate 
reference class to determine the evidential probability that a particular rabbit from the warren 
will be female, yet [0.49, 0.51] seems an implausibly precise interval in this context, then we 
can reduce the precision by accepting only the weaker claim that a wider interval-valued 
proportion of rabbits in the warren are female, such as 48-52%, 38-62%, and so on. Even if 
any precision seems spurious, the maximally imprecise [0, 1] interval can be used, as 
discussed in Chapter 1 Subsection 5.3. By such adjustments, an Evidential Probabilist can 
always avoid any spurious precision via weakening the body of accepted evidence in context. 
Such adjustments do not make Evidential Probability an arbitrary system: they are 
                                                          
301 E.g. Kyburg and Teng (2001) p. 216-217. 
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appropriate only if we have incorrectly specified our relative frequency evidence in a 
particular context by accepting excessively precise statistical claims. Another option is to use 
inequalities like > 0.5 or < 1 as the limits of the intervals when this is the best representation 
of the available relative frequency data. 
 
3.1.2 Prior Probabilities 
 
Norton also directs a number of criticisms against Bayesian prior distributions. 
Opponents of Bayesianism have targeted this part of Bayesian epistemology since its earliest 
days: George Boole criticises the use of Bayes’s Theorem (except when the terms are based 
on known relative frequencies) in his critique of proto-Bayesians like Pierre-Simon Laplace 
and Augustus De Morgan302. Norton’s arguments are particularly interesting, because he 
develops this criticism beyond the mere charge of arbitrariness. Firstly, he criticises Bayesian 
priors for the “imaginary” nature of a complete prior distribution. Secondly, he notes the 
possibility that scientific theories will not always determine a real-valued prior probability for 
possible evidence, so that a Bayesian cannot always avoid his first objection in local contexts 
by deriving priors from accepted scientific theories. I shall describe each of Norton’s points 
in turn. 
 
 Firstly, Norton criticises what he calls the “curious” fact that, in Bayesianism, the 
evidential relations are determined by a prior probability distribution that is entirely 
imaginary, because no-one actually has a Bayesian prior probability distribution over all the 
                                                          
302 Boole, G. (1958) p. 286-292. 
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statements that they know303. Norton does not precisely state why this unreality is 
problematic, but I shall develop one challenge that it raises for a Bayesian. 
 
 As a preliminary, one must clarify what a “prior probability distribution” means in 
this context. I shall assume, initially, that Norton is interested in Subjective Bayesian priors. 
As described in Chapter 1 Subsection 2.1.3, Subjective Bayesians hold that epistemic 
probabilities are rational degrees of belief, where “rationality” is satisfied by satisfying the 
constraints of the axioms of additive probability and perhaps some further restrictions. For a 
Subjective Bayesian, the challenge that Norton presents is to justify the normative 
significance of rational Bayesian prior probability distributions for our actual inductive 
practices, on the assumption that we do not actually possess such prior distributions. 
 
 In conditionalization, when E does not entail or contradict H, the extent to which E 
confirms a hypothesis H will depend on an infinite number of unconditional probabilities. 
Conditioning H on E involves replacing P(H) by P(H | E) in the new distribution. Assuming 
that P(E) > 0, Bayes’s Theorem defines P(H | E) as: 
 
𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸) = ⁡
𝑃(𝐻⁡^⁡𝐸)
𝑃(𝐸)
=
𝑃(𝐸⁡|⁡𝐻)𝑃(𝐻)
𝑃(𝐸)
 
 
 P(H) is one term in the conditional probability. In turn, this term will depend on the 
complete probability distribution. For example, if (H, H´… Hn) is an exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive set of hypotheses, then: 
 
                                                          
303 Norton (2003) p. 662. 
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⁡𝑃(𝐻⁡𝑣⁡𝐻´… ⁡𝑣⁡𝐻𝑛) = 1 
 
 Thus, prior probabilities of a vast number of rival hypotheses put restrictions on the 
extent to which learning E increases the probability of H. Since it is possible that n = ∞ (it is 
possible to mechanically construct contrary hypotheses for H in any domain that is rich 
enough to represent scientific knowledge) the value of P(H | E) depends on the value of an 
infinite number of probability values. The prior distribution is a vital part of a Bayesian 
analysis induction, but Norton correctly notes that no human being has such a distribution for 
any algebra of statements that could plausibly represent the corpus of scientific knowledge. 
 
⁡ A Subjective Bayesian could respond that, when 0 < P(H) < 1 and 0 < P(E) < 1, one 
can have a good model of the evidential relationship between H and E via simply examining 
P(E | H) and P(E | ¬H), as E will confirm H given those assumptions if P(E | H) > P(E | ¬H). 
Yet, under those assumptions: 
 
𝑃(𝐸⁡|⁡𝐻) = ⁡
𝑃(𝐸⁡^⁡𝐻)
𝑃(𝐻)
=
𝑃(𝐸)𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸)
𝑃(𝐻)
 
 
- so that P(E | H) is only defined when P(H) and P(E) are also defined and the necessity of the 
full probability distribution is once again apparent. 
 
  Objective Bayesians and Logical Bayesians might object that their prior distributions 
are not imaginary, because the probabilities exist independently of their correspondence to 
any actual person’s degrees of beliefs. In other words, in such interpretations of Bayesianism, 
the correct value for P(H | E) exists for any suitable domain, and we can use it for analysing 
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inductive reasoning. However, Norton’s point still stands if we are analysing a real instance 
of inductive reasoning, because it is mysterious how a prior distribution that need not 
remotely correspond to the actual person’s overall degrees of belief can provide a serious 
normative constraint and how updating such a prior distribution can constitute the method of 
inductive reasoning, any more than updating an imaginary person’s subjective credences can 
constitute the inductive method. Additionally, the justification of these idealized priors raises 
yet another horde of problems for a Bayesian. 
 
 Another possible response could be to deny that their epistemology requires a simple 
correspondence between coherent degrees of belief and our actual beliefs, so that the 
incoherence of our actual degrees of belief is compatible with the relevance of Bayesian 
norms for our inductive practices. Put another way, there are a variety of bridge principles 
between Bayesian priors and human reasoning304. For instance, a Subjectivist could argue 
that the guidance from their theory of induction is not that one should attempt to formulate a 
coherent prior distribution and conditionalize using those priors; instead, they could argue 
that one should try to approximate a coherent agent conditionalizing upon the evidence one 
encounters. A similar approach that Howson and Urbach develop is to interpret Bayesian 
norms such as coherence and conditionalization as standards to which reasonable people 
commit themselves, rather than descriptions of the reasoning that they do or can, in practice, 
perform305. Furthermore, the Subjectivist (and indeed Objectivist) interpretation of degrees of 
belief has at least as much flexibility as the interpretation of “belief”. Norton has certainly not 
shown that there is a problem here for every variety of analysis of belief: one might have a 
                                                          
304 A bridge principle connects some matter of fact – such as the fact that an action will cause an increase in 
expected human suffering or the logical inconsistency of a person’s belief – with some normative claim, such as 
a prohibition against that action or that the person should change their beliefs. 
 
305 Howson and Urbach p. 422-423. 
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theory of beliefs in terms of overt behaviour, dispositions, a sui generis psychological state, a 
form of near-knowledge, or one of a panoply of other possible analyses. In short, while there 
is a potential problem for Bayesians that Norton raises, Bayesian epistemology is very 
diverse and no short argument is likely to be problematic for every type of Bayesian. 
 
 There are further defences that a Bayesian might make in response to Norton’s 
criticism, but since my goal is merely to motivate Norton’s concern, I shall proceed onto 
Norton’s next argument regarding prior probabilities on the assumption that imaginary priors 
are at least prima facie problematic for Bayesians. One can sometimes use scientific theories 
to derive Bayesian priors. As a result, it might seem as though Bayesians can avoid the 
problem of imaginary priors in some local contexts. For instance, the probability of a particle 
undergoing radioactive decay in a particular interval of time might be determined by the 
accepted theory of its half-life. By founding their priors on values from scientific theories, 
Bayesians might attempt to escape Norton’s charge, at least in the context of applying their 
methodology to a particular case of inductive reasoning: once priors for the hypotheses have 
been derived in this way, a Bayesian analysis of induction can proceed in terms of updating 
these priors via conditionalization. 
 
 However, Norton argues that a Bayesian cannot always obtain a real-valued 
probability using this method306. 
 
 
                                                          
306 Norton (2003) p. 660-661 and (2007) p. 166-169. 
 
330 Probability and the Balance of Evidence 
 
Key 
 
X: A random variable. 
H1: The hypothesis that X will have a value r. 
H2: A nondeterministic scientific theory that merely says that r is a member of an infinite set 
of equiprobable possible values of X. 
 
 Clearly, H2 is insufficiently informative to provide a precise value for the probability 
of H1. However, such theories might be the best that is available in a particular case of 
inductive reasoning. Norton gives the example of the Steady State Theory of Cosmology: 
according to this theory, there is an infinite space in which hydrogen atoms can materialize, 
but this materialization is both random and uniformly probable for any point in space-time307. 
Since the Steady State Theory says that hydrogen atoms can materialize randomly and 
uniformly across an infinite region, there is no possible positive real-valued uniform 
distribution308. 
 
 Norton’s point is most obvious if the probability distribution satisfies the Principle of 
Countable Additivity. Suppose that the domain of P consists of sets and UAi is a mutually 
disjoint union of sets309. For P to satisfy the Principle of Countable Additivity, it must be the 
cast that P(UAi) = ∑ P(Ai) for every Ai in the union. Let UAi be an infinite set consisting of 
possible values for a random variable X. The distribution of P over the members of UAi is 
                                                          
307 Norton (2003) p. 660-661. 
 
308 A uniform distribution is a distribution which has constant probability. In the simple case of a discrete 
distribution, this means that each statement is equiprobable. Uniform continuous uniform distributions are those 
in which equally-large intervals in the continuum of possible values of a random variable are all equiprobable. 
 
309 A disjoint union of sets is a set that contains the union of some sets that share no members. 
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uniform if and only if P(Aj) = x for every arbitrarily selected set Aj. Since UAi is countably 
infinite disjoint union and P satisfies the Principle of Countable additivity, P(UAi) = ∑ P(Ai) 
= 1. If there is a uniform distribution, then x ≥ 0. However, if x > 0, then ∑ P(Ai) = ∞, 
contradicting the assumptions; whereas if x = 0, then ∑ P(Ai) = 0, also contradicting the 
assumptions. Therefore, if P satisfies the Principle of Countable Additivity, there is no 
possible uniform distribution for an infinite set of possible values for a random variable X310. 
 
 However, the Principle of Countable Additivity is not an essential feature of a 
Bayesian probability function. If P does not satisfy this principle, then we can consistently 
assign a probability of zero to the materialization of the hydrogen atom for each particular 
region of space. Yet, in such a distribution, the probability of a hydrogen atom materializing 
at any particular point is the same as the probability of a contradiction. That does not seem to 
reflect the actual epistemic situation: the Steady State Theory states that it is possible that 
such a materialization could occur, which is intuitively different from stating that it is as 
unlikely as a contradiction. Furthermore, in standard Bayesianism, such an assignment would 
entail that it was impossible to increase the probability of a hydrogen atom materializing at a 
particular point in space-time by acquiring additional evidence, because a hypothesis with an 
extreme value cannot have its probability increased via conditionalization. This is a 
counterintuitive result: one would think that the mere acceptance of the Steady State Theory 
does not warrant certainty that ‘A hydrogen atom will materialize in front of my nose’ is 
unconfirmable by any possible evidence. 
 
 A Bayesian might try to avoid this problem by assigning an infinitesimal probability 
                                                          
310 Howson and Urbach (1993) p. 34. 
 
332 Probability and the Balance of Evidence 
 
to each possible coordinate position. An infinitesimal number is a non-zero number that is so 
small that is cannot be measured. Unlike real values, infinitesimals can have a product that is 
greater than 0, such that a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses could have a 
joint product of 1, in accordance with axioms (i) and (iii) in Chapter 1 Subsection 2.1.2. 
However, this is not a possible output for a standard Bayesian probability function, because 
infinitesimals are not members of the set of reals, which is the co-domain of Bayesian 
functions. 
 
 Norton gives another example of this problem that is especially exciting, because it 
occurs in Newtonian mechanics, and this theory has traditionally been thought to be 
deterministic311. Suppose there is an object with a point mass, on top of a perfectly symmetric 
dome, and the object can slide in any direction without any friction whatsoever across the 
Dome. According to Newtonian mechanics, it is possible that the point mass will stay on top 
of that dome forever. However, it is also possible that the point mass will slide in any one of 
an infinite number of vectors across the Dome. It is even possible that the point mass will be 
motionless for any of an infinite number of possible periods of time and then slide (without 
any external force) along any of an infinite number of possible vectors across the Dome. If 
we attempt to use this theory to determine a real-valued prior probability that ‘The point mass 
will move along a particular vector at a particular time period t’, then we shall have to 
arbitrarily impose a non-uniform distribution or assign a value of zero for all the possible 
vectors, but this assignment is unsatisfactory for the same reason it was unsatisfactory in the 
example of the Steady State Theory. 
 
                                                          
311 Norton (2007) p. 166-169. 
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 John Worrall objects that a Subjective Bayesian can happily accept arbitrariness in the 
Dome312. (Worrall’s point also applies for the Steady State Theory example.) Subjective 
Bayesianism is famously consistent with very arbitrary distributions. However, this does not 
elude Norton’s criticism, because the values of such a distribution are not derived from 
accepted scientific theories and so the problem of imaginary priors returns313. Norton 
confronts Bayesians with a dilemma: priors that are not taken from scientific theories are 
objectionable because they form an imaginary distribution, but scientific theories will not 
always supply priors, even when they provide some potentially relevant information. It is 
possible that the Bayesian can address this dilemma, but Norton has certainly presented a live 
challenge to Bayesian theories of induction. 
 
 Evidential Probabilists avoid both of these problems by abandoning the ambition of a 
prior distribution. In Evidential Probability, something resembling a Bayesian prior 
distribution can only be obtained in epistemically rich contexts in which there is precise 
relative frequency data that can be used to determine a full distribution, so that there is no 
oddity of an imaginary prior distribution. Since evidential probabilities come from the 
available relative frequency data, there is no need to worry about a complete real-valued 
distribution over all statements in the domain of the Evidential Probability function. What 
matters are the formal relations between (1) the evidence plus the background knowledge and 
(2) the hypothesis just as all that matters for a deductive logic claim like ‘Γ ├ Φ’ are the 
derivation rules in the deductive system in use and the formal relations between Γ and Φ. 
                                                          
312 Worrall (2010) p. 752. 
 
313 If the distribution only applies to the statements under consideration, then there will be the danger the agent’s 
total credences are inconsistent with the axioms of the probability calculus, which is an unacceptable possibility 
in conventional Bayesian epistemology. 
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If a scientific theory only provides an imprecise value for the relative frequency of 
some statement (like ‘A hydrogen atom will materialize at point x in space-time’) and that 
scientific theory is our best available basis for the probability of that statement, then 
Evidential Probabilists have exactly the formal tools of imprecise probability to represent that 
statement’s probability given the scientific theory. At the extreme, they can use the [0, 1] 
interval, as explained in Chapter 1 Subsection 5.3. Overall, the precision of the intervals need 
not (and must not) exceed the precision of the relative frequency data provided by the 
scientific theory and the available background knowledge. 
 
 Norton might object that the domain of Evidential Probability is weakly deductively 
closed, such that every statement’s consequences are also in the domain, and this requirement 
is beyond what any human being can possibly achieve. This weak deductive closure is 
certainly an idealization, but it involves real deductive logical relations, rather than imaginary 
prior probability values. That a particular hypothesis entails another hypothesis is 
(presumably) a true or false question. In contrast, outside of special cases, whether P(H | E) = 
r  is true is a question that has literally no answer in Bayesianism unless P is fully defined 
over the complete domain to which H and E belong. In addition, one might regard weak 
deductive closure as placing a norm on an agent’s commitments: if I believe H1 and H1 
implies H2, but I have never explicitly considered H2, then it is arguable that I am committed 
to believing H2, and must either accept it or reject H1 when I consider this hypothesis. That is 
quite a different matter from being committed to an imaginary prior distribution(s?). In short, 
there is no prima facie case for a strong “ought implies can” assumption in formal 
epistemology. Furthermore, Evidential Probability still has much to say about inductive 
inference even in domains that are not fully deductively closed. Therefore, even assuming 
335 Confirmation, Decision, and Evidential Probability 
 
 
that Norton’s criticism of Bayesianism is sound, it does not apply to Evidential Probability. 
 
 I shall now explain how an Evidential Probabilist can analyse Norton’s examples 
without the use of imaginary priors. In the case of Steady State Cosmology, suppose that we 
initially have a set of statements that includes the Steady State theory and this set is our best 
statistical basis for the evidential probability that a hydrogen atom will materialize at x, where 
x is a particular point in space-time. From the Steady State theory and the properties of 
hydrogen atoms, we can deduce that it is possible that a hydrogen atom will materialize at x. 
However, the theory tells us nothing about the relative frequency of this event, and hence the 
evidential probability is [0, 1]. Of course, depending on the available background knowledge, 
it is possible that the lower or upper limits are different from 0 or 1. For instance, suppose 
that our total evidence contains some reasons to think that it is extremely unlikely that a 
hydrogen atom will materialize at x. An Evidential Probabilist can assign a very low 
probability to the hypothesis, like [0, 1-67], with the limits depending on the relative 
frequency data in the total evidence. 
 
 The analysis for the Dome example is essentially identical. Suppose that Newtonian 
physics and the available background knowledge jointly provide absolutely no guidance 
regarding the relative frequency of the object moving along any given vector 𝐴𝐵⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗. It does not 
even provide us with a relative frequency for how often (and for how long) the object will be 
motionless on top of the dome. Once again, an Evidential Probabilist must use the [0, 1] 
interval: for all we know in Norton’s scenario, point-massed objects on a frictionless dome 
will never move along 𝐴𝐵⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗, or sometimes move along 𝐴𝐵⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗, or even always move along 𝐴𝐵⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗. If 
we have richer background knowledge, then a narrower interval (or even a precise interval) 
might be applicable. 
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 In general, the [0, 1] interval enables Evidential Probabilists to have probabilities that 
are (a) positive and (b) uniform across an infinite set of contrary hypotheses. It is 
mathematically impossible to satisfy both (a) and (b) with real-valued probability functions. 
However, it is possible to satisfy both desiderata with interval values, as a function can 
consistently assign [0, 1] to each member of the set. 
 
3.1.3 The Problem of Old Evidence 
 
Another problem for Bayesianism that Norton uses is Clark Glymour’s “Problem of 
Old Evidence”314. This is the alleged problem that the comparison of P(H) with P(H | E) (or 
P(H | B) with P(H | E ^ B)) is insufficient to determine whether E confirms H, because E 
might be “old evidence” that has already been used for conditionalization, such that P(H) = 
P(H | E). Norton uses this problem to object against the very idea of using a degree of belief 
or degree of support function.  
 
 I shall give an example of the Problem of Old Evidence. Suppose that we learn the 
evolutionary history of some newly discovered species of deep-sea fish and this history is 
what we would expect if that species evolved by natural selection. We suppose that we have a 
probability distribution P over a set of statements {E, H} with values defined for P(H), P(H | 
E), and P(E), such that P(E) < 1. Upon learning E, our distribution shifts to P´, in which P´(E) 
= 1. To determine P´(H), we use the conditional probability P(H | E). Representing Darwinian 
evolutionary theory by H and our new evidence by E, we formulate a new probability 
                                                          
314 Norton (2011a) p. 402-403. 
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distribution P´, in which P´ is calculated by Bayes’ Theorem and the relevant parts of the old 
prior distribution: 
 
𝑃´(𝐻) =
𝑃(𝐻)𝑃(𝐸⁡|𝐻)
𝑃(𝐸)
 
 
Under the conditions that: 
 
(a) 0⁡ < ⁡𝑃(𝐻) ⁡< ⁡1 
(b) 0⁡ < ⁡𝑃(𝐸) ⁡< ⁡1 
(c) 𝑃(𝐸⁡|⁡𝐻) ⁡> ⁡𝑃(𝐸) 
 
 - then P´(H) > P(H). Just as we would expect, E confirms H. 
 
 The Problem of Old Evidence looms when P(E) = 1. For example, in The Origin of 
Species, most of Darwin’s evidence consists of pre-existing biological knowledge. Let E´ 
represent this old evidence. As E´ was already known, it will be assigned the value P(E´) = 1. 
For any hypothesis Hi such that P(E´ | Hi) is defined, then P(E´ | Hi) = 1. Plugging these 
values into Bayes’ Theorem gives: 
 
𝑃(𝐻⁡|⁡𝐸´) =
𝑃(𝐻)1
1
= 𝑃(𝐻) 
 
- and hence P´(H) = P(H). Updating a model of Darwin’s reasoning using Bayesian 
conditionalization gives the absurd result that the accepted evidence in 1859 did not confirm 
338 Probability and the Balance of Evidence 
 
Darwinism. 
 
 I shall not discuss the Bayesian responses to the Problem of Old Evidence, because 
my focus is whether Norton’s criticisms are problems for Evidential Probability, as opposed 
to whether they are problematic for Bayesianism. Kyburg’s system avoids the Problem of Old 
Evidence because updating in Evidential Probability is invariant to the time at which the 
evidence is learned: if we can use (E ^ K) to derive new relative frequency information about 
H and this information is the proper basis for H’s evidential probability (according to the 
rules in Chapter 1 Subsection 5.3) then H can have a new probability, regardless of whether E 
was learned before or after we considered the probability of H. The key formal difference 
with Bayesianism is that, in Evidential Probability, updating is not a matter of using a 
distribution of unconditional probabilities, because there are only conditional probabilities in 
Evidential Probability. Changes in the probability are purely a result of changes in the 
accepted evidence, rather than an ongoing series of shifts from a prior distribution to new 
probability distributions. 
 
 In the case of Darwinism, we can say (greatly simplifying the subtleties of Darwin’s 
arguments) that natural selection was an extremely good explanation of the evolution of the 
species that Darwin discussed. I shall suppose that the intended scope of Darwinism was the 
development of the overwhelming majority of distinct species on Earth. Thus, the theory is a 
statistical generalisation asserting that almost all species evolved via natural selection315. 
Darwin’s reasoning can be (greatly) simplified as follows: given that natural selection is the 
best explanation for the species that he discussed, it was probably the best explanation for 
                                                          
315 There is a solid historical justification for this interpretation: in The Origin of Species, Darwin was notably 
taciturn regarding whether humans had evolved by natural selection. This rhetorical strategy would have been 
pointless if his theory of evolution was a universal generalisation over all species. 
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most species’ evolutions. The central facts that he needed to establish were (a) that natural 
selection was the best explanation of this sample of species and (b) that the sample he 
discussed was representative of species in general. 
 
 This statistical induction could be formally modelled using the strategy I discussed in 
Subsection 2.3. Some salient factors in such an induction are (1) whether natural selection 
was the best explanation of the evolutions that Darwin discussed, (2) the probability that 
Darwin’s sample was representative, and (3) the probability of such a statistical inference 
leading to error. Historically, all three factors were controversial. Samuel Wilberforce, in his 
1860 review of The Origin of Species, argued that Darwin’s explanations were lacking, as 
Darwin had no evidence of favourable mutations, yet such mutations are a crucial part of the 
natural selection mechanism316; this debate between Wilberforce and the Darwinians is an 
instance of a controversy regarding (1). He also argued that Darwin’s reasoning involved 
leaps of fancy – that it was incompatible with “the true Baconian Philosophy” – which can be 
modelled as challenging (2) and (3)317. Insofar as the defenders of Darwin were successful in 
responding to Wilberforce and other critics, the evidential probability would be a higher 
interval value for Darwinism’s probability. (The exact numbers would depend on the 
confidence level for such a statistical inference.) Since the value of 1/2[x, y] for Darwinism 
would be increased by adding the old evidence to its total evidence in any plausible formal 
model of the debate, the old evidence that Darwin cited would confirm his theory. 
Consequently, even if old evidence poses a problem for Bayesians, it is unproblematic for 
Evidential Probabilists. 
                                                          
316 Wilberforce (1860) p. 238. 
 
317 Wilberforce (1860) p. 249. 
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 Not all philosophers would agree that the Problem of Old Evidence is a problem. For 
example, Lakatos argues that only novel predictions can confirm a hypothesis; specifically, 
they can confirm what he calls a “research programme” that includes that hypothesis318. Alan 
Musgrave labels this position the “Strictly Temporal” view of evidence: if the evidence was a 
part of the background knowledge of science (as a whole, rather than an individual scientist’s 
background knowledge) then the evidence cannot confirm any hypothesis319. More broadly, 
one might think that some types of old evidence will not be relevant for confirmation320. 
However, Bayesians can agree with philosophers such as Lakatos, and argue that the Problem 
of Old Evidence is a positive feature of their theory, rather than a bug. 
 
 This raises the issue of the logical relations between such theories, which I shall label 
using the term ‘predicitivist’, and (1) my proposed definition of confirmation and (2) 
Evidential Probabilism more broadly. Since evidential probabilists are not committed to any 
single formal definition of confirmation (or even the existence of a formal definition of this 
concept) these logical issues must be treated separately. 
 
 Firstly, predictivist theories are incompatible with the definition I offered in 
Subsection 2.2, since it is possible (as in the example of Darwin’s theory of evolution given 
above) that old evidence can confirm a hypothesis on my definition. Secondly, predictivist 
theories and Evidential Probability are compatible. For instance, one could add an additional 
                                                          
318 Lakatos (1978) p. 6. 
 
319 Musgrave (1974) p. 8. 
 
320 For example, Zahar (1973a) and Zahar (1973b). Such theories of evidence must be distinguished from the 
position of philosophers such as William Whewell (1857, p. 464) who argue that (in a particular sense of ‘new’) 
new evidence confirms more strongly than old evidence. 
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clause to my definition stating that ‘E was not a generally accepted part of the body of 
scientific data prior to the formulation of H’. Such a definition would be significantly alter 
my definition, since the current form is ahistorical and this additional clause would make 
confirmation relative to a particular moment in the history of science. There are also a variety 
of alternative versions of such a clause; Martin Curd and J. A. Cover distinguish four distinct 
senses in which one might require that the evidence is ‘new’: 
 
(1) Temporal Novelty: The evidence was not known to anyone prior to the proposal of the 
theory that it confirms. 
 
(2) Epistemic Novelty: The evidence was not known to the person proposing the theory, nor 
was it generally known by scientists prior to proposal of the theory that it confirms. 
 
(3) Design-Novelty: The evidence was not a factor in the scientist’s development of the 
theory. 
 
(4) Use-Novelty: The evidence was not used to decide the value of a parameter in the theory 
and the evidence is not built into the theory321. 
 
 Since I accept both my definition of confirmation and Evidential Probability, my 
position is incompatible with predictivism. Given sufficient reasons to accept predictivism, 
one simple option for me would be to maintain Evidential Probability, but to adopt a 
                                                          
321 Curd and Cover (1998) p. 512-513. 
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historically relative definition with a clause(s) that excludes old evidence. Additionally, the 
general spirit of predictivism (though not the letter) is compatible with my definition of 
confirmation, because my definition of confirmation is qualitative: it only states whether the 
evidence confirms a hypothesis relative to particular background knowledge, and that it is 
compatible with a range of theories about the comparative strength of confirmation. For 
example, I could consistently hold that new evidence confirms more strongly than old 
evidence, ceteris paribus. That would still not satisfy predictivists, who insist that only new 
evidence can confirm a hypothesis, but it would do some justice to some people’s intuitions 
that there is something special about new evidence. However, since my fundamental aim in 
this chapter is to advocate an Evidential Probabilist qualitative definition of confirmation, I 
shall not explore these comparative issues further. 
 
 To summarise this subsection, my definition accommodates the view that old 
evidence can confirm a hypothesis; as a consequence, it is incompatible with predictivists’ 
contention that only new evidence can confirm a hypothesis. However, Evidential Probability 
is compatible with this view. Thus, Evidential Probability as such does not imply that old 
evidence can confirm hypotheses, but it is compatible with this position. 
 
3.1.4 The Representational Limits of Bayesian Probability 
 
 Norton also raises problems regarding the ability of the Bayesian formalism to 
represent certain types of epistemic states. There are two types of epistemic state that Norton 
discusses: (1) the problem of distinguishing between “disbelief” and “ignorance”322 and (2) 
                                                          
322 Norton (2011a) p. 407. 
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the problem of representing ignorance over a countable infinity of outcomes323. Regardless of 
whether Bayesians can formalise these distinctions, I shall argue that they pose no problem 
for an Evidential Probabilist. 
 
 I shall begin with (1). In a rational agent, ‘disbelief’ might be modelled as a low 
Evidential Probability. To analyse ‘ignorance’, there are actually two different senses that an 
Evidential Probabilist can distinguish. Firstly, we might have relevant evidence for a 
statement, but this relevant evidence cannot be used to form a precise probability. Adam Elga 
has a good example of such a situation324. Imagine that a stranger on the street walks in front 
of you and suddenly takes three objects from his bag: a travel-sized tube of toothpaste, an 
ordinary tube of toothpaste, and a live jellyfish. Let H be the hypothesis that the next object 
that is drawn will be a tube of toothpaste. Although you seem to have relevant evidence 
regarding H, it is not intuitive that your evidence provides any basis for a precise probability. 
 
 An Evidential Probabilist can represent this first sort of ignorance via the width of the 
evidential probabilities. In Elga’s example, the probability that the stranger will take out a 
tube of toothpaste will be a very wide interval, which represents a state of deep ignorance 
regarding H. In contrast, if we are making a random selection from a bag with a known 
proportion of tubes of toothpaste, then the evidential probability will be precisely valued. 
Thus, the degree of imprecision of Evidential Probability intervals can be used to represent 
this form of ignorance. Such a formal analysis of ignorance is distinct from the Evidential 
Probabilist analysis of disbelief, because it involves the precision of the evidential 
probabilities rather than their values. 
                                                          
323 Norton (2011a) p. 412-415. 
 
324 Elga (2010) p. 1. 
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  Another kind of ignorance occurs when there is no relevant evidence for a statement. 
For example, suppose you know that X and Y correspond to genuine predicates in the 
language of a previously isolated Amazonian tribe, but you do not know the denotation of X 
and Y. Assume that you have no relevant evidence for the truth or falsehood of the statement 
‘Some X is Y’. (If this sort of occasion never occurs, then an Evidential Probabilist does not 
face a problem with representing this type of ignorance, because no-one does.) Using 
Evidential Probability, one can represent this second type of ignorance as the satisfaction of 
the following conditions: 
 
(1) EP(H | K) = [0, 1] 
 
(2) There is no reference class statement in K regarding H325. 
 
 The first claim says that K does not provide the basis for any precision in your 
probability for H. The second says K has no potential reference class data that you might 
have been able to use for an interval other than [0, 1]. Collectively, they imply there is no 
relevant evidence in K regarding the probability of H. 
 
 Norton also raises the problem of representing ignorance over a countable infinity of 
outcomes. If there is a random variable that can take an infinite number of values given our 
total evidence, then an epistemic probability theory would ideally be able to (i) assign 
positive values to each hypothesis that the random variable will take one of these values and 
also (ii) assign a uniform distribution, because we have no reason to regard any particular 
                                                          
325 See Chapter 1 Subsection 5.3 for a definition of a reference class statement. 
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value of the random variable as more likely than any other. No real-valued probability 
distribution can satisfy these desiderata. However, as I argued in the examples of the Steady 
State Cosmology and the Dome, it is possible to satisfy both (i) and (ii) by assigning [0, 1] as 
the probability for each of the outcomes. An Evidential Probabilist does not seem to face any 
special problems in representing ignorance over an infinite number of possibilities. 
 
3.1.5 Summary 
 
 In most of my responses to these criticisms, there is a common pattern: challenges to 
Bayesianism have been developed; these challenges present particular sorts of contexts where 
Bayesianism seems to lead to counterintuitive results; and these challenges vanish once a 
probabilist abandons the Bayesian ambition of having a precise probability in all situations. If 
one regards Evidential Probabilism as a generalisation of Bayesianism to cases in which the 
relative frequency data does not warrant precise probabilities, then this pattern is not 
surprising. From an Evidential Probabilist perspective, Norton is correctly pointing out that 
precise probabilities are not always legitimate. Nonetheless, an Evidential Probabilist can 
reason like a Bayesian when they have suitably rich data, while obviating the problems that 
Norton raises. 
 
3.2 The Reliability of Inductive Schemas 
 
 Norton uses the term “formal” to describe theories of induction that aim to use only 
formal relations that hold between the evidence and the hypothesis to analyse inductive 
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reasoning326. In formal theories of induction, one only sues the formal relations between H 
and E when analysing an inductive argument. A very simple example of a ‘formal’ theory 
would be a naïve form hypothetico-deductivism: ‘If H implies E, then E confirms H’. A 
much more sophisticated example of a formalist theory of induction (in Norton’s sense) is 
Bayesianism. Kyburg’s theory of induction is also formalist, because in this theory the 
rationality of an induction is purely a matter of the Evidential Probability relations. 
 
Norton327 raises the following question for formalists: how do we know that these 
formal schemas are reliable? Norton does not define what he means by “reliable”, but the 
Oxford English Dictionary provides two potentially relevant definitions: 
 
(1) “[Something] That may be relied upon.” 
 
(2) (In modern statistics) “[a method] that yields consistent results when repeated under 
identical conditions.” 328 
 
 Definition (1) is not helpful in this context, because ‘reliable’ in this sense applies if it 
is reasonable to rely on the method in question and this would simply be an open challenge 
for a justification of the formal schema. Naturally, it would not be a very interesting criticism. 
However, if Norton means something like (2), then he has raised an interesting problem. We 
                                                          
326 Norton (2003) p. 649. His usage is different from my use of ‘formal’ in Chapter 4: a theory of induction, as I 
have defined ‘induction’ and as Norton seems to use the term, must be informal in the sense used in that chapter, 
because restrictions are placed on the predicate terms (they must be observational) in the evidence before an 
argument can be inductive. Stove (1965) makes this point regarding the informality of Hempel’s theory of 
confirmation, because Hempel requires that the premises are observation statements. 
 
327 Norton (2003) p. 667. 
 
328 OED Third Edition, updated 2009, from www.oed.com accessed 29/08/2016. 
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would ideally like to know that there is a high relative frequency (or at least greater than 
50%) of true results using our inductive rules, assuming our premises and background 
knowledge. Similarly, if we knew that using an inductive rule in a particular type of context 
would almost always lead us to falsity (even when the premises and our background 
knowledge are true) then there would be a strong prima facie case against using the rule. If 
Norton’s use of ‘reliability’ refers to an inductive rule leading us to truth in a high frequency 
of cases, then he is raising an important challenge for a theory of induction. 
 
For example, we know that enumerative induction is an unreliable rule when applied 
to the colour of swans. (Enumerative inductions are inferences from uniform samples to 
generalisations like ‘All x are y’ or ‘Most x are y’.) Consider this enumerative inductive 
argument: 
 
A3 
 
(1) All of the swans in a 1,000-fold sample of members of a newly discovered species of 
Antarctic swan are blue. 
 
Therefore, probably, (C) All swans of this species are blue. 
 
 Such inferences are famously unreliable, even when they involve an extrapolation 
from large sample sizes. Suppose that, as far as we know, A3 is no more reliable than past 
enumerative inductions about swans. Intuitively, we should be very reticent to infer from (1) 
to C. Such reticence can be justified by direct inference from a known statement about 
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enumerative inductions in general (that they are unreliable when applied to swans) to the 
particular inductive inference that I have formalised in A3. 
 
 At its heart, Evidential Probability is a theory about direct inference, since evidential 
probabilities are ultimately based on direct inference; the logic of direct inference is crucial to 
Evidential Probabilism. One can use this logic to evaluate the reliability of inferences like 
A3. Since we know that swans tend to be non-uniform in their colours from the failure of 
previous enumerative inductions, the Evidential Probability of the conclusion of A3 will be 
very low given (1) and our background knowledge. This means that the Evidential Probabilist 
has a method for distinguishing inductions that are reliable given what we know from 
unreliable inductions.  
 
 Norton has a follow-up problem for those formal theories of induction that appeal to 
some other formal theory of induction to prove their validity: how do we know that this 
second formal theory of induction is reliable? As Norton points out, this question begins a 
regress problem for some formalists329. Consider a formalist who argues that her theory of 
eliminative induction is a reliable method by providing an enumerative inductive argument in 
favour of her theory. She might argue that the theory would have been successful in the past 
and accordingly it is likely to be successful in the future as well. If she justifies this 
enumerative induction by appealing to a formal theory of enumerative induction, then Norton 
correctly notes he can simply reformulate his question: what is her justification for thinking 
that this second formal system is reliable? 
 
                                                          
329 Norton (2003) p. 667. 
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However, Evidential Probability is not just another formal system of induction: 
fundamentally, it is a system of deriving epistemic probabilities from statistical information 
by direct inference. Unlike the inductivist who does not rest her theory of induction on a non-
inductive form of reasoning like direct inference, an Evidential Probabilist can answer to the 
question ‘How do we know that this formal inductive schema is a reliable method in this 
context?’ without an appeal to another formal inductive schema. 
 
 Nevertheless, Norton could raise a new question: how do Evidential Probabilists 
know that their system of direct inference is reliable? Yet, in contrast to ‘Is this inductive rule 
reliable’, it is not clear what this second question means. A logic of direct inference is how 
one can determine whether something is reliable given some information, but it is not clear 
what it means to say that such a logic is ‘reliable’. Norton himself does not provide a 
justification of his own theory of direct inference, which he employs in his “material” theory 
of induction330. 
 
 Until the question is clarified, it is not clear that either Norton or an Evidential 
Probabilist is obliged to answer it. According to the Evidential Probabilist, one can evaluate 
an inductive inference by using the relevant evidential probabilities, which are ultimately 
derived from statistical information by direct inference. According to Norton, one can 
evaluate an inductive inference by applying his theory of direct inference to the relevant 
background information, in order to assess the reliability of the inductive inference. There is a 
clear dialectical parallel, and if Norton can answer the question of the reliability of induction 
in this way, then he must allow the same use of direct inference by the Evidential Probabilist. 
The salient difference between both answers and inductive justifications of induction (which, 
                                                          
330 Norton (2013) p. 673-674. 
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as Norton argues, suffer from a vicious regress) is that they appeal to direct inference, rather 
than induction. 
 
Therefore, an Evidential Probabilist can answer Norton’s first question without 
generating an obvious regress: to assess the reliability of a particular inductive argument, we 
need to examine the probability of its conclusion given its premises and our background 
information. It is worth noting that my discussion does not constitute an answer to problems 
like Hume’s Problem of Induction. The question Norton raises is simply whether a particular 
inductive argument is reliable given our background knowledge. The broader epistemological 
question of how that background knowledge is acquired is beyond the scope of Norton’s 
challenge. The salient points are that (a) Evidential Probabilists have a method for evaluating 
the reliability of an inductive argument and (b) this method does not seem to face a genuine 
regress problem. 
 
3.3 Mill’s Muddle 
 
 Norton argues that formalist theories of induction struggle to analyse demonstrative 
inductions, by presenting a particular example in which two (apparently) formally identical 
inductive arguments are clearly qualitatively different in the support that their premises 
provide to their conclusions331. I shall call this example ‘Mill’s Muddle’, as Norton develops 
it from a passage in Mill332. Consider A4 and A5: 
                                                          
331 Norton (2003) p. 649. 
 
332 Mill (1882) p. 228. 
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A4 
 
(1) All tested pure samples of the element bismuth melt at 271 C. 
 
Therefore, (C1) All pure samples of the element bismuth melt at 271 C. 
 
A5 
(1) All tested pure samples of wax melt at 91 C. 
 
Therefore, (C2) All pure samples of wax melt at 91 C. 
 
Norton points out that A4 is clearly a much better argument, relative to our 
background knowledge. Mill’s Muddle is the following puzzle: why is A3 a better argument 
than A4? On the surface, the arguments are formally identical. A theory of induction must 
involve looking below the surface to justify our intuitive comparative judgement. 
 
 Kyburg uses Evidential Probability to analyse a similar example. Imagine that an 
organic chemist has developed a new compound NC333. Under normal laboratory conditions, 
NC is a crystalline compound. She conducts a laboratory test to discover NC’s melting point 
by measuring a single sample a1. On the surface, the reasoning is: 
 
                                                          
333 Kyburg (1976) p. 194-196. 
352 Probability and the Balance of Evidence 
 
A5 
 
(1) a1 is a pure sample of NC and a1 melted at x degrees. 
 
Therefore, (C3) All pure samples of NC melt at x degrees. 
 
 In fact, her reasoning is more sophisticated. Firstly, there are the implicit premises: 
 
(IP1) NC is a crystalline compound. 
 
(IP2) If y is a crystalline compound, then it has a uniform melting point. 
 
 Additionally, any actual measurement procedure in science has a margin of error. Her 
actual premise is: 
 
(1´) a1 is a pure sample of NC and a1 melted at x ± ε degrees. 
 
- where ε is the estimated margin of error for her measurement method. 
 
 Kyburg analyses this reasoning using evidential probabilities. If E is the conjunction 
(IP1 ^ IP2 ^ 1´), then E deductively implies C3, so EP(C3 | E) = [1, 1]. The scientist can 
rationally follow this chain of reasoning if the conjunction E is acceptable in this context: 
each conjunct must be acceptable and the conjunction as a whole must also be acceptable. 
Under those circumstances, she can accept that NC melts at x ± ε degrees. Accordingly, once 
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her background information is fully articulated and incorporated into the formal model, an 
Evidential Probabilist can explain how she may reasonably make a general induction from a 
single sample. 
 
 Of course, Kyburg’s analysis assumes that the scientist has fully accepted E. In 
practice, statements like ‘If y is a crystalline compound, then it has a uniform melting point’ 
are not typically accepted with certainty. Instead, they can become increasingly probable. In 
Subsection 2.1, I described how Kyburg models scientific knowledge as a hirearchy of sets of 
statements: at the top of the hirearchy are our most certain knowledge, whereas at the lower 
levels are the hypotheses that are acceptably probable given our evidence. What constitutes 
‘evidence’ in this model will depend on our standards of acceptance in a particular context: a 
statement like ‘If y is a crystalline compound, then it has a uniform melting point’ might not 
be acceptable relative to an exacting standard that we might use to establish (C3) as part of 
received scientific knowledge, but it might be sufficiently probable to be acceptable as a 
working assumption in a laboratory test of (C3). As E implies H, if it has a high probability, 
then H will have at least as high a level of probability within the hirearchy of statements. 
 
 I shall now apply a similar Evidential Probabilist analysis to Mill’s Muddle. In the 
case of A4, Norton points out that chemistry provides us with the implicit premises: 
 
(IP3) Most known elements are non-allotropic. 
 
(IP4) Non-allotropic elements have uniform melting points under laboratory conditions. 
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(IP5) Bismuth is an element334. 
 
 We need to know if we can infer that bismuth has a uniform melting point. Suppose 
that the reference class that we have selected by the rules of Sharpening is the set of known 
elements and we formalise ‘Most’ as ‘> 50%’. In that context, relative to our background 
knowledge K, the evidential probability of the claim- 
 
(IP6) Bismuth is non-allotropic. 
 
- is EP(IP6 | K) = [>0.5, 1]. 
 
 Suppose that, in this context, we are willing to accept a statement whose probability, 
relative to K, has a lower limit that is > 0.5, so that we can add (IP6) to the Evidential 
Corpus. An additional implicit premise is the following: 
 
(IP7) Bismuth has a uniform melting point under laboratory conditions. 
 
We might be able to obtain this premise (that is the validator of A5) from (IP4) and 
(IP6). In other words, we need to see if we can accept the conjunction that ‘Non-allotropic 
elements have uniform melting points under laboratory conditions and Bismuth is non-
allotropic.’ If the probability of (IP4 ^ IP6) is sufficiently high, then it can be added to the 
Evidential Corpus, and therefore so can IP7, since (IP4 ^ IP6) implies (IP7). 
                                                          
334 Norton (2003) p. 651. 
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 Suppose that we have found that our implicit and explicit premises are acceptable in 
this context. We can now formulate A4 in an Evidential Probabilist representation of our 
reasoning in the bismuth case: 
 
A6 
 
(1) All tested samples of the element bismuth melt at 271 C 335. 
 
(IP7) Bismuth is uniform with respect to its melting point under laboratory conditions 
 
Therefore, (C3) All samples of the element bismuth melt at 271 C under laboratory 
conditions. 
 
- and since our accepted premises (1) and validator (IP7) jointly imply (C3), we can accept 
(C3) when using any standard of acceptance at which we accept both premises. Via such a 
representation, an Evidential Probabilist can explain why A4 is such a strong argument. 
 
 In contrast, if we try to repeat the same reasoning with A5, we know that wax is not 
uniform with respect to its melting point because we know that there have been different 
pieces of wax that have melted at different temperatures under controlled conditions. 
Consequently, the probability of A5’s conclusion given our total evidence is [0, 0], since we 
                                                          
335 Like Norton, I shall ignore the fact that actual measurement involves a margin of error. 
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know that wax does not have a uniform melting point of 91 degrees. An Evidential 
Probabilist can also explain our intuitions in this example, because Kyburg’s theory always 
requires that we consider relevant background knowledge. 
 
 In this way, Evidential Probability can formalise the asymmetry between the bismuth 
induction and the wax induction. The former is akin to the crystalline compound example that 
Kyburg discusses, whereas the latter is an irrational inference, because our background 
knowledge contains the statistical information that not all wax melts at 91 degrees. This 
formal analysis requires the articulation of our relevant background knowledge, but Kyburg’s 
system can express this information. 
 
 This response to Norton is not a bare appeal to background knowledge: my point is 
not just that we have asymmetric background knowledge between wax and bismuth. 
Evidential Probabilism also enables one to distinguish between (a) background knowledge 
that affects the evidential relations and (b) background knowledge that does not affect the 
evidential relations. Specifically, in order to alter the probability of the hypothesis given the 
total evidence, a piece of background knowledge Kx must exclude the probability without Kx 
via the rules of Sharpening, as described in Chapter 1 Subsection 5.3. Thus, my answer goes 
beyond merely saying that there is background knowledge that creates an asymmetry: an 
Evidential Probabilist analysis can identify and justify the significance of some particular 
piece of background knowledge. This analytic potential is an advantage over theories that do 
not provide for the detailed articulation and analysis of the import background knowledge. 
 
 However, there are theories (such as Bayesianism) which do allow for background 
knowledge to feature in the analysis of inductive reasoning. This raises the question as to 
357 Confirmation, Decision, and Evidential Probability 
 
 
whether Evidential Probabilism has any special advantages over such theories. There are two 
unusual (though not unique) features of Evidential Probability that are especially useful in 
this context. Firstly, as explained in Chapter 1 Subsection 5.3, evidential probabilities are 
unique, in the sense that relative to the same evidence and the same background knowledge, 
evidential probabilist scientists will agree on the probability of a hypothesis. Not all forms of 
Bayesianism have this uniqueness for all of their probabilities. This feature makes the theory 
attractive for those who think that scientific confirmation is independent of extra-evidential 
opinion: while Evidential Probability does not remove all scope for reasonable disagreement, 
it does narrow this scope. In a particular sense of ‘objectivity’, it allows for analyses of 
demonstrative induction (and induction more generally) that are more objective than 
alternatives. 
 
 Secondly, as I also discussed in Chapter 1 Subsection 5.3, Evidential Probabilists 
have an answer to the Problem of the Reference Class. When background knowledge enters 
into the formal modelling of inductive reasoning, it is crucial that this problem is answered: 
for instance, in the bismuth case, we must determine whether the relevant reference class data 
for the probability that a sample of bismuth is representative is (a) our data about elements, 
(b) our data about chemicals, (c) our data about laboratory samples, (d) our data about 
samples of bismuth, or (e) some other reference class. The Evidential Probabilist answer 
might be incorrect (it is doubtful that it is the last word on the Problem of the Reference 
Class) but it is still a systematic answer that fits many of intuitions about reference class 
selection. Such an answer is not easily available: Alan Hájek argues that the Problem of the 
Reference Class is a severe problem for many probability theories, though he does not 
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discuss Kyburg’s theory in particular336. I do not claim that either this answer, nor the 
objectivity feature, are unique features of Evidential Probability. Nonetheless, they are not 
features that every formalist theory can satisfactorily provide: for instance, Subjective 
Bayesians have no pretensions to such a strong sense of objectivity in their analyses, and if 
Hájek is correct, then a good answer to the Problem of the Reference Class is a rare treasure. 
 
 Norton argues that probabilistic readings of the direct inferences in the bismuth case 
are “contrived”, because there are only approximately 100 known chemical elements337. 
(Currently, there are 118 discovered chemical elements.) However, he does not explain why 
the small size of the population in a direct inference is problematic for a probabilistic 
interpretation of the inference. For example, it seems uncontrived to offer a probabilistic 
reading of an argument that: 
 
A7 
 
(1) 99 out of 100 tickets in the lottery are red. 
 
Therefore, probably, (C) A randomly drawn ticket in the lottery will be red. 
 
 Indeed, probabilistic reasoning is often illustrated using normal decks of cards and 
such a deck contains only 52 cards. A probabilistic analysis of card-game reasoning does not 
seem “contrived” at all. It is possible that Norton means that it would be contrived to have a 
probabilistic analysis that used precise probabilities to analyse ‘most’. He is correct that 
                                                          
336 Hájek (2007). 
 
337 Norton (2013) p. 674. 
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interpreting a particular use of ‘most’ as a precise value like 75% or 90% would be yet 
another case of the “spurious precision” of Bayesian theories of induction that both he and 
Kyburg consider objectionable. However, an imprecise probabilist analysis of terms like 
‘most’, as I have used above, does not seem contrived: ‘most’ and ‘more than half’ seem 
roughly synonymous. Furthermore, if ‘most’ is being used in a stronger way in a particular 
context (like ‘more than 75%’) then this can also be formalised using imprecise probabilities. 
The Evidential Probabilist has the tools to help clarify puzzles like Mill’s Muddle. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Epistemic probabilities offer one way of developing a theory of the balance of 
evidence in science. In this chapter, I have argued that Evidential Probability can answer 
Norton’s criticism of such theories in the context of inductive reasoning. It can also analyse 
cases of demonstrative induction, which Norton regards as an important criterion of adequacy 
for theories of inductive reasoning. One important consequence of my arguments is that a 
probabilist can avoid some of the contemporary criticisms of probabilistic theories of 
induction by adopting Kyburg’s system. In particular, Bayesians who are troubled by the 
criticisms that I have considered might be attracted to Kyburg’s alternative (but still closely 
related) probabilistic theory of induction. 
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CONCLUSION AND FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 I have applied Evidential Probability to several important problems involving the 
concepts of confirmation and decision. As I argued in Chapters 1, 2, and 3, Kyburg’s theory 
offers the tools for a fresh look at some classic problems. In Chapter 4, I argued that a 
formalist can use his Evidential Probabilist model of scientific knowledge to answer 
Goodman’s otherwise fearsome New Riddle of Induction. Evidential Probability also avoids 
some of the most prominent objections to probabilistic theories of confirmation and decision, 
as was seen in Chapter 5. It seems to be a particularly powerful system for the analysis of 
neglected aspects of evidence and rational choice. 
 
 Clearly, I think that Kyburg’s theory offers much of value. However, there are 
differences between my own views and those of Kyburg. For example, the decision theory 
that I develop in Chapter 3 is relatively close to MEU theory. Furthermore, while we agree on 
most of the issues I have discussed in this thesis, we have disagreements about some other 
parts of the philosophy of science. For instance, I do not endorse Kyburg’s conventionalist 
views on theory choice and the nature of scientific laws. My thesis offers grounds to think 
that Kyburg’s theory of probability is useful, but I do not intend to encourage a complete 
acceptance of Kyburg’s philosophy of science. 
 
 Although I have given reasons to be interested in the formalisation of the quantity of 
evidence, I have not provided or endorsed a full quantitative formalisation of this concept. 
Perhaps no satisfactory general formalisation is possible, but it is a natural area for further 
investigation. An auspicious approach might be to combine my qualitative account in Chapter 
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1 with a suitable information theory. Such an inquiry would require a detailed discussion of 
information theory, which I have not attempted in this thesis. 
 
 Evidential Probability and Bayesianism are rivals. Criticism is one way that rival 
philosophical theories can confront each other. Suppose that there is a topic C, for which 
there are rival theories A and B. Adherents to A can develop problems for B; adherents to B 
can return the favour by developing problems for A and seek to answer the challenges from 
adherents to A; this cycle can be repeated indefinitely, or at least until both A and B fall out 
of fashion. Such a dialectic can produce a great quantity of brilliant philosophical work: both 
the problems and solutions can be stunningly ingenious. However, there is a danger that such 
a dialectic can lead to a neglect of the original topic, C. 
 
 Rather than focus on criticising Bayesianism, it seems more promising for Evidential 
Probabilists to seek to develop new answers to topics of common interest. Like Bayesians, I 
am interested in developing better formal theories of confirmation and rational decision. Like 
Bayesians, I think that probability is a crucial concept for understanding evidential relevance 
and inductive reasoning. Like the early Carnap (a founding father of Bayesianism) and 
perhaps some modern Bayesians, I think that a purely formal theory of confirmation is an 
interesting and attainable goal. My thesis is a part of all these enterprises. It seems that 
Evidential Probabilists can be the best sort of rivals to Bayesianism by making positive 
contributions to the pursuit of common goals. I hope that this thesis is such a contribution. 
 
 There are a vast number of promising unexplored areas in confirmation theory and 
decision theory where an Evidential Probabilist can make useful investigations. For example, 
I have not stressed the fact that Evidential Probability is a member of the family of logical 
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interpretations of probability. It is also very different from the other members of this family. 
Perhaps these differences offer the means by which a logicist can address some of the 
criticisms of this interpretation. 
 
 Similarly, the application of Evidential Probability to decision theory is almost 
entirely unexplored. (The principal exception is Chapter 8 of Kyburg’s Science and Reason.) 
For instance, I argued in Chapter 3 that an increase in the quantity of relevant evidence can 
reduce the degree of uncertainty of our decisions. It would be interesting to investigate the 
significance of this formalism for the longstanding debate on the value of evidence. 
 
 Finally, my strategy to answering the New Riddle of Induction suggests that the 
reliability of evidence can be useful for addressing at least some types of general 
underdetermination problem. The reliability of evidence offers a dimension of evidential 
support that can supplement the balance of evidence. Its significance for other 
underdetermination problems is largely unexplored and a rich area for profitable inquiry. 
 
 The sophisticated formal study of scientific reasoning is a young area, but it has 
already had a tremendous impact on the philosophy of science. Above all else, my thesis 
indicates that there are still many unexplored areas and that Evidential Probability has much 
to offer this endeavour. 
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